CourtListener 10336567•People v. Gamez CA2/6
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Filed 2/20/25 P. v. Gamez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333917
(Super. Ct. No. CR39965)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JUAN JOSE GAMEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Juan Jose Gamez appeals the trial court’s Penal Code
section 1172.75 resentencing order.1 We conclude that the court
may consider factors in aggravation and mitigation to support a
middle-term sentence, and affirm. (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 189, 204 [imposition of the middle term at
resentencing does not require aggravating circumstances be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Bautista-Castanon
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 929 [same].)
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
stated otherwise.
This appeal concerns resentencing of Gamez’s conviction of
spousal rape and assault with a semiautomatic firearm, among
other crimes and findings, due to a now-invalid prior prison term
enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) At resentencing, the trial
court struck the one-year prison term enhancement and imposed
a middle-term sentence rather than a requested lower-term
sentence for the assault with a firearm conviction. Gamez
appeals and challenges the sentence as a violation of his Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial. He asserts that
the middle-term sentence rests upon aggravating factors to which
he neither stipulated nor were found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a trier of fact.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
L.L. and Gamez were married with two children but had
separated. Following his release from prison for a drug
conviction, Gamez entered L.L.’s bedroom as she slept.
Thereafter, he raped L.L., repeatedly threatened to kill her,
grabbed her by her neck, forced his firearm inside her mouth, and
held her captive for nearly eight hours. Gamez’s four-year-old
daughter was inside L.L.’s bedroom and awake at times during
the ordeal.
A jury convicted Gamez of spousal rape, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, false imprisonment, and criminal threats.
(Former § 262, subd. (a)(1); §§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4), 245, subd. (b),
236, 422.) The jury also found that Gamez personally used a
2 At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested the
trial court to take judicial notice of the court file, including the
transcript of the preliminary examination. Gamez did not object
and referred to the transcript during argument. This factual
summary is from the transcript.
2
firearm during commission of the crimes and served a prior
prison term. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b).) Prior to
trial, Gamez pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine,
then a felony. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).)
On August 4, 1997, the trial court sentenced Gamez to an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life for spousal rape with a
firearm-use allegation. The court also imposed a consecutive
determinate term of 10 years eight months for the remaining
counts, including nine years (upper term) for the assault with a
firearm conviction and one year for the prior prison term
enhancement. Sentence on the remaining counts and allegations
was either stayed or ordered to be served concurrently.
Resentencing Notice and Petition
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation notified the trial court that Gamez may be eligible
for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Gamez later filed a
petition for resentencing and a supplemental brief, in part
seeking full resentencing and a lower-term sentence for the
assault with a firearm conviction. He based his argument upon
his youth at the time of the crimes and his childhood trauma of
physical and sexual abuse.
November 29, 2023, Resentencing
Following a hearing, the trial court struck the prior prison
term enhancement and reduced the methamphetamine
possession conviction to a misdemeanor. The court declined to
strike the firearm-use enhancements which had been stayed at
the initial sentencing. The court also refused to sentence Gamez
to a lower-term sentence for the assault with a firearm
conviction, but it reduced the sentence to the middle-term of six
3
years. As a result, Gamez’s total determinate term was six years
eight months, which the court deemed served.
In sentencing Gamez, the trial court described the
aggravating factors as “extensive,” including a child’s presence
during the crimes, the fact that Gamez was then a parolee, and
that Gamez had previously admitted committing acts of domestic
violence against L.L.
DISCUSSION
Gamez argues that he was entitled to a lower-term
sentence for his assault with a semiautomatic firearm conviction,
in part due to his youth and childhood trauma. He points out
that the trial court stated that he was one day short of his 26th
birthday at the time of the crimes. (§ 1016.7, subd. (b) [“youth”
includes any person under 26 years of age on the date the offense
was committed].)3
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that any prison
term enhancement imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b), except that imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense, is legally invalid.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) requires the trial court to recall
an applicable sentence and resentence the defendant.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) mandates the trial court
to impose “a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed . . .
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” At
resentencing, the court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
3 Gamez’s birthdate as stated in Board of Parole Hearing
documents, however, indicates that he was nearly 28 years old at
the time of the crimes.
4
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2).) The court may also consider post-conviction
factors, including the defendant’s disciplinary record, his
rehabilitation, and his age and physical condition affecting any
risk for future violence, among other factors. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
“Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court
may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless
there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides the opportunity
for a lower-term sentence where a defendant has experienced
childhood trauma and the trauma was a contributing factor to
the offense, unless the court finds imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice. Section 1170,
subdivision (c) also requires the court to state on the record the
reasons for its sentencing choice at the time of sentencing.
California Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d) permits a sentencing
judge to choose between the middle and lower terms of
imprisonment by considering circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation. This is true “whether or not the factors have been
stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial.” (Ibid.)
Relevant circumstances may rest upon the probation officer’s
report and evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing among
other things.
5
We agree with People v. Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
189, 204, and People v. Bautista-Castanon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
922, 929, that imposition of a middle-term sentence does not
require aggravating factors to be admitted or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Unlike section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and
(b)(2) – which expressly require stipulation or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the facts relied upon to impose an upper-term
sentence – subdivision (b)(6) states no such requirement.
(Hilburn, at p. 204; Bautista-Castanon, at p. 929.) Subdivision
(b)(6) does not implicate the Sixth Amendment jury trial
guarantee because it creates a potential reduced term, not an
increased term, based upon findings of eligibility and the
interests of justice. (Hilburn, at p. 204.) Circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation need only rest upon a sufficient factual
basis for this purpose. (Id. at p. 205.)
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the middle term. After a sufficient factual basis to
support aggravating or mitigating factors is found, the court has
broad discretion in its sentencing determination. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by statute as
stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757.) We review
the sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) The
court abuses its discretion if it relies upon circumstances that are
not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an
improper basis for decision. (Ibid.)
Here the trial court carefully considered the relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and appropriately
determined that Gamez’s criminal history and the circumstances
of the crimes warranted a middle-term sentence. The court’s
resentencing decision was not an abuse of discretion. (People v.
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Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(B) does not require imposition of the lower
term in every case in which the defendant was under age 26 at
the time he committed the crime].) The court properly weighed
the factors and determined that the aggravating factors
predominated despite evidence of Gamez’s progress in
rehabilitation.
DISPOSITION
The resentencing order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
7
Paul W. Feldman, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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