In re D.R. CA2/6

CourtListener 10335665Calctapp19 feb 2025

Testo completo

Filed 2/19/25 In re D.R. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.R., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B331491
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. FJ57528)
(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D.R. appeals following a juvenile court order committing
her to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline
term of seven years, with a maximum term of 15 years to life.
The order was based on a finding appellant had committed
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).
Appellant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient as to
the murder true finding; (2) the court abused its discretion in
ordering the seven-year SYTF term; and (3) the predisposition
custody credits should have been applied against the baseline
and not the maximum exposure term.
We will affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant used to be friends with the victim Kenya and her
sister Kate. In May 2021, Kate and Kenya went to a lake with
appellant and her family. Appellant’s boyfriend Jesse was also
present.
Subsequently, Kate and Kenya visited appellant at her
mother’s house. Some other people came to the house. Jesse was
“banging on them” and “throwing up . . . his hood” using hand
gestures. Appellant grabbed Jesse, “and they locked themselves
in their room.” Kate and Kenya went home.
On May 26, 2021, Kate communicated with appellant via
Instagram. Appellant’s username was once “2ghett0.g” but was
changed to “2gone.og_” at some point. During the May 26th
conversation, Kate told appellant her man was “a chump.”
Eventually, Jesse sent a message from appellant’s account
stating in part: “I aint no chump . . . goes to show u the only
chump u to turnt down so sit tf down u don’t even know your own
gang history fuck peants and they dead homies they dead family
all that shit . . . LOS GANG.” After a further exchange of
insulting messages, Kate suggested they meet at a park.
As Kate and Kenya headed to the park, neither was
carrying a weapon. When Kate reached San Pedro and 51st
Street, she saw appellant and Jesse in appellant’s mother’s van.
Appellant was driving, and Jesse was a passenger. Kate saw
Jesse “throwing up” hand gestures. Kate acknowledged Jesse by
saying, “‘What’s up.’” Appellant and Jesse went up 51st Street,
and Kate lost sight of them.

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Kate and Kenya entered the park. Kate was afraid because
appellant and Jesse had remained in the car. Kate “felt like . . .
something was going to go wrong.” The prosecution played a
video that showed appellant and Jesse driving by and shooting at
Kate and Kenya. Kate testified Jesse’s arm was extended out
with a gun pointed at her and Kenya. Kate believed about five
shots were fired, maybe more. Appellant never stopped the car.
Kenya was shot. She was transported to the hospital and
ultimately died.
Appellant’s sister Kayla testified at the hearing. According
to Kayla, appellant said she and Jesse went to the park because
Kate had challenged her to a fight. Kayla also testified she told
officers that appellant had said she did not think her boyfriend
was going to do what he did. Kayla agreed she told Detective
Miguel Barajas that appellant said she was not going to turn in
the direction of Kate and Kenya until Jesse asked her, “You’re my
ride-or-die. Right?” Appellant made the turn.
Detectives Barajas and Ortiz had conducted a recorded
interview of Kayla. Detective Barajas testified appellant told
Kayla that they shot Kenya in the leg, and it was nothing bad. It
was news to appellant that Kenya had died from the gunshot.
Appellant was madly in love with Jesse. The prosecutor asked
Detective Barajas if Kayla ever told him that appellant had said
she did not know Jesse was going to do what he did. Detective
Barajas did not recall that statement being made.
The juvenile court sustained as pled the petition alleging
appellant had committed Kenya’s murder. As to disposition, the
court indicated it had considered the probation report as well as
appellant’s counsel’s subsequent filing, which included many
mitigating circumstances. Appellant’s counsel requested camp
placement in lieu of SYTF commitment. While counsel

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acknowledged that the probation report recommended SYTF
commitment, counsel noted that report was over one year old.
The court stated it had “read and considered the five
factors indicated in the report and listened to the argument of
counsel regarding that.” The court described the less restrictive
alternative of camp as a “holding tank . . . .” The court indicated
that given appellant’s development and accomplishments, “she
would best be served by SYTF through the matrix of services,
[its] kind of tentacles that are out in the community . . . .” The
court believed “SYTF is the best resolution for [appellant].”
The court ordered appellant committed to the SYTF for a
baseline term of seven years, with a maximum term of 15 years
to life. The minute order states appellant’s predisposition credits
are to be applied to the maximum term of confinement.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient as to the
murder true finding. We disagree.
“Our task is clear. ‘On appeal we review the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “Where
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a
reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 358.) “[A]ppellant has a heavy burden in demonstrating
that the evidence does not support the juvenile court findings.”
(In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1136.)

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Here, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
appellant aided and abetted the implied malice murder of Kenya.
“‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus
of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.
[Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus
required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life
endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus
includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the
life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice
murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct,
aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of
that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by
the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990-991 (Reyes).) “Mental
state and intent are rarely susceptible of direct proof and must
therefore be proven circumstantially.” (People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 355.)
The record contains substantial evidence to support each
required element. As to the actus reus, appellant’s driving of the
car aided Jesse’s life-endangering act of firing multiple bullets at
Kate and Kenya. Regarding the mens rea, the key question is
whether the record discloses substantial evidence appellant knew
Jesse intended to shoot at Kate and Kenya. We conclude it does.
On the day of the murder, Jesse used appellant’s Instagram
account to feud with Kate. Their heated exchange referenced
gangs. As appellant drove Jesse by Kate and Kenya the first
time, he threw hand gestures—just as he did on the prior
occasion wherein appellant grabbed Jesse and locked him away.

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Appellant’s behavior during that prior incident suggests an
awareness that Jesse was prone to escalation in such situations.
Between appellant’s first and second pass by Kate and
Kenya, Jesse escalated from throwing signs to shooting bullets.
Appellant’s initial intent not to turn in the direction of Kate and
Kenya evinces knowledge of Jesse’s own intent. Jesse himself
signaled his intent to shoot when he asked appellant, “You’re my-
ride-or-die. Right?” With the situation clarified, a lovestruck
appellant made the turn. Appellant was Jesse’s ride, and Kenya
died. After the shooting, appellant even admitted to her sister
that they had shot Kenya. Substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s true finding.
Appellant notes that mere presence does not amount to
aiding and abetting. (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23,
57-58.) However, her conduct far exceeded mere presence.
Appellant drove Jesse to the murder victim not once, but twice.
As the juvenile court observed, the second pass converted her
conduct “from driving to hunting.”
Abuse of Discretion
Appellant asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering appellant to a seven-year SYTF term. Appellant has
failed to demonstrate abuse of discretion.
A juvenile court may order SYTF commitment if certain
criteria are met. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)1 Of
significance here, the court must make “a finding on the record
that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is
unsuitable.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

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In making this unsuitability determination, “the court shall
consider all relevant and material evidence, including the
recommendations of counsel [and] the probation department
. . . .” The court shall additionally make its determination based
on the following five criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or
offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated,
including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and
harm done to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent
history, including the adequacy and success of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether
the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided
in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the
treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the
goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by
assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition
that is available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age,
developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities
or special needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing
the ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment
facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E); see also § 725.5.)
“[T]he juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion in
the disposition of juvenile matters . . . . ” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 393, 411.) “We review the court’s placement decision for
an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We review the court’s findings
for substantial evidence, and ‘“[a] trial court abuses its discretion
when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in
the evidence.”’” (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1154 (Nicole H.).) “‘“‘In determining whether there was
substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must
examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light

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of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law,’”’” which include
promoting public safety and the juvenile offender’s rehabilitation.
(In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5; see also § 202, subd.
(b) [“Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a
consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the
interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment,
and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that
holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is
appropriate for their circumstances”].)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. In
accordance with section 875, the court indicated it considered the
probation report, as well as the argument and mitigation
evidence appellant’s counsel provided. The court further
indicated it considered the five factors enumerated in section 875,
subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E). The first of those factors—the severity
of the offense—strongly supported SYTF commitment. (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) Appellant aided and abetted murder, among the
gravest of crimes. Appellant’s conduct seriously jeopardized
Kate’s life as well.
The juvenile court did not limit its focus to the offense’s
severity. Counsel stated the court knew “this is [appellant’s] first
arrest,” and the court acknowledged there had been “no previous
attempt at rehabilitation under the system.” (See § 875, subd.
(a)(3)(B).) The court’s ruling referenced factors like age,
developmental maturity, and mental health under section 875,
subdivision (a)(3)(E). The court determined SYTF would afford
appellant a variety of services. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(C).) The
probation report, which listed available services, substantiates
this determination. The court also rejected camp as a holding
tank evidently lacking the same degree of services. (§ 875, subd.
(a)(3)(D).) Moreover, the court was not required to attempt a less

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restrictive placement like camp before ordering SYTF. (Cf. Nicole
H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) Although appellant had
shown progress after exhibiting some behavioral issues in
juvenile hall, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that SYTF, with its matrix of services, was the appropriate
resolution.
Predisposition Credits
Appellant contends her predisposition credits should have
been applied against the baseline SYTF term and not the
maximum exposure term. We conclude the credits are properly
applied to the maximum term of confinement.
Appellant’s claim raises, in the first instance, a question of
statutory interpretation. “Where there is an issue of statutory
interpretation, courts will review such questions de novo . . . .”
(Fair Education Santa Barbara v. Santa Barbara Unified School
District (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 884, 895.)
Section 875, subdivision (c) addresses the maximum term
of confinement, which “represent[s] the longest term of
confinement in a facility that the ward may serve . . . .” (§ 875,
subd. (c)(1).) Subdivision (c)(1)(C) provides: “Precommitment
credits for time served must be applied against the maximum
term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(1)(C); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.804(c) [“The
court must apply the youth’s precommitment credits to the
maximum term”].) The statute unambiguously requires
application of credits to the maximum term of confinement.
Because “the statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we presume
the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the
statute governs.’” (People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232)
Citing In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31, appellant
asserts an equal protection violation based on alleged disparate

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treatment of youths under the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)
and SYTF schemes. Appellant concludes her “credits should be
applied to the baseline term of seven years . . . .” Our First
District colleagues have rejected the argument that “equal
protection principles require application of precommitment
credits against the baseline term.” (See In re M.B. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 435, 445.) For the reasons explained in that cogent
opinion, we likewise reject appellant’s equal protection argument.
(See id. at p. 467 [“Section 875, subdivision (c) thus directs that,
for SYTF placements, precommitment credits are to be applied in
the same way Ernesto L. held they should be applied in the DJJ
setting . . . . [T]here is no disparate treatment that could give
rise to an equal protection problem.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Benjamin R. Campos, Commissioner
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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