CourtListener 10335663•In re M.M. CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 2/19/25 In re M.M. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re M.M. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D084922
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J520901A-B)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
K.M. (Mother)1 appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights to M.M., and J.M. (together, the children). (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.26.)2 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that reversal is
necessary to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA). We reject Mother’s sole contention and affirm the juvenile court’s
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 5, 2021, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (the Agency) filed a petition alleging that M.M. met the
requirements of section 300, subdivision (b). The Agency filed the petition
after Mother and M.M. tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine,
and a marijuana metabolite following M.M.’s birth. Prior to M.M.’s birth, the
Agency received a referral―the seventh concerning Mother’s children―
related to Mother’s drug use or abuse, but attempts to contact Mother were
unsuccessful. Both Mother and Father had extensive criminal records
related to illicit substances. Consistent with that history, Mother has a
history of abusing methamphetamines and admitted to marijuana usage
during her pregnancy. She offered that she may have tested positive for
methamphetamine as a result of consuming over the counter cold medicine or
the medication she received during her c-section. Hospital staff refuted the
explanation that the medication they provided would cause her to test
positive for methamphetamine.
1 T.M. (Father) is not a party to this appeal. C.R. is also listed as an
alleged father for J.M.; he is similarly not a party to this appeal.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Initially, the Agency did not have evidence sufficient to demonstrate
immediate risk to J.M. and the family created a safety plan to protect him
while he remained in the parents’ care. However, within a week of filing the
petition regarding M.M., Father also tested positive for methamphetamines.
Accordingly, the Agency filed a protective custody warrant and a second
petition alleging that J.M. also met the requirements of section 300,
subdivision (b).
The court ordered the children detained in separate detention hearings.
Following a contested combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
court sustained the petitions, found jurisdiction and declared the children
dependents. Mother did not visit with the children consistently and
frequently lost contact with them and the Agency. Mother did not engage in
services and made no progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes
necessitating placement. Accordingly, the court terminated reunification
services on September 21, 2022. Mother did not see the children for
approximately two years; in March and April 2024, she participated in a few
virtual visits while she was incarcerated. After continuing the section 366.26
hearing for approximately 20 months, the court terminated parental rights
and ordered the permanent plan of adoption.
In her first contact with the Agency following M.M.’s positive drug test,
Mother denied having any Native American heritage. Father similarly
denied any relevant heritage and the court found that ICWA did not apply.
Mother again confirmed to a social worker that she did not have any known
Native American heritage in January 2023. During that conversation,
Mother told the social worker that she would provide contact information for
biological relatives. Later, Mother provided the Agency with contact
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information for a maternal great aunt, De., and maternal aunt, Al.3 Both De.
and Al. denied Native American ancestry, as did a maternal uncle.
DISCUSSION
Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns that Native American
children were being separated from their tribes through adoption or foster
care and placed with non-Native American families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 1, 7.) California subsequently enacted its own statutes specifying the
procedures the Agency and juvenile courts are required to follow before
making placement decisions in determining whether a child is a Native
American child. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).) Under
these statutes, the juvenile court and the Agency have an “Affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” during dependency proceedings whether a child
“is or may be [a Native American] child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
“This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty
to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA
notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) In the first phase, the
Agency’s initial duty requires it to, at a minimum, inquire from the party
reporting child abuse or neglect whether they have information that suggests
the child may be a Native American child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) In the second
phase, “if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is [a
Native American] child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible [Native American] status of the child and shall make
that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052,
italics omitted.) In the third stage, if further inquiry results in a reason to
3 Mother also provided contact information for a distant relative, A.W.,
but his relationship to the children is unknown and the Agency was unable to
contact him.
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know a child is a Native American Child, the notice requirements of section
224.3 apply. (Ibid.)
“On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for
substantial evidence.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) Where the
facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s
requirements have been satisfied. (Ibid.) The failure to engage in a
sufficient inquiry requires conditional reversal. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1125.)
The Agency’s duty of inquiry extends to “asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, [Native American] custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child and [any] party reporting child abuse or
neglect . . . . ” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Thus, the Agency is not obligated to
conduct an ICWA inquiry of all family members―only those who qualify as
“ ‘extended family member[s]’ ” as defined under ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) Extended family members are “defined by the
law or custom of the [Native American] child’s tribe or, in the absence of such
law or custom, shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is
the [Native American] child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c).) Additionally, the Agency “is not required to
‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.”
(D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.)
Mother contends that the Agency did not sufficiently inquire of the
maternal great-grandmother or a maternal cousin, Do. First, the record does
not indicate Mother ever provided the Agency with contact information, or
even a name, for the maternal great-grandmother. As best we can discern,
Mother first brought “cousins” Do. and A.W. to the attention of the court and
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the Agency in March 2024. Mother provided a phone number for A.W.,
although the Agency was unable to contact him because it was out of service.
With respect to Do., the purported maternal cousin, Mother argues that “the
Agency is required to ask mother for the contact information, and simply
made no effort.” This argument fails to account for the six court orders
directing Mother to provide the Agency with information about the children’s
relatives. It similarly fails to account for her assertion that she would
provide Do.’s contact information to the Agency.
We observe that Mother has never asserted Do. is a first or second
cousin. Sections 224.1 and 224.2 together impose a duty upon the Agency to
inquire of first and second cousins. Instead, Mother implicitly concedes Do. is
not a qualifying relative and relies on section 224.2, subdivision (b), which
requires the Agency to inquire of “others who have an interest in the child.”
Thus, we look to whether the maternal great-grandmother and Do. might
qualify as “others” with an interest in the children.
“Grandparents are included in the statutory definition of ‘ “extended
family member,” ’ but great-grandparents are not.” (In re Dominick D. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 560, 564, fn. 2.) Mother seeks to align her family members
with the interested parties in Dominick D. but her case is easily
distinguished. The great-grandfather considered in Dominick D. was the
child’s primary caregiver for two months, not a distant relative for the
relevant agency to track down. (Ibid.) In fact, the social worker responsible
for managing Dominick’s case interviewed the great-grandfather and failed to
make ICWA inquiries. (Id. at p. 565.) Thus, in order to fall into the category
of “others who have an interest in the child,” it is not enough to simply be
related―a person must be involved in the child’s life. The sole reference to
the maternal great-grandmother in the record before us indicates she offered
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Mother support following a domestic violence incident approximately three
months after the children were removed from her custody. Similarly, we find
nothing in the record to indicate Do. has ever been involved in the children’s
lives, only that she may be related to Mother in some way. We must
therefore conclude that neither of these attenuated relations qualify as
“others who have an interest in the child[ren].”
On this record, we conclude the inquiry below met the requirements of
ICWA.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
RUBIN, J.
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