CourtListener 10334742•People v. Watts CA3
Testo completo
Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Watts CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099754
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE010594)
v.
DEONDRE ANTHONY WATTS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Deondre Anthony Watts guilty of two counts of being a
felon in possession of a firearm after police discovered firearms during a search of his
car. On appeal, Watts contends that the trial court erred in denying his suppression
motion because the search violated his constitutional rights. He also effectively argues
that the abstract of judgment incorrectly lists his restitution fine. We will direct the trial
court to amend the abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the restitution fine imposed
and will otherwise affirm the judgment.
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BACKGROUND
A jury found Watts guilty of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm
(Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))1 based on evidence that officers discovered a
semiautomatic firearm and a revolver during a traffic stop. Before trial, Watts moved to
suppress this evidence under section 1538.5. In his motion, Watts argued that the search
of his car was illegal because it was conducted without a warrant. Watts explained that
“[u]nder the pretext of an inventory search, the officers illegally searched [him] for the
purpose of gathering evidence to use against [him] in a criminal case.” He also noted that
“[t]he decision to impound [his] vehicle must be justified by a community caretaking
function ‘other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity’ because inventory
searches are conducted in the absence of probable cause.”
At the suppression hearing, Officer Reynaldo Garcia-Barron testified that on
June 26, 2022, he observed a silver sedan driving 90 to 95 miles per hour in an area
where the speed limit was 65 miles per hour. Officer Garcia-Barron activated his lights
and siren and the sedan pulled over. The sedan remained partially in the driving lane
when it stopped and thus was obstructing other vehicles on the roadway. Officer Garcia-
Barron identified Watts as the sedan’s driver. After the officer smelled alcohol and
observed Watts’s red and watery eyes, he directed him out of the car and patted him
down for weapons. Watts answered some of Officer Garcia-Barron’s questions but was
unwilling to submit to field sobriety tests. Officer Garcia-Barron arrested Watts under
suspicion of driving under the influence. Officer Garcia-Barron could not recall how
long the stop lasted.
Officer Garcia-Barron testified that he proceeded to have Watts’s car towed
because it was blocking the roadway and he did not want to leave the car to be
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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vandalized, as it “wasn’t a safe area.” Before the car was towed, Officer Jonathan
Velasquez conducted an inventory search, during which a firearm was discovered. On
cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Garcia-Barron the following questions:
“[Defense counsel:] Is there a specific [California Highway Patrol] policy
regarding inventory searches?
“[Officer Garcia-Barron:] In regards to what?
“[Defense counsel:] How to conduct it.
“[Officer Garcia-Barron:] Yes, you fill out a CHP-180.
“[Defense counsel:] Okay. And did you fill that out in this case?
“[Officer Garcia-Barron:] I did not.
“[Defense counsel:] Did Officer Velasquez?
“[Officer Garcia-Barron:] I don’t know which officer did but I—Officer
Velasquez started it, yes.”
Officer Velasquez testified that it was necessary to conduct an inventory search
here “[t]o notate all the belongings—the valuable belongings. So that when the vehicle
goes to the tow yard, it’s all notated.” He estimated that he conducts anywhere between
one and 10 inventory searches a night. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the
following questions:
“[Defense counsel:] Is that a specific [California Highway Patrol] policy on
inventory searches?
“[Officer Velasquez:] [There] is a policy on inventory, yes, I would assume.
“[Defense counsel:] Can you tell me about it?
“[Officer Velasquez:] In regards that’s a very expansive policy I mean . . .
“[Defense counsel:] I’ll narrow it down a bit. Are you supposed to inventory
search every vehicle that you encounter?
“[Officer Velasquez:] Yes, absolutely.
“[Defense counsel:] And that is part of the official department policy?
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“[Officer Velasquez:] Yes.”
Defense counsel argued at the hearing that “it’s evident that this was a[] pretense
search [as] the officers had everything they needed in terms of probable cause to arrest
Mr. Watts for DUI. They immediately searched him for weapons and then under the
color of—of an inventory search they searched his vehicle right there on the street for
evidence of a crime. [¶] And it’s apparent from their testimony that they were absolutely
searching for evidence of a crime. And that was their true motivation for the search.
They could have impounded the vehicle and completed the inventory search at the tow
yard. [¶] Further they’re—this was a prolonged detention for the purpose of searching
for evidence of a crime. The officer refused to give or claimed that he couldn’t recall the
length of the detention. [¶] So we should assume that he prolonged the detention for the
purpose of conducting this illegal search under the guise and pretext that it was, in fact,
an inventory search, when it’s very clear that it was a search for evidence of a
crime . . . .”
The court denied Watts’s motion to suppress the evidence, explaining: “I found
Officer Garcia and Officer Velasquez to be credible in their testimony. It sounds like the
investigation is a typical DUI investigation. In this particular case Officer Garcia was
clear that the totality of the circumstances led him to place Mr. Watts under arrest for
suspicion of driving under the influence. . . . [¶] . . . And then the car was ultimately
towed and an inventory search was done. [¶] So I am not—from the testimony I heard, I
didn’t see any clear evidence of a pretext stop or a pretext search or anything like that.”
The trial court sentenced Watts to the middle term of two years for one possession
conviction and one-third of the middle term, eight months, for the other possession
conviction. The court imposed “all mandatory minimum fines and fees.” The abstract of
judgment lists Watts’s restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), as $600.
Watts timely appealed in October 2023. After delays in preparation of the record and
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multiple requests by both parties to extend the briefing schedule, this case became fully
briefed on December 19, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress
Watts argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the
evidence established that the police conducted an investigatory search, not an inventory
search. More specifically, Watts contends that: (1) the officers’ testimony was
insufficient to establish that an inventory search was conducted pursuant to standard
policies and protocols; (2) the People failed to meet their burden of proving the actual
existence of a standard policy on inventory searches; (3) there was no evidence that a
standard inventory form was completed; and (4) Officer Velasquez’s testimony indicates
he incorrectly believed he was entitled to conduct an inventory search on any vehicle.
“ ‘The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ ” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 182, italics omitted.)
Absent a search warrant, “a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception
to the warrant requirement.” (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 382.) One such
exception is for inventory searches of police-impounded cars. (Blakes v. Superior Court
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904, 913.) The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that police
officers have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents of vehicles they
legally impound “to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to
insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from
danger.” (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 372.) “To determine whether a
warrantless search is properly characterized as an inventory search, ‘we focus on the
purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory.’ ” (People v. Lee
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867.) “ ‘[A]n inventory search conducted pursuant to an
unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable.’ ” (People v. Torres (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786.) “The decision to impound the vehicle must be justified by a
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community caretaking function ‘other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’ ”
(Id. at p. 787.)
A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that “[t]he search or
seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “[W]hen
defendants move to suppress evidence, they must set forth the factual and legal bases for
the motion, but they satisfy that obligation, at least in the first instance, by making a
prima facie showing that the police acted without a warrant. The prosecution then has the
burden of proving some justification for the warrantless search or seizure, after which,
defendants can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that justification. [Citation.]
Defendants who do not give the prosecution sufficient notice of these inadequacies
cannot raise the issue on appeal.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136.) “The
prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was
reasonable under the circumstances. [Citations.] But, if defendants detect a critical gap
in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to
admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.” (Id. at p. 130.) “The
degree of specificity that is appropriate will depend on the legal issue the defendant is
raising and the surrounding circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 130-131.) “Defendants cannot,
however, lay a trap for the prosecution by remaining completely silent until the appeal
about issues the prosecution may have overlooked.” (Id. at p. 131.)
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s
factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
The People argue that Watts has forfeited his current arguments by failing to raise
them below. Watts offers no response in his reply brief to the People’s forfeiture
argument. We agree with the People. In his written motion in the trial court, Watts
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moved to suppress the evidence because it was obtained in a warrantless search. Watts
explained that the inventory search was a pretext and that the decision to impound his
vehicle had to be justified by a community caretaking function. At the suppression
hearing, the People adduced evidence that the impound of Watts’s vehicle was supported
by a community caretaking function—specifically, to remove his car from the roadway
and to protect the car from vandalism. Watts continued to assert that the search was
investigatory, emphasizing that: (1) officers patted him down for weapons; (2) in his
view, officers prolonged his detention to search for evidence of a crime; and (3) officers
conducted the search before impounding the car, rather than after. At no point did Watts
argue that the People failed to prove the search was conducted pursuant to a standardized
policy or that such a policy even existed. Nor did he claim that the absence of a
completed inventory form or Officer Velasquez’s understanding of an inventory search
suggested that the search was investigatory.
Had these points been raised, the People would have had the opportunity to rebut
them. For instance, Watts now argues that this was not an inventory search because
officers never completed an inventory form (CHP 180) of the car’s contents. However,
the record does not affirmatively establish this. Officer Garcia-Barron testified that he
did not personally fill out the form but stated that Officer Velasquez “started it.” Officer
Velasquez was subsequently never asked whether he filled out the form. Based on this,
Watts now contends that “[t]here was no inventory list put into evidence, nor was there
any indication that officers ever filled one out,” asserting that the officers’ testimony was
“ambiguous” on this point.
If Watts had argued below that the lack of a completed inventory form suggested
that the search was for the purpose of obtaining evidence, any deficiencies in the record
on this point could have been remedied. For these reasons, Watts cannot now raise these
arguments on appeal.
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Restitution Fine
The parties agree, as do we, that the $600 restitution fine listed on the abstract of
judgment is incorrect. It is the oral pronouncement of judgment that governs (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185), and here the trial court orally imposed the
minimum mandatory restitution fine, which is $300. (See § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1) [“If the
person is convicted of a felony, the fine shall not be less than three hundred dollars
($300)”].) Accordingly, we direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to
reflect a restitution fine of $300 and a parole revocation fine in the same amount. (See
§ 1202.45, subd. (a) [“the court shall, at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution
fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment reflecting Watts’s restitution fine as $300 under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), and the parole revocation fine as $300 under section 1202.45,
subdivision (a). The court shall then forward the amended abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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