People v. Hernandez CA2/6

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Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331829
(Super. Ct. No. 2021014197)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

ANGELITA HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Angelita Hernandez appeals following a bench trial at
which the court found her guilty of receiving stolen property over
$950 (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)1 Appellant admitted special
allegations of a prior strike (§ 667, subd. (c)(1), (e)(1)), a prior
serious or violent felony requiring prison (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3)),
and ineligibility for probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). The court
sentenced appellant to two years, eight months in prison.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant contends her jury trial waiver was not voluntary,
knowing, or intelligent. We will reverse because we conclude
appellant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The jury waiver colloquy in this case transpired as follows:
“The Court: Matter has been sent here for jury trial. Had
a brief discussion with counsel in chambers. I think it appears
that your client is willing to waive jury; is that correct?
“[Appellant’s Counsel]: That’s correct, your Honor.
“The Court: [Appellant], you have a right to have a jury
trial by 12 people from the community, the right to cross-examine
and confront witnesses, the right not to testify, and the right to
present your own evidence. Do you understand those rights?
“[Appellant]: Yes, sir.
“The Court: Willing to give up those rights?
“[Appellant]: Yes, sir.
“The Court: Do you have questions?
“[Appellant]: Not at this time. Thank you.
“The Court: We will show jury trial has now been waived.
“[Appellant’s Counsel]: Counsel joins in the waiver.
“The Court: Counsel joins in the waiver.”
The court then proceeded to motions in limine.
DISCUSSION
We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances,
appellant’s jury trial waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).)
The federal and state constitutions afford defendants the
right to a jury trial. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 16.) However, a “jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant
and the defendant’s counsel.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)

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A jury waiver must be “‘knowing and intelligent, that is,
“‘“made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it,”’”’” and “‘voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of a
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.”’”’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.) “We
uphold the . . . jury waiver ‘“if the record affirmatively shows that
it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the
circumstances.”’” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991
(conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.); accord, id. at p. 1018 (conc. and
dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.); People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297,
310.)
The law does not “mandat[e] any specific method for
determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. We
instead examine the totality of the circumstances.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167; see also People v. Morelos (2022) 13
Cal.5th 722, 753 (Morelos).) Included among those circumstances
is the waiver colloquy. (Sivongxxay, at pp. 167-170.) While our
Supreme Court has “eschewed any rigid formula or particular
form of words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver,”
the Court has offered guidance. (Id. at p. 169.) The Court has
recommended advisement “of the basic mechanics of a jury trial
. . . including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a
jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant
through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3)
all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict;
and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge
alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Ibid.)
The Court also recommended trial courts “take additional
steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant

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comprehends what the jury trial right entails.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Those steps might include asking: (1)
whether “the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss
the decision with his or her attorney”; (2) whether “counsel
explained to the defendant the fundamental differences between
a jury trial and a bench trial”; and (3) whether the defendant
“understands or has any questions about the right being waived.”
(Id. at pp. 169-170.)
Here, the totality of the circumstances does not “establish a
sound and ‘affirmative[]’ basis . . . to conclude” appellant
knowingly and intelligently waived her right to a jury trial.
(Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 759.) The court’s only
appropriate advisal was that appellant had “a right to have a jury
trial by 12 people from the community . . . .” Contrary to
Sivongxxay’s guidance, the court did not otherwise explicate the
basic mechanics of a jury trial.
The court did not even explain that, in lieu of a jury, it
would decide guilt. (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 1019
(conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.) [“essence of the jury trial right”
includes fact that waiver entails “the court alone would
determine the issue[] of guilt . . .”].)
Instead, the court continued by advising appellant of other
rights—the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, the
right not to testify, and the right to present evidence—and asked
if appellant was willing to give up those rights as well. Even
though waiver of jury trial did not entail waiver of those other
rights, appellant stated she was willing to give them up too. This
confused exchange betrays a fundamental misunderstanding as
to the nature of the jury trial right. In this context, appellant’s
lack of questions is of limited relevance.

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Moreover, the court made no inquiry with appellant, on the
record, as to the adequacy or content of any discussion with
counsel. (See People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 435
(Jones.) Although we recognize no precise advisement or inquiry
is necessary, the “barebones colloquy,” combined with the
confused exchange over other distinct rights, convinces us that
appellant’s jury trial waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
(People v. Blancett (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206 (Blancett).)
Respondent cites appellant’s criminal history as evidence
“she was familiar with the mechanics of a criminal prosecution.”
As respondent dutifully acknowledges, however, “the record does
not affirmatively show what previous advisements appellant may
have received . . . .” We will not, on such a record, “presume that
[appellant] was legally sophisticated.” (Blancett, supra, 15
Cal.App.5th at p. 1206.)
“The denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury
trial constitutes structural error that requires reversal regardless
of the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” (Jones,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 429.) Therefore, we must reverse.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. BALTODANO, J.

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Paul W. Baelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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