Sonnet v. Westside Residence Hall CA2/8

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Filed 2/14/25 Sonnet v. Westside Residence Hall CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

RAY SONNET, B328230

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV26610)
v.

WESTSIDE RESIDENCE HALL,
INC., et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald F. Frank, Judge. Affirmed.

Greenslade Cronk, Michael Greenslade and Nicole C.
Moskowitz for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Horvitz & Levy, Eric S. Boorstin, Andrew G. Spore;
Berman, Berman, Berman, Schneider & Lowary, Mark Lowary
and Rochelle M. McKenzie for Defendants and Respondents.

_______________________
Claiming he was injured by a malfunctioning elevator at
Westside Residence Hall, Ray Sonnet sued property owner
Westside Residence Hall, Inc. and property manager Cantwell
Anderson Inc. (together, Westside). The trial court granted
summary judgment in Westside’s favor, and Sonnet appeals. On
appeal, Sonnet contends the trial court erred when it granted
summary judgment because (1) Westside failed to carry its initial
burden as the moving party; (2) if the burden did shift to him, he
raised triable issues of fact regarding Westside’s knowledge of a
dangerous condition; and (3) the court should have granted the
continuance he requested on the day of the summary judgment
hearing. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2020, Sonnet filed a complaint alleging, inter alia,
negligence and premises liability against Westside. Sonnet
alleged that on January 14, 2020, he was injured when the
elevator he was in at Westside Residence Hall came crashing
down multiple floors until it ultimately landed quickly and
violently, slamming at the ground floor level. During discovery,
Sonnet described the elevator as falling a few feet.
In 2022, Westside moved for summary judgment, arguing
Sonnet did not have, and could not obtain, evidence establishing
any defect or dangerous condition in the elevator that would have
caused it to fall at the time of the incident, and the elevator free
fall Sonnet alleged was mechanically impossible. Westside
contended the undisputed evidence demonstrated it did not have
actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition or defect
in the elevator, and even if the elevator was defective, the defect
was trivial.

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In opposition, Sonnet argued Westside had a duty under
Civil Code section 1714 to exercise reasonable care. Sonnet
argued Westside had not acted reasonably because it knew a
malfunction of overspeed protections would cause serious injury,
yet it failed for more than a decade to mitigate the risk by
modernizing the elevators and bringing them up to code. Sonnet
argued Westside negligently failed to bring the elevators up to
state and federal standards through modernization, though it
knew emergency rescues and repairs were increasingly frequent.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground
there was no triable issue of material fact as to the issue of
notice. Specifically, the trial court ruled, “Defendant has negated
an essential element of plaintiff’s case. That element is that
defendant knew, or through the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, of a condition with the elevator that created
an unreasonable risk of the elevator jolting either suddenly
upward or suddenly downward as Plaintiff testified to having
occurred here. . . . ‘[T]he owner’s actual or constructive notice of
the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.’
Defendant is not held to the strict liability standard of a
manufacturer of an allegedly defective product; rather, premises
liability and negligence cases require plaintiff to prove the
defendants’ negligence in the ownership, care, or maintenance of
its property. Here, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact
could find that the moving defendants had any prior notice that
the elevator might jolt or abruptly move up or down, or that the
moving defendants created such a condition. While Defendant
did have notice of other conditions of the pertinent elevator car
and doors, the Court finds the evidence of an elevator becoming
stuck between floors or having its doors fail to open is not prior

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notice or knowledge of the claimed failure that caused Plaintiff’s
injuries here.
“Defendant has made the requisite affirmative showing
that it made reasonable inspections of the premises including an
inspection through its outside elevator maintenance company
just days before the plaintiff’s incident, and that said inspections
did not reveal or discover an unsafe condition or defect with the
elevator or its components. Plaintiff’s opposition papers do not
create a triable issue of fact as to actual or constructive notice of
whatever condition it is that may have caused the elevator to jolt
suddenly on the day of the incident. A generalized notice of the
fact that the elevator system was old, or would benefit from
upgrading, or was subject to non-injurious operational problems,
is not sufficient. Plaintiff has not identified a claimed condition
or cause of the jolting on the day of the incident even as of this
point in the litigation, which is a further indication that the
moving defendant did not have notice actual or constructive of
that condition or cause.”
Sonnet appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Continuance
Sonnet unsuccessfully sought a continuance of the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment during the hearing on the
motion. We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of
discretion (Braganza v. Albertson’s LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
144, 152) and find no abuse of discretion here.
Sonnet argues the trial court’s failure to grant a
continuance was reversible error, but he does not argue he met
the statutory requirements for seeking a continuation of a

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hearing on a summary judgment motion1 or that good cause
supported his request for a continuance. Instead, he claims the
court abused its discretion because of a comment it made after it
granted Westside’s motion for summary judgment. Referring to a
motion for summary judgment filed by a different litigant, the
court said, “We still have another motion pending in this case for
a bit of time in the future.· I think the hearing on that motion is
on December—February 28.· I have not read any briefs that have
been filed since I continued the hearing on that motion.· So I’ll be
looking forward to seeing what briefing and evidence I have
concerning that motion that’s still currently pending.· I'm not
ruling on it today. [¶] Thank you, all, very much.· I look forward
to seeing you folks in a few weeks’ time at that hearing, and to
read the papers that are filed in connection with that.” According
to Sonnet, the trial court’s statement implicitly indicates that
although it had just granted summary judgment in Westside’s
favor, “it had not resolved [Westside’s] liability,” and therefore its

1 Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h)
provides, “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment . . . that facts
essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons
stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be
had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to
continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be
made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the
opposition response to the motion is due.” “Although a trial court
may excuse failure to comply with the requirement of a
declaration in support of a motion for continuance [citations], the
court is not required to do so.” (Mahoney v. Southland Mental
Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d
167, 172.)

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ruling denying a continuance exceeded the bounds of reason
because it “accomplish[ed] the opposite of the trial court’s
intention” to further consider Westside’s potential liability.
A fundamental rule of appellate review is that the
judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct,
and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Sonnet
asks us to do the opposite: to conclude that despite having just
granted Westside’s motion for summary judgment with respect to
Sonnet’s complaint, the court nonetheless harbored an unstated
conflicting intention to further consider Westside’s liability
simply because it made a parting reference to a hearing date and
motion filed by another party. This we may not do. Moreover,
even were we to make such a leap, Sonnet does not establish how
the court’s purported post-ruling intention to further consider
Westside’s liability demonstrates any error in its decision to
refuse a continuance.
II. Summary Judgment Ruling
We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment
to determine whether triable issues of material fact exist.
(Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1138, 1142.) “We therefore ‘take the facts from the record that
was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion.
[Citation.] “ ‘We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.’ ” [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ”
(Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.) However,

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“although we use a de novo standard of review here, we do not
transform into a trial court. As a Court of Appeal, even in
exercising our independent judgment, we do not find it sufficient
for an appellant merely to claim the respondent should not have
been successful [in the trial court] and then the burden shifts to
the respondent . . . . Instead, the appellant must frame the issues
for us, show us where the superior court erred, and provide us
with the proper citations to the record and case law.” (Morgan v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913
(Morgan).)
A. Westside’s Initial Burden of Production
Sonnet argues Westside’s motion for summary judgment
failed to meet its initial burden of production as a matter of law
for two reasons. First, Sonnet claims Westside had a
nondelegable duty to maintain the elevators and that its showing
was insufficient because it failed to assert facts that would
exclude as a cause of the elevator’s malfunction negligent repairs
by the elevator service company it hired to maintain, service, and
repair the elevators.
But Sonnet did not oppose the summary judgment motion
on this ground in the trial court. Instead, he argued Westside
owed him a duty of care under the general duty principles of Civil
Code section 1714 but failed to act reasonably toward him in view
of the probability he would be injured. Sonnet argued his injury
was foreseeable: Westside had received elevator modernization
proposals that included the replacement of one safety mechanism
and the installation of another; it was aware of the serious injury
a malfunction of overspeed protections would cause; and despite
the elevator service company’s and others’ advice to modernize
the elevators, it had not done so. Sonnet contended Westside was

7
negligent because it failed to bring the elevators up to state and
federal standards and it knew that emergency rescues and
repairs were happening more often.
None of these grounds for opposing the summary judgment
motion concerned vicarious liability for the elevator service
company’s purportedly negligent repairs or the inadequacy of the
motion for summary judgment because it failed to assert facts
excluding negligence by the elevator service company as a cause
of the elevator’s malfunction. Nor did Sonnet oppose summary
judgment on these grounds at oral argument on the motion. We
therefore decline to consider this argument because it was not
raised in the trial court. (Howard v. Accor Management US, Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 130, 134 [appellant “forfeited any
argument about the hotel’s constructive knowledge or notice due
to unreasonable inspections because she never presented this
issue to the trial court, either in her opposition brief or during
oral argument”]; Magallanes de Valle v. Doctors Medical Center of
Modesto (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 914, 924 [appellant’s new theories
of liability rejected on appeal because they were not raised in the
trial court].)
Second, Sonnet contends the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies and that Westside did not shift the summary judgment
burden to Sonnet because it did not produce evidence of the
elevator’s malfunction that would eliminate its own negligence as
a cause. Although he did not argue res ipsa loquitur in the trial
court, Sonnet claims he may raise its applicability for the first
time on appeal because it is purely a legal question based on
undisputed facts. Res ipsa loquitur, however, is not a pure
question of law. It is an evidentiary presumption triggered by
evidence of certain conditions. “In California, the doctrine of res

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ipsa loquitur is defined by statute as ‘a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence.’ (Evid. Code, § 646, subd. (b).) The
presumption arises when the evidence satisfies three conditions:
‘ “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ ”
(Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 825–
826 (Brown).) In the trial court, Sonnet did not present evidence
and argue in opposition to the summary judgment motion that
the three conditions for res ipsa loquitur were satisfied, and he
therefore has forfeited this claim.2 (Expansion Pointe Properties
Limited Partnership v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch,
LLP (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 42, 54–55 [“ ‘in reviewing a summary
judgment, the appellate court must consider only those facts
before the trial court, disregarding any new allegations on
appeal. [Citation.] Thus, possible theories that were not fully
developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot create a
“triable issue” on appeal’ ”].)

2 In his reply brief, Sonnet claims he relies exclusively on
three facts in Westside’s separate statement of material facts to
establish the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. However, these
facts—Westside contracted with the service company for elevator
maintenance and repair; the service company regularly and
systematically maintained and repaired the elevator both before
and after the incident; and the elevator company had inspected
and serviced the elevator shortly before the incident, ensuring its
functionality at that time —do not establish all three conditions
precedent for res ipsa loquitur. (See Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
pp. 825–826.)

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Even if the argument were not forfeited, Sonnet has not
shown error. When a defendant moves for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff cannot prove the defendant
breached a duty of care that proximately caused harm, the
plaintiff can defeat the summary judgment motion by showing
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies. (Elcome v. Chin (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [when moving defendants met their
burden of producing evidence they did not breach the standard of
care or cause plaintiff’s injuries, burden shifted to plaintiff to
raise a triable issue of material fact either by producing direct
evidence of each defendant’s negligence and causation or by
producing evidence of the three elements of res ipsa loquitur]; see
Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 825–826.) Sonnet, however, places
the burden on Westside, asserting Westside was required to
prove res ipsa loquitur did not apply in order to meet its initial
burden of production on summary judgment. Sonnet provides no
argument or authority to support his contention that a defendant
moving for summary judgment on a negligence claim must
disprove the doctrine’s applicability before the burden of
production shifts to the plaintiff, and we are aware of no
authority supporting the use of the doctrine in this manner.
Sonnet has not demonstrated error.
B. Triable Issues of Material Fact
“[T]he owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega
v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) Sonnet argues
summary judgment was erroneously granted because he raised
triable issues of material fact regarding Westside’s notice of a
dangerous condition.

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1. Notice of Similar Incidents
Sonnet asserts Westside knew of prior similar incidents
with the elevator and was therefore on notice of its dangerous
condition. The trial court found that although Sonnet had
demonstrated the elevator required frequent repairs, he had not
submitted evidence showing that any of the elevator
malfunctions involved an elevator falling, jolting, or abruptly
moving up or down. For this reason, the trial court concluded
Sonnet had provided “no evidence from which a trier of fact could
find that the moving defendants had any prior notice that the
elevator might jolt or abruptly move up or down, or that the
moving defendants created such a condition. While Defendant
did have notice of other conditions of the pertinent elevator car
and doors, the Court finds the evidence of an elevator becoming
stuck between floors or having its doors fail to open is not prior
notice or knowledge of the claimed failure that caused Plaintiff’s
injuries here.”
On appeal, rather than providing argument demonstrating
error in the trial court’s ruling and the existence of a triable
issue, Sonnet merely repeats the elevator repair history as set
forth in his separate statement of undisputed material facts, then
refers to a statement made by the trial court in a tentative ruling
on the motion for summary judgment (a ruling the court
ultimately did not adopt). This is insufficient to show error.
(Morgan, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 [appellant must frame
the issues and show error; it is not “sufficient for an appellant
merely to claim the respondent should not have been
successful . . . and then the burden shifts to the respondent”].)

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Even if we overlook the lack of a developed argument here,
Sonnet’s showing is insufficient to show error. Although he
acknowledges that in order to show notice of a dangerous
condition based on a prior, similar incident, the “similar accident
must have occurred under substantially the same circumstances”
(Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 403, 432), Sonnet failed to provide evidence of a
similar accident occurring under substantially the same
circumstances as those alleged here. The elevator history Sonnet
describes in his separate statement and his opening brief is:
(1) the elevators at Westside Residence Hall were notorious for
breaking down and frequently requiring emergency rescue and
repair; (2) in the nine months prior to the Sonnet incident, the
elevator in question required 13 unscheduled, non-routine
maintenance visits; and (3) in the four months prior to the Sonnet
incident, the elevator service provider received four emergency
calls regarding passengers trapped in the elevator. Sonnet does
not identify any service calls made for an abrupt jolt or fall, make
any showing of a prior falling/jolting incident, or establish any
similarity between prior elevator incidents and the events he
alleged in this action.
Sonnet then states, “Moreover, as the lower court’s initial
tentative ruling on [Westside’s] motion for summary judgment
recognized, the deposition testimony of [an elevator technician]
indicated that the elevator’s pickup rollers, which fell out of
adjustment in the past, may have caused a jolt of the elevator,
resulting in Plaintiff’s fall and injury. [Citation.] The court’s
ultimate ruling does not explain why it ultimately departed from
this initial conclusion.” Sonnet cites only to the court’s tentative
ruling, not to any evidence in the record. A tentative ruling is not

12
evidence to be considered in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (b)(2) [“The opposition,
where appropriate, shall consist of affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters
of which judicial notice shall or may be taken”].) Sonnet has not
established error.
2. Prior Unsuccessful Repairs
In a conclusory three-sentence paragraph that does not
include any developed argument or citations to the record, Sonnet
asserts he was “entitled to draw an inference” that Westside had
knowledge of the dangerous condition based on the elevator
service company’s “failed repairs.” “ ‘On review of a summary
judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing error, even if
he did not bear the burden in the trial court. [Citation.] . . . “[D]e
novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit
of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite
triable issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the
appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and,
therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are
present by citation to the record and any supporting authority.
In other words, review is limited to issues which have been
adequately raised and briefed.” ’ ” (Bains v. Moores (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455.) Sonnet’s cursory presentation is
insufficient to present an issue for review.
3. Unreasonable Failure to Discover the
Dangerous Condition
Sonnet argues Westside had constructive notice of the
dangerous condition of the elevator because “the problems with
the subject elevators existed for long enough that the failure to

13
discover them was not reasonable.” Sonnet claims a reasonable
owner would have known of the need to upgrade the elevator’s
safety features for more than a decade for two reasons. First, the
elevator service company had submitted proposals to modernize
the elevators at the Westside Residence Hall four times in the 10
years before Sonnet’s injury. Sonnet, however, does not
demonstrate by argument, evidence, or authority that the
modernization proposals concerned, addressed, or responded to
any dangerous condition in the elevators that would have caused
them to fall suddenly or jolt their passengers. That the elevator
system was old and would benefit from modernization is not
sufficient to establish notice that the elevator could suddenly jolt
or plunge.
Second, Sonnet argues Westside had notice of a dangerous
condition because the “[t]he Americans with Disabilities Act and
California Building Code prescribed handrails in passenger
elevators, which would have needed to be installed if the elevator
had been modernized, as recommended by [the elevator service
company], and which could have permitted Appellant to avoid
crashing on the ground.” Sonnet’s complaint neither mentions
handrails nor alleges a failure to comply with either law. Sonnet
alleged in his complaint that the elevator’s “component original
or replacement parts malfunctioned,” not that he was injured by
a purported failure to install handrails or a violation of any code.
The pleadings frame the issues to be decided on summary
judgment. (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co.
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 444.) In a motion for summary
judgment, the defendant need only address the issues raised in
the complaint (Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98–99, fn. 4), and a plaintiff cannot

14
create a triable issue by presenting argument or evidence
concerning issues not raised by the pleadings. (Residential
Capital v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 807, 829; Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342 [“ ‘ “The [papers]
filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment
may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a
substitute for an amendment to the pleadings” ’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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