People v. McClain CA2/1

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Testo completo

Filed 2/14/25 P. v. McClain CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B335966

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA141644)
v.

PATRICK McCLAIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In 2017, defendant Patrick McClain pleaded no contest to
two counts of attempted murder and admitted he personally used
a firearm in the commission of one of the attempted murders. In
2023, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6, a statute which authorizes relief for, among
others, persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court denied his
petition without appointing counsel for him and ordering
briefing. He contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree the trial court prejudicially erred. Based on the record of
conviction before us, it is reasonably probable that if McClain had
been afforded assistance of counsel, the trial court would not
have summarily denied his petition without an evidentiary
hearing. We reverse the order denying the petition and remand
the matter for further proceedings under section 1172.6.

BACKGROUND
A. Charges and No Contest Plea
An information, dated January 24, 2017, charged McClain
and a codefendant with two counts of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder alleged to have occurred on the
same date. The information also alleged, in pertinent part, that
both defendants (and a principal) personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury to the two
victims. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).) As to McClain, the
information included prior conviction allegations, including the
allegation that he had a prior robbery conviction that qualified as

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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a prior strike conviction under the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667,
subd. (d) & 1170.12, subd. (b).)
On July 27, 2017, McClain waived his constitutional rights,
withdrew his not guilty plea, and pleaded no contest to both
counts of attempted murder. The prosecution dismissed the
allegations that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. As to count 1, McClain admitted he
personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) He also
admitted the prior strike conviction. The parties stipulated to,
and the court found, a factual basis for the plea.2 Under the
terms of the plea negotiation, the trial court sentenced McClain
to 28 years in state prison: the upper term of nine years for the
attempted murder in count 1, doubled to 18 years for the prior
strike conviction, plus 10 years for the personal use firearm
enhancement. The court imposed a concurrent term of nine years
for the attempted murder in count 2.

B. Petition for Resentencing
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f), p. 6674; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) &
189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188

2 Other than his admission that he personally used a

firearm in the commission of one of the two attempted murders,
McClain did not stipulate to any specific facts about the crimes.

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(defining malice) and 189 (felony murder) and added section
1170.95, now renumbered section 1172.6,3 which established a
procedure for vacating murder convictions and resentencing
defendants who could no longer be convicted of murder in light of
the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4, pp. 6675–6677.)4 On October 5, 2021, the Governor signed
into law Senate Bill No. 775 which amended then-section 1170.95
to, among other things, authorize relief for persons convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2.) The amendment became effective January 1, 2022.
On September 7, 2023, McClain, as a self-represented
litigant, filed a petition for resentencing using a pre-printed form.
He checked boxes on the form indicating (1) an information was
filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder;
and (3) he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019. He also checked the box requesting
appointment of counsel.

3 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered

section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
4 Senate Bill No. 1437 added the following provision to

section 188: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

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On November 6, 2023, without holding a prima facie
hearing, the trial court summarily denied McClain’s petition for
resentencing. The court’s minute order states the following
reasons for the denial: “Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to an
agreed-upon disposition. Specifically, the petitioner settled his
case by pleading ‘no contest’ to two counts of attempted murder.
Moreover, petitioner admitted that he ‘personally discharged a
firearm’ pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53(b).[5] There
was a stipulation to the facts supporting his plea and admissions.
The prosecution was not pursuing a theory of liability based upon
aiding and abetting or natural and probable consequences. All of
the evidence supports the conclusion that petitioner was the
actual shooter and the direct perpetrator of the attempted
murders.”6

DISCUSSION
McClain contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree the trial court prejudicially erred in denying McClain’s
petition for resentencing without appointing counsel for him.

A. Section 1172.6 and Other Applicable Law
As stated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a person
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable

5 As part of his plea deal, McClain admitted he personally

used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). He did not admit he personally discharged a
firearm.
6 It is not clear what “evidence” the trial court was

referencing in its minute order. We note that the record before us
does not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing.

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consequences doctrine may file a petition to have the attempted
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts “when all of the following conditions apply: [¶]
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶]
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.”
When a defendant files and serves a facially sufficient
petition under section 1172.6, subdivision (b), by completely
filling out the pre-printed form petition and checking all required
boxes, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner, allow briefing from both sides, and hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)-(c).) As our Supreme
Court explained: “While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6]
relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.
Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the

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petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971
(Lewis).)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing, unless the parties stipulate that the petitioner is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)-(d)(2).) At the evidentiary
hearing, the prosecution has the burden of “prov[ing], beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
When a trial court errs in declining to appoint counsel for a
defendant in connection with a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing, we review for harmless error under the standard
set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which requires
a defendant to “ ‘demonstrate there is a reasonable probability
that in the absence of the error he . . . would have obtained a
more favorable result.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.)
“More specifically, a [defendant] ‘whose petition is denied before
an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing “it is
reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been afforded

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assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have been
summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

B. Analysis
There is no dispute that McClain filed a facially sufficient
petition under section 1172.6, subdivision (b).7 Thus, the trial
court erred in denying the petition on the merits without
appointing counsel to represent McClain, allowing briefing from
both sides, and holding a hearing to determine whether McClain
made a prima facie showing for relief. (See § 1172.6, subds. (b)-
(c).) The Attorney General concedes the error.
The Attorney General also concedes and we agree that the
error was prejudicial. There is nothing in the record of conviction
before us conclusively refuting the allegations in McClain’s
petition that he was convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could
not now be convicted of that crime because of changes to section
188, effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The record
of conviction does not establish that McClain discharged a
firearm, let alone that he did so with malice aforethought. Nor
does the record establish that McClain directly aided and abetted
an attempted murder with intent to kill (a still-valid theory of
attempted murder unaffected by the amendment to section 188).
(See People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [“Direct

7 The Attorney General notes the record does not show that

McClain served the petition on the district attorney as required
under section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1). The Attorney General
acknowledges, however, that the trial court accepted the petition
for filing and summarily denied it on the merits, so the purported
lack of service is not an issue here.

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aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder
after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775”].) Based on this
record of conviction, it is reasonably probable that if McClain had
been afforded assistance of counsel, the trial court would not
have summarily denied his petition without an evidentiary
hearing. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) Therefore, the
court’s error in declining to appoint counsel for McClain was
prejudicial, and we reverse the order denying the petition.
In his opening appellate brief, McClain urged us to remand
the matter and direct the trial court “to appoint counsel, issue an
order to show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).” In the respondent’s brief, the
Attorney General pointed out that the next steps after
appointment of counsel are those enumerated in section 1172.6,
subdivision (c)—briefing and a prima facie hearing. McClain did
not file a reply brief.
The intermediate steps between the appointment of counsel
and an evidentiary hearing are mandatory, not optional. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (c) [“Within 60 days after service of a petition that
meets the requirements set forth in subdivision (b), the
prosecutor shall file and serve a response. . . . After the parties
have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief”], italics added.) We remand the matter for
further proceedings under section 1172.6, beginning with the
appointment of counsel for McClain under subdivision (b), and
briefing and a prima facie hearing under subdivision (c). We
express no opinion at this juncture as to whether the trial court
should issue an order to show cause under subdivision (c) and
hold an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d).

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DISPOSITION
The November 6, 2023 order denying the petition for
resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings under section 1172.6, including the appointment of
counsel for McClain under subdivision (b), and briefing and a
prima facie hearing under subdivision (c).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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