T.B. v. Q.P. CA6

CourtListener 10333653Calctapp14 feb 2025

Testo completo

Filed 2/14/25 T.B. v. Q.P. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

T.B., H051846
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 20FL002130)

v.

Q.P.,

Defendant and Respondent.

This appeal concerns a father’s challenge to an adverse domestic violence
restraining order and an order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the parties’
young child to the mother.
Appellant T.B. (father) and respondent Q.P. (mother or Q.P.) have one son, D.B.
(child), who was nearly four years old at the time the order was entered below. In
July 2023, mother, pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA or the Act;
Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.),1 filed a request for domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO request) against father. She also sought a custody modification order awarding
her sole physical and legal custody of the child. Father opposed both requests. A
contested hearing took place on January 10, 2024, during which both parties testified.
As reflected in the settled statement, “[t]he [trial c]ourt found on the record that [mother]
was a credible witness who had proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence that

1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
[father] had committed domestic violence as defined in Family Code section 6203.”
The court therefore granted mother’s DVRO request, awarded mother temporary sole
legal and physical custody of the child, and ordered that father receive no visitation until
further court order. (This superseded a prior temporary order granting joint legal custody
to the parties and sole physical custody to mother.) A formal order was filed on
January 10, 2024.
On appeal, father argues that the trial court erred with respect to the granting of the
DVRO and the custody and visitation orders. Father contends, inter alia, that the court
erred in excluding certain evidence that he proffered at the hearing and that this
evidentiary ruling violated his constitutional right to due process. He argues further that
the trial court erred when it “unilaterally” (father contends) drafted and certified the
settled statement.
We conclude that there was no error and will affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Prior Proceedings
On November 17, 2022, the court issued an order after screening, awarding
temporary sole physical and legal custody of the child to mother. Father was granted
weekend care and visitation of the child to take place at the home of the paternal
grandparents.
In June 2023, father sought an emergency visitation order allowing him to take
temporary custody of the child for the purpose of taking him to a dentist for an
emergency procedure that would include general anesthesia. Father alleged in the request
that he had made multiple unsuccessful efforts to obtain mother’s cooperation to facilitate
the emergency dental procedure. He alleged further that “[t]he urgency of [his] request
[was] further compounded by the fact that Mother . . . had a pending criminal matter
against her for punching [father] in the face.” He alleged that mother had punched him
multiple times in the face on April 16, 2023, in the child’s presence. Father also

2
requested monetary sanctions of $5,000 under section 271. The court granted the
emergency order permitting him to have custody of the child “from 9:00 a.m. on June 20,
2023 to 8:00 p.m. on June 26, 2023 for the purpose of taking the minor child to his
emergency dentist procedure and recovery.”
On July 13, 2023, there was a hearing on father’s request for emergency order.
The court ordered that the parties would have joint legal custody. The court denied
father’s request for sanctions.
B. Mother’s DVRO Request
1. Mother’s Request
Mother, a self-represented litigant, filed a DVRO request on July 14, 2023.
Mother sought a restraining order against father for herself, her mother and sister, and the
child. The request consisted of a completed Judicial Council form request for DVRO
signed under penalty of perjury, and a completed Judicial Council form request for child
custody and visitation orders. The court granted mother’s request for temporary orders in
part, ordering that father not harass assault, threaten, or stalk mother, disturb her peace, or
exercise coercive control over her. The court denied temporary no contact, stay away,
visitation and custody orders pending the hearing, and denied any orders in favor of
Q.P.’s mother or sister.
Mother alleged that father had abused her on April 16, 2023, in the presence of
Q.P.’s mother. Father caused mother emotional harm by saying “ ‘[his] attorney will[]
sue [her and she will] go [to] jail.’ ” Mother alleged further that on that day, father
entered her house without permission, refused to drop off the child, and “just stood there.
. . .” In a two-page attachment to the DVRO request, mother alleged that she could not
get father to leave her home. She stated she started to slap father but did not follow
through on that action. Mother alleged that both she and father called the police. After
the police arrived and spoke to both parties, mother was handcuffed and arrested.

3
2. Father’s Response to Mother’s DVRO Request
Father, represented by counsel, filed a verified response to mother’s DVRO
request. Father stated that he believed mother’s request was “nothing but retaliatory.”
He stated that on April 16, 2023, he did not refuse to drop off the child, and he entered
the home with mother’s permission; it “was a regular drop-off day until [mother] actually
attacked [father].”
Father denied further that he had stalked mother on April 19, 2023, as she alleged.
After mother refused to make the child available for a Facetime visit, father asked the
police to conduct a welfare check to make sure the child was safe.
C. Hearing on Mother’s DVRO Request
The DVRO request by mother was originally noticed for hearing on August 1,
2023. Father’s request for continuance was granted. An evidentiary hearing took place
on January 10, 2024. Mother and father appeared without counsel and provided sworn
testimony. The hearing was not reported.2
Mother testified that the matters stated in her declaration were accurate to the best
of her knowledge. She testified that after father was granted joint legal custody of the
child, he immediately changed the child’s medical providers without mother’s knowledge
or consent. Shortly afterward, the child had a serious illness. After mother contacted
father, he suggested the child be taken to an emergency room near father in a different
county. Father picked up mother and the child and drove them to his home. Father then
told mother that he had made an appointment for the next morning at a clinic and she and
the child would have to spend the night. Mother reluctantly agreed, and because there
were no other sleeping choices, she slept on the floor in father’s bedroom at his parents’
home. During the night, father got on top of mother, forcibly removed her clothing, and

2
The summary of evidence that follows is derived from the settled statement
prepared by the trial judge and filed April 8, 2024.

4
had forcible sexual intercourse without her consent. Mother admitted on cross-
examination that she did not call the police to report the incident.
At another time, father made a medical appointment for the child that was in a
different county near his home, and he picked up mother and the child to take them to the
appointment.3 During the drive (with the child in the back seat), father fondled mother
over her clothing and then digitally penetrated her vagina “without her consent by means
of force, fear, and duress.” Mother admitted on cross-examination that she did not call
the police to report the incident.
On a third occasion, during a visitation exchange, father entered mother’s home
without her permission. On that (or another) occasion, mother was arrested by the police
and was charged with assaulting father; she testified that any acts by her were done in
self-defense.
Father testified that he had changed the medical providers for the child shortly
after obtaining joint custody, and that he had done so without advising mother or
obtaining her permission. He admitted that on one occasion, after picking mother up and
telling her they were going to the emergency room for the child’s illness, he instead drove
to his home and said he had made an appointment at a clinic for the next day. Father
admitted that he told mother that they would have to stay overnight. He testified that he
and mother had consensual sexual intercourse on the floor in his bedroom.
Father also testified that at another time, he had offered to take the child to a
medical clinic. He denied that during the drive he had fondled or digitally penetrated
mother.
Father testified that on one occasion, he entered her home during a custody
exchange because the child was having bathroom issues. He had filmed a portion of the
interaction with his cell phone and offered to play the video; the court declined.
3
Although not clearly expressed, we infer from the settled statement that the
medical appointment was for treatment of the child.

5
Finally, father testified that in another instance, mother struck him one time. The
police arrested her, and she was charged with assault.
The court—as recited in the settled statement—“found on the record that [mother]
was a credible witness who had proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence that
[father] had committed domestic violence.” The court therefore granted mother’s DVRO
request for a period of three years to January 10, 2027. Mother was the sole protected
party; insofar as the request that Q.P.’s mother, sister, and child be included as protected
parties, the court denied the DVRO request. The court made a finding under section
3044 regarding father as the restrained person, namely, that “there is a rebuttable
presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person
who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child.”
(Id., subd. (a).) It ordered that mother would have temporary sole physical and legal
custody of the child and that father would receive no visitation pending further court
order. The court also ordered that father attend and complete a 16-week parenting
without violence program.
The court signed formal orders granting the DVRO request and concerning
temporary custody and visitation, which were filed January 10, 2024.
Father filed a notice of appeal in which he challenged the minute order and formal
order granting mother’s DVRO request, both filed January 10, 2024. (See Rivera v.
Hillard (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 974 [“an order granting or denying a request for
DVRO” is appealable]; Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377-
1378 [postjudgment child custody order appealable].)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders
The DVPA is intended “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual
abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence
for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the

6
violence.” (§ 6220.) “Courts may issue a restraining order to achieve this purpose upon
‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ (§ 6300, subd. (a).) ‘The length of time
since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative. The court shall
consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a
petition for relief.’ (§ 6301, subd. (c).)” (J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 641.)
Further, “[n]o showing of the probability of future abuse is required to issue a DVPA
restraining order.” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 823.)
Abuse is defined under the DVPA as consisting of: “(1) To intentionally or
recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [¶] (2) Sexual assault. [¶] (3) To place
a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to
another. [¶] (4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a).) Under the DVPA, to constitute abuse, there need not
be “the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Id., subd. (b).)
Section 6320, subdivision (a) identifies various conduct that the court may enjoin;
many of the acts specified, such as harassment and disturbance of the peace of another,
do not involve the infliction of physical injury or assault upon the victim. As a panel of
this court has held, “[S]ection 6320 broadly provides that ‘disturbing the peace of the
other party’ constitutes abuse for purposes of the DVPA” (In re Marriage of Nadkarni
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497), and that “the plain meaning of th[is] phrase . . . may
be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other
party” (ibid.). Section 6320 contains a broad definition of “ ‘disturbing the peace of the
other party’ ” as “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the
mental or emotional calm of the other party. . . . This conduct includes, but is not limited
to, coercive control . . . .” (Id., subd. (c).)
The party seeking a restraining order under the DVPA bears the burden of
establishing the justification for the order. (See Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023)

7
96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593.) “The burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
[Citations.]” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11.)
We review a trial court order granting or denying a petition for a restraining order
under the DVPA for abuse of discretion. (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249,
1264 (S.M.).) To the extent that we must consider the trial court’s factual findings, they
are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.)
B. Custody and Visitation Orders
In a trial court’s consideration of custody and visitation issues, “the overarching
[statutory] concern is the best interest of the child. . . . When determining the best interest
of the child, relevant factors include the health, safety and welfare of the child, any
history of abuse by one parent against the child or the other parent, and the nature and
amount of contact with the parents. [Citation.]” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th
249, 255 (Montenegro).)
An appellate court reviews custody and visitation orders under “the deferential
abuse of discretion test. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25,
32.) Factual findings made by the trial court concerning custody and visitation orders are
reviewed for substantial evidence. (Jaime G. v. H.L. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 794, 805
(Jaime G.).) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused
its discretion. (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 16.) And an “order of a lower court
is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged
in favor of its correctness. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1130, 1133.)
C. Father’s Appellate Challenges
Father asserts five arguments in this appeal.
(1) The trial court’s refusal to consider evidence proffered by father (two
videos and two police reports) violated his right to due process under the

8
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under section
3022.
(2) There was no substantial evidence to support the issuance of the DVRO.
(3) The court erred in applying the presumption under section 3044 in making
the custody order because there was no “clear evidence of [appellant’s]
wrongdoing,” there was insufficient evidence to support the order, and it
did not comply with “the ‘Best Interests of the Child’ ” standard.
(4) The court erred in ordering father to attend and complete a 16-week
parenting without violence course.
(5) The court erred in its “unilateral drafting and certification of [its] own
settled statement” thereby “biasing the factual record” in violation of
appellant’s due process rights.
Father’s chief claims of error concern the exclusion of evidence and the trial
court’s action in preparing a settled statement. We will therefore first address these two
arguments.
D. Evidentiary Rulings
Father argues several times in his appellate briefs that the court erred by its
“refusal to consider” evidence father proposed, consisting of “video footage from a body-
worn camera and police reports.” Father does not provide specifics about this evidence
that he proffered and which was refused by the trial court. However, from papers he filed
here in support of a motion to augment the record, this court concludes that the claimed
evidence consists of: (a) video footage (37 seconds) recorded from mother’s home on
April 16, 2023 (identified as exhibit A); (b) video footage (58 seconds), undated,
apparently involving an interaction between police and father (identified as exhibit B);
(c) a San Jose Police Department document, undated, noting a report of the commission
of an offense on April 16, 2023 (identified as exhibit C); and (d) a San Jose Police

9
Department document, undated, noting the report of the commission of an offense on
December 7, 2023 (identified as exhibit D).4
Father asserts in his appellate briefs that this evidence was “critical.” He contends
that the exclusion of this evidence: (a) violated his right to due process because the court
did not give him a fair opportunity to present his case; and (b) was inconsistent with the
requirement under section 3022 that the family court must consider the best interests of
the child in making custody orders.5
A claim of wrongful exclusion of evidence is governed by Evidence Code
section 354, which provides: “A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of
evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it
appears of record that: [¶] (a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded
evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by
any other means; [¶] (b) The rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a)
futile; or [¶] (c) The evidence was sought by questions asked during cross-examination or
recross-examination.” As with all evidentiary rulings, appellate review of a trial court’s
order excluding evidence is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. (See

4
Father filed a motion to augment with this court, seeking to include evidence he
identified as exhibits A through D. He asserted that he presented these exhibits at the
hearing on January 10, 2024, and the court excluded this evidence. This court granted the
motion to augment.
5
Section 3022 provides: “The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding or
at any time thereafter, make an order for the custody of a child during minority that
seems necessary or proper.” (See Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004,
1020 [decisions “about the custody of children are to be made based on a determination
of the child’s best interests”]; see also In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1072, 1094.)

10
San Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo
Valley Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1414.)
Father’s contention that the court erred in excluding evidence fails for several
reasons.
First, the record does not show the foundational facts in support of father’s claim,
namely, that he offered the evidence at the hearing, and the court rejected it. (See
People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1304 [where record did not demonstrate
that “defendant’s trial counsel ever sought to introduce [witness’s] testimony or that the
trial court excluded it,” defendant’s claim of erroneous exclusion of evidence under Evid.
Code, § 354 failed].) Neither the minute order nor the formal order from the January 10,
2024 hearing confirms father’s claim that he offered exhibits and that they were excluded
by the court. The only reference in the appellate record to any of the four items of
purportedly excluded evidence is in the court’s settled statement, which refers to one of
the videos (exhibit A). It was recited in the settled statement that father testified that he
had entered mother’s home on one occasion at her request “because the child was having
bathroom issues. [Father] testified that he had filmed part of the interaction with his cell
phone and offered to play the video for the court. The court declined to view the cell
phone video.”
A party challenging a ruling by the trial court has the burden of showing reversible
error by an adequate record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 (Ballard).) An
appellant’s failure to do so results in a finding that he or she has defaulted and that the
trial court’s decision must be affirmed. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609
(Jameson).) Therefore, as to three of the items of evidence (identified by father as
exhibits B through D), no appellate challenge is cognizable because the threshold matters
necessary for such challenge—namely, that father offered the exhibits, and they were
excluded by the trial court—find no support in the appellate record.

11
As to the fourth item (exhibit A), father’s claim likewise fails because the
appellate record, while minimal, is inadequate. Under Evidence Code section 354,
“a judgment may not be reversed for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless ‘the
substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the
court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means.’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 580.) As explained by one appellate court,
“One aspect of [the] burden [of demonstrating error through an adequate record] requires
that the appellant develop the fullest possible evidentiary record before seeking review.
Thus, an appellant must make an offer of proof in the trial court in order to claim on
appeal that evidence was wrongly excluded. [Citation.] Similarly, if an appellant
wishes to argue a point on appeal, it must first make a record by raising the point in the
trial court. [Citations.]” (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433 (Tudor Ranches).)
Here, there is no record that father provided an offer of proof, argument, or made
any other showing to the trial court of the relevance and admissibility of the video
(exhibit A) which he claims on appeal was wrongfully excluded. Accordingly, father’s
failure to make a record precludes his claim on appeal. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
pp. 608-609; Tudor Ranches, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.)
Second, father’s arguments that the trial court erred in excluding evidence are not
supported by proper (or any) citations to the appellate record. In each appellate brief, the
party is required to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (California Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)6 As an appellate court, we will deem “to be forfeited” any
contention in father’s briefs that is not supported by a citation to the record. (See In re
S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 407; see also Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, Inc. (2005)

6
Hereafter, all rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

12
128 Cal.App.4th 443, 451 (Yeboah) [factual statements in briefs “not supported by
references to the record may be disregarded” by the reviewing court].) Further, in this
instance, father presents in his briefs facts and procedural matters that are outside of the
appellate record.7 This violates the rule that the appellant in his or her opening brief is
required to “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the
record.” (Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), italics added.) “Factual matters that are not part of the
appellate record will not be considered on appeal and such matters should not be referred
to in the briefs.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 102.)
Third, even were we to overlook father’s failure to procure an adequate record and
to include citations to the appellate record, his claim of error nonetheless fails. As noted
above, father argues that the purportedly excluded evidence (which he identifies as
exhibits A through D) was “critical” to his opposition to mother’s DVRO and custody
modification requests. These repeated arguments, however, are conclusory and
undeveloped. In his briefs, father does not describe the evidence in any detail to explain
why it was critical to his defense. Rather, his position is framed in generalities.
Moreover, father cites no legal authorities that support the contention that in this instance,
the purported exclusion of evidence constituted prejudicial error.
“Conclusory assertions of error are ineffective in raising issues on appeal.
[Citation.]” (Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498,
523.) As a panel of this court has explained: “We are not bound to develop appellants’
argument for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to
authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone

7
Father asserted in his opening brief (without support) that “[the trial judge]
refused to consider [father’s] videotape evidence and police reports, stating, ‘I don’t want
to see it.’ ” As a second example, father asserted that the court “had [him] removed from
the courthouse without warning, and without charging [him] with contempt.” We will
disregard these statements concerning matters not found in the record. (See Lona, supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.)

13
& Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) Therefore, father has forfeited his claim that
the trial court erred by purportedly excluding evidence generally described in his
appellate briefs as “video footage from a body-worn camera and police reports.” (See
Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007 (Berger)
[contentions made “in conclusory fashion . . . [without] a coherent argument or cit[ation
of] any authority to support their contention” are forfeited on appeal].)
Fourth, it is asserted by father that the trial court’s purported exclusion of evidence
constituted a violation of his right to due process because the court did not give him a fair
opportunity to present his case. As we have observed, there is nothing in the record
supporting father’s contention that he offered, and the trial court excluded, evidence he
identifies as a video and two police reports (exhibits B through D). Moreover, because
father’s due process claim is conclusory, it cannot be considered by this court. (See
People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 987 (Weaver) [claim of error that is not
supported by legal argument or is merely perfunctorily asserted will not be addressed by
appellate court]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657,
707 [appellate court deems forfeited appellant’s unsupported claim that due process
rights were violated by trial court].)8
Fifth, there is no showing that the trial court’s purported exclusion of evidence
proffered by father was prejudicial. Regardless of whether error was shown, the
appellant must also establish that the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial, namely, “that a

8
Father cites Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 (Elkins) in support
of his position that the purported exclusion of evidence deprived him of due process.
Elkins is distinguishable. It did not involve the exclusion of evidence at an evidentiary
hearing. Rather, it concerned a successful challenge to a local rule that permitted,
contrary to hearsay rules, the submission of declarations in contested dissolution
proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1354-1357.) Moreover, Elkins does not support father’s due
process claim. The Supreme Court in Elkins held that because it concluded that the
challenged local rule was contrary to the hearsay rules established under California law,
it was not required to decide whether the local rule also violated litigants’ due process
rights. (See id. at p. 1357.)

14
miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of its ruling. [Citations.]” (Travelers Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 99, 117; see also
Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370, 378 [appellant bears burden to
demonstrate that the claimed error in excluding evidence was prejudicial].) As noted
above, father’s discussion of prejudice is inadequate, because it provides only the
conclusory argument that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s purported ruling because
the evidence was “critical.”9
We therefore conclude that father’s contentions that the trial court erred by
excluding evidence proffered by father and that these evidentiary rulings were prejudicial
are without merit.
E. Settled Statement
Father asserts error based upon the trial court’s alleged “unilateral drafting and
certification of [its] own settled statement.” He contends that the court acted “without
considering [father’s] proposed settled statement or the evidence he attempted to
present,” and that such action “could be seen as creating a potential bias in the factual
record.” Father argues that these actions violated his right to due process.
The appellant’s designation of the record of oral proceedings may include an
indicated intent to proceed by way of a reporter’s transcript, agreed statement, or settled
statement. (See rule 8.121(b)(1)(C); see also rule 8.120(b).) If the relevant court
proceedings were not reported, the appellant may elect to proceed by way of a settled
statement. (See rule 8.137(b)(1)(A).) The appellant’s proposed settled statement must
be a “condensed narrative” that includes “a concise factual summary of the evidence
and the testimony of each witness relevant to the points that the appellant states . . . are

9
The two San Jose Police Department documents attached to father’s motion to
augment (which he identified as exhibits C and D and claimed were offered at the hearing
and refused by the court) do not evidence that mother was charged or arrested for any
criminal activity.

15
being raised on appeal.” (Rule 8.137(d)(2)(A).) A respondent, within 20 days after
being served, may file its proposed amendments to appellant’s proposed settled
statement. (Rule 8.137(e)(1).) After service of that response or after time has elapsed to
do so, any party may request a hearing, but the court need not, and “will not ordinarily
order a hearing unless there is a factual dispute about a material aspect of the trial court
proceedings.” (Ibid.) In addressing a proposed settled statement and any proposed
amendments, the trial court shall, if the settled statement is noncompliant, direct appellant
to prepare a new proposed statement; alternatively, the court may make corrections or
modifications to make the proposed statement an accurate summary or identify the
proposed changes and request appellant to do so. (Rule 8.137(f)(3).) Generally, a “trial
court does retain discretion to refuse to settle a statement; it need not consent to a
narrative that is inaccurate, but may insist that the statement reflects the actual
proceedings.” (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 934.)
Here, the January 10, 2024 hearing was not reported, and father elected to proceed
by a settled statement. (See rule 8.137(b)(1)(A).) The record—which appears to be
incomplete—shows that father filed a proposed settled statement on February 22, 2024.
On April 8, 2024, the trial court filed its settled statement in which it summarized the
proceedings of January 10, 2024. The trial court certified the statement on April 8, 2024.
(See rule 8.137(h)(1).)10
Father’s challenge here to the settled statement that was certified by the trial court
is not cognizable. Although he contends that the trial court’s actions in drafting and
certifying the settled statement were “unilateral,” his argument is not supported by any
citations to the appellate record and thus does not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). We

10
Although there are no other documents concerning the settled statement process
that are part of the appellate record here, a review of the register of actions discloses that
there may have been one or more hearings or orders after the filing on February 22, 2024,
of father’s proposed settled statement concerning this matter.

16
must therefore disregard father’s unsupported factual or procedural statements. (See
Yeboah, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) Father also does not provide citations to
any legal authority to support his contention that the court erred in drafting and certifying
the settled statement. He therefore forfeited the challenge. (See Berger, supra,
128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Moreover, father has failed to show by an adequate record
that the trial court erred in its handling of the settled statement. (See Ballard, supra,
41 Cal.3d at p. 574.) He has therefore defaulted with respect to this challenge. (See
Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
F. Father’s Additional Arguments
The remaining appellate challenges that father asserts are tied directly to his
claims that the trial court erred in allegedly excluding evidence proffered by father and
by its “unilateral” drafting and certification of the settled statement. Because, as we have
discussed, ante, these two appellate claims fail, father’s remaining challenges likewise
fail.
Father argues that the trial court’s issuance of the DVRO “was not supported by
sufficient evidence” and “was [not] justified.” These contentions are conclusory and are
not developed in any respect in father’s appellate briefs. We cannot consider them. (See
Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 987 [appellate court will not address claim of error
unsupported by legal argument or perfunctorily asserted].) Moreover, an appellant
asserting a substantial evidence challenge must “ ‘demonstrate that there is no substantial
evidence to support the challenged findings.’ . . . [Citations.] . . . [I]f . . . [appellant
argues that] ‘some particular issue of fact is not sustained, [appellant is] required to set
forth . . . all the material evidence on the point and not merely [appellant’s] own
evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.’ . . . [Citations.]”
(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881-882, original italics
(Foreman & Clark).) Father’s appellate briefs contain no recitation of the evidence

17
(with citations to the record) on the question of the trial court’s finding that mother had
established her right to issuance of the DVRO.
We also reject father’s contention that the court’s issuance of the DVRO was
improper because mother’s “allegations of rape lack[ed] corroborative evidence and were
not substantiated during the hearing.” Corroborating evidence of claimed abuse, while
useful, is not required under the DVPA. “The testimony of one witness, even that of a
party, may constitute substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Fregoso &
Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 703.) “In many domestic violence cases, . . . the
sole evidence of abuse will be the survivor’s own testimony which, standing alone, can
be sufficient to establish a fact. . . .” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119.) Furthermore, as recited in the settled statement, “[t]he [trial
c]ourt found on the record that [mother] was a credible witness who had proven beyond a
preponderance of the evidence that [father] had committed domestic violence as defined
in Family Code section 6203.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
mother’s DVRO request. (See S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.)
Father also argues that the trial court erred in awarding mother sole physical and
legal custody of the child because that finding was not supported by sufficient evidence,
and because the court improperly applied the presumption under section 3044. It is clear
from father’s briefs that these arguments are founded upon his position that the trial court
erred in allegedly excluding evidence, a contention we have rejected. Further, in making
the conclusory argument that the custody order was not supported by substantial
evidence, father does not recite all evidence (with citations to the record) relevant to the
trial court’s determination regarding custody. As appellant, he was required to do so.
(See Foreman & Clark, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Moreover, although the presumption
under section 3044 is rebuttable, there is nothing in the record as to what evidence or

18
arguments, if any, father presented to attempt to rebut the presumption. (See Jaime G.,
supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 803-805.)11
As the California Supreme Court has explained: “Under California’s statutory
scheme governing child custody and visitation determinations, the overarching concern
is the best interest of the child. The court and the family have ‘the widest discretion to
choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ (Fam. Code, § 3040,
subd. (b).) When determining the best interest of the child, relevant factors include the
health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by one parent against the
child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of contact with the parents.
(§ 3011.)” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255, fn. omitted.) Under “ ‘the
deferential abuse of discretion test’ ” applicable to review of custody and visitation orders
(ibid.), the trial court in this instance did not err.
III. DISPOSITION
The January 10, 2024 orders (1) granting respondent Q.P.’s request for a domestic
violence restraining order under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.), and (2) granting her request for modification of custody and visitation are
affirmed. Statutory costs are awarded to respondent.

11
Father also apparently asserts, without supporting argument, that the court’s
order that he enroll in a 16-week parenting without violence program was inappropriate.
We will not address this perfunctory challenge. (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 987.)

19
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER, J.

WILSON, J.

T.B. v. Q.P.
H051846

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