People v. Sandoval CA2/7

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Filed 2/13/25 P. v. Sandoval CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B333446

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA240842-03)
v.

JORGE SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael E. Pastor, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

In 2008 a jury convicted Jorge Sandoval of first degree
felony murder and attempted robbery and found true the
allegation he committed the murder during the attempted
robbery. We affirmed the murder and attempted robbery
convictions in Sandoval’s direct appeal.
Sandoval now appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) after an evidentiary
hearing.1 Sandoval argues substantial evidence did not support
the court’s finding he is guilty of murder under current law as a
major participant in an underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Sandoval and His Codefendants Try To Rob
a Hardware Store
In the early afternoon of December 17, 2002 Alejandro
Viveros drove Jorge Martinez and Sandoval to a hardware store
at the corner of an intersection. Martinez and Sandoval each
carried a loaded nine-millimeter, semi-automatic handgun.
Viveros dropped Martinez and Sandoval at the store, drove a
short distance away, and remained with the car.
Sandoval walked into the store first and approached the
store owner, Claro Cortez, who was with a customer in one of the
aisles. Martinez followed Sandoval into the store and approached

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Cortez’s wife, Elvia, who was standing at the cash register.
Martinez, who had his gun out, stood close to Elvia and said that
“it was a robbery and that [she] should open the cash register.”
As Elvia struggled to open the register, gunshots were fired.
According to Sandoval, who testified at trial,2 he
approached and greeted Cortez, and Cortez pulled out a revolver
and started shooting at Sandoval. Sandoval fired one shot at
Cortez, but his gun jammed and he was unable to fire any
additional rounds. Sandoval claimed he fired his gun at Cortez
“to survive.” Martinez, who also testified at trial, said he fired
seven shots at Cortez. Cortez was hit six times, collapsed, and
later died of his injuries. A customer was also killed in the
gunfire. The entire incident happened “very quickly,” lasting
about a minute.
Martinez and Sandoval ran from the store to Viveros’s car,
and the three men drove away from the scene. Police officers who
happened to be nearby stopped the car a few blocks from the
store, arrested all three men, and recovered two nine-millimeter
handguns. Sandoval had been shot in the leg and was taken to a
nearby hospital. During an interview with police officers at the
hospital, Sandoval admitted he and Martinez had gone to the
hardware store intending to rob it.

2 This was the second trial for Martinez and Sandoval.
A jury convicted the two men in 2004. We reversed those
convictions because the trial court required Sandoval, Martinez,
and Viveros to share one interpreter without a valid waiver. (See
People v. Martinez (Jan. 30, 2007, B174379) [nonpub. opn].) In
2008 Martinez and Sandoval were retried together with separate
juries.

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B. A Jury Convicts Sandoval of First Degree Murder and
Attempted Robbery, and We Affirm
The People charged Sandoval with two counts of first
degree murder, one for Cortez and one for the customer, although
the court subsequently granted a motion by Sandoval for a
judgment of acquittal on the murder count for the customer. The
People also charged Sandoval with two counts of attempted
second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664). The People alleged Sandoval
committed the murder while committing an attempted robbery
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The People also alleged
that, for the murder count for Cortez and the two attempted
robbery counts, Sandoval personally used and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c))
and that a principal was armed with a firearm during
commission of the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The People
tried the case on a felony-murder theory, seeking to prove that
Martinez and Sandoval entered the store with the intent to rob it
and that the murder of Cortez occurred during the attempted
robbery.
The jury convicted Sandoval on the remaining first degree
murder count and the two attempted robbery counts. The jury
found true allegations that Sandoval committed the murder while
committing an attempted robbery, that Sandoval personally used
and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and that a
principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the
offenses. The trial court sentenced Sandoval to a prison term of
life without the possibility of parole on the murder count, plus
20 years pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The court
imposed but stayed under section 654 execution of a term of two
years for each attempted robbery conviction and the related

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firearm enhancements. We affirmed the judgment in Sandoval’s
second direct appeal. (People v. Martinez (June 22, 2009,
B209063) [nonpub. opn.].)

C. The Superior Court Denies Sandoval’s Petition for
Resentencing under Section 1172.6
In August 2022 Sandoval filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, checking boxes on a form petition stating
he was eligible for relief and asking the court to appoint counsel
to represent him. The superior court appointed counsel, the
People filed a written response to the petition, and Sandoval filed
a reply. Based on the parties’ stipulation, the court found
Sandoval stated a prima facie case for relief and set the matter
for an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing in August 2023 neither
Sandoval nor the People presented any additional evidence. The
court stated that “certainly the petitioner in this case was
involved very directly in the planning of the underlying robbery
and carrying it out. Very significantly, the defendant/petitioner
put himself right at the scene, taking an active role, and the
petitioner acknowledged it.” The court stated that “the record of
conviction reveals, clearly, that the petitioner was individually
and personally armed with a firearm and was acting, not as
someone to simply distract or assist in a getaway, but right there
to confront anybody at the store who may want to challenge the
authority of these two armed gunmen. . . . The court can easily
conclude that, in undertaking the actions that the petitioner did
in this case, and the role and responsibility, that that
significantly demonstrated reckless indifference to human life.
Mr. Sandoval was ready, willing, and able to ratchet up the

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circumstances and to enter a new and different role as an armed
gunman, and really escalate any contact with an individual in the
store, and use a firearm to do so.”
The court also found that Sandoval “was personally present
at the scene. He was not standing outside, a block away, in a car,
in a home. He was right there in the midst of things, and that
goes beyond being a major participant. Being involved in
planning, actually going to the scene, actually entering the store
with another individual, his partner, who was armed with a
firearm as well, that takes it to a whole different level in
distinguishing and distinguishes these facts from facts that may
have been present in other cases. This is much more aggravated,
in terms of the preparedness of the petitioner and his willingness
to take this to a different level.” The court concluded:
“Specifically under [People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522], as
articulated in Clark and its progeny, it’s quite obvious that
Mr. Sandoval was aware of the nature of the robbery, came
armed himself, obviously knew that his cohort was armed and he
went anyway, and got involved in a situation where he was
taking a direct role in terms of, as far as this court is concerned,
employing lethal force on the decedent. That is quite significant.”
The court denied the petition, and Sandoval timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a person guilty of murder and significantly narrowing the felony-

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murder exception to the malice requirement for murder.
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468; People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel); see People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 [felony murder]; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 [natural and probable
consequences].) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on a person’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule. (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Arellano, at pp. 467-468; Curiel, at
p. 449.) That provision requires the People to prove specific facts
relating to the defendant’s culpability: The defendant was the
actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); the defendant, though not the
actual killer, with the intent to kill assisted in the commission of
the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major
participant in a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, “as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Curiel, at
p. 448; Strong, at p. 708.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he or
she could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes
the Legislature made effective 2019 to the definitions of the
crime. (See People v. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 468-469;
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.) If a petition under
section 1172.6 contains all the required information, the court
must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested.

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(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 962-963; People v. Foley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 653, 659.)
The People must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Where, as here by stipulation, the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the People may also
offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.; see People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-854.)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6, we review the superior court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Villagrana (Jan. 21, 2025,
No. B331439) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2025 WL 258597, at p. 2];
People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066; People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.) “In reviewing the
trial court’s findings for substantial evidence, we . . . examine the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that
would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the necessary
fact] beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . While the trial
judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve

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contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400, 414, internal quotation marks omitted; see Villagrana, at
p. ___ [p. 2].) “‘“Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.”’” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339; see
People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; People v. Davis (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 500.)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying
Sandoval’s Petition Under Section 1172.6

1. Applicable Law
Section 189, subdivision (e)(3), provides that a person who
participates in one of the felonies listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), may be liable for murder if the People prove he or
she “‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life,’” within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 448; see People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v.
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.) The Supreme Court in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th 522 “clarified the meaning of the special
circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676)
and identified “a nonexhaustive list of considerations” relevant to
whether a defendant was culpable for murder under section 189,

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subdivision (e)(3) (Strong, at pp. 706-707; see People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 986).
Sandoval does not challenge the superior court’s finding he
was a major participant in the attempted robberies. He
challenges only the court’s finding he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. “Reckless indifference to human life
has a subjective and an objective element. [Citation.] As to the
subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard
‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’
[Citations.] As to the objective element, “‘[t]he risk [of death]
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature
and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known
to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor’s situation.’”” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677; see People v. Hill, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074.)
“Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any armed crime is insufficient; only knowingly
creating a ‘grave risk of death’ satisfies the constitutional
minimum.” (People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808; People
v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 316-317.)
To determine whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
courts consider, among other factors, the following: “Did the
defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the
felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the
defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have
the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What

10
was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of
the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge
of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of
using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to
minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see People v. Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623; People v. Hill, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1074-1075.) “No one of these considerations is necessary,
nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” (People v. Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; see Clark, at p. 618; Hill, at p. 1075.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior
Court’s Finding Sandoval Acted with Reckless
Indifference to Human Life
The evidence relating to the first factors, whether Sandoval
used or knew a gun would be used during the felony and how
many weapons were ultimately used, supported the court’s
finding Sandoval acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Although “a defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the
felony is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human
life” (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618; see People v.
Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 988), a “defendant’s use of a
firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim or the
evidence does not establish which armed robber killed the victim,
can be significant to the analysis of reckless indifference to
human life” (Clark, at p. 618). Sandoval and Martinez were each
armed with a loaded nine-millimeter, semi-automatic handgun,
and Sandoval was aware Martinez was armed with that weapon.
(See In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013 [substantial
evidence supported a finding of reckless indifference to human

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life where the defendant was armed with a knife and knew his
confederate was armed and prepared to use his gun]; cf. People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 126 [substantial evidence
did not support a finding of reckless indifference to human life
where the defendant was unarmed and did not know her
confederates planned to use a deadly weapon]; Ramirez, at p. 988
[substantial evidence did not support a finding of reckless
indifference to human life where there was no evidence the
defendant was armed or supplied the murder weapon].) And as
the jury found, Sandoval personally and intentionally discharged
his firearm during the attempted robbery. These facts
distinguish Sandoval from felony-murder defendants who did not
act with reckless indifference to human life because they “‘simply
had awareness their confederates were armed and armed
robberies carried a risk of death.’” (Clark, at p. 618.)
The evidence on the second and third factors, whether
Sandoval was physically present at the crime or had the
opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim, also supported
the superior court’s finding, at least in part. Sandoval was
physically present inside the store during the entire incident,
though it is unclear whether, from where he was standing, he
could have discouraged Martinez from shooting Cortez.3 (Cf.
In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 678 [unarmed defendant

3 Given Sandoval’s testimony he shot Cortez in self-defense
and was only trying to survive after Cortez shot at him first, it is
unlikely Sandoval, if he had the opportunity to restrain Martinez,
would have tried to restrain him. To the contrary, under his
version of the events, Sandoval would have encouraged Martinez
to keep shooting to defend against Cortez’s attack.

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was across the street from the incident and unable to control his
confederate’s act of shooting the victim].)
Some of the other factors were either neutral on whether,
or weighed against finding, Sandoval acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The duration of the crimes was short.
(See People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 561-562
[defendant’s culpability is reduced where the “‘evidence tended to
show that the shooting was a “somewhat impulsive” response to
the victim’s unexpected resistance, as opposed to the culmination
of a prolonged interaction that increased the opportunity for
violence’”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989
[attempted carjacking occurred so quickly that the defendant had
“no realistic opportunity to intervene” before his confederate
opened fire].) And there was no evidence that Sandoval knew or
suspected Martinez had any particular propensity toward
violence or that Martinez had committed any prior (charged or
uncharged) violent crimes. (See People v. Guiffreda, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 128 [substantial evidence did not support a
finding of reckless indifference to human life where there was no
evidence suggesting the defendant knew her codefendant planned
to use a weapon during the robbery or had previously committed
violent crimes].)
But the evidence relating to the final factor, whether
Sandoval made any effort to minimize the risks of violence during
the felony, strongly supported the court’s finding Sandoval acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Not only did Sandoval
do nothing to minimize the risk of violence during the robbery,
his actions increased the risk violence would occur. In addition to
bringing a loaded firearm to the hardware store, Sandoval
behaved aggressively. As the superior court observed, Sandoval

13
was not merely a lookout: He directly approached Cortez and
exchanged gunfire with him moments after entering the store. In
addition, the robbery occurred in the early afternoon during the
store’s regular business hours, when customers and employees
were likely to be present. (Cf. People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 621-622 [defendant minimized the risk of violence by
planning to rob a store after business hours when fewer
employees would be present and by directing his confederate to
use an unloaded firearm].) The exchange of gunfire killed a
customer. Nor did Sandoval attempt to aid the two gunshot
victims. Instead, he fled from the scene and attempted to escape
with Martinez in their getaway car. (See Clark, at p. 619
[defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life by
failing to aid a wounded victim]; In re Parrish (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life by failing to pause to aid or comfort
victim].)
Sandoval suggests the evidence showed no more than a
“‘garden-variety armed robbery, where death might be possible
but not probable.’” (See People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 802.) The Supreme Court in Clark stated there must be
something “in the plan that one can point to that elevated the
risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed
robbery” to show reckless indifference for human life. (People v.
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 623.) But the Supreme Court also
clarified a “garden-variety armed robbery” is a “robbery in which
the only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is
the fact of the use of a gun.” (Id. at p. 617, fn. 74, italics added.)
As discussed, there was much more to the armed robbery here.
Sandoval came to the hardware store with a loaded firearm and

14
immediately confronted Claro Cortez, which caused Cortez and
Sandoval to exchange gunfire moments after Sandoval and
Martinez entered the store. Sandoval was not simply standing by
in case Martinez needed backup or watching for the police.
Sandoval escalated the robbery into a three-way gun battle that
resulted in the death of two people. Those actions supported the
court’s finding Sandoval acted with reckless indifference to
human life.

DISPOSITION

Sandoval’s request for judicial notice is granted. The order
denying Sandoval’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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