CourtListener 10332741•Hahn v. Frascht CA2/7
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Filed 2/13/25 Hahn v. Frascht CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
AARON MARK HAHN, B329167
Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STFL03991)
v.
BRITTANY NICOLE FRASCHT,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dean H. Hansell, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacqueline M. Sale for Appellant.
Kermisch & Paletz, Daniel J. Paletz and Eden C. Bautista
for Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Aaron Mark Hahn appeals from an order granting Brittany
Nicole Frascht $79,692 in attorney fees, which Frascht incurred
in obtaining a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
against him. Hahn contends the attorney fees are unreasonable
and that the trial court failed to determine Hahn’s ability to pay.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Frascht and Hahn previously dated and have a minor child,
born June 2014. Frascht has sole physical and legal custody of
their child, pursuant to a Minnesota custody order. The parties
have an ongoing family law case pending in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court.
In July 2020, Frascht filed a request for a DVRO and
received a temporary restraining order against Hahn. In
June 2022, after several reissuances of the temporary restraining
order, the trial court held a three-day trial and issued a
permanent domestic violence restraining order against Hahn.
Frascht sought prevailing party fees under Family Code
section 6344.1 In support, she filed a declaration of counsel
1 Frascht sought attorney fees under the former version of
Family Code section 6344 that was in effect in 2022, under which
“a prevailing petitioner’s right to recover attorney’s fees depended
on the petitioner’s demonstrated inability to pay fees and a
disparity in income between the parties.” (Dragones v. Calkins
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1080.) The parties do not dispute
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attaching copies of attorney fee invoices. Her counsel declared:
“[Frascht] has incurred a total of $96,282 from the inception of
this case to June 30, 2022. After review of the billing statements,
which include notations for non-DVRO related work, it is
estimated that $75,632 in attorneys’ fees and costs were incurred
in connection with DVRO related work and $20,650 was incurred
for work unrelated to the DVRO.”
Hahn opposed the attorney fee request. He argued the
amount was unreasonable and included charges unrelated to the
DVRO and asserted he could not afford to pay Frascht’s attorney
fees. Hahn did not submit any evidence of his finances or other
information supporting his statement that he was unable to
afford to pay any amount of attorney fees. Frascht filed a reply
brief and submitted an income and expense declaration, which
Hahn moved to strike. After briefing and a hearing, the trial
court denied Hahn’s request for an order to strike.
Before the hearing on the attorney fee motion, Frascht filed
a supplemental declaration from her counsel documenting
additional attorney fees Frascht incurred. Frascht sought an
additional $6,242 for ongoing work in connection with the DVRO
and $4,975 for work opposing Hahn’s request for an order to
strike her income and expense declaration.
On February 10, 2023, the trial court issued its findings
and order granting Frascht $79,692 in attorney fees and costs.
On Frascht’s original request for $75,632, the court granted
$71,000 and “reduced the request by $4,632 for work the Court
that the current version of section 6344, effective January 1,
2023, applies to this case. (See id. at pp. 1078-1085 [current
version of § 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its
effective date]; see Stats. 2022, ch. 591, §§ 1-2.)
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concluded could have been performed more efficiently.” On
Frascht’s supplemental request for additional work by her
counsel, the trial court granted the additional $6,242 requested
for work in connection with the DVRO but granted only $2,450
for work in connection with the motion to strike. The court
explained it “did not grant the entire additional amount sought
by [Frascht] for work in connection with opposing the motion
because some of that work may have been occasioned by how
[Frascht]’s FL-150 [income and expense declaration] was
prepared.” The court ordered Hahn to pay Frascht’s counsel
$5,000 per month until the amount was paid in full.
Hahn timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Family Code section 6344, subdivision (a), provides that
“[a]fter notice and a hearing, a court, upon request, shall issue an
order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing
petitioner” on a request for a DVRO.2 “Before a court awards
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section, the court shall
first determine pursuant to Section 270 that the party ordered to
pay has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay.”
(§ 6344, subd. (c); see § 270 [“If a court orders a party to pay
attorney’s fees or costs under this code, the court shall first
determine that the party has or is reasonably likely to have the
ability to pay.”].) Thus, section 6344 “mandates an award of
attorney’s fees to a prevailing petitioner in an action brought
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
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pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, subject only to
the trial court’s consideration of the respondent’s inability to
pay.” (Dragones v. Calkins (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1085
(Dragones); see id. at p. 1081 [current § 6344 “requires the court
to award fees to a prevailing petitioner, subject only to the
respondent’s ability to pay,” without need for the prevailing
petitioner to show inability to pay or disparity in access to
funds].)
“We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the
amount of an attorney fee award. [Citation.] ‘[A]n experienced
trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to
assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court,
and the amount of a fee awarded by such a judge will therefore
not be set aside on appeal absent a showing that it is manifestly
excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper
basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the
amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience
and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the
determination.’” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1495, 1509 (Loeffler); accord, Dragones, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1085.)
Although a court reporter was present for the attorney fees
hearing, Hahn elected to proceed with his appeal on a clerk’s
transcript and without a reporter’s transcript of the relevant
proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.121, 8.122.) This is
referred to as a “judgment roll” appeal. (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324-325; Allen v. Toten (1985)
172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082; Krueger v. Bank of America (1983)
145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207; see Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (b)
[defining contents of judgment roll].) “The trial court’s findings of
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fact and conclusions of law therefore are presumed to be
supported by substantial evidence and are binding upon us,
unless the judgment [or challenged order] is not supported by the
findings or reversible error appears on the face of the record.”
(Krueger, at p. 207; see Nielsen, at pp. 324-325 [on a judgment
roll appeal, appellate review is limited to errors appearing on the
face of the record].)
The appellant bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error. (See Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 374, 383; Gould v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181.) To do so, the appellant must
provide an adequate record (see Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A.
Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348), as well as
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to facts in the
record and legal authority. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457 (Multani); see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.204(a)(1) & 8.204(a)(2).) We will not reverse the
trial court’s order awarding attorney fees unless, “‘considering all
the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no
judge could reasonably make the order made.’” (In re Marriage of
Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Awarding
Attorney Fees
Here, Frascht requested a total of $86,849 in attorney fees,
and provided invoices and declarations documenting her counsel’s
work and billing to support her request. The trial court awarded
Frascht $79,692 in fees.
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Hahn has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by
finding that $79,692 was a reasonable amount of attorney fees
incurred. As stated, Frascht submitted detailed billing records
from her attorney, and her attorney attested under penalty of
perjury that the amounts requested solely pertained to work in
connection with the DVRO and not to the parties’ family law
cases. (See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [attorney’s
declaration attesting to the accuracy of the fee bill is entitled to a
presumption of credibility].) Additionally, the pleadings,
exhibits, hearings, three-day trial, and other evidence of the
nature of the litigation and actual work performed by Frascht’s
counsel were all before the trial court, which made its own
determination regarding the value of the services. (See Melnyk v.
Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [“The value of legal
services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court
has its own expertise.”].)
Hahn argues in a conclusory manner that the case was not
complex, did not require great skill, the work included in the
award was not necessary and there was “overbilling,” and that
the award purportedly included fees and costs for family court
litigation unrelated to the DVRO. But Hahn provides no
citations to the record in support of his arguments, and he “does
not attempt to establish that any specific item of fees or costs was
not reasonably incurred by [Frascht]. Accordingly, [Hahn] has
not met his burden to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in that the award was ‘manifestly excessive in the
circumstances.’” (Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509; see
Multani, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457 [without citation to
facts in the record, “‘conclusory claims of error will fail’”].)
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Further, the trial court did not award the full amount of
attorney fees that Frascht sought. The court reduced Frascht’s
initial request for $75,632 to $71,000, excluding “work the Court
concluded could have been performed more efficiently,” and it
granted only $2,450 of Frascht’s supplemental request for $4,975
for work opposing Hahn’s request for an order to strike her
income and expense declaration “because some of that work may
have been occasioned by how [Frascht]’s FL-150 [income and
expense declaration] was prepared.” In total, the family court
awarded $7,157 less attorney fees than Frascht sought. (See
Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509, fn. 15 [significant fee
reduction from the original request indicates trial court exercised
its discretion].)
The trial court’s order also contemplates that Hahn will
pay the attorney fees in installments, rather than a lump sum.
This further demonstrates the award was not the result of
passion or prejudice. “The reduced fee amount and the
installment structure indicate that the fee award resulted from
the court’s exercise of discretion after considering the facts of the
case . . . . Should [Hahn] find [him]self unable to afford the
installment payments, []he can file an appropriate request to
modify the installment payments, with sufficient facts to
demonstrate h[is] inability to pay.” (Dragones, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086.) “‘In these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the award of attorney fees shocks the conscience or
suggests that passion and prejudice had a part in it.’” (Loeffler,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509, fn. 15.)
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Hahn additionally contends the trial court erroneously
failed to consider his ability to pay in making its order.3 The
parties litigated the issue of their respective abilities to pay for
Frascht’s attorney fees under former section 6344, and the court
stated it had reviewed the parties’ filings, but it did not make an
express finding regarding Hahn’s ability to pay. As previously
noted, on a judgment roll appeal our review is limited to
determining whether any error appears on the face of the record,
and we “‘“must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample
to sustain the [trial court’s] findings.”’” (Nielsen, supra,
178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 324-325.) Here, the trial court impliedly
found Hahn “has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to
pay.” (§ 6344, subd. (c).) The trial court was not required to
make express written findings regarding Hahn’s ability to pay
either under sections 270 or 6344. (See Gunther v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 361 [“‘there is no general
rule requiring trial courts to explain their decisions on motions
seeking attorney fees’”].)
Hahn submitted a declaration to the trial court attesting
that he “cannot afford to contribute” to Frascht’s attorney fees
and has “no source of payment.” But Hahn did not submit any
evidence of his finances or other information supporting his
statement that he was unable to afford to pay any amount of
attorney fees. The trial court was within its discretion to find
3 We disregard Hahn’s citations of unpublished California
cases in his respondent’s brief. Unpublished California appellate
opinions “must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in
any other action” except in narrow circumstances not applicable
here. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a); see People v. Russo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1133, fn. 1.)
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Hahn’s declaration lacked credibility. (See Faton v. Ahmedo
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1172 [“To the extent the court’s
finding was derived from a credibility evaluation, as an appellate
court we defer to this assessment.”].) And, “‘in the absence of
evidence . . . especially in a judgment roll appeal, we have no
reason to assume the facts are favorable to appellant.’”
(Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 662, 674, fn. 8.) Although Hahn argues Frascht
failed to “assert” or “allege” Hahn’s ability to pay, there is no
statutory requirement that the prevailing petitioner must
demonstrate the respondent’s ability to pay section 6344 attorney
fees.
We thus find no error on the face of the record and
“conclusively presume,” as we must, that the evidence supports
the trial court’s implied findings that Hahn has or is reasonably
likely to have the ability to pay and that his declaration to the
contrary was not credible. (See Nielsen, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 324-325.)
Hahn also contends the trial court committed “reversible
error” by “waiting 6 months to rule on an attorney fees motion.”
But the authorities he cites are specific to the failure to render a
decision within 90 days after submission of the case. (See Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 19; Hassanally v. Firestone (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1245.) “‘A case is deemed to be under
submission when the court, trying the issues without a jury, has
heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel and has taken
the case under advisement.’” (Shapira v. Lifetech Resources, LLC
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 429, 437; accord, Jalof v. Robbins (1941)
19 Cal.2d 233, 235; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.900(a) [a
“cause is deemed submitted” in the earlier of two circumstances:
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when “[t]he . . . court orders the matter submitted,” or on “[t]he
date the final paper is required to be filed or the date argument is
heard, whichever is later”].) Here, the attorney fees hearing was
held on November 28, 2022, and the trial court issued its decision
on February 10, 2023. There was no failure to render a timely
decision.4
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order awarding attorney fees is affirmed.
Frascht is to recover her costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J. PULOS, J.*
4 Hahn’s opening brief also contends that the court
erroneously ordered sanctions under section 271. As Frascht
points out, this argument appears to have been inadvertently
included, as the court’s order and record on appeal reflect no such
sanctions award.
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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