CourtListener 10330391•People v. Dixon CA1/5
Testo completo
Filed 2/10/25 P. v. Dixon CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A167191
v. (Contra Costa County
JACQUELINE DIXON, Super. Ct. No. 05002007508)
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant and defendant Jacqueline Dixon challenges the imposition of
a five-year enhancement for the infliction of “great bodily injury under
circumstances involving domestic violence” pursuant to Penal Code section
12022.7, subdivision (e).1 She contends that the enhancement does not apply
because great bodily injury is also an element of her underlying conviction for
mayhem. She further contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
the enhancement. Subdivision (g) of section 12202.7, however, establishes
that this particular enhancement applies even if the infliction of great bodily
injury is an element of the underlying offense. There is also ample evidence
to support the jury’s finding that Dixon inflicted great bodily injury in the
course of a domestic violence incident that she initiated when she tried to run
over her husband with her van. We therefore affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
A. The Charges and Special Allegations
An amended information charged Dixon with nine felonies:
(1) attempted murder of Victoria Sims (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1);
(2) mayhem against Sims (§ 203; count 2); (3) assault with a deadly weapon
on Sims (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3); (4) attempted murder of the husband
Raymond Patrick Dixon (husband) (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 4);
(5) spousal abuse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 5); (6) assault with a deadly
weapon on the husband (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6); (7) child abuse against
Jane Doe #1 (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 7); (8) child abuse against Jane Doe #2
(§ 273a, subd. (a); count 8); and (9) child abuse against Jane Doe #3 (§ 273a,
subd. (a); count 9). As to counts 1 through 6, the amended information
alleged that Dixon personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) under
circumstances involving domestic violence (GBI enhancement) (§ 12022.7,
subd. (e)) and used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1) or
969f). As to counts 1 through 3, the weapon was alleged to be a motor
vehicle; as to counts 4 through 6, the weapon was alleged to be a knife.
Finally, the amended information alleged numerous aggravating
circumstances.
The case proceeded to a jury trial.
B. Prosecution’s Case
The People called multiple witnesses, including the husband, E.D. (the
husband’s mother), Sims (the husband’s niece and E.D.’s granddaughter),
and Jane Doe #1 (Dixon’s daughter).
1. Dixon, the Husband, and the Children
Dixon and the husband married in 2010 and have four children
together, including Jane Doe #3 and Jane Doe #2. Dixon also has two
2
children from a prior relationship: Josiah and Jane Doe #1. The husband is
six feet four inches tall and weighs over 300 pounds.
In November 2019, the husband served Dixon with divorce papers. He
also sought a restraining order against Dixon that was denied. Dixon, in
turn, sought a restraining order against the husband—which was also
denied.
2. Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence
Dixon and the husband had a history of domestic violence. In 2017,
they argued at their home, and the husband left. When he returned, Dixon
had packed his stuff and left it on the driveway. The husband confronted
Dixon and shoved her. She then slapped him, causing his glasses to fall off
his face. In response, the husband hit Dixon. Dixon called the police, and
the police arrested both Dixon and the husband.
Another incident occurred on the day that the husband served divorce
papers on Dixon. Before the papers were served, Dixon and the husband
argued in front of the children at their home. As the husband drove away
with the children, Dixon struck the car. She also threatened to call the
police and accused the husband of “kidnapping the kids.” The husband
called 911, and the police concluded that no crime had been committed.
Eventually, the husband returned the children to Dixon.
In February 2020, the husband went to their former home (Dixon and
the husband were now living apart) to see Jane Doe #2 on her first birthday.
At that time, Dixon was living with her six children, including her four
children with the husband, her friend and her five children, “and some other
guys.” A couple of days earlier, the husband became upset because he
discovered that Dixon had taken some tax refund money that he believed
belonged to him. When the husband arrived at the home “unannounced,” he
3
discovered that most of his belongings had been “destroyed.” He became
angry, flipped a table over in the garage, and left.
On April 11, 2020—two days before Dixon’s birthday—the husband
took their four biological children to stay with him. Between then and May
10, 2020 (Mother’s Day), the husband only allowed Dixon to see the four
children twice.
3. The Mother’s Day Incident
In May 2020, the husband was living with his and Dixon’s four
biological children at a friend’s house in Antioch. He agreed to allow Dixon
to see the children at E.D.’s apartment, a “neutral” location, on Mother’s
Day. On that day, the husband brought the children to E.D.’s apartment in
the late afternoon or early evening. Sims, who was living with E.D. at the
time, was also there.
The husband and Sims left together in E.D.’s car. Soon after, Dixon
arrived at E.D.’s apartment with Jane Doe #1, who was 12 at the time, to see
the other four children.
The husband and Sims returned to E.D.’s apartment a couple of hours
later. Dixon, the husband, and Jane Doe #1 then stepped into the hallway
outside the apartment to talk. Dixon asked the husband when she could
“have the kids back.” When the husband refused to return the children, he
and Dixon began yelling at each other.
Due to the commotion, E.D. went into the hallway and asked Dixon and
the husband to be quiet. The husband re-entered E.D.’s apartment, while
Dixon continued yelling at him from the hallway. E.D. again asked Dixon to
be quiet, but Dixon responded by threatening that she was “going to get
[E.D.] put out.”
4
Dixon eventually left E.D.’s apartment building with Jane Doe #1, and
they walked to Dixon’s van. E.D. and Sims followed them. Dixon stood by
the driver’s seat with the door open, and Jane Doe #1 was by the front
passenger seat.
E.D. asked Dixon to leave. Meanwhile, Sims and Dixon yelled at each
other. Sims told Dixon that she was “tired” of how Dixon treated the
husband and E.D.; Dixon told Sims to “shut up little girl” and threw a water
bottle at E.D.’s car. Sims called Dixon “the B word” and invited her to fight.
Dixon then threatened to “beat [Sims’s] ass.”
The husband also left E.D.’s apartment to confront Dixon. He came up
behind E.D. and Sims and told Dixon that he did not like how she was
talking to Sims. Dixon then began arguing with the husband.
Eventually, Dixon—who was visibly angry—got into her van, which
had been parked facing E.D.’s car. At Dixon’s request, Jane Doe #1 got into
the front passenger seat. At that point, there had been no physical contact
between Dixon and the husband, E.D., or Sims.
Dixon backed up the van, made a U-turn, and accelerated towards the
husband, E.D., and Sims. Jane Doe #1 and Sims testified that Dixon tried
“to hit” or “run over” the husband, as well as E.D. and Sims. After Dixon
almost hit him, the husband struck the van’s driver side mirror.
Meanwhile, Sims tried to run away. Dixon, however, drove “really
fast,” jumped a curb, struck Sims, and pinned her against a tree.
Jane Doe #1, who testified that Dixon purposely hit Sims, hit her head
against the windshield. Jane Doe #1 then “squeeze[d]” out of the van.
Meanwhile, Dixon backed up, made another U-turn, started driving towards
E.D. and Jane Doe #1, and eventually hit E.D.’s car.
5
At some point, the husband, who was enraged and wanted “to beat
[Dixon] up,” pulled Dixon out of the van by her hair.2 After Dixon fell to the
ground, the husband testified that he froze and that Dixon got back into her
van. Jane Doe #1, however, testified that Dixon and the husband began
“wrestling” with each other.
Eventually, Dixon pulled out a knife. Jane Doe #1 testified that she
knocked the knife out of her hand. Jane Doe #3—who was “9 or 10” and
holding Jane Doe #2, who was one at the time—ran out of the apartment
and yelled at Dixon to stop. Jane Doe #1 took Jane Doe #2 from Jane Doe #3
and handed her to the husband.
At some point, Dixon grabbed the back of the husband’s shirt, and he
“threw her to the ground.” The husband then fell on his back while holding
Jane Doe #2. Jane Doe #1 picked up Jane Doe #2 and ran to the sidewalk
with her.
During their tussle, Dixon stabbed the husband with her knife. He
suffered an 8-inch laceration to his left thigh and a 14-centimeter laceration
across his back.
Sims suffered more severe injuries. She “had a major crush injury
across her pelvis and her thigh,” including “an open pelvis” and “femur
fracture.” In addition, “her leg was ripped open.” As a result, she had to
undergo multiple surgeries, including a leg amputation, and stayed in the
hospital for six weeks. At the time of trial, Sims still used a colostomy bag,
and her sexual organs remained compromised.
C. Defense Case
Three witnesses, including Dixon herself, testified in her defense.
2 There appeared to be some confusion over when the husband pulled
Dixon out of her van.
6
1. Josiah
Josiah, Dixon’s son who was 16 at the time of trial, testified that when
Dixon and the husband argued, there would be “banging” and “holes in the
wall.” He also saw the husband flip tables and heard the husband call Dixon
“the B word.” One time, Josiah heard the husband tell Dixon that he didn’t
care if “a bunch of dudes” had sex with her. Finally, Josiah testified that he
was scared that the husband would harm Dixon.
2. Dixon
Dixon testified that the husband started to call her names and ask for
sexual acts that she did not want to perform after five years of marriage.
According to Dixon, the husband did not want her “to have any friends
outside the marriage.” And before 2017, the husband would punch holes in
walls, flip tables, and knock doors off hinges during their arguments.
As for the 2017 incident, Dixon initially testified that she pushed the
husband and that he responded by slapping her. As a result, Dixon’s glasses
fell off, and she fell to the floor. Dixon later clarified that the husband
pushed her first. She then slapped him, and he slapped her back. The
husband also threatened to “beat [her] ass.” Dixon called the police, who
arrested Dixon. This was the first time the husband had hit her.
On the day that the husband served her with divorce papers, Dixon
testified that he left with five of the children, including their four biological
children. Dixon called the police, who directed her “to family court.” The
husband returned the children about a week later.
Dixon also testified about the incident that occurred on Jane Doe #2’s
first birthday. According to Dixon, the husband became “enraged” when he
discovered that she had “destroyed” his property. He flipped a table in the
7
garage, called Dixon a “crack ass bitch,” and threatened Dixon’s friend.
Dixon also talked about shooting the husband.
According to Dixon, the husband took their four biological children a
couple of days before her birthday in April 2020. Over the next few weeks,
she saw the children once. When Dixon asked the husband when she “was
going to get the kids back,” he refused to answer.
On Mother’s Day, Dixon testified that she went to E.D.’s apartment to
see their four children. When the husband returned to the apartment, Dixon
asked to speak with him in the hallway outside the apartment. The
husband told her that he was not going to return the children, and they
began yelling at each other. E.D. came out and asked them to be quiet.
After the husband threatened to “beat [her] ass,” Dixon, who was “shaking,”
left and went to her van with Jane Doe #1.
According to Dixon, E.D. and Sims followed her to her van. Dixon
admitted that she threw a water bottle at E.D.’s car and that she and Sims
yelled at each other. Dixon called Sims “a little girl,” and Sims threatened to
“whoop [her] ass.” Dixon testified that the husband, who was visibly angry,
came out and hit her in the head, causing her glasses to fall off. As a result,
Dixon could not see “much at all.”
Dixon testified that she called 911 right before she started driving her
van because the husband had hit her and because she was scared of him.
Jane Doe #1 sat in the front passenger seat. As Dixon drove away, the
husband hit the side view mirror. According to Dixon—who was driving
without her glasses—she made a U-turn so she wouldn’t hit anybody. She
testified that she tried to brake but accidentally “hit the gas,” jumped the
curb, and hit a tree. She did not see anybody in front of her van. When she
backed up, she heard people yelling that she “hit her” but did not “realize
8
that [she had] hit anyone” at that time. She later saw Sims laying on the
ground “bloody.” Dixon testified that she did not “mean to hit” Sims.
After Dixon hit E.D.’s car, she testified that the husband, who was
“very upset” and screaming at her, pulled her out of the van by her hair and
began hitting her. Dixon fought back, but the husband, who was much
larger, “had the upper hand.” When the husband stood up, Dixon, who was
“scared for [her] life,” pulled out a knife from her bra and stabbed him in the
back and leg. As the husband walked away, she went to her van and waited
for the police.
3. Dr. Laura Barnard
Dr. Barnard testified as “an expert on intimate partner battery and its
[effects]” and “traumatic stress and its [effect] on memory.” She opined that
Dixon was “a battered woman,” who suffered from “fairly extreme” abuse.
As a result, Dixon’s memory of incidents may become “jumbled up.” Dr.
Barnard also testified that, based on the escalating events on Mother’s Day,
Dixon, as a battered woman, likely feared for her life, even when she stabbed
her husband after he stood up. She also opined that Dixon’s decision to call
911 suggested that she was not the “aggressor.”
D. The Verdict and Sentence
The jury acquitted Dixon of the attempted murders (§§ 664, 187, subd.
(a)) of Sims (count 1) and the husband (count 4) and two counts of felony child
abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 8 and 9).
The jury, however, found Dixon guilty of: (1) attempted voluntary
manslaughter of Sims (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a)), a lesser included offense of
attempted murder (count 1); (2) mayhem against Sims (§ 203; count 2);
(3) assault with a deadly weapon on Sims (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3);
(4) felony child abuse against Jane Doe #1 (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 7); and
9
(5) misdemeanor child abuse against Jane Doe #3 (§ 273a, subd. (b)), a lesser
included offense of felony child abuse (count 9). As to the three counts where
Sims was the victim, the jury found that Dixon inflicted GBI under
circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and used a
deadly weapon (motor vehicle) (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1) or 969f).
The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the remaining three counts
where her husband was the alleged victim: (1) attempted voluntary
manslaughter (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a); count 4); (2) spousal abuse (§ 273.5,
subd. (a); count 5); and (3) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 6). The trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts and dismissed
them pursuant to the People’s motion.
The trial court sentenced Dixon to 13 years in state prison by imposing
the upper term of eight years on her mayhem conviction (count 2) plus five
years for the GBI enhancement. It also stayed the sentences as to the
attempted involuntary manslaughter (count 1) and assault with a deadly
weapon (count 3) convictions pursuant to section 654 and ran the sentences
as to the child abuse convictions (counts 7 and 9) concurrently. Dixon timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Double Punishment
Dixon contends that the trial court erred by imposing the GBI
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (e) because GBI is an
element of both the enhancement and the underlying offense of mayhem.
Section 12022.7, subdivision (g), however, establishes otherwise.
The rules of statutory construction are well established. If the
statutory language is unambiguous, then “ ‘the plain meaning of’ ” that
10
language controls and we need look no further. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma
Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 530.) But if the language is ambiguous,
then we may consider the canons of statutory construction in interpreting the
statute. (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 850.) “The
interpretation of statutory language is . . . subject to our de novo review.”
(MES Investments, LLC v. Dadson Washer Service, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
451, 458.)
Subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 12022.7 establish different
enhancements based on the infliction of GBI. The one at issue here—found
in subdivision (e)—states in relevant part: “Any person who personally
inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an
additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years.” Subdivision (g) then states that the GBI enhancements
found in “[s]ubdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) [of section 12022.7] shall not apply
if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.” It, however,
omits subdivision (e) from the list of enhancements that do not apply in that
circumstance.
Because subdivision (g) created a “specific list” of GBI enhancements
found in section 12022.7, the omission of subdivision (e) from that list must
be “intentional.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla (2016) 62
Cal.4th 486, 514.) And that intentional omission means that the Legislature
did not intend to include subdivision (e) among the enhancements that do not
apply when GBI is also an element of the underlying offense. (See Mountain
Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 116 [“where
11
exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not
to be presumed unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned”].)
In her reply brief, Dixon does not challenge this reasoning. Instead,
she contends for the first time that, notwithstanding section 12022.7,
subdivision (g), imposing the enhancement violates section 654 because she is
being punished twice “for the same act or omission.”3 But “[t]hat argument
has been forfeited.” (People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 505, 514.)
In any event, section 12022.7, subdivision (g)—which only applies when
a defendant inflicts GBI—is more specific than section 654—which applies to
any act or omission. (See People v. Billy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 246, 264 [“A
statute is general when its subject matter encompasses hundreds of
situations, while a statute is specific if its subject matter applies to a specific
class of crimes or a single type of conduct”].) Recourse to section 654 is
therefore “unnecessary,” and “[t]he court should simply apply the answer
found in the specific statutes and not consider the more general section 654.”
(People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163.) Section 12022.7, subdivision
(g) establishes that subdivision (e) applies even if GBI is an element of the
underlying offense. Accordingly, the trial court was free to apply section
12022.7, subdivision (e) here.
3 Section 654, subdivision (a) states:“An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under
any other.”
12
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Dixon contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding that she inflicted GBI “under circumstances involving domestic
violence” pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (e). In considering a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
59-60 (Albillar).) Viewing the evidence in that light, we find more than
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.
Under section 12022.7, subdivision (e), the enhancement applies only if
the defendant inflicts GBI “under circumstances involving domestic violence.”
“ ‘Domestic violence’ means abuse committed against an adult or a minor who
is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with
whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or
engagement relationship.” (§ 13700, subd. (b).) And “ ‘[a]buse’ means
intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or
placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious
bodily injury to himself or herself, or another.” (Id., subd. (a).)
For GBI to occur “under circumstances involving domestic violence,”
the injury must occur “in the course of an incident of domestic violence.”
(People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 899 (Truong).) The injury may
be inflicted “on any person involved in the incident, whether or not a victim of
domestic violence . . . .” (Ibid.) Thus, the enhancement may apply “when the
defendant inflicts [GBI] upon a friend or relative who has attempted to come
13
to the aid of the domestic violence victim” or when “an angry husband
physically abuses his wife and, as part of the same incident, inflicts [GBI]
upon the man with whom she is having an affair.” (Id. at pp. 899-900.)
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
finding, the domestic violence incident began when, as Jane Doe #1 and Sims
testified, Dixon tried to run over the husband with her van.4 Shortly after
she failed to hit the husband, Dixon seriously injured Sims—who had just
been defending the husband and who the husband had just been defending
against Dixon—by pinning Sims against a tree with the van. Thus, there is
ample evidence that Dixon inflicted GBI upon Sims in the course of this
incident of domestic violence. Indeed, Sims is no different than the boyfriend
of the defendant’s spouse in Truong, who “fe[lt] the wrath of somebody who
was actually committing an act of domestic violence upon another . . . .”
(Truong, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.)
Dixon counters that she injured Sims because of their verbal spat and
not as part of any domestic violence incident. Even if this interpretation of
the evidence is plausible, we must view that evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s findings. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60.) In
any event, the record indicates that Dixon likely became angry with Sims
right before she hit Sims with her van because Sims was defending the
husband. Thus, the evidence in support of the enhancement is even stronger
than in Truong, where the defendant stabbed his spouse’s boyfriend while he
was sleeping. (Truong, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 893, 900.)
4 The jury was free to disbelieve Dixon’s testimony that the husband
threatened and struck her before she tried to run him over.
14
Dixon also contends that, because the jury deadlocked on the three
counts where the husband was the alleged victim—including the count for
spousal abuse—the jury did not find that Dixon committed any abuse. But
these three counts—which alleged that Dixon personally used a knife as an
element of the offense or the enhancement to the offense—did not cover
Dixon’s attempt to run over the husband. Thus, the jury’s inability to reach a
verdict on those counts has no bearing on its finding that Dixon inflicted GBI
on Sims “under circumstances involving domestic violence.” (§ 12022.7, subd.
(e).)
Finally, Dixon contends that the enhancement should not be imposed
because she was the victim, and not the perpetrator, of domestic violence in
this instance. The jury, however, could have found otherwise based on
Dixon’s attempt to run over the husband. Because we must presume “ ‘ “the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence” ’ ”
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550), we presume that the jury did so
here.
Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support the enhancement.
C. Abstract of Judgment
Both parties agree that certain errors in the abstract of judgment
(abstract) should be corrected. We too agree.
First, the abstract lists the statutory basis for the personal use of a
deadly weapon enhancements (deadly weapon enhancement) as section
12022, subdivision (e)(1). But that subdivision does not exist. Instead, the
correct subdivision is subdivision (b)(1), and the abstract should be corrected
to fix this error.
15
Second, the abstract states that a deadly weapon enhancement
(mistakenly listed as “PC 12022(e)(1)”) was alleged, imposed, and stayed as to
count 3. But count 3 only alleged the use of a deadly weapon as a “Special
Allegation” under section 969f, making it a serious or violent felony. And in
its oral pronouncement of judgment, the trial court did not impose or stay any
deadly weapon enhancement as to count 3. “Where there is a discrepancy
between the oral pronouncement of judgment and . . . the abstract of
judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (Zackery).) The deadly weapon enhancement as to
count 3 should therefore be deleted.
Third, the abstract states that the trial court stayed, rather than
struck, the deadly weapon enhancement as to count 1. But in its oral
pronouncement of judgment, the court struck that enhancement. Again, the
oral pronouncement controls, and the abstract should be conformed to it.
(Zackery, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.)
Finally, the abstract states that Dixon was sentenced under section
667, subdivisions (b) through (i) or section 1170.12 based on a “strike prior.”
Dixon, however, had no prior strikes. The reference in the abstract to any
prior strike should therefore be deleted.
Accordingly, we order that the abstract be corrected and conformed “to
the sentences actually imposed by the court” in the manner described above.
(See People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222, fn. 14.)
16
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
as described above. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The trial
court is further directed to forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
CHOU, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A167191)
17
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.