CourtListener 10330305•People v. Gonzalez CA2/5
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Filed 2/10/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333270
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA081411)
v.
ARTURO GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Arturo Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for vacatur of his conviction of first degree murder and
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court denied
Gonzalez’s petition because he failed to make a prima facie
showing that he was eligible for relief. We affirm the trial court’s
order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2015, Gonzalez was charged with the murder of a fellow
prison inmate after he participated in “disciplining” the victim for
failing to follow gang regulations. Gonzalez and two or three
other inmates beat the victim, which resulted in his death.
At trial, Gonzalez was prosecuted for murder under three
theories. The prosecutor argued that Gonzalez was either guilty
as (1) a direct perpetrator of malice murder; (2) an aider and
abettor of malice murder; or (3) an aider and abettor of an assault
with force likely to cause great bodily injury that resulted in
murder as a natural and probable consequence of the assault.
The prosecutor emphasized that the evidence showed that
Gonzalez committed first degree malice murder, but that
alternatively the jury could find Gonzalez guilty of second degree
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The trial court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting
general principles (CALCRIM No. 400), aiding and abetting
intended crimes (CALCRIM No. 401), natural and probable
consequences (CALCRIM No. 403), homicide (CALCRIM
No. 500), first or second degree murder with malice aforethought
(CALCRIM No. 520), first degree murder (CALCRIM No. 521),
2
and assault likely to cause great bodily injury (CALCRIM
No. 875).
During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification
regarding CALCRIM No. 520, specifically the portion of the
instruction defining implied malice. The jurors indicated that
they were in agreement that Gonzalez committed murder but
were struggling to reach consensus regarding the degree of
murder. After the trial court responded to the jury’s final
question regarding implied malice, the jurors returned to
deliberations and reached a verdict.
The jury convicted Gonzalez of first degree murder. (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1.) The jury also found true a gang
enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C). In a
separate bench trial, Gonzalez admitted that he had served four
prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b), two of which he served concurrently. The trial
court sentenced Gonzalez to 25 years to life in prison for the
murder, plus a one-year term for the concurrent prison priors.
The court imposed a minimum parole eligible date of 15 years
pursuant to the gang enhancement. The court struck the
remaining two prison priors in the interest of justice.
Gonzalez appealed, and the judgment was affirmed by a
different panel of this court in an unpublished opinion. (People v.
Gonzalez (Jan. 20, 2017, B271270 [nonpub. opn.]). As pertinent
here, on appeal Gonzalez argued that the trial court’s omission of
certain portions of the pattern instructions for CALCRIM No. 520
and CALCRIM No. 521 in combination with the trial court’s
responses to the jury’s questions erroneously led the jury to
believe that any murder committed with express malice (intent to
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
kill) was murder in the first degree and that only the commission
of aiding and abetting an act the natural and probable
consequences of which are death was murder in the second
degree. (Id. at *7-9.) Another panel of this court concluded that
the trial court did not err in instructing the jury under CALCRIM
No. 520 and CALCRIM No. 521. (Id. at *7-8.) The panel held
that it was “abundantly clear that [Gonzalez could] only be found
guilty of first degree murder if it is proven that [he] ‘acted
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation,’ and not merely
intentionally.” (Id. at *8.) The panel held that Gonzalez forfeited
his challenge to the trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions
by consenting to the court’s responses at trial, and also observed
that “the trial court’s explanations relating to the elements of
either first or second degree murder were accurate statements of
law based in whole or in part upon the applicable CALCRIM
model instruction.” (Id. at *8-9.)
In 2021, Gonzalez petitioned for vacatur of his murder
conviction and resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6)2, which the People opposed. Gonzalez was appointed
counsel and filed a reply.
At a hearing in 2023, the trial court denied the petition,
finding that Gonzalez was prima facie ineligible for relief. The
court found the jury had been instructed that if it found Gonzalez
guilty of murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, it was murder in the second degree. The jury convicted
Gonzalez of first degree murder, so it could not have based its
decision on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
2 Prior to filing his section 1170.95 petition, Gonzalez filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the same basis, which the
trial court later denied as duplicative.
4
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) In addition to substantively amending sections 188
and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill 1437 added section
1170.95 [(now § 1172.6)], which provides a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as
amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended
former section 1170.95. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1). As a result of
these amendments, current section 1172.6 provides that
“person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter,”
may file a petition to have that conviction vacated under certain
circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a petitioner makes a
prima facie showing of eligibility under section 1172.6, the trial
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
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hearing. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) A
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes that he or she was not
convicted under any theory of liability affected by Senate Bill
1437’s amendments to the law of murder. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 450 (Curiel); People v. Mancilla (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 854, 866–867.)
We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. Analysis
At the time of Gonzalez’s trial, an aider and abettor could
not be convicted of first degree murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59
Cal.4th 155.) As Gonzalez recognizes, if the jury was properly
instructed, its verdict of first degree murder would conclusively
establish that it did not convict Gonzalez under that now-invalid
theory of liability. Gonzalez seeks to escape this conclusion by
arguing that, taken together, certain instructions, the court’s
response to jury questions, and the prosecutor’s remarks in
closing argument erroneously suggested to the jury that it could
convict him of first degree murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. We reject Gonzalez’s arguments.
1. Jury Instructions
Gonzalez first contends that the trial court’s instruction on
aiding and abetting (CALCRIM No. 400) informed the jury that if
6
Gonzalez aided and abetted another crime it could find him guilty
of first degree murder. Gonzalez’s argument concerns the final
paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400, which stated: “Under some
specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and
abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other
crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.”
This language related to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, but the instruction is of no assistance to Gonzalez
because nothing in CALCRIM No. 400 suggested that Gonzalez
could be convicted of first degree murder based on the theory.
CALCRIM No. 400 described the natural and probable
consequences doctrine only generally. It did not describe the
“specific circumstances” under which a defendant could be found
guilty of murder under the theory or instruct on determining the
degree of the crime. The trial court provided specific guidance on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine in CALCRIM
No. 403, which, as we next discuss, clearly indicated that a
conviction of natural and probable consequences murder could
only be a conviction for murder in the second degree.
Second, Gonzalez contends that language in CALCRIM
No. 403, the natural and probable consequences instruction, may
have caused jurors to believe that they could convict him of first
degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. CALCRIM No. 403 stated in pertinent part: “If you
find the defendant guilty of murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory, it is murder of the second degree. If,
however, you unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder
under a different theory of liability, then you must decide the
degree of murder and need not unanimously agree on the theory.”
(Italics added.) Gonzalez argues that the second sentence is
7
confusing and could have caused the jury to believe that it could
convict him of first degree murder if some of the jurors found that
he was guilty of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and others found him guilty under a
malice theory.
We disagree. The first sentence of CALCRIM No. 403
clearly stated that if the jury found Gonzalez guilty under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, he was guilty of
second degree murder. The second sentence then explained that
if the jury found Gonzalez guilty under a different theory than the
natural and probable consequences doctrine—i.e. as either the
perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor who acted with malice—
it did not need to agree regarding which of those two theories
applied. This was a correct statement of the law. (See People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120 [“the aider and abettor
doctrine . . . obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider
and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each
played which role”].) The instruction did not permit the jury to
find Gonzales guilty of first degree murder unless the jurors
unanimously agreed that he committed murder in the first
degree, which the jurors could not do if even a single juror found
that Gonzalez was guilty of natural and probable consequences
murder, as that theory could only result in a conviction of second
degree murder.
Third, Gonzalez complains that the trial court gave a
version of CALCRIM No. 520 that omitted the sentence in the
pattern instruction that states: “If you decide that the defendant
committed murder, it is murder of the second degree, unless the
People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder
8
of the first degree as defined in CALCRIM No. [521].” This
contention also lacks merit.
“ ‘[W]here, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in
deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law
of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal,
and . . . in any subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .’ ”
The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters
[citations] . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘We will apply the law of the case
doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was “ ‘actually
presented and determined by the court.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Medrano (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1262.)
Gonzalez raised this exact issue on direct appeal. (People v.
Gonzalez (Jan. 20, 2017, B271270 at *7.) The appellate court
held that the trial court did not err in omitting the statement
from CALCRIM No. 520 because the jury was clearly instructed
under CALCRIM No. 521 that “The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first
degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first
degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.” (Ibid.)
The panel’s decision is law of the case.
We are not otherwise persuaded by Gonzalez’s argument
that the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 constitutes a change in
the law that provides an exception to the law of the case doctrine.
The changes wrought by Senate Bill No. 1437 invalidated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Senate Bill
No. 1437 did not impact the court’s prior determination that the
trial court properly instructed the jury on first degree murder—
9
the same issue that Gonzalez asks us to determine here.
Gonzalez’s contention with respect to CALCRIM No. 520 is a
question of law that has already been decided. It is law of the
case and cannot provide a basis for Gonzalez’s argument here.
2. Prosecutor’s Comments in Closing Argument
Gonzalez contends that the prosecutor “made problematic
arguments during closing concerning what was required for an
aiding/abetting theory to get to first degree murder when it
insinuated that any degree of involvement could be enough, thus
further confusing the issue.”
This contention also fails. The question on appeal from the
denial of Gonzalez’s section 1172.6 petition is not whether the
prosecutor made statements that might have confused the jury
on any point of law, but whether there is a possibility that the
prosecutor’s statements would have led the jury to believe that it
could convict Gonzalez of first degree murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
The prosecutor would have had to argue that Gonzalez
could be convicted of first degree murder because he committed
assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, that
another participant in the assault committed murder, and that
under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Gonzalez’s
position would have known that murder was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury. The prosecutor would also
had to have argued that no subjective mental component was
necessary, as “[a]ider and abettor liability under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine does not require assistance with
10
or actual knowledge and intent relating to the [murder], nor
subjective foreseeability of either [murder] or the perpetrator’s
state of mind in committing it. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [inquiry is strictly objective and does not
depend on defendant’s subjective state of mind].) It only requires
that under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would have or should have
known that [murder] was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the act aided and abetted by the defendant. (Ibid.)” (People v.
Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 165–166.)
The first segment of the prosecutor’s argument to which
Gonzalez objects was made during the prosecutor’s discussion of
malice murder, which the prosecutor clearly separated from his
discussion of the natural and probable consequences doctrine
throughout his argument. Gonzalez takes the prosecutor’s
statements out of context, quoting only the italicized language
that follows:
“So if you believe [Gonzalez] is a direct
perpetrator, that’s first degree murder. If you believe
that one of the other two or three people was the direct
perpetrator and [Gonzalez] aided and abetted it
because he was in there kicking too, he is an aider and
abettor, and that’s first degree murder. He is guilty of
the same offense as the man who intended to kill him.
“And then finally, under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, this would mean
that all of the people only intended to assault him.
And as a natural and probable consequence, they
knew that an assault was dangerous to human life
11
and they disregarded, they consciously disregarded
that danger and assaulted him anyway and killed
him, that’s second degree murder.
“So you’ve got two theories that you can
proceed on for first degree murder. Direct
perpetrator or aider and abettor with one of the other
guys being the direct perpetrator.
“And then you’ve got one theory to proceed on,
natural and probable consequences, that leads to
second degree murder.” (Italics added.)
The prosecutor’s argument inaccurately suggested that all
malice murder was murder in the first degree. The prosecutor
also inaccurately stated that a conviction of natural and probable
consequences murder required Gonzalez to consciously disregard
that his acts were dangerous to human life. These inaccuracies
do not impact the present inquiry, however, because they would
not have lead the jury to believe that it could convict Gonzalez of
first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. If anything, the prosecutor’s misstatements provided
Gonzalez additional protection under that theory, because the
prosecutor stated that Gonzalez had to be subjectively aware of
danger to human life and consciously disregard that knowledge,
although the natural and probable consequences doctrine had no
subjective component.
Gonzalez also objects to the italicized portion of the
prosecutor’s later statement in closing argument:
“[Defense] [c]ounsel told you there was no
malice aforethought. No intent to kill.
12
“I previously told you that he crossed the line
when the attack continued after [the victim] went
down. That demonstrates the mental state.
“[The victim] was sittin’ on the pavement with
his hands like this when the attack commenced.
Punching by three to four guys. Punching, blows all
about the head and the neck. And then kicking,
kicking. And now he is flat on the ground and it
continued.
“And one of the witnesses said [Gonzalez]
finished him off. Somebody else said somebody else
finished him off. . . .
“So on the intent issue, if your [(and the
gang’s)] rule is no punching and kicking after the
victim is on the ground, why continue to punch and
kick? That’s the intent for first degree murder.
“And if you buy [Gonzalez’s] argument . . . that
somebody else killed [the victim] by kicking him,
that’s aiding and abetting, because he was aiding and
abetting the killer. And he gets first degree murder
for that too.
“First degree murder if you decide he was the
direct perpetrator. First degree murder if you decide
somebody else kicked him and that caused the death
and he was aiding and abetting because he was
punching the guy.
“Defendant just admitted that he was involved
in the fight. So we know it was him.
13
“Why punch and kick when [the victim] is
down? Why? Because you crossed the line into
intent.” (Italics added.)
These statements related solely to the prosecutor’s theory
that Gonzalez acted with malice and was guilty as either the
perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. They do not implicate
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Nothing in
either of the prosecutor’s foregoing statements suggested that the
jury could convict Gonzalez of first degree murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine rather than a still-
valid theory of murder. Gonzalez had the opportunity to raise
any challenges regarding confusion between still-valid theories of
murder on direct appeal. Those challenges do not provide relief
under section 1172.6. (See People v. DeHuff (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner
to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error”].)
3. Trial Court’s Response to Jury Questions
Finally, Gonzalez contends that one of the trial court’s
responses to a jury question may have confused the jury, because
the response did not state that if the jury found Gonzalez guilty
of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
he could only be guilty of second degree murder.
During deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the
court:
“(1) We are asking for further clarification on
[CALCRIM No.] 520, ‘The natural and probable
14
consequences of the act were dangerous to human
life;’ along with an example.
“(2) We can’t seem to be moving forward deciding
between [first] and [second] degree murder.”
Gonzalez characterizes the jury’s note as “a jury
question . . . concerning the NPC doctrine.” However, with
respect to the jury’s first question, CALCRIM No. 520 does not
concern the natural and probable consequences doctrine. It
describes malice murder.3 The second part of the jury’s question
concerned the degree of murder, which was relevant to all three
of the prosecution’s theories of murder—malice murder, direct
aiding and abetting malice murder, and aiding and abetting
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The trial court discussed its response with the parties. The
court intuited from the jury’s note that the jurors unanimously
agreed Gonzalez was guilty of murder, but had yet to reach
3 The jury appears to have been confused regarding implied
malice. CALCRIM No. 520 explained the difference between the
two forms of malice as follows:
“The defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully
intended to kill.
“The defendant acted with implied malice if:
“1. He intentionally committed an act;
“2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous
to human life;
“AND
“4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.” (Italics added.)
15
agreement with respect to degree. With the agreement of the
parties, the court sent the following response:
“This clarification is in response to your statement
which reads, ‘we can’t seem to be moving forward,
deciding between first and second degree murder.’
Does this mean that the jury has already made a
decision whether or not the defendant is guilty of
murder and the only remaining issue is the degree of
murder? Please advise.”
The jury responded:
“We all agree at this point that the defendant is
guilty of murder. However, whether it is first or
second remains to be agreed upon.”
The trial court then sent the jury the response that Gonzalez
complains of:
“The court is in receipt of your question, which is
attached.
“Instruction [CALCRIM No.] 520 defines murder and
its various degrees. Instruction [CALCRIM No.] 521
defines what is required to prove [first] degree
murder.
“The natural and probable consequences theory of
murder is a theory of criminal liability for murder.
16
Instruction [CALCRIM No.] 403 defines the natural
and probable consequences theory of murder. To
prove a defendant is guilty of murder under this
theory, the People must prove that the defendant
committed an act, and that the natural and probable
consequence of the act he intended to commit, is
murder. Furthermore, a natural and probable
consequence is one that a reasonable person would
know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. Refer to instruction [CALCRIM No.] 403
for a full detailed explanation of murder under this
theory.”
“The court cannot provide examples of murder under
the natural and probable consequence theory.
“If the jury requires further assistance in deciding
the degree of the crime, please inform the court.”
Gonzalez contends that the court’s failure to state that
natural and probable consequences murder could only be murder
in the second degree may have confused the jury as to whether it
could convict him of first degree natural and probable
consequences murder. The contention lacks merit. The trial
court’s response did not specify the possible degrees for any of the
prosecution’s theories of murder. The court referred the jury to
the instructions describing each of the theories and stated that
CALCRIM No. 521 instructed on the requirements for first
degree murder. The court then specifically advised the jury to
consult CALCRIM No. 403 regarding the natural and probable
17
consequences theory of murder, which, as we have discussed,
clearly states that natural and probable consequences murder
may only be in the second degree. The court’s response did not
introduce any confusion regarding the degree of murder for the
various theories.
We affirm the trial court’s order. The jury was clearly
instructed that it could only convict Gonzalez of first degree
murder if he killed the victim willfully, with deliberation and
premeditation. It was also clearly instructed that under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine it could only convict
Gonzalez of murder in the second degree. The prosecutor did not
state that the jury could convict Gonzalez of first degree murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Finally,
the trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions did not suggest
that the jury could convict Gonzalez of first degree murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court
referred the jury to the specific, legally correct instructions on the
degrees of murder to resolve the issue of degree. The jury could
not have convicted Gonzalez of murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in light of its finding that he
committed first degree murder. The court did not err in denying
Gonzalez’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
18
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Gonzalez’s
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
19
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