CourtListener 10328572•I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist.
Testo completo
Filed 1/15/25; Certified for Publication 2/6/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
I.C., B322148
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC665118
v.
COMPTON UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Hirji & Chau, Rosa K. Hirji and
Alexander F. Rodriguez for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Olivarez Madruga Law Organization, Terence J. Gallagher
and Leslie Anne Burnet for Defendants and Respondents.
_____________________________
SUMMARY
In September 2016, plaintiff was a student, almost 16 years
old, when he and a friend started a fistfight during their art
class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had recently
been using a walker because of a back condition, immediately
intervened to prevent the two boys from hurting themselves or
someone else. While pulling the larger boy away from plaintiff –
and being hit himself by plaintiff, who continued to throw
punches after the other boy stopped—the teacher lost his balance
and fell onto plaintiff, breaking plaintiff’s leg. One of the other
students recorded the teacher’s intervention in the fight.
Plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for
negligence. Plaintiff contended the teacher should not have tried
to stop the fight because of his weight and physical condition, and
he should have done something else, sooner, to prevent the fight.
Plaintiff also contended the school district had failed to train its
teachers how to safely intervene in physical altercations between
students. After 15 days of trial, the jury, who viewed the video of
the incident many times during the trial, concluded that neither
the teacher nor the school district was negligent, and that
plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for
the harm to plaintiff.
Plaintiff appeals, contending the trial court should have
granted his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV); erred in refusing multiple special instructions plaintiff
requested; and erred in excluding an expert witness. We find no
error and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
We have reviewed the record and recount the relevant
facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to the verdict. We
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will supplement our recitation as necessary in connection with
plaintiff’s contentions on appeal.
1. Plaintiff’s Injury
The incident resulting in this lawsuit occurred on
September 19, 2016, during defendant Marco Godinez’s art class
at Dominguez High School in the Compton Unified School
District (the District). Mr. Godinez had been an art teacher at
Dominguez High for about 15 years. Class had begun, with the
students seated and working on their assigned projects.
Plaintiff I.C., who was almost 16 years old, and his friend
Christopher L. began “horseplaying.” The horseplay was “slap-
boxing,” which in this case consisted of playfully trying to tap
each other on the cheek and avoid getting tapped at the same
time. Mr. Godinez, who was at his desk in the center of the class
grading assignments in sketch books, saw them and told them to
stop, and they stopped.
They did not, however, stop for long. According to another
student, A.F., the punching started approximately 30 seconds
later. Mr. Godinez heard chairs screeching and looked up to see
the two boys were on their feet and striking each other with full
force. He yelled at them to stop as he made his way toward them,
and saw a spray of blood somewhere between them. He intended
to come in from behind Christopher, who was bigger, and pull
him away. (The video of the incident begins at this point in the
altercation.)
As Mr. Godinez grabbed Christopher around his shoulder,
plaintiff hit Christopher, who collapsed downward, “and I
[Mr. Godinez] ended up going down trying to protect
[Christopher] from hitting the table.” As Mr. Godinez was
“wrapping [Christopher] up,” “holding [him] underneath me,”
Mr. Godinez started to fall forward. Plaintiff continued trying to
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hit Christopher but instead struck Mr. Godinez three times, in
the face, collarbone area and shoulder. Then Christopher
escaped Mr. Godinez’s grasp, and when that happened,
Mr. Godinez “ended up falling the rest of the way. And
instinctually I just tried to stop myself from falling by reaching
forward, and what was there was [plaintiff].”
Mr. Godinez “ended up grabbing around or grabbing
[plaintiff] by the legs to keep me from falling forward.” He
landed on plaintiff, who began screaming that his leg was broken.
As they were on the floor, Mr. Godinez began to pull plaintiff
toward him and put his hand behind plaintiff because he wanted
to protect him until he could turn around to look for Christopher.
At this point, he was not putting any weight on plaintiff. When
he saw the fight was over, he directed his attention to plaintiff;
told him “to stop rolling, stop moving”; stood up with help from
students who rushed over to him; and told a student to call 911.
Plaintiff’s leg was broken and bleeding, with the bone protruding
from his skin.
At trial, Mr. Godinez explained what happened in detail,
with the jury viewing the 13- or 14-second video, which he
testified was an accurate depiction of what he recalled happening
that day.
Christopher also testified about what was happening on the
video, frame by frame. He described Mr. Godinez’s actions, after
plaintiff and Mr. Godinez went down on the floor at about
four seconds into the video, as “holding [plaintiff] down” for the
remaining 10 seconds.
A.F., who was at the same worktable as plaintiff and
Christopher, testified, based on his observation of the fight, to his
belief “that if [plaintiff] would’ve stopped punching [after
Christopher stopped punching], this wouldn’t have escalated the
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way that it did.” He testified that when Mr. Godinez fell on
plaintiff, it appeared to him (A.F.) “that he fell on him on
accident,” and that “Mr. Godinez did not intentionally tackle or
try to bring down or actually drop [plaintiff].”
2. Mr. Godinez’s Physical Condition
Plaintiff tried to establish that Mr. Godinez was negligent
when he chose to intervene in the fight, falling because he was in
no physical condition to intervene and was not trained to do so.
Plaintiff presented evidence from Mr. Godinez’s medical records
and testimony from doctors that Mr. Godinez was obese
(375 pounds and six feet two inches tall); suffered from sciatica;
called or went to doctors for back pain on several days in
September 2016, with a last visit to the emergency room for back
pain on Friday, September 16, 2016, three days before the
accident; and had been using a walker to get around.
His emergency room doctor on September 16, 2016, Amy
Koplovsky, testified from the medical record of that day that he
“can stand and walk a few steps but then has a shooting pain
down his legs which cause his legs to buckle and needs the
walker.” She gave him a shot of Toradol and testified she hoped
it would alleviate his pain that night, but it was highly unlikely
to do so in the future. She also testified that, “hopefully,” the
Toradol, “in combination with the prednisone, if he’s doing
stretches, exercising, the recommended treatment, that all those
things combined would be factors that would hopefully alleviate
the inflammation and pain.”
Mr. Godinez testified that he woke up the following
morning (Saturday) “feeling much, much better,” and did
stretches for sciatica throughout the weekend. He continued to
feel much better on Monday morning, the day of the fight, and
had no back pain until that evening, after the incident, when his
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back was “a little tight.” He visited the emergency room in the
afternoon or evening after the fight, on the advice of the assistant
principal and emergency personnel at the scene, to have his
wounds from the fight checked out and documented. He did not
complain of back pain, but he was using a crutch as a cane to
avoid having his back tire out.
Mr. Godinez explained that he thought he felt so much
better on the day of the fight because of the “combination of
everything that was finally kicking in”—the shot, the prednisone
he had been taking for two weeks, several visits to a chiropractor,
and the stretching exercises. He also testified that none of his
doctors put any kind of restriction on his activity at work, and
never referred to him as having a disability or a handicap. He
testified that his back did not have any impact on how he
handled breaking up the fight, and his back did not feel tired or
weak before the fight.
3. The Training Issue
Plaintiff sought to prove that the District was negligent in
its training of its teachers and staff.
Plaintiff presented evidence of several points admitted by
defendants: that the District “employed a practice to train its
teachers in non-violent crisis intervention for the safety of its
students”; that the “purpose of non-violent crisis intervention
training is to teach verbal and physical techniques to ensure the
care, welfare, safety, and security of all students, even in violent
moments”; and that the District’s training program “states that
non-violent physical crisis intervention should be used as a last
resort and to minimize the risks. The staff should work with the
team member whenever applying physical interventions.”
The District’s policy on employee security required the
superintendent or designee to “ensure that employees are trained
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in crisis prevention and intervention techniques in order to
protect themselves and students. Staff development may include
training in classroom management, effective communication
techniques, and crisis resolution.”
Plaintiff presented three exhibits referred to as the
District’s “CPI Manual.” These are workbooks concerning “Non-
violent Crisis Intervention,” and “Non-violent Crisis Intervention,
Integrating Positive Behavioral Interventions and Support
(PBIS).” PBIS “was implemented into the [CPI] program,” and
the two programs “essentially are based on the same principles.”
Jose Gomez, a CPI trainer, testified that the CPI training
“is a tool for classroom management,” with the “primary focus of
it, to create a positive environment throughout the classroom.”
He said that PBIS training was the “more modern version” of CPI
training. Training included topics such as nonverbal
communication, paraverbal communication (tone, volume,
cadence), and de-escalation techniques. Mr. Gomez testified that
he did not train the Dominguez High School staff on “the use of
restraints” or “on ways of taking students to the ground in a
confrontation.” Material on understanding the risks of restraints
was provided to participants in the training, but was not covered
by the trainer.
Another CPI trainer, Felicia Fernandez, similarly stated
that she taught units 1 through 7 and unit 10 of the material,
and did not cover units 8 and 9 (which included “physical control
and restraint positions to be implemented when physical control
is necessary as a last resort due to an individual’s dangerous
behavior” and “situational role-plays”). Ms. Fernandez testified
that those materials were given to the teachers being trained,
“[s]o they had it available to them, but it was not an area that
needed training at that time.”
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Mr. Godinez received training in 2014 and in 2016. He
testified that he did not receive training “on safe intervention
with student fights,” “other than the CPI training.” Mr. Godinez
testified that “[w]e had to go through the entire manual. We had
to read it,” but “they did not do a demonstration” of how to safely
physically intervene when two students are in an altercation.
Mr. Godinez was asked whether the District had “a policy in
regard to what teachers are required to do to break up a fight.”
He responded: “The District just requires that we take some sort
of action, but it gives us the leeway to determine what that action
is. It sees us as professionals and just recognizes we are
supposed to act in the best interest of safety for our students.”
Blain Watson, a witness in plaintiff’s case-in-chief, was
principal at Dominguez High School from July 2017 (after the
incident) through June 2020. Plaintiff had previously deposed
Mr. Watson because he was deemed the person most
knowledgeable on “the policies and procedures of Dominguez
High School’s safety plan for student altercations.” Plaintiff’s
counsel asked him about the PBIS program. Mr. Watson
described it as “a framework of how you want to model positive
behaviors for students and between students and make that be
the expectation.” He stated that “there is always going to be
fights, right? And so it’s a framework.” He explained that “[i]t’s
a national model,” and “has been a huge framework for schools to
follow . . . for a couple decades now,” and is used throughout the
United States.
Mr. Watson also testified that “[a]s far as I’ve seen in my
years working as a professional for different districts, I’ve never
seen a policy that articulates specifically a recipe or instructions
on how to handle a physical altercation between students.” In
22 years in the profession, “I’ve never seen a policy that dictates
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how people should interact when there’s a physical altercation.
There’s no policy for that.” He testified it would be
“irresponsible” to have “a written recipe or formula for how
teachers should or should not step in to break up a fight.” He
explained that “[b]ecause every altercation between students is
situational, and you don’t know necessarily what could happen if
you follow a script that is provided by you for you by someone
who is not present in that situation to deal with it.” He testified
it is “[a]bsolutely” typical for educators in general “that they are
using their professional discretion.” He testified that it is “up to
that individual teacher” to exercise “their best judgment” about
intervening in physical fights.
Plaintiff sought to offer testimony from Douglas Dickerson
“as an expert in the field of tactics of addressing juvenile
delinquency and professional training development.”
Mr. Dickerson had an extensive background in law enforcement
and juvenile delinquency. The trial court questioned the
relevance of his opinions: “Because what I see is I see someone—
if we were dealing with how a policeman or safety officer had
dealt with the plaintiff, I would see the relevance of his
testimony. [¶] But given what we are dealing with and given
that he notably told us he’s not worked with kindergarteners
through 12th graders, how are his opinions going to be relevant?”
The court observed that “anybody can watch the video,” and
asked what Mr. Dickerson’s opinions were going to be.
Plaintiff’s counsel replied: “His opinions are going to be
from his standing point whether or not the . . . intervention was
just and how the intervention happened, whether or not it was
conducted safely, whether or not they followed the training,
whether or not the training was appropriate, whether or not the
training was good enough from the District to its employees.”
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The court asked, “Well, what experience does he have with
training teachers as opposed to police officers to handle
kindergarteners to 12th graders?” Counsel said that he “has
trained many school districts” and his juvenile delinquency
background “can be all the way from ages 12 through 18.” The
court responded that “I think we may well be listening to some
voir dire of [Mr. Dickerson] by [defense counsel] tomorrow
morning.”
After voir dire of Mr. Dickerson the following day, the court
observed that “I’m not persuaded yet that I’ve heard anything
that shows what his expertise is with respect to managing a
classroom and dealing with an unruly student in a classroom.”
The court again asked plaintiff’s counsel what opinions
Mr. Dickerson would offer if he were qualified. Counsel replied
that Mr. Dickerson would “talk about the risks and the proper
techniques to stop juveniles fighting one another when controlled
by staff or other options that the individual, in this case, the
defendant, could have taken to safely review the situation. [¶]
He’s also going to talk about what the District can do towards
training people so to better educate its staff to make sure it’s a
safer campus for all students, including the combative juveniles.”
The court held that Mr. Dickerson was “not qualified in the
area of expertise that’s relevant, and . . . to the extent there is
any relevance to it, it outweighs 352. [¶] So I’m ruling that he is
not qualified as an expert.”
During the defense case, counsel sought to offer expert
testimony from Craig Cunningham, who was president of
“21st Century Education Enterprises,” a company that provided
“inservice training for teachers” and litigation services, among
other things. He had an extensive, 55-year background in
education, and the defense offered him “as an expert in the field
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of educational practices including supervision of instruction,
safety of instruction, and school safety practices.”
In a discussion of why an expert was needed, the court
observed that, “There’s evidence of what training the teachers
got. Right now there’s no evidence that it was inadequate,” and
“You are rebutting something that’s not there, and that’s a waste
of time.” Addressing plaintiff’s counsel, the court said: “I’m not
aware that you have any evidence that the training received was
below what is offered in most school districts because you don’t
have any evidence on that subject.” Plaintiff’s counsel agreed
that “[t]his is not the case that is brought on some nuanced school
code or some other code. It’s a general negligence case. [¶] They
[the jury] can make their own decision.” The court concluded
that “the marginal relevance is outweighed by the undue
consumption of time,” and excused the defense witness.
4. Other Evidence, the Instructions and the Verdict
The parties presented a great deal of evidence, much of it
disputed, on the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, the surgeries
required, the success of the surgical repairs, the impact of
plaintiff’s injuries on his functioning, the existence or not of any
disability from the leg injury, the cause and gravity of his
posttraumatic stress syndrome, limitations on his earning
capacity, and so on. No appellate issues require us to address
that evidence.
The trial court instructed the jury with CACI instructions
on negligence, as modified by plaintiff. The court refused several
special instructions proposed by plaintiff on the duties of school
authorities and standards of care, finding none of them was
necessary to assist the jury in deciding the questions in the
special verdict form. (We describe the instructions in our
discussion of plaintiff’s claim of error, post.)
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Question No. 1 of the special verdict asked the jury, “Was
Marco Godinez negligent?” and “Was Compton Unified School
District negligent?” The jury answered “No” to both questions.
The form directed the jury: “If you answered yes for any
defendant in question 1, then answer question 2 for that
defendant. If you answered no for any defendant in question 1,
insert the number zero next to that defendant’s name in
question 8. If you answered no for all defendants in question 1,
stop here, answer no further questions, and have the presiding
juror sign and date this form.”
The jury did not answer questions Nos. 2 through 7, but
nevertheless answered question No. 8, which asked: “What
percentage of responsibility for [plaintiff’s] harm do you assign to
the following? Insert a percentage for only those who received
‘yes’ answers in questions 2, 5, or 7.” The jury entered zeros for
Mr. Godinez and the District, and entered 50 percent for plaintiff
and 50 percent for Christopher.
The jury was polled, and the clerk reported that
“nine jurors answered yes, and three jurors answered no.”
Judgment was entered on May 11, 2022.
On May 27, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for JNOV or in
the alternative for a new trial on multiple grounds, including that
the evidence entitled plaintiff to judgment, and that the refusal
to give plaintiff’s special jury instructions and the exclusion of
Mr. Dickerson’s testimony required a new trial.
On July 5, 2022, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The JNOV Ruling
“A motion for [JNOV] may be granted only if it appears
from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party
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securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in
support.” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001)
25 Cal.4th 62, 68 (Sweatman).) The standard of review on appeal
is the same: “whether any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion.” (Ibid.)
The facts recited above are substantial evidence supporting
the verdict that neither Mr. Godinez nor the District was
negligent, so we necessarily affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Plaintiff makes two arguments, both of which require us to weigh
the evidence, which we cannot do.
Plaintiff first contends the District “abdicated its duty to
train and there was insufficient evidence to support [the
District’s] position that its lack of training was reasonable.” This
is a convoluted suggestion that the District had a burden to
establish that “its lack of training was reasonable.” Of course,
the District had no such burden. It was plaintiff’s burden to
show the District failed to do something “that a reasonably
careful person would do in the same situation.”
Plaintiff’s contention rests entirely on the proposition that
the District “did not train . . . Godinez on safe physical
interventions” in student fights, leaving it to the teacher’s
discretion, and the District’s training “did not train on those
portions related to restraints or physical intervention.” This
ignores the testimony from Blain Watson—plaintiff’s own
witness—that the PBIS training was used throughout the United
States and, more particularly, that it is “[a]bsolutely” typical for
educators in general “that they are using their professional
discretion,” and it is “up to that individual teacher” to exercise
“their best judgment” about intervening in physical fights
between students.
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Moreover, plaintiff neither presented, nor proffered any
evidence, that the District’s training was different from that
provided anywhere else, or that it was necessary to provide
school teachers with demonstrative training on “restraints or
physical intervention.” As already mentioned, the trial court
observed during the defense case that there was evidence “of
what training the teachers got,” and “[r]ight now there’s no
evidence that it was inadequate,” and “I’m not aware that you
have any evidence that the training received was below what is
offered in most school districts because you don’t have any
evidence on that subject.” The jury heard and saw all the
evidence plaintiff presented on training (see pp. 6-9, ante)—the
District’s admissions, the manuals, the board policy, testimony
from two CPI trainers and from Mr. Watson—and rejected
plaintiff’s claim that the District acted unreasonably in the
training it gave or in the discretion it gave its staff in handling
student alterations. The trial court agreed, and so do we.
Plaintiff’s second contention is that there was “insufficient
evidence to support [the District’s] claim that Godinez acted with
due care in intervening in the student fight.” Again, it is plaintiff
who must prove that Mr. Godinez did not act with due care. The
jury apparently believed Mr. Godinez’s testimony and found he
acted with due care. One of many examples is his testimony, in
response to questions from plaintiff’s counsel about whether he
made “a split second decision to intervene immediately,” that yes,
it was a split second choice. Counsel asked him, “You did not
consider alternatives during that split second, did you?” and
Mr. Godinez replied, “I thought the situation was so outrageously
dangerous that the only choice I had was to intervene.”
Plaintiff relies on Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, calling it a “strikingly similar case.” There is
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nothing similar about it, except that two high school boys were
“slap boxing.” (Id. at pp. 746, 745.) The fight took place on school
grounds during the noon recess and had continued for five to
10 minutes in front of a crowd of about 30 students gathered to
watch. (Id. at p. 746.) One of the boys died after he was slapped,
fell backwards and fractured his skull. (Ibid.) The court found
the jury could reasonably conclude that the two employees
responsible for supervising failed to exercise due care, and their
negligence was the proximate cause of the tragedy. (Id. at
p. 750.) “The fact that another student’s misconduct was the
immediate precipitating cause of the injury does not compel a
conclusion that negligent supervision was not the proximate
cause of Michael’s death. Neither the mere involvement of a
third party nor that party’s wrongful conduct is sufficient in itself
to absolve the defendants of liability, once a negligent failure to
provide adequate supervision is shown.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The italicized premise for finding liability in Dailey is
missing in this case. Plaintiff simply concludes, without citation
to any evidence, that “[h]ere, there was a failure of supervision.”
The jury was entitled to conclude otherwise from the evidence we
have already recounted.
Then plaintiff cites the CPI manual to the effect that risks
are involved in any physical intervention and must be considered,
and the manual “warns against acting with instinct.” Plaintiff
claims that “[s]ubstantial evidence proves . . . Godinez . . . failed
to weigh the risks of his intervention,” and did not consider “how
his body could cause injury to [plaintiff].” Neither this nor any
other of plaintiff’s arguments about the evidence has shown that
“there is no substantial evidence in support” of the verdict.
(Sweatman, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 68; see Flores v. Liu (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 278, 297 [“Where, as here, it is the plaintiff
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asserting on appeal that a defense verdict is not supported by the
evidence, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show on appeal that there
is no substantial evidence to support that defense verdict, and
not merely that substantial evidence would have supported a
verdict in her favor.”].)
2. The Instructional Error Claim
Plaintiff contends he is entitled to a new trial because the
trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to give six special
instructions plaintiff requested. We disagree.
a. Instructions given and instructions refused
The jury was instructed that, to establish his negligence
claim, plaintiff had to prove Mr. Godinez or the District was
negligent, plaintiff was harmed, and the negligence was a
substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm (CACI No. 400).
Negligence was defined (CACI No. 401) as “the failure to use
reasonable care to prevent harm to oneself or to others.” The jury
was instructed, as to each defendant, that “[a] person can be
negligent by acting or by failing to act. [¶] A person is negligent
if that person does something that a reasonably careful person
would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation. [¶]
You must decide how a reasonably careful person would’ve acted
in Defendant Marco Godinez’s [or the District’s] situation.”
The jury was also instructed on the standard of care for
minors (CACI No. 402); on the standard of care for a person with
a physical disability (CACI No. 403); on the comparative fault of
plaintiff (CACI No. 405); on the apportionment of responsibility
to Christopher (CACI No. 406); and on the duty of care owed to
children (CACI No. 412).
In addition, plaintiff requested several special instructions,
six of which he contends should have been given. These were:
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(1) that the special relationship between a student and
teacher arising from mandatory school attendance “imposes an
affirmative duty on the school district to take all reasonable steps
to protect its students”;
(2) that school authorities “have a duty to supervise at all
times the conduct of children on school grounds and to enforce
those rules and regulations necessary to their protection”;
(3) the standard of care for school employees is “that degree
of care which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with
comparable duties, would exercise under the same
circumstances” and that “[e]ither a total lack of supervision or
ineffective supervision may constitute a lack of ordinary care”;
(4) that school authorities “have a duty to train and
supervise their employees’ exercise of reasonable care in
protecting students from foreseeable harm, including harm from
other school employees”;
(5) the duty of care owed by school personnel “includes the
duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from
foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently
or intentionally”; and
(6) the very injury that occurred need not have been
foreseeable; negligence is established “if a reasonably prudent
person would foresee that injuries of the same general type would
be likely to happen in the absence of such safeguards.”
Plaintiff argued the instructions were “very pertinent to
understanding” the special relationship that “creates an
affirmative duty for the District that’s not covered by CA[C]I.”
The court replied, “Do you think there is any case authority that
says it’s error not to give these instructions? Because I don’t
think they do anything. They may be accurate statements of the
law, but I don’t think they do anything. And so I’m not convinced
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I should give them unless you can show me that there’s case
authority saying that it would be reversible error for me to refuse
them.”
Plaintiff’s counsel could cite no such authority. The court
stated that “[i]f you get it, let me know. Because that would
change things. Or if in preparing the special verdict form you
come up with an answer to a question in the special verdict form
where it’s going to require one or more of these instructions, let
me know and I’ll reconsider it.”
b. Legal principles
We review the propriety of jury instructions de novo.
(Cristler v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 72, 82.)
“A party is entitled upon request to correct,
nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case
advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence.”
(Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 (Soule).)
“A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in
a civil case ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ ”
(Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580, quoting Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.) “Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it
seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the
verdict.’ ” (Soule, at p. 580.) “Actual prejudice must be assessed
in the context of the individual trial record. . . . Thus, when
deciding whether an error of instructional omission was
prejudicial, the court must also evaluate (1) the state of the
evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of
counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself
that it was misled.” (Id. at pp. 580-581.)
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c. Contentions and conclusions
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury on the special relationship between school
personnel and students. Plaintiff contends the “lack of
instructions on [the District’s] obligations to protect [plaintiff]”
prejudicially affected the verdict.
We see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that none of
the requested instructions was necessary to assist the jury in
deciding any of the fact questions they were asked to decide. The
District’s duty to protect plaintiff was never at issue; there was
no dispute that both defendants were required “to use reasonable
care to prevent harm to . . . others,” which necessarily included
plaintiff, and the jury was so instructed with CACI No. 401.
Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel read to the jury defendants’
admission that Mr. Godinez “had a duty to supervise, control, and
manage his classroom,” and Mr. Godinez himself testified to that
duty. The issue for the jury was whether Mr. Godinez breached
that duty. The standard of care is precisely the same: the jury
was instructed to “decide how a reasonably careful person
would’ve acted in [Mr. Godinez’s] situation.” None of plaintiff’s
proposed instructions adds anything to that principle.
Plaintiff states he “advanced three theories at trial” that
were supported by substantial evidence: that the District “failed
to train” Mr. Godinez on safe intervention in student altercations,
that Mr. Godinez “negligently failed to supervise his classroom,”
and that Mr. Godinez “negligently intervened in a student
altercation in a manner that was contrary to the standard of care,
causing severe injury.” These three “theories of the case,”
however, are all ordinary negligence theories for which the
standard of care is well established: ordinary care.
19
The standard of care is explained in C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869. “ ‘The
standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out
this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the
performance of their other duties. This uniform standard to
which they are held is that degree of care “which a person of
ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would
exercise under the same circumstances.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In general,
one has no duty to control the conduct of others or to protect
another, unless a “special relationship” gives rise to such a duty.
(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)
4 Cal.5th 607, 619.) Because of the special relationship between
school personnel and students under their supervision and
control, the duty of care “includes the duty to use reasonable
measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the
hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.” (C.A.,
at p. 870.)
As we have seen, in this case the school’s duty to prevent
harm to plaintiff was never in dispute, so there was no need to
instruct the jury on the “special relationship.” The standard of
care is the same: reasonableness under the circumstances. The
only question for the jury was whether Mr. Godinez or the
District did something “that a reasonably careful person would
not do in the same situation or fail[ed] to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation.”
Even if we were to find the trial court erred in refusing
plaintiff’s instructions (which we do not), plaintiff has not
satisfied his burden to show a miscarriage of justice. As we have
observed, when deciding whether an error of instructional
omission was prejudicial, we evaluate the state of the evidence,
the effect of other instructions, the effect of counsel’s arguments,
20
and “any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Soule,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 580-581.) None of these factors assists
plaintiff.
There is no more to say than we have already said about
the state of the evidence and the effect of the instructions that
were given. As for the “effect o[f] counsel’s arguments,” plaintiff
insists, at length, that the “lack of instructions on the school’s
affirmative duties” permitted defense counsel “to consistently
skew the jury’s focus away from the Defendants’ obligations and
instead onto [plaintiff’s] and Christopher’s negligence, improperly
arguing that the conduct of the two students released Defendants
from their responsibilities.” For this assertion, plaintiff cites
six transcript pages of defense counsel’s opening argument, and
five pages of counsel’s closing argument. Plaintiff identifies
nothing specific in the opening argument to justify his
characterization of it as “improper.” It was not.
The defense opening argument included a slow-motion
review of the video and argument that Mr. Godinez was doing the
right thing for the right reasons, while plaintiff and Christopher
were not acting like reasonably careful teenagers of the same age,
intelligence, experience and knowledge. As for the defense’s
closing, plaintiff mischaracterizes the argument that plaintiff
should be held accountable as an “assumption of risk” argument
in contravention of the court’s ruling that assumption of the risk
doctrine did not apply, and says it was “misconduct to mislead a
jury by a false statement of law.” There was no misconduct. The
defense was entitled to argue that plaintiff was in the wrong for
fistfighting in class and for continuing to punch after Mr. Godinez
stepped in, and that Mr. Godinez acted as a reasonable and
careful teacher would have acted in that situation. The defense
21
at no time engaged in “misconduct” and at no time “[s]uggest[ed]
that the jurors disregard the law.”
Finally, plaintiff claims the jury’s answers on the special
verdict form show it was misled by the lack of instructions on
defendants’ special duty. We have described the jury’s answers
at pages 12 through 13, ante. In summary, although the
directions on the verdict form told the jury not to answer question
No. 8, apportioning fault, if it found neither defendant was
negligent, the jury answered that question anyway, apportioning
zero fault to defendants and 50 percent fault on the part of each
of the two boys. We see no jury “confusion” whatsoever on the
matters the jury was charged with deciding; the error in
answering a question they were not asked simply shows the
jury’s emphatic rejection of defendants’ liability.
In short, even if there had been any error in the court’s
instruction, plaintiff has failed to show any prejudice.
3. Exclusion of Expert Testimony
The court excluded the testimony of Mr. Dickerson,
plaintiff’s sole expert on the standard of care. We have described
Mr. Dickerson’s qualifications and the trial court’s reasoning at
pages 9 through 11, ante. In brief, the trial court concluded, after
voir dire of Mr. Dickerson, that it had heard nothing “that shows
what his expertise is with respect to managing a classroom and
dealing with an unruly student in a classroom,” and held that
Mr. Dickerson was “not qualified in the area of expertise that’s
relevant.” (Later, testimony from the defense’s expert was also
excluded.)
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or not admit
evidence, including expert evidence, for abuse of discretion.
(Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) Any error in excluding evidence is
22
grounds for reversal only if the party appealing demonstrates a
miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.) We see no abuse of discretion on
this record.
Plaintiff argues to the contrary at length. Plaintiff asserts
the trial court “held an erroneous view of the issues,” and
Mr. Dickerson was “qualified and experienced” on safe physical
interventions. Plaintiff acknowledges “that Dickerson did not
have direct experience teaching, or managing a classroom,” but
contends this “was not dispositive of his qualification to opine on
[the District’s] training and Godinez’s intervention.” He criticizes
the trial court’s “overly strict standard requiring a personal
working knowledge of classroom management and discipline.”
He acknowledges the court also excluded the defense expert’s
testimony, but complains “that still left the Defendants with the
advantage of testimony from various school district staff about
training and school policy.” He says that “[w]ithout Dickerson’s
expert opinions, [District] employees presented testimony that
distorted the issues,” and recites and criticizes employee
testimony. He laments that plaintiff “could not have his expert
explain whether a safety plan that addressed bomb threats,
armed assaults, hostage situations etc., but did not address
student fights, was a failure on the part of [the District].”
We can see no error in “requiring a personal working
knowledge of classroom management and discipline” from an
expert purporting “to explain to the jury why and how Godinez’s
intervention” – in a classroom student altercation – was
“unreasonable.” Further, we agree with the trial court that the
jury watched the video and did not need an expert to expound
upon “whether or not the . . . intervention was just and how the
intervention happened, [and] whether or not it was conducted
23
safely.” There was no error in excluding Mr. Dickerson’s
testimony.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying plaintiff’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively for a new
trial are affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
24
Filed 2/6/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
I.C., B322148
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC665118
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
COMPTON UNIFIED OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,
[No Change in Judgment]
Defendants and
Respondents.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on
January 15, 2025, was not certified for publication in the
Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the
opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is
so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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