CourtListener 10326952•People v. Gordon CA2/4
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Filed 2/4/25 P. v. Gordon CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B333054
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA062155)
v.
BRUCE KELCY GORDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Bruce Kelcy Gordon appeals from
a post-conviction order reducing his sentence pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.75.1 Despite being present and represented by
appointed counsel at the hearing, defendant contends he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to full resentencing
because he received no advisement on what would occur at a full
resentencing proceeding. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Information, Plea, and Original Sentence
An amended information filed October 14, 2014, charged
defendant with 17 counts of human trafficking-related offenses.
The information also alleged defendant suffered a prior
conviction for making criminal threats, which constituted a prior
serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)).
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant pled no
contest to four charged offenses (§§ 245, subd. (a)(2) [count 7],
288, subd. (a) [count 9], 236.1, subd. (b) [count 13], 286,
subd. (c)(2)(A) [count 21]). Defendant admitted he suffered a
prior conviction for a violent and serious felony (§§ 667.5,
subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)). He also admitted a multiple-victim
special allegation under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61) for
engaging in lewd acts upon children under the age of 14 years
(§ 288, subd. (a) [count 9]). Defense counsel joined in the plea,
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code.
2
waivers, and admissions and stipulated to a factual basis based
on the preliminary hearing transcripts and probation report.
Based on the court’s oral admonitions and an executed plea
form, defendant was apprised of the maximum exposure for all
charged offenses (89 years plus two 30-years-to-life terms and
two additional life sentences), the maximum exposure for the
charges to which he pleaded (30 years plus 15 years to life), and
the agreed-upon disposition (12 years plus 15 years to life). The
court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon disposition, and
explained and ordered various fines, fees, and assessments.2
B. Resentencing Proceedings
In November 2022, the court received notification from the
Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation that defendant’s sentence included an invalid one-
year sentence imposed for a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)),
under the recent enactment of section 1172.75. The trial court
calendared defendant’s case for resentencing, appointed counsel,
and ordered the parties to meet and confer. The court’s order
also provided: “If the parties do not waive the resentencing
hearing, defense counsel is ordered to confer with the defendant,
to determine if he wants to be present at the hearing . . . .”
2 Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life plus a consecutive
one-year term for the prior prison conviction on count 9 (§§ 667.61,
subds. (b) & (e), 667.5, subd. (b)), plus additional and consecutive
terms of one year (one-third the middle-term) on count 7 (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)); two years (one-third the middle-term) on count 21 (§ 286,
subd. (c)(2)(A)); and eight years (the low-term) on count 13 (§ 236.1,
subd. (b)). The court dismissed all remaining charges and
enhancement allegations.
3
When calling the matter for a hearing on June 22, 2023,
the court noted defendant’s presence and asked if he was
“requesting a full resentencing.” Defendant’s appointed counsel
replied, “Yes,” and stated he was “[j]ust asking to strike the one-
year prior.” The court addressed defendant: “Mr. Gordon, your
counsel is indicating that he’s not requesting a full
[re]sentencing, and I do believe the defendant is entitled to strike
the one-year prior[,] leaving [him] with a sentence of 11 years
plus 15 to life.” Defense counsel confirmed that was an accurate
request.
The court continued: “[S]ir, you understand that you are
entitled to have the court consider this for full resentencing. And
after discussions with your attorney, is it your desire to go
forward without a full resentencing?” Defendant replied, “Excuse
me?” before stating he did not understand his right to a full
resentencing hearing.
Appointed counsel interjected: “Your honor, I think my
client is confused by the concept of a full resentencing versus
striking the one-year prior. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] He and I discussed it
where I believe it appropriate for the court at this time to strike
the one-year prior and that is all that the court, in my opinion,
would realistically end up doing were we to proceed any other
way. So, I advised him to ask the court to strike the one-year
prior and submit on that.”
The court addressed defendant again: “All right. Mr.
Gordon, did you understand that?” Defendant replied, “Yes,” and
affirmed his counsel had “discussed all [of his] options” before
advising him on striking the one-year prior “and proceed that
way.”
4
The court struck the one-year prison prior and resentenced
defendant to 11 years plus 15 years to life. Following imposition
of sentence, defendant inquired, “What about restitution?” After
noting no prior objection or modification request, the court found
“no basis to do that at this time.” The court denied defendant’s
request. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
In 2021, the Legislature enacted former section 1171.1, now
section 1172.75, to invalidate most sentence enhancements
imposed for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, see § 3; § 1172.75, subd. (a)
[if imposed before January 1, 2020, such enhancements are
“legally invalid” unless they were imposed for a sexually violent
offense].) After verifying the current judgment includes an
invalid sentence enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), the court “shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
The court’s review and resentencing procedures are
prescribed under subdivision (d) of section 1172.75. Two
provisions in that subdivision are relevant here.
Subdivision (d)(2) specifies that the court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion . . . to promote uniformity of sentence.”
Subdivision (d)(3) provides the court “may consider postconviction
factors, including, . . . the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
5
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, . . . so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” The statute further provides that “[t]he
parties may waive a resentencing hearing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (e).)
B. Analysis
Defendant contends he did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to a full resentencing hearing. He points to the
court’s failure to inform him of the scope of full resentencing in
which new sentencing rules or ameliorative changes in the law
could be applied or in which postconviction evidence could be
presented.
Defendant has cited no authority, and we are aware of
none, in which a defendant who is present, represented by
counsel, and who previously discussed the prospect of full
resentencing with counsel, is entitled to have the court advise
him of the merits or scope of a resentencing proceeding before
obtaining his waiver. (See People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 455, 465 [defendant “failed to preserve [similar]
claim for appeal” by citing no authority or raising objection
below]; see also People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666
[reviewing courts presume the judgment or trial court order is
correct and indulge ‘““[a]ll intendments and presumptions . . . to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown”’”].)
To the extent the “knowing and intelligent” waiver
standard applies to section 1172.75 resentencing proceedings,3 we
3 Defendant attempts to analogize his waiver of full resentencing
to the waiver of rights preceding entry of a guilty plea. Before entry of
a guilty or no contest plea, a defendant must be advised of the
6
further conclude the record reflects an adequate understanding
and waiver of defendant’s right. Criminal defendants can
expressly waive various constitutional and statutory rights. (See
Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th
151, 166 (Sivongxxay); People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231,
241–242 (Burgener).) To be valid, the waiver must be “knowing
and intelligent, that is, ‘“‘made with a full awareness both of the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it,’”’ as well as voluntary ‘“‘in the sense that
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.’”’” (People v. Collins (2001)
26 Cal.4th 297, 305.)
When determining the validity of a waiver, “‘“[n]o
particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant
who seeks to waive [his rights].” [Citation.] Rather, “the test is
whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant
understood the disadvantages of [his or her choice], including the
risks and complexities of the particular case.” [Citations.]’”
(Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 241; accord, Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835–836.) The trial court need
not assess the defendant’s understanding of “‘substantive law or
the procedural details’” (People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457,
473–474), including “legal concepts such as the various burdens
constitutional rights being waived (see In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122,
132 [“self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury trial”]), as well as the
direct consequences of the plea. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13
Cal.4th 68, 80; People v. Lytle (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) This
analogy is unavailing. When an agreed-upon sentence is later
modified by a legislative act of lenity, the same constitutional rights
are not implicated. (See People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,
588–589.)
7
of proof, the rules of evidence, or the fact that the pursuit of one
avenue of defense might foreclose another.” (People v. Riggs
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 277; accord, People v. Redmond (1969) 71
Cal.2d 745, 758.)
We independently examine the record to determine
whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to a full resentencing hearing. (Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 241; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453.) Our review
“‘must be pragmatic,’ and focused upon ‘the status of the
defendant’s knowledge and understanding at the time of the
purported waiver.’” (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
524, 546.) As the appealing party, the defendant bears the
burden of affirmatively demonstrating an invalid waiver. (Id. at
p. 547.)
Here, defendant argues the court told him “nothing except
that he was entitled to a ‘full resentencing’ without explaining
what that meant.” This argument is insufficient to establish an
invalid waiver. “[I]t is clear that [the defendant’s burden] is not
satisfied by simply pointing out that certain advisements were
not given.” (People v. Truman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1824
(Truman) [defendant argued “‘there is nothing to indicate’ that he
had ‘a sufficient understanding of the disadvantages of self-
representation”].)
We agree with defendant the resentencing court did not
specifically advise him of the procedures set forth in section
1172.75, subdivision (d). As discussed, however, defendant
provides this court no legal basis on which to impose this type of
advisement. After reviewing the record, we conclude defendant
understood the nature of the right abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.
8
Defendant was represented by counsel at the time he
personally entered his waiver to full resentencing. “Like all
lawyers, the court-appointed attorney is obligated to keep [his or
her] client fully informed about the proceedings at hand, to
advise the client of [their] rights, and to vigorously advocate on
[their] behalf.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th
131, 151–152; accord, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113,
1124 [“counsel is presumed to know the defendant’s rights and is
obligated to advise the defendant accordingly”].) “Absent a
contrary indication, the trial court and, on appeal, the reviewing
court may presume that a represented defendant has consulted
with counsel” on the defendant’s rights and the effect of waiving
them. (Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 373;
accord, People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 [same].)
Defendant waived a full resentencing hearing with
approval from appointed counsel. He entered his waiver after
discussing the matter with his counsel, who addressed the
likelihood of what “the court, . . . would realistically end up doing
were we to proceed any other way.” (Italics added.) Defendant
affirmed his “[c]ounsel discussed all [his] options” with him.
(Italics added.) Although the court did not provide specific
advisements on the legal concepts involved at a full resentencing
hearing, which “may be useful to help a defendant understand
‘just what he is getting himself into’” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3
Cal.5th 961, 979), his own affirmations and those of appointed
counsel sufficiently demonstrate defendant’s understanding of
the nature of the statutory right and the consequences of waiving
it. (Accord, People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310, 319;
9
People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 453, 470.)4 We thus
conclude defendant entered an effective waiver of a full
resentencing proceeding.
Assuming the trial court erred in failing to ensure a
knowing and intelligent waiver to full resentencing, the Attorney
General argues the error was harmless. We agree with the
Attorney General and reject defendant’s suggestion the error was
structural or subject to Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18.5
Any error in advising a criminal defendant of a statutory or
judicially created right is not reversible “unless there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant was prejudiced as a
result of the error.” (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346,
364; People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 378 (McClellan);
People v. McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1370.)
Defendant argues the error was prejudicial because no
evidence established he “would necessarily have waived a
resentencing hearing if he had understood his rights therein.” He
avers “he could have argued” for running his sentences
concurrently. Again, this is insufficient to establish prejudice.
(See McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 378 [absent an indication
in the record, defendant’s “but for the trial court’s omission”
4 United States v. Correa-Torres (1st Cir. 2003) 326 F.3d 18, on
which defendant relies, is inapposite. (See id. at pp. 20–21 24
[appointed counsel entered waiver of rights to probation revocation
hearing “based on his (counsel’s) conversations with the appellant’s
girlfriend” and show-cause order and notice of procedural rights
written in English, without a Spanish translation].)
5 As before, defendant analogizes his waiver of full resentencing
with entry of a guilty plea.
10
argument is insufficient “to meet his burden of establishing
prejudice”].)
Despite requesting modification to restitution, defendant
did not request any modification to his term of imprisonment.
And “since no such motion was made, there was nothing for
defendant to contribute.” (People v. Santos (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 666, 678, rev. granted May 29, 2024, S284341.)
Were defendant to make a request to reduce his sentence,
he fails to establish the relative merits of prevailing on it.
Defendant faced a term of imprisonment far above his negotiated
plea, which led to the dismissal of over 10 additional counts.
Defendant has not addressed the sentencing rules or changes in
law that would reduce his sentence (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)), or
any postconviction factor(s) bearing on his reduced risk of future
violence (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3). On these facts, we conclude any
error in accepting defendant’s waiver was harmless.
11
DISPOSITION
The post-conviction order is affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
12
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