Shakir v. Billingsley CA2/2

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Filed 2/4/25 Shakir v. Billingsley CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CREON SHAKIR, a Minor, etc., et al., B327102

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV20859)
v.

TAIJUAN BILLINGSLEY, SR.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. James A. Kaddo, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Gabriel H. Avina and Gabriel Herrera Avina
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Horvitz & Levy, H. Thomas Watson, Mark A. Kressel;
Courtney D. Flannery & Associates, Michael Hyun Park and
Raquel Vallejo for Defendant and Respondent.

______________________________
Creon Shakir (Shakir) was a passenger in a car driven by
his mother, Creonia Ward (Ward), when Taijuan Billingsley, Sr.,
(Billingsley) rear-ended them. By and through his guardian ad
litem, Shakir sued Billingsley for damages. Following trial, the
jury found that Billingsley was not negligent. Shakir appeals,
raising several arguments: (1) The trial court erred in denying
his Batson/Wheeler1 motion contesting Billingsley’s peremptory
challenge to a prospective juror; (2) The trial court erred in
denying his three for-cause prospective juror challenges; (3) The
trial court committed two evidentiary errors; and (4) The trial
court made certain comments that invited jury nullification.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 4, 2018, Ward was driving eight-year-old Shakir to
a party when her car was rear-ended by Billingsley. Shakir, who
suffers from cerebral palsy and related medical conditions,
allegedly suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident.
Shakir filed the instant lawsuit for damages. Following
trial, the jury found Billingsley not negligent and accordingly
answered no further questions on the special verdict form.
Judgment was entered, and Shakir’s timely appeal ensued.

1
Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v.
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).

2
DISCUSSION
I. Batson/Wheeler Motion
Shakir argues that the trial court failed to conduct a
“‘sincere and reasoned’” evaluation of Billingsley’s justifications
for excusing a prospective juror.
A. Relevant factual background
1. Initial panel of prospective jurors
Voir dire began with 18 prospective jurors called up.
During the initial questioning, the trial court excused several
prospective jurors for hardship and called up replacements.
When the time came for the first round of for-cause and
peremptory challenges, four of the 18 seated prospective jurors
were Latino. The other persons represented a diverse
population.2
2. First round of for-cause and peremptory challenges
During the first round of juror challenges, the trial court
sua sponte excluded one prospective juror because he insisted
that he was biased.
Shakir’s counsel, Gabriel Herrera Avina, asserted his first
for-cause challenge against a Latina prospective juror, who said
that she sat on another jury in a car accident trial and found that
it was a “waste of time.” The trial court denied this challenge
because the prospective juror had acknowledged that this was a
different case and that she did not know the facts in the instant
case.

2
Shakir did not create a record of the jurors’ races and
ethnicities. However, in the context of evaluating
Batson/Wheeler challenges, we may infer certain ethnicities from
last names. (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1156, fn. 2
(Gutierrez).)

3
Shakir’s second for-cause challenge was directed at
Prospective Juror No. 4, who stated that she and her mother had
previously been sued; thus, this case gave her a “little bit of a
weird vibe.” The trial court denied this challenge on the grounds
that the prospective juror had stated that she does investigations
as part of her human resources job and understands the need to
be fair and listen to all of the evidence before making a decision,
which she could do here.
Shakir’s third for-cause challenge was directed at a
prospective juror who felt that Shakir was disrespectful for
wearing sunglasses in the courtroom. On further examination,
the prospective juror explained that he believed that it was
disrespectful for the plaintiff to wear sunglasses when the jurors
had been given a dress code. After the trial court explained that
Shakir wore sunglasses for medical reasons, the prospective juror
retracted his comments. The trial court accordingly denied
Shakir’s challenge.3
Billingsley passed for cause.
Shakir then made his first peremptory challenge.4
Billingsley accepted the jury, which included three Latino
individuals, as constituted. Shakir’s second peremptory
challenge was against a Latina prospective juror. Billingsley
again accepted the jury as constituted. Shakir then made a third

3
The trial court admonished Shakir’s counsel that he bore
responsibility for not advising the court that he was bringing
Shakir to court and that Shakir wore sunglasses for medical
reasons. “So don’t hold it against [this prospective juror] because
you did not tell us so we could advise the jury.”

4
Shakir challenged Prospective Juror No. 4.

4
peremptory challenge. Thereafter, Billingsley made his first
peremptory challenge to a Latina prospective juror. Shakir made
a fourth peremptory challenge. Billingsley accepted the jury as
constituted. Shakir then made a fifth peremptory challenge.
3. Second round of for-cause and peremptory
challenges
At this point, the trial court called up a new batch of
prospective jurors. Three of the new prospective jurors were
Latino. One such individual, Prospective Juror No. 17, stated: “I
don’t speak English very well. So every—all you guys talking
about over here, I understand like 40, 50 percent. So in the end,
if everybody is going to say it’s guilty, I’m going to say it’s guilty.
So I don’t have to answer correctly.”
At the end of the round of questioning, Billingsley’s
counsel, Raquel Vallejo, asked for a sidebar with the court. At
the sidebar, Ms. Vallejo attempted to challenge Prospective Juror
No. 17 for cause based upon his lack of English proficiency. The
trial court disallowed the challenge because Prospective Juror
No. 17 was not yet one of the 12 jurors “in the box.”
The parties began their next round of peremptory
challenges. Billingsley used his second peremptory challenge
against a prospective juror who was not Latino. Shakir made his
sixth and final peremptory challenge against a prospective juror
who was not Latino. Billingsley then made his third and fourth
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who were not
Latino, the result of which was that a Latino prospective juror
was put into the box in the excused individual’s place. Billingsley
made his fifth peremptory challenge against a Latino prospective
juror.

5
The result of Billingsley’s fifth peremptory challenge was
that Prospective Juror No. 17 became Prospective Juror No. 10—
he was now seated with the putatively empaneled jurors.
Ms. Vallejo immediately challenged him for cause, stating: “He
said he hears only about 40 percent of what we say in English.
He said he’s going to decide what everybody else decides.” The
trial court denied Billingsley’s for-cause challenge.
4. Shakir’s Batson/Wheeler challenge
At the next opportunity, Billingsley used his final
peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 10. In
response, Shakir made an oral Batson/Wheeler motion contesting
Billingsley’s challenge. The trial court said: “Do I hear Latino,
Latino, Latino?” Mr. Avina: “Yes. You did.”
Ms. Vallejo responded: “Your Honor, I’m Latina.
I didn’t—.” She explained: “I didn’t challenge him having to do
anything with that. It is a language issue. It is the fact that he
said that he’s going to go with what everybody else says because
he can only understand 40 percent of English.” She reminded the
court that she attempted to challenge him for cause as soon as
this information came to light, but the trial court denied her
motion as premature. She then stated that she brought a for-
cause challenge as soon as Prospective Juror No. 10 was “in the
box,” but the trial court denied her challenge; thus, she was using
her peremptory challenge based upon Billingsley’s right to have a
jury that understands the evidence.
The trial court recalled Prospective Juror No. 10 stating
that he only understood 40 percent of spoken English. It then
ruled: “The defense counsel has shown other reasonable grounds
for excusing that [prospective juror], and the court accepts her
explanation that it’s because he indicated he only understands

6
40 percent of the—what has been going on in the English
language.” Thus, it denied Shakir’s Batson/Wheeler motion and
permitted Billingsley to use his final peremptory challenge to
excuse Prospective Juror No. 10.
5. Final jury
The final empaneled jury had three Latino jurors.5
B. Relevant law and standard of review
“At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any
specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against
an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or
similar grounds. [Citation.] Exclusion of even one prospective
juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler
constitutes structural error, requiring reversal. [Citation.]”
(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158.)
“The prohibition against the exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of group bias
applies to civil as well as criminal cases.” (Unzueta v. Akopyan
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 67, 79 (Unzueta).)
“When a party raises a claim that an opponent has
improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, the court and counsel must follow a three-step
process. First, the Batson/Wheeler movant must demonstrate a
prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. . . .
“Second, if the court finds the movant meets the threshold
for demonstrating a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

5
The appellate record does not indicate if any jurors were
African-American.

7
opponent of the motion to give an adequate nondiscriminatory
explanation for the challenges. . . .
“Third, if the opponent indeed tenders a neutral
explanation, the trial court must decide whether the movant has
proven purposeful discrimination. [Citation.] In order to prevail,
the movant must show it was ‘“more likely than not that the
challenge was improperly motivated.”’ [Citation.] This portion of
the Batson/Wheeler inquiry focuses on the subjective
genuineness of the reason, not the objective reasonableness.
[Citation.] At this third step, the credibility of the explanation
becomes pertinent. . . . To satisfy herself that an explanation is
genuine, the presiding judge must make ‘a sincere and reasoned
attempt’ to evaluate the [attorney’s] justification, with
consideration of the circumstances of the case known at that
time, her knowledge of trial techniques, and her observations of
the [attorney’s] examination of panelists and exercise of for-cause
and peremptory challenges. [Citation.] Justifications that are
‘implausible or fantastic . . . may (and probably will) be found to
be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’ [Citation.] We
recognize that the trial court enjoys a relative advantage vis-à-vis
reviewing courts, for it draws on its contemporaneous
observations when assessing [an attorney’s] credibility.
[Citation.]
“We review a trial court’s determination regarding the
sufficiency of tendered justifications with ‘“great restraint.”’
[Citation.] We presume an advocate’s use of peremptory
challenges occurs in a constitutional manner. [Citation.] When a
reviewing court addresses the trial court’s ruling on a
Batson/Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for
substantial evidence. [Citation.] A trial court’s conclusions are

8
entitled to deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and
reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications
offered.’ [Citation.] What courts should not do is substitute their
own reasoning for the rationale given by the [attorney], even if
they can imagine a valid reason that would not be shown to be
pretextual.” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158–1159.)
C. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court did not err. Ample evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Billingsley provided a neutral explanation for
exercising his peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror
No. 10. (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158, 1168; People v.
Smith (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 860, 869.) As Ms. Vallejo explained
to the trial court, she was using her peremptory challenge to
excuse Prospective Juror No. 10 because (1) the trial court denied
her two prior attempts to excuse him for cause, (2) he only
understood about 40 percent of what was being said in English,
and (3) he was just going to go along with what the other jurors
decided. These reasons are clear and reasonably specific, and the
trial court found them sincere and nondiscriminatory. (People v.
Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 548; People v. Reynoso (2003)
31 Cal.4th 903, 926.)
Urging us to conclude otherwise, Shakir argues that the
trial court erroneously gave Billingsley two bites of the apple to
challenge Prospective Juror No. 10. He writes: “[Defense
counsel] essentially had a second opportunity to justify the
peremptory challenge to [Prospective Juror No. 10] after stating
that she’s Latina failed.” Shakir seems to be asserting that the
law required the court to consider her comment about being
Latina the exclusive justification for the challenge, and the trial

9
court was prohibited from considering her subsequent
statements. This argument is nonsensical.6 Aside from the fact
that Shakir offers no legal authority to support this novel
proposition (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852), his argument is unsupported by the
appellate record. Rather, after a careful review of the reporter’s
transcript, it is readily apparent that Ms. Vallejo’s first response
after being caught off guard by the accusation that she was
discriminating against Latino prospective jurors was to
demonstrate that the accusation was absurd since she was Latina
herself.
Not only was Billingsley’s stated reason race-neutral,
Shakir failed to prove that it was more likely than not that
Billingsley’s peremptory challenge was actually based on
“impermissible discrimination.” (People v. McDaniel (2021)
12 Cal.5th 97, 122.) “[L]ook[ing at] all [the] relevant
circumstances bearing on the issue of discrimination” (ibid.),7

6
We also do not understand Shakir’s comment that “As a
Black Plaintiff in a predominately White jury, the court failed to
recognize the primary defense by Defense course, which was [to]
paint Plaintiff’s mother in a racially prejudicial light as a litigant
who was rear ended twice.” It appears undisputed that both
parties are African-American.

7
“Relevant circumstances may include the race of the
defendant, the ultimate racial composition of the jury, the
pattern of strikes, and the extent or pattern of questioning by the
[attorney] during voir dire. [Citations.] A court may also
consider the fact that the [attorney] impermissibly struck other
jurors ‘for the bearing it might have upon the strike’ of the
challenged juror. [Citation.] The high court has also held that

10
ample evidence indicates that the trial court made a “‘sincere and
reasoned’” attempt to evaluate Billingsley’s peremptory
challenge. (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 127.) At the
risk of sounding redundant, Ms. Vallejo excused Prospective
Juror No. 10 because he had a limited understanding of English
and because he was inclined to simply agree with the decision of
the other jurors. Furthermore, as set forth above, defense
counsel had accepted the jury as constituted three times when
two to three Latino prospective jurors were on the panel and
multiple peremptory strikes remained. And half of Ms. Vallejo’s
peremptory strikes were against non-Latino prospective jurors.
Under these circumstances, Shakir did not prove that it was
more likely than not that Billingsley improperly used his
peremptory challenge to this prospective juror. (People v.
DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 108 [concern with a prospective
juror’s ability to understand the proceedings and anticipated
evidence is a proper basis for a challenge]; People v. Duff (2014)
58 Cal.4th 527, 546 [attorneys “may legitimately choose to shy
away from followers or unduly timid jurors”]; People v. McDaniel,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 124 [fact that opposing party accepted jury
panel with members of the group that counsel is accused of
discriminating against suggests lack of bias]; People v. Smith,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 872, fn. 6 [fact that jury includes
members of group allegedly discriminated against indicates
opponent’s good faith in exercising peremptories].)

comparative juror analysis may be probative of purposeful
discrimination.” (People v. McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 122.)

11
To the extent Shakir attempts to rely upon postjury
selection events to overturn the trial court’s Batson/Wheeler
ruling, his argument fails. (See People v. McDaniel, supra,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 122–123; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 1158–1159.)
Finally, Shakir’s reliance upon Code of Civil Procedure
section 231.7 is misplaced. The statute does not currently apply
to civil cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (k) [“This section
shall not apply to civil cases”]; Unzueta, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 77 & fn. 6.)
II. Shakir’s For-Cause Challenges
Shakir argues that the trial court erred in denying his for-
cause challenges. Specifically, he asserts that “all attempts for
actual bias were denied despite potential jurors expressing actual
bias toward Plaintiff Shakir’s case.”
A. Shakir’s argument is procedurally defective
Shakir’s argument fails. He does not cite to any portion of
the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);
Humboldt County Adult Protective Services v. Superior Court
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 548, 555.) And, he does not explain, with a
cogent, reasoned argument, how the trial court’s rulings
prejudiced him. (Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317,
323 [“the obligation to support points with argument and
citations to authority requires more than simply stating a bare
assertion that the judgment ‘is erroneous and leaving it to the
appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court’s
role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the
judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness’”].)
In addition, to appeal the denial of a for-cause challenge,
the appellant must have (1) exercised a peremptory challenge to

12
remove the juror in question, (2) exhausted all available
peremptory challenges, and (3) expressed dissatisfaction with the
jury as finally constituted. (People v. Manibusan (2013)
58 Cal.4th 40, 61; Kimbley v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1985)
164 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169.) Here, Shakir did not expressly state
his dissatisfaction with the jury below. (People v. Black (2014)
58 Cal.4th 912, 918.) It follows that the issue was not preserved
for appeal.
Finally, Shakir has not shown prejudice as a result of the
trial court’s denial of his for-cause challenges. (People v. Yeoman
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114.) There is no evidence or argument that
an incompetent juror was forced upon him. (Ibid.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s rulings
Setting these procedural obstacles aside, Shakir’s
arguments fail on the merits. Substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s rulings. (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 562.)
First, regarding the prospective juror who found her prior jury
experience in a car accident trial a “waste of time,” she
acknowledged that this was a different case than the prior one
and she was unfamiliar with the facts in this case. Second,
regarding the prospective juror who stated that she had been
sued before, the trial court denied the challenge because the
individual stated that she does investigations as part of her
human resources job and that she could be fair and listen to all of
the evidence before making a decision here. Third, regarding the
prospective juror who felt that Shakir was being disrespectful for
wearing sunglasses, that individual retracted his comment after
learning that Shakir wore sunglasses for medical reasons.

13
III. Evidentiary Rulings
Shakir argues that the trial court committed two
evidentiary errors: (1) It erroneously denied his motion in limine
to exclude evidence of car accidents after the July 2018 accident
with Billingsley; and (2) It erroneously excluded evidence of a
photograph of the October 2018 accident between Ward and a
third party.
A. Relevant factual background
1. Shakir’s motion in limine
Prior to trial, Shakir filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence of accidents subsequent to the July 2018 collision with
Billingsley, in which Ward was again rear-ended while Shakir
was in her car; in particular, Shakir sought to exclude evidence of
an accident in October 2018. Shakir argued that Billingsley
intended to introduce evidence of the October 2018 accident to
suggest to the jury that the October accident (not the July
accident involving Billingsley) caused Shakir’s injuries.
Billingsley opposed the motion on the grounds that
evidence of the October 2018 accident was relevant given that it
resulted in injuries to the same body parts that Shakir claimed
had been injured in the July 2018 accident.
The trial court denied Shakir’s motion, finding that
evidence showing that the October accident resulted in injuries to
the same body parts that Shakir claimed were injured in the
collision with Billingsley was relevant and admissible.
2. Ward’s testimony
During Ward’s testimony, Shakir attempted to introduce
into evidence a photograph of the October 2018 accident to show
that it was so minor it could not have been a substantial factor in
causing Shakir’s injuries. Billingsley objected on the grounds

14
that Shakir failed to produce the photograph during discovery
despite his request for such evidence, and the trial court
previously granted a motion to exclude any documents not
produced in discovery. Shakir responded that the photograph
was not within the scope of Billingsley’s discovery request.
Ultimately, the trial court excluded evidence of the photograph,
finding that it was within the scope of Billingsley’s request for
production, it was not produced in discovery, and it should be
excluded pursuant to the court’s earlier ruling to exclude
evidence not produced in discovery.
Later during Ward’s testimony, Shakir attempted to use
the photograph to “refresh” Ward’s recollection about how
minimal the October 2018 accident was. The trial court
sustained Billingsley’s objection when it became clear that Shakir
was really trying to get Ward to describe the photograph.
B. No error
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Shakir’s motion in limine. (Pannu v. Land Rover North America,
Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) Evidence of the October
2018 accident was relevant and admissible. (Evid. Code, §§ 210,
351, 352.) After all, Billingsley’s theory at trial was that the
October 2018 accident was the sole or partial cause of the injuries
and damages claimed in the instant case. Under these
circumstances, the challenged evidence was relevant. (Ault v.
International Harvester Co. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113, 121–122
[evidence of other accidents is relevant to causation]; Brown v.
Affonso (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 235, 238 [evidence of injuries
sustained in prior car accidents was relevant to damages].)
Colombo v. BRP US Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1442 does
not compel a different result. In that case, a trial court properly

15
excluded evidence of other similar injuries in unrelated accidents
“because their admission would have led to myriad mini-trials
regarding these other claims.” (Id. at p. 1483.) Here there was
no such risk: There was only one other accident (October 2018)
and involved the same driver (Ward), the same passenger
(Shakir), and the same injured body parts.
The trial court also did not err in excluding from evidence a
photograph related to the October 2018 accident. Based upon the
parties’ appellate briefs and the record provided,8 it appears that
Billingsley requested copies of all photographs of damage to
Ward’s vehicle during discovery; Shakir did not produce the
subject photograph; and the trial court excluded all evidence not
produced during discovery. The fact that Billingsley may have
solicited testimony about the October 2018 accident does not alter
our analysis; the doctrine of “opening the door” is not unfettered
(see, e.g., In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 733), and Shakir
offers no legal authority that it allows a plaintiff who has not
complied with his discovery obligations to admit unproduced
evidence at trial.
C. No prejudice
It is well-settled that a judgment may not be reversed as a
result of evidentiary error unless the appellant can show that the
error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 475.) Shakir cannot do so. The evidentiary issues that he
raises on appeal relate solely to the causation and damages
elements of his negligence cause of action. (See Ault v.

8
Billingsley’s discovery request is not part of the appellate
record. We only have Ms. Vallejo’s statement at trial regarding
the scope of the discovery request and the trial court’s
confirmation that it was “all inclusive.”

16
International Harvester Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 121–122;
Brown v. Affonso, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d at p. 238.) But the jury
here specifically found Billingsley not negligent; because it did
not reach the issues of causation and damages, the challenged
evidentiary rulings could not have been prejudicial to Shakir.
IV. Trial Court Fairness
Finally, Shakir argues that the trial court made
disparaging remarks about Ward and/or Shakir’s attorney,
creating an impression of judicial bias. This argument has been
forfeited on appeal. Shakir “did not object to [any] of the trial
court’s remarks. Ordinarily, the lack of an objection at trial
forfeits the claim on appeal.” (People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1220.) Although there are exceptions to this
rule (ibid.), Shakir has not argued that any such exception
applies here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Billingsley is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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