In re Y.Z. CA2/2

CourtListener 10326175Calctapp3 feb 2025

Testo completo

Filed 2/3/25 In re Y.Z. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Y.Z., a Person Coming B337304
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
20CCJP02356B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Y.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, Y.L. (mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights
to her oldest daughter, Y.Z. (daughter). Mother argues the court
erred in not applying the beneficial parental relationship
exception to adoption. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Daughter is the second oldest of 11 children born to mother
and her husband, D.Z. (father). At least 10 of mother and
father’s children have been declared dependents of the juvenile
court and removed from their custody and care. Their youngest
child was born in November 2023, while the underlying
proceedings were pending. The record on appeal does not
indicate whether that child also has been declared a dependent of
the court.
The instant appeal is not the first time this family has been
before us. In previous nonpublished decisions, we (1) upheld the
removal of mother and father’s oldest son (In re W.Z. (Mar. 11,
2022, B309689)), (2) upheld the jurisdictional findings and
removal order as to mother and father’s, at the time, youngest
son (In re M.Z. (Dec. 2, 2022, B314485)), and (3) upheld
termination of mother’s parental rights to two of her children (In
re G.Z. (Apr. 7, 2023, B320543)). Additionally, under In re

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Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, we dismissed mother’s and
father’s appeals of an order as to educational and developmental
rights regarding one of their younger children (B317258). We
also dismissed mother’s and father’s appeals of the juvenile
court’s order terminating parental rights to one of their younger
children (B322390). Mother’s appeal was dismissed under In re
Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th 835, and father’s appeal was
dismissed for failure to file an opening brief. Finally, we
dismissed mother and father’s writ petition filed in propria
persona challenging the juvenile court’s order setting a
permanency planning hearing (B318240).
Rather than repeat the facts of these proceedings up
through the time of parents’ earlier appeals, we incorporate by
reference our opinions in each of the earlier appeals listed above.
We highlight the most recent and pertinent facts here.
1. Daughter
When the underlying proceedings began in 2020, daughter
was eight years old. She is now almost 13 years old. Daughter
has not lived with or been in mother and father’s custody and
care for the entirety of the underlying proceedings. As we noted
in our first opinion, at the start of the proceedings, daughter “was
‘quiet and timid.’ Initially, she indicated someone in the home
had inappropriately touched her, although she would not specify
how or who. In later interviews, the oldest daughter wavered
between denying anyone had touched her inappropriately and
specifying she was ‘sexually touched on her breast and groin area
by an adult male’ who lived in her home and provided food,
clothes, and other basic needs. The oldest daughter’s teeth were
visibly discolored and full of cavities.” (In re W.Z., supra,
B309689.)

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In May 2022, after four other placements, daughter was
placed with her current caregivers, who are her prospective
adoptive parents (caregivers). While with caregivers, daughter
has made immense strides emotionally, developmentally, and
academically. Caregivers stated, “When she first arrived,
[daughter] was quiet, closed off, and seemed like she wanted to
hide/not be seen.” She also expressed anxiety about catastrophic
events happening. After six months with them, caregivers
reported daughter had “come out of her shell.” She hummed to
herself, was “no longer quiet as a mouse,” became more flexible
with her schedule, and was comfortable enough to show
caregivers “her grouchy, grumpy, moody, and sullen sides.” After
22 months, caregivers described daughter as “talkative, quirky,
intelligent, engaging, loves to ask questions or crack a joke, and
loves to laugh” and stated “she now sings to herself, she works on
crafts, she draws, and reads on her own.” Caregivers said
daughter was relaxed in their home and “now claims ownership
of her room and bathroom as she has developed an increased
sense of permanency,” which was lacking when she first arrived
at caregivers’ home. Caregivers also explained daughter’s
academic skills had greatly improved while in their care, she had
made friends at school, and she had formed relationships with
caregivers’ family, becoming “an integral part of our extended
families.” Caregivers had “developed a strong bond with her and
her attachment has grown such that she is now calling us mom
and dad.”
The Department similarly reported daughter was
“thriving” in caregivers’ home. She was happy, stable, and
bonding with caregivers. She “appeared relaxed and smiled
easily.” If she could not return to her parents, daughter wanted

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to stay with caregivers permanently. Daughter was sad not to
reunite with her family, but after five months with caregivers,
daughter wanted to be adopted by them. As time went on,
daughter repeatedly and consistently “verbalized desire to be
adopted by the caregivers.” In July 2023, the Department
reported, “[Daughter] is an integral part of the family unit and
the character of their relationship appears to be beneficial to the
well-being of the child, and the family as a whole.”
Daughter participated in and benefited greatly from
individual therapy. Her therapist stated, “ ‘I can support
[daughter] in many ways including identifying feelings, but
adoption is a very specific issue because her birth mother
[mother] is involved too much.’ ” Daughter also met with an
adoption therapist. By August 2023, daughter had reached her
individual treatment goals and was “deemed to have stabilized”
such that her individual therapy concluded. She continued to see
the adoption therapist.
2. Mother and Father
In violation of multiple court orders, father continued to
post confidential and sensitive case information online. More
than once, the juvenile court found father in contempt of court.
Additionally, mother and father continued to assert their
outrageous accusations of persecution and victimhood.
Mother did not separate herself from father. They
continued to live together and have children together. During the
pendency of the underlying proceedings, mother gave birth to five
children, including most recently their 11th child in November
2023.

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3. Caregivers
Caregivers wanted and were approved to adopt daughter.
They already had applied to adopt her youngest brother who was
born during the pendency of the underlying proceedings (son),
with whom daughter had a strong bond, and for whom mother
and father’s parental rights already had been terminated.
Caregivers explained they would have applied earlier to adopt
daughter, but her immigration status had caused uncertainty.
Daughter’s case was complicated and delayed by difficulties in
obtaining her birth certificate (she and her older brother were
both born in China) and necessary coordination with immigration
procedures and services.
4. Visits
Mother visited with the children regularly.1 Visits
generally went well and were always monitored. During visits,
mother interacted with and cared for her children appropriately.
The Department reported, “In general, the mother has had
quality time with her children during the visitations.” On
multiple occasions, the Department reported mother, daughter,
and two of daughter’s siblings had “maintained [a] close
relationship, as evidenced by their communication and
interaction,” and “it appeared that the mother could parent and
discipline the children properly.” On one occasion in June 2022,
however, father was present and refused to leave. He and
mother insisted caregivers were both forcing daughter to wear
prescription glasses and abusing infant son. Eventually mother
called 911 and son was taken to a hospital, where mother and

1 As of mid-2022, after the juvenile court restricted father’s
visitation and ordered that he not visit at the same time as
mother, father no longer visited with the children.

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father continued to repeat their concerns and father claimed
caregivers could be poisoning son. A doctor examined son,
conducted a blood test, and found him to be “healthy without any
concerns.”
In June 2023, father suffered a “challenging medical
condition,” causing mother to cancel visits for months while she
cared for father.2 Mother also was pregnant with her 11th child
at the time. Mother resumed her visits in January 2024.
However, by March 2024, mother again stopped visiting with her
children because her work schedule became more demanding
following father’s medical issues.
5. Termination of Parental Rights and Appeal
On March 7, 2024, the juvenile court held daughter was
adoptable and the beneficial parental relationship exception to
adoption did not apply. The court explained that, although
mother had “maintained regular visits with [daughter] and the
visits have been positive,” “there were a string of missed visits
based on mother’s other obligations. She does have to take care
of father at this time.” The court held neither mother nor father
had shown that daughter would benefit from a continued
relationship with the parents or that termination of the parental
relationship would be detrimental to daughter. The court found
the benefit to daughter of permanency through adoption
outweighed any harm that might result from terminating the
parental relationship. Accordingly, the court terminated
mother’s and father’s parental rights to daughter.
Mother appealed the court’s March 7, 2024 order
terminating parental rights. Father did not appeal.

2 According to a statement by mother’s counsel below,
father appears to have suffered a stroke.

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DISCUSSION
1. Applicable Law
At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court
may terminate parental rights only upon finding the child is
likely to be adopted and no statutory exception to adoption
applies. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subds. (b) & (c)(1).)3 Here,
it is undisputed daughter was likely to be adopted. Thus, our
focus is whether a statutory exception to adoption and the
termination of parental rights applies.
The exception mother raises is the beneficial parental
relationship exception. This exception is set forth in section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides: “[T]he court shall
terminate parental rights unless . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The court
finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would
be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.”
To establish this exception, mother must prove the
following three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
631 (Caden C.).) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be
detrimental, the trial court must decide whether the harm from
severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the
benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.
[Citation.] By making this decision, the trial court determines

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s best
interests.” (Id. at p. 632.) “ ‘If severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of
a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 633.) The
“ ‘statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.’ ” (Id. at p. 631.)
2. Standard of Review
When reviewing an order terminating parental rights and
rejecting application of the beneficial parental relationship
exception, we apply a hybrid standard of review. On the one
hand, “[a] substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements [of the exception]. The determination that the
parent has visited and maintained contact with the child
‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the
court’s orders’ [citation] is essentially a factual determination.
It’s likewise essentially a factual determination whether the
relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing
it.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)
On the other hand, the juvenile court’s determination on
the third element is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. As to the
third element, the juvenile court “makes the assessment by
weighing the harm of losing the [parent-child] relationship
against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. And
so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)

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“In reviewing factual determinations for substantial
evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have
reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of
discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the
evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses
its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits
of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.] But ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
“At its core,” this hybrid standard of review “embodies the
principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a
reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in
the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in
that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s
comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 641.)
3. No Error
The parties agree mother satisfied the first element
(regular visitation and contact with daughter) of the beneficial
parental relationship exception. Although the juvenile court
found otherwise, we assume without deciding that mother
satisfied the second element (a relationship with daughter, the
continuation of which would benefit daughter). We conclude,

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however, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
determining mother failed to establish the third element.
As noted above, the third element requires the juvenile
court to “decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever
the [parental] relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court must determine “how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) Although the loss
of a parental relationship may cause detriment to a child, the
question for the juvenile court is whether the countervailing
positives the child gains in a permanent, stable home outweigh
any such detriment. (Ibid.) “When the relationship with a
parent is so important to the child that the security and stability
of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be
‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633–634.)
Here, it was not an abuse of discretion to determine
adoption by caregivers outweighed any detriment daughter might
experience by losing her relationship with mother. By the time of
the March 2024 permanency planning hearing, daughter had not
been living with mother or father for almost four years. Close to
two of those years daughter spent with caregivers, who were
steadfast in their desire to adopt daughter and provide her with a
stable home. Although at first daughter indicated she preferred
to return home with mother and father, as time went on, she
repeatedly and consistently expressed her desire to be adopted by
caregivers, who she came to call “mom and dad.” It is undisputed
daughter flourished emotionally, developmentally, and
academically while in their care.

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Although as mother points out on appeal she and daughter
shared a relationship, the record amply supports a finding that
their relationship was not of the type or character that would
warrant foregoing adoption. Mother never progressed past
monitored visits with daughter. She also never distanced herself
from father, and in fact continued to have children with him and
continued to espouse similarly paranoid beliefs as him. As we
have noted in previous opinions, mother’s reliance on and
connection to father impeded her ability to care for her children.
Dr. Wen (who performed mother’s and father’s mental health
evaluations) opined mother was “ ‘unable to independently care
for her children without relying on her husband’ ” and “ ‘[t]he
impedance by [father] will likely pose mental health and safety
concerns for any minors under their care.’ ” (In re G.Z., supra,
B320543; In re M.Z., supra, B314485.) Finally, for months
leading up to the permanency planning hearing and termination
of parental rights, daughter saw mother only a handful of times
because mother canceled visits due to father’s illness, the birth of
their 11th child, and her work schedule. There is no indication in
the record that this decrease in visits with mother negatively
impacted daughter.
We conclude it was not an abuse of discretion for the
juvenile court to find the benefits and security of adoption by
caregivers outweighed any harm from terminating mother’s
parental relationship with daughter. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 640.) Thus, the juvenile court did not err when it
held the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did
not apply.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s March 7, 2024 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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