CourtListener 10326136•Go v. McClaugherty CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/31/25 Go v. McClaugherty CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JUANITO APAO GO, D083772
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVPS2203302)
JAY McCLAUGHERTY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside,
Christopher B. Harmon, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Ellis Law Group and Mark E. Ellis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ropers Majeski, and Lawrence Borys, Pascale Gagnon, Anna
Norvruzyan for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Juanito Apao Go appeals a judgment entered
after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of
defendants and respondents, attorney Jay McClaugherty and McClaugherty
and Associates, to Go’s second amended complaint for legal malpractice and
breach of contract. According to his pleading, Go had been sued for wrongful
death, settled that civil action on defendants’ advice then faced criminal
charges. He alleged in part that defendants, who were assigned to him by his
insurer, negligently failed to advise him of the likelihood that the civil
settlement would not prevent him from exposure for criminal restitution or
failed to draft the settlement agreement so as to minimize his restitution
obligation. The trial court ruled Go had not cured his inability to allege
causation and damages, reasoning that Go had not been damaged by
anything defendants may have omitted from the civil release or from any
more extensive settlement agreement. Go contends his pleading adequately
alleges that defendants’ malpractice caused him damages, and thus his
second amended complaint should have survived the demurrer. He also
contends he alleged defendants owed him a duty of care, and that Insurance
Code section 533.5—barring insurance coverage or indemnity for the
payment of restitution in any criminal proceeding—does not bar his causes of
action.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude the court erred by
sustaining defendants’ demurrer to Go’s second amended complaint.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions that the
court enter a new order overruling defendants’ demurrer.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We state the background facts from the well-pleaded material factual
allegations of Go’s operative second amended complaint, disregarding
contentions, deductions and factual or legal conclusions. (Quishenberry v.
UnitedHealthcare, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1057, 1062; John’s Grill, Inc. v. The
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1008; 290
Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 439, 450.) We consider matters that may be judicially noticed.
(John’s Grill, at p. 1008.)
2
In January 2018, Go was involved in an accident with a pedestrian who
eventually died. The victim’s next of kin, Olga Silva, sued Go for motor
vehicle negligence and wrongful death. Go’s insurer assigned his file to
defendants. In November 2018, the Riverside County District Attorney’s
office filed a criminal misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter complaint
against Go.
In early 2019, defendants agreed to settle the civil case.1 They
recommended to Go that they put up the full policy limits—$1,250,000—to
terminate any further liability exposure, and on their advice, in January
2019, Go signed a settlement agreement/release with Silva for his insurer to
pay those policy limits. The release provides in part that under the
settlement, Silva will dismiss her action with prejudice “with each party
1 Defendants in their brief recite certain facts that are outside Go’s
pleadings. For example, they assert as to the settlement’s timing: “After
discovery, including Silva’s deposition, Silva presented a policy limit demand
to [Go’s insurer] Allstate. Allstate considered the demand, made the decision
to, and did agree to settle for the full policy limits, as was its right and
obligation. . . . After the agreement to settle, but before the payment, the
Riverside District Attorney charged . . . Go criminally with respect to the
accident that had resulted in the death of Decedent.” For these propositions,
defendants cite to their reply memorandum of points and authorities in
support of their demurrer to Go’s complaint. As discussed below, on a
demurrer we must accept Go’s allegations as true. An exception is where an
alleged fact is contradicted by matters that are properly judicially noticed.
(Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
645, 653.) Even if defendants’ document was judicially noticeable as a court
record, we do not accept the truth of assertions made in it. (Guarantee
Forklift, Inc. v. Capacity of Texas, Inc. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1075
[appellate court may take judicial notice of court records but generally does
“not take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted in such
documents, and may decline to take judicial notice of matters not relevant to
dispositive issues on appeal”]; Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903,
915.) We disregard defendants’ extraneous assertions, including those
supported only by citation to points and authorities.
3
bearing their own costs and attorneys’ fees.”2 Defendants did not
communicate with or advise Go about any likelihood that the civil settlement
would not prevent him from facing further monetary exposure by way of
criminal restitution to Silva; the release drafted by the defendants failed to
address or attempt to prevent or minimize, a criminal restitution obligation
by set off or otherwise.
Instead, defendants and the release language led Go to incorrectly
believe that the settlement, with the exhaustion of his insurance policies,
would fully release him from all future potential liability to Silva. The
defendants did not reach out and interact with Go’s criminal attorney to
determine how to best negotiate a full release of both civil and criminal
liability.
In November 2020, the court in the criminal case ordered Go to pay
Silva $491,362.70 in restitution, finding that to be the actual and reasonable
attorney fees she had incurred in pursuit of her civil recovery pursuant to a
contingency fee agreement. If defendants had advised Go that exhaustion of
his full insurance policy would still leave him exposed to future liability, he
would not have consented to the settlement but instead would have required
defendants to insist on a full release of all civil and criminal damages liability
to Silva.
2 As indicated below, the trial court took judicial notice of the People’s
restitution memorandum in Go’s criminal case, which attached a “release of
all claims” (capitalization omitted) between Go and Silva reflecting the terms
of their settlement. In part, the release provides: “It is further understood
that this release is pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into between
plaintiff . . . Silva and defendant . . . Go. Additionally, pursuant to said
settlement, plaintiff . . . will dismiss the above-referenced action, with
prejudice, forthwith, with each party bearing their own costs and attorneys’
fees.”
4
After he and defendants entered into a tolling agreement, Go in June
2022 filed a complaint against them for legal malpractice and breach of their
contract for legal services. Defendants successfully demurred to that
complaint as well as Go’s first amended complaint. The court granted Go
leave to amend on the condition that he make an effort to mitigate his
damages by having the restitution award amended or deemed satisfied by the
settlement. In doing so, it cited authority—People v. Bernal (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 155 (Bernal), People v. Jennings (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 42
(Jennings), and People v. Short (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 899 (Short)—for the
proposition that an insurer’s private settlement offsets a restitution award.
Go then filed a second amended complaint containing the same causes
of action. He alleged defendants owed him a duty to advise of the foreseeable
consequences of settling the underlying case, including the imposition of
criminal restitution, and they failed to use due care in performing legal
services to protect him by negotiating a settlement that released any
potential criminal restitution, and/or by failing to advise Go about his
exposure to continuing liability in the criminal case. He alleged defendants
breached their professional duties by, among other things, failing to negotiate
and/or draft the settlement agreement “to reduce, if not wholly eliminate by
compromise settlement, any right of . . . Silva to criminal restitution” and
they “did not recognize that the settlement signed by both [Go] and . . . Silva,
as drafted, did not even attempt to address her settlement, or compromise, of
the foreseeable possibility of her seeking further criminal restitution.” Go
alleged defendants put the interests of his insurer before his interests in the
settlement of the underlying civil case, and failed to work or coordinate with
his criminal attorney “so as to best protect him, and/or to use the insurance
proceeds to cover both the civil settlement and the foreseeable criminal
5
restitution obligation.” He alleged defendants’ failure to properly advise him
that the settlement would not cut off further liability in the criminal matter
was below the standard of care, and had he known of that fact, he would have
refused the settlement and insisted the policy proceeds be used to resolve the
extant monetary claims. Go alleged defendants’ failures to advise were
substantial factors in causing a further monetary award against him in
excess of $400,000. He alleged if defendants had acted competently, he would
have resolved the criminal restitution by settlement or the restitution award
would have been subject to setoff.
Defendants again demurred to Go’s second amended complaint on
grounds it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. They
argued Go had not demonstrated how any alleged breach of duty on their
part caused him damages in the criminal matter, in which they were not
involved. More specifically, pointing out Go had not alleged he had made
efforts to satisfy the court’s condition in granting him leave to amend,
defendants argued legal causation was lacking in view of People v. Vasquez
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126 (Vasquez), which held in part that the
settlement of a civil action and release of a defendant by a crime victim does
not discharge the defendant’s responsibility to satisfy a restitution order.
They argued they were not retained to address the restitution order, and they
could not control that order or any offset. Defendants further argued
Insurance Code section 533.5—providing there is no insurance coverage for
criminal restitution—barred Go’s causes of action. They argued Go could not
allege any duty or breach of duty on their part, and had not cured any of the
deficiencies in his first amended complaint. Defendants asked the court to
take judicial notice of various items, including the People’s restitution memo
in Go’s criminal case and the court’s restitution ruling.
6
Go opposed the demurrer, arguing Vasquez actually demonstrated
causation, that is, that the restitution award was defendants’ fault because
he became liable for restitution of over $400,000 in attorney fees because his
civil settlement failed to provide which portions of the fees were for non-
economic versus economic damages, and/or subject to setoff. Among other
arguments, Go maintained he pleaded significant new facts to support the
causation element. He asked the court to judicially notice the misdemeanor
complaint in his criminal case.
Granting the parties’ requests for judicial notice, the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Its order recounts its prior
reasoning ruling on defendants’ demurrer to the first amended complaint,3
then states: “[Go] failed to cure the defect in the prior pleading on the
causation and damages issue, and failed to allege any facts that any efforts
were made to have the restitution order deemed satisfied in criminal court.
In fact, [Go] ignores this issue altogether in the opposition, thereby conceding
3 The court had reasoned: “Given the rule of Bernal, Jennings and Short,
it does not appear that [Go] has been damaged by anything the defendants
omitted either from the release or from any more extensive settlement
agreement. It is settled that the release cannot prevent the imposition of a
restitution order, so the wording of the release could not have caused damage
to [Go]. Similarly, it is not clear how the text of any more extensive
settlement agreement could have caused damage to [Go]. Regardless of what
the settlement agreement says or fails to say, [Go] is entitled to an offset, so
long as the insurance proceeds were paid to compensate the victim for the
same losses for which restitution was ordered. There is no allegation that the
losses for which restitution were ordered are different from the losses for
which the settlement was paid. [¶] It appears to the court that the remedy
for [Go] is a motion in the criminal court for an order deeming the restitution
order to have been satisfied by the settlement. Since the defendants were not
representing [Go] in the criminal action, any adverse consequences flowing
from the failure to bring such a motion was not caused by any breach of duty
by the defendants.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
7
no such efforts were made. As pointed out by defendant[s], [Go’s] additional
allegations in the [second amended complaint] regarding duty and breach of
duty are no different than theories [Go] has previously alleged, i.e., that
defendants failed to properly advise him of foreseeable consequences of
having to pay criminal restitution and failed to protect his interests by
drafting the settlement release in a manner to shield or minimize liability for
a criminal restitution award. . . . More importantly, these allegations do
nothing to cure the defect regarding causation or damages.”4 (Some
capitalization omitted.)
Go appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
On an appeal from a judgment entered after the court sustains a
demurrer, settled principles apply. “[W]e examine the operative complaint de
novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action
under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4
Cal.5th 145, 162; see also Martin v. Gladstone (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 681,
688-689.) “ ‘ “We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as
a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume
the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” ’ ” (Rosenberg-
4 The court had previously rejected defendants’ arguments under
Insurance Code section 533.5 in connection with their demurrer to Go’s first
amended complaint. It reasoned defendants’ reliance on the statute was
“misplaced” as “[i]t simply provides that ‘[n]o policy of insurance shall
provide, or be construed to provide, any coverage or indemnity for the
payment of any fine, penalty, or restitution in any criminal action or
proceeding’ ” and “does not prohibit the use of insurance proceeds to offset
criminal restitution.”
8
Wohl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 520, 523.) “[T]he
facts alleged in the [complaint] are deemed to be true, however, improbable
they may be,” unless they are inconsistent with attached documents or
judicially noticed facts. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981)
123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) We liberally construe Go’s pleading with a view to
substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Morales v.
22nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 504, 537.)
“Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we
consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.”
(T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 162.)
“We may affirm on any basis stated in the demurrer, regardless of the
ground on which the trial court based its ruling.” (Krolikowski v. San Diego
City Employees’ Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 549, quoting
Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324.)
II. Pleading Legal Malpractice
“[T]he elements for a legal malpractice cause of action in California are:
‘(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as
members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach
of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney’s
negligence.’ ” (Akhlaghpour v. Orantes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 232, 254-255,
quoting Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.) “ ‘In the
legal malpractice context, the elements of causation and damage are
particularly closely linked.’ [Citation.] The plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that but for the attorney’s negligent acts or
omissions, he would have obtained a more favorable judgment or settlement
9
in the action in which the malpractice allegedly occurred.” (Namikas v.
Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1582; see also Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30
Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) This requirement safeguards against speculative and
conjectural claims. (Viner, at p. 1241.) This method of presenting a legal
malpractice lawsuit is commonly called a “trial within a trial” because the
trier of fact is called upon to determine, using an objective standard, what
should have been the results absent counsel’s malpractice. (See Gutierrez v.
Girardi (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 925, 934.)
Here, we are reviewing the adequacy of Go’s complaint’s allegations.
The question before us is not whether Go can prove a legally cognizable
claim, but only whether he has pleaded one. (Briggs v. Lawrence (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 605, 610.) “[I]n an action brought by a client against his attorney
for the latter’s alleged negligence in failing to perform some act in behalf of
the client, the complaint must not only specify the act, but must specifically
allege and the plaintiff must prove that if the attorney had performed the act
it would have resulted beneficially to the client.” (Feldesman v. McGovern
(1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 566, 568; see also Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 170, 180 [to survive a demurrer on a claim for legal malpractice,
plaintiff “need only allege that, but for [the attorney’s] malpractice, she would
have obtained a ‘more favorable result’ than the $600,000–plus judgment
ultimately rendered against her”].)
But, “ ‘[i]f the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it
generates no cause of action in tort.’ ” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 750.) “ ‘The mere breach of a
professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the
threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not suffice to create a cause of
action for negligence. [Citations.] Hence, until the client suffers appreciable
10
harm as a consequence of [the] attorney’s negligence, the client cannot
establish a cause of action for malpractice.’ ” (Ibid.)
III. Criminal Restitution as Affected by Civil Settlements Arising from a
Defendant’s Criminal Conduct
The California Constitution gives “all persons who suffer losses as a
result of criminal activity . . . the right to seek and secure restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A); see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644,
652; People v. Grundfor (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 22, 27.) “Restitution is
mandatory: It must be ordered ‘in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed.’ ” (Grundfor, at p. 27, citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
subd. (b)(13)(B).) Whenever a victim has suffered an economic loss as a
result of the defendant’s conduct, the trial court must order the defendant to
pay “full restitution.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f); Giordano, at pp. 651-
652; Grundfor, at p. 27.)5 Because restitution serves not just to indemnify
the crime victim but also to rehabilitate and deter a defendant from future
criminality, a civil settlement between a victim and the criminal defendant’s
insurer does not relieve the defendant of his restitution obligation to the
state. (People v. Nonaka (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 998, 1002, citing Bernal,
5 Both the Giordano and Grundfor courts referred to earlier versions of
Penal Code section 1202.4 before the Legislature in 2016 omitted the phrase
“unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so” from
subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1202.4. (People v. Giordano, supra, 42
Cal.4th at pp. 651-652; People v. Grundfor, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 27, fn.
4.) Go’s accident occurred in January 2018, and the court ordered him to pay
restitution in November 2020. The statute’s versions operative in January
2018 and November 2020 are unchanged in all respects material to this case,
both providing that “[t]he court shall order full restitution.” (Former Pen.
Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f); see Stats. 2017, ch. 101, § 1; Stats. 2018, ch. 142, §
1.)
11
supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 161-162; see Grundfor, at p. 28 [that a victim
signs a release is irrelevant to propriety of the restitution order as the
settlement and state’s right to compel restitution “operate independently of”
each other; “While the release may have relieved Grundfor from further civil
liability, it did not relieve him from paying criminal restitution”]; Barickman
v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 508, 517-518; Vasquez, supra,
190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.) “However, settlement payments made to a
victim on the defendant’s behalf must be used to offset the restitution award
‘to the extent that those payments are for items of loss included in the
restitution order.’ ” (Nonaka, at p.1002, citing Bernal, at p. 168 & Vasquez,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134-1135; see also Barickman, at p. 518;
People v. Hume (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 990, 996.)
“ ‘Actual and reasonable’ attorney fees,” including fees a victim incurs
to settle a civil lawsuit against the criminal defendant arising from the
defendant’s criminal conduct, “constitute an economic loss.” (People v.
Grundfor, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 28, citing Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd.
(f)(c)(3) & People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 876, 883 (Fulton); see also
People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 654; People v. Nonaka, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) Such attorney fees are recoverable as restitution
unless they are offset in a civil settlement. (Grundfor, at p. 28; see Bernal,
supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165-168.) There is no such offset where a civil
settlement agreement with a defendant stemming from his or her criminal
activity requires each side to bear their own attorney fees, and thus the
criminal court must order the defendant to pay full restitution for the fees.
(Grundfor, at p. 28; see also id. at p. 29 [“Here, the [settlement] terms were
that each side would bear its own attorney fees. Because the terms
unambiguously show that the parties did not intend to include all of [the
12
victim’s] losses—including her attorney fees—in the settlement, they could
not have intended to resolve all restitution issues in it”].)
In 2003, this court acknowledged in Fulton that while a victim may
recover actual and reasonable attorney fees incurred as a result of a
defendant’s criminal conduct as restitution, they are limited to those fees
incurred to collect economic damages, that is, restitution “otherwise
permitted under the statute.” (Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 884-
885; see also People v. Grundfor, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 [“Attorney
fees incurred to recover noneconomic losses cannot be ordered as
restitution”]; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 25-26 [observing the
Penal Code provides for full restitution of a victim’s economic losses, but does
not authorize direct restitution for noneconomic losses].) We held in Fulton,
however, that given the legislative intent and strong public policy requiring
victims to be fully reimbursed for economic losses, “[i]t would be improper to
reduce the attorney fees incurred to obtain economic damages merely because
those same attorney fees also led to the recovery of nonrecoverable damages
(e.g., pain and suffering damages).” (Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p.
885.) Thus, “when fees cannot be reasonably divided between the pursuit of
economic losses as opposed to noneconomic losses, the victim is entitled to be
fully reimbursed for all actual and reasonable attorney fees.” (Ibid.; see also
Grundfor, at p. 30.) We elaborated on the defendant’s burden in the
apportionment process: “Once the record contains evidence showing the
victim suffered economic losses and incurred reasonable attorney fees to
recover those losses, this showing establishes the amount of restitution the
victim is entitled to receive, unless challenged by the defendant. In that
event, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the portion of the attorney
fees that are not recoverable because those fees can be attributed solely to a
13
nonrecoverable category of noneconomic losses. [Citations.] This approach
complies with the statutory mandate that the amount of restitution is to be
based on the ‘loss claimed by the victim’ and the designated right of the
defendant to a hearing ‘to dispute the determination of the amount of
restitution.’ ” (Fulton, at p. 886.)
Two years later in Jennings, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 42, a majority
panel of this court held a defendant was entitled to an offset for a portion of
payments made by an insurance company to his victim, who he injured while
he was driving with a 0.16 blood-alcohol level. (Id. at pp. 46, 49-50.) The
victim had signed a settlement agreement with the insurer to accept
$105,000 in exchange for a release of the defendant and his mother from
further civil liability arising from the accident; the settlement agreement
“conditioned execution of the release on ‘an agreed allocation of the
settlement amount of 15 percent to medical expenses and 85 percent to pain
and suffering . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 47.) The main focus on appeal was whether
the defendant was an insured entitled to an offset. The majority held he was,
and that the portion of the defendant’s civil settlement covering the economic
losses—15 percent of the $105,000 settlement agreement amount—should be
offset against the amount of the defendant’s restitution obligation. (Id. at p.
14
58.)6 We ordered the defendant’s restitution obligation modified to reflect a
credit for that amount tendered by his insurer to pay for the victim’s medical
expenses, less amounts allocated to attorney fees. (Id. at pp. 58-59.)
Since this court decided these cases, it has become well understood in
this context that a criminal defendant faced with an obligation to pay a
victim’s attorney fees as restitution has the burden of proving both the
nature of the attorney fee award—whether it includes fees to recover general
or noneconomic damages—as well as the proper apportionment between
recoverable and nonrecoverable fees, i.e., those incurred to recover economic
medical and other expenses versus those incurred to recover noneconomic
6 Justice Benke dissented in Jennings, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 42. She
disagreed with Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 155, reasoning that “allowing
a defendant to offset a direct restitution obligation with monies paid by his
liability insurer effectively disengages the amount of direct restitution the
defendant must pay from the calculation of the harm caused and thus steals
from the restitution obligation its intended rehabilitative and deterrent
effect.” (Jennings, at p. 60 (dis. opn. of Benke, J.).) She also felt the majority
improperly expanded Bernal to include a defendant who had not himself
obtained and paid for the liability insurance that funded the settlement.
(Jennings, at pp. 61-62 (dis. opn. of Benke, J.); see also People v. Vasquez,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.) The California Supreme Court denied
review in Jennings in July 2005.
15
pain and suffering damages. (Vasquez, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137,7
citing People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 33-34; see also People
v. Grundfor, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 30.)
IV. Contentions
Go contends his second amended complaint properly alleges
defendants’ malpractice caused him damages, and that the court erred by
sustaining defendants’ demurrer to both causes of action for legal malpractice
and breach of contract. Specifically, he argues that defendants had a duty
but failed to advise him of foreseeable consequences of entering into the civil
settlement, including that he could become liable for restitution in the
amount of the attorney fees paid to settle the case. He points out that despite
the law holding that a restitution award may be set off by attorney fees
incurred to recover economic damages where the loss can be rationally
divided or allocated between economic and noneconomic damages, defendants
7 People v. Vasquez, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 1126, relied upon by
defendants below, held a trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to
order his restitution obligation ($168,633.20 in medical expenses his victim
had incurred “so far”) satisfied by a civil settlement. (Id. at pp. 1136-1138.)
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that at most, the defendant had a right to
an offset for the portion of the civil settlement made on his behalf and
allocable to medical expenses included in the restitution order, amounting to
no more than $22,335. (Id. at pp. 1137-1138.) However, it held he had not
carried his burden to show a proper apportionment between recoverable
(economic) and nonrecoverable (noneconomic) losses. (Id. at p. 1137.)
Because the victim had incurred additional medical expenses after the date of
the restitution order, the Court of Appeal held the trial court “reasonably
inferred the portion of the civil settlement attributable to medical expenses
did not include those expenses included in the court’s restitution order.
Rather, as contemplated at the time the restitution order was entered, [the
victim] recovered in her civil action sums for additional losses (both economic
and noneconomic) she had sustained.” (Id. at p. 1138.) Thus, the court held
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling the defendant had failed
to establish entitlement to an offset. (Ibid.)
16
did not divide or allocate the attorney fees incurred on recoverable losses, or
make any attempt to negotiate that point in the civil settlement. Go points to
his allegations that if defendants had properly advised him that the
exhaustion of his policy would have left him exposed to future restitution
liability, he would not have consented to the settlement but would have had
defendants insist on a full release of all civil and criminal liability. He argues
defendants’ advice or lack of advice led him to believe he would be released
from all future liability to Silva, and they were a “ ‘substantial factor,’
perhaps not the only factor, that led to [his] damages.”
Go also argues his second amended complaint alleges the “settlement
agreement could have been drafted to, among other things, minimize
criminal restitution including allocations of payers [sic] between economic
and non-economic damages for purposes of setoff.” He argues defendants
owed him the duties by virtue of their attorney-client relationship, and
defendants knew or should have known it was foreseeable he would face a
restitution hearing as a result of the collision, and the adverse legal
ramifications.
Go further challenges defendants’ arguments based on Insurance Code
section 533.5 on grounds this matter involves negligent driving (as opposed to
a willful act) and defendants’ separate fiduciary obligations to him to give
competent advice regarding the civil settlement.
Finally, Go argues his second amended complaint properly alleges a
duty and breach thereof, in part pointing to Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1672, for the proposition that lawyers may have an obligation to
advise their clients of legal problems that are apparent “ ‘even though they
fall outside the scope of retention.’ ”
17
V. Analysis
A. Duty of Care
We begin with the element of duty, since absent a duty of care, there
can be no breach and no negligence. (Goldberg v. Frye (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d
1258, 1267.) Though the court did not base its ruling on the existence or
nonexistence of a duty of care, defendants argue that Go’s second amended
complaint is legally defective because the criminal prosecution and resultant
restitution order were outside the scope of their duty, which was limited to
defending him in the wrongful death civil lawsuit. They assert there is no
allegation they were hired to do anything or give advice with respect to any
criminal matter. In making this claim, they acknowledge an attorney’s
engagement denotes the scope of the duties he or she undertakes.8
We reject the suggestion that an attorney cannot be sued for
malpractice with respect to matters outside the scope of his or her client
contract or retainer agreement. (See Janik v. Rudy, Exelrod & Zieff (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 930, 940 [“We find no support for defendants’ broad
assertion that ‘an attorney cannot be sued in malpractice for failing to raise
claims beyond the scope of a retainer agreement’ ”].) “True, the extent of an
attorney’s duty to act necessarily depends on the scope of the attorney-client
relationship [citation], and the scope of this relationship may be limited by
the agreement between the attorney and the client. [Citation.] But an
attorney who undertakes one matter on behalf of a client owes that client the
duty to at least consider and advise the client if there are apparent related
matters that the client is overlooking and that should be pursued to avoid
prejudicing the client’s interests. ‘[E]ven when a retention is expressly
8 Defendants do not provide a record citation to their retainer or other
agreement to provide Go services.
18
limited, the attorney may still have a duty to alert the client to legal
problems which are reasonably apparent, even though they fall outside the
scope of the retention.’ ” (Janik, at p. 940, citing Nichols v. Keller, supra, 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 1684 & Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953,
983-985.)9
Here, Go’s allegations demonstrate his claims rely at least in part on an
asserted duty within the scope of defendants’ representation: to competently
draft the settlement and release in the civil wrongful death action. Liberally
construing Go’s pleading as we must, which shows Go had pending criminal
charges at the time of the settlement, we conclude the duty here extended to
making efforts to preserve Go’s ability to offset some or all of the insurance
payment against a potential criminal restitution award. Even if the criminal
matter was technically outside the scope of defendants’ retainer, a question
we cannot determine on the pleadings or this record, we would hold Go’s
9 The court in Nichols v. Keller more fully explains: “One of an attorney’s
basic functions is to advise. Liability can exist because the attorney failed to
provide advice. Not only should an attorney furnish advice when requested,
but he or she should also volunteer opinions when necessary to further the
client’s objectives. The attorney need not advise and caution of every possible
alternative, but only of those that may result in adverse consequences if not
considered. . . . The rationale is that, as between the lay client and the
attorney, the latter is more qualified to recognize and analyze the client’s
legal needs. The attorney need not represent the client on such matters.
Nevertheless, the attorney should inform the client of the limitations of the
attorney’s representation and of the possible need for other counsel.”
(Nichols v. Keller, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1684.) Defendants seek to
factually distinguish Nichols as well as another case Go cites, Novak v. Low,
Ball & Lynch (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 278. But the general principles
expressed in those cases, as in Novak that an attorney hired by an insurer to
defend a claim owes a high duty of care to both the insurer and insured
(Novak, at p. 283) particularly in settlement negotiations after litigation is
filed (id. at p. 284, fn. 3), are relevant here notwithstanding the factual
differences.
19
allegations are sufficient. Under the circumstances, and the law going back
to 2002-2004 (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 155, Fulton, supra, 109
Cal.App.4th 876, and Jennings, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 42) pertaining to the
intersection between civil settlements stemming from criminal conduct and
criminal restitution, the legal problem of a potential criminal restitution
award of attorney fees expended by his victim in obtaining the civil
settlement should have been “reasonably apparent” (Janik v. Rudy, Exelrod
& Zieff, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 940) to defendants.
Defendants argue that the later criminal restitution proceedings were
“entirely speculative when the settlement of the wrongful death action was
concluded with the full release and payment of the policy limits” and thus
they had no duty with regard to how the civil settlement might be construed
or interpreted in those proceedings. But as stated above, criminal restitution
is mandatory for a victim’s economic losses, which include attorney fees
incurred by the victim in the respects discussed above. We cannot say in this
instance, where Go’s criminal case was pending when defendants settled
Silva’s civil action and the state of the law, the potential for a criminal
restitution award was so speculative to eliminate their duty to structure the
civil settlement to minimize it.
We are unpersuaded by defendants’ seeming reliance on the proposition
that Go’s insurer had the right and duty to accept Silva’s policy limit demand
and settle the case within the policy limits. In part, the argument is based on
New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v Edwards, Sooy & Byron (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 799, which defendants do not discuss in any detail. In New
Plumbing, the insured, a contractor, sued its insurer’s counsel for
professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty for settling an earlier
action without notifying it and “ignoring valid defenses that would have
20
absolved [it] of any liability” causing it to pay “higher premiums . . . lower
coverage and higher deductibles, and [requiring it to] deal with financially
weaker carriers to obtain insurance thereafter.” (Id. at p. 801.) The Court of
Appeal affirmed a summary judgment based on the absence of causation, but
specifically in view of “a policy provision giving an insurance company
discretion to settle as it sees fit . . . .” (Id. at p. 802.) In that instance, “the
insurer is ‘entitled to control settlement negotiations without interference
from the insured,’ and generally, it has no liability to the insured for settling
within the policy limits. [Citation.] Thus, there is no cause of action where
the insured claims the settlement injured its business reputation [citation],
nor any where the insured claims the settlement unfairly used up its
deductibles. [Citation.] . . . [¶] Since [the insurer] could settle without
consulting [the insured] and over its objection, counsel’s recommendation of
settlement was not a cause of any harm the [insured] may have suffered.”
(Ibid.)
Go’s pleading and the record are absent any indication Go was subject
to any such policy provision. These principles do not prevent him from
alleging viable claims.
B. The Second Amended Complaint Adequately Alleges Causation and
Damages with Respect to the Settlement Agreement’s Drafting
With regard to causation and damages, our task is only to decide
whether the second amended complaint includes facts which, if accepted as
true, would allow a trier of fact to conclude the defendants’ alleged negligence
caused Go damage. To do so, there must be factual allegations explaining
how defendants’ alleged negligent act or acts prevented Go from obtaining a
more favorable result. (Charnay v. Cobert, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
21
Under the principles discussed above, it was not possible for Go’s civil
settlement to eliminate his legal obligation to pay criminal restitution to his
victim. “[T]he cases construing [Penal Code] section 1202.4 and the effect of a
crime victim’s acceptance of a civil settlement on the defendant’s obligation to
satisfy a restitution order have all concluded a civil settlement and
release/waiver of liability by the victim do not preclude or necessarily satisfy
a properly entered restitution order.” (People v. Vasquez, supra, 190
Cal.App.4th at p. 1137, citing Vigilant Insurance. Co. v. Chiu (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 438, 445, Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 164 & Short,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.)
However, Go alleged another theory that renders his causes of action
viable so as to survive defendants’ demurrer. He alleges that “[t]he form of
the release drafted by the defendants fails to address, much less attempt to
prevent (or minimize), a criminal restitution obligation by set off or
otherwise.” (Some capitalization omitted.) These factual allegations satisfy
the elements of causation and damage. They permit a fact-finder to conclude
that defendants negligently structured or drafted his settlement in the civil
action, failing to reach some agreement to allocate the civil settlement
between economic and noneconomic damages so as to minimize the
restitution award in his then-pending criminal case. (Accord, Jennings,
supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) These are specific allegations of conduct by
defendants that prevented a more favorable result, namely Go’s ability to
offset some of his obligation to pay victim restitution in his criminal case by
establishing that allocation. And liberally construed, they support the notion
that Go’s counsel prevented a more favorable result in Silva’s action (as
22
opposed to just Go’s criminal case), that is, a more comprehensive settlement
inuring to Go’s financial benefit.10
Because this theory supports Go’s legal malpractice and breach of
contract claims, it is of no moment that Go’s pleading contains other theories
that would not support his claims. (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57
Cal.4th 364, 370 [“ ‘ “[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in
testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead
must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to
state a cause of action under any legal theory . . . .” ’ ”]; Thomas v. Regents of
University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 611-612 [A complaint will
“ ‘ “survive[ ] a general demurrer insofar as its states, however inartfully,
facts disclosing some right to relief” ’ ”]; Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park,
LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 [“ ‘[i]f the complaint states a cause of
action under any theory, . . . that aspect of the complaint is good against a
demurrer,’ ” italics added].) Because Go’s second amended complaint states
causes of action on a viable theory, it survives demurrer. Go’s possible
inability or difficulty in proving these allegations is not a factor in our
analysis. (New Livable California v. Association of Bay Area Governments
(2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 709, 714.)
Defendants argue Go’s position that they should have structured the
release differently by allocating economic versus non-economic damages “is of
no avail” given the statutory nature of a civil wrongful death action and its
remedies. They point out that the economic damages recoverable by a
wrongful death plaintiff are burial and funeral expenses as well as lost
10 We note Go could also allege that defendants prevented a more
favorable result by providing as part of the settlement that the parties would
bear their own attorney fees. (Accord, People v. Grundfor, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at pp. 28, 29.)
23
income and financial support. Defendants maintain that “[a]ttorneys’ fees
are not economic damages recoverable by a wrongful death plaintiff.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The argument is misplaced. The question is not
what damages Silva was entitled to recover, but whether the attorney fees
she expended to recover those damages are awardable as restitution (they are
under [Penal Code] section 1202.4, subdivision (h)), and whether those fees
could be “reasonably divided between the pursuit of economic as opposed to
noneconomic losses” (Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 885) such that Go’s
insurer’s settlement payment might offset some of that award. The challenge
in this respect lacks merit.
C. Insurance Code Section 533.5
We finally reject defendants’ argument concerning the asserted bar of
Insurance Code section 533.5 on Go’s claims. That section provides in part:
“No policy of insurance shall provide, or be construed to provide, any coverage
or indemnity for the payment of any fine, penalty, or restitution in any
criminal action or proceeding . . . .” (Ins. Code, § 533.5, subd. (a).) According
to defendants, “Insurance Code Section 533.5 expressly and clearly provides
that the Allstate policy could not, as a matter of law, provide indemnity for
the later imposed criminal restitution . . . . The plain language of the section
prohibits coverage of restitution payments in a criminal action regardless of
the terms of the settlement of the wrongful death action.”
Offsetting a criminal defendant’s insurer’s duplicative insurance
payments to a victim against that defendant’s criminal restitution obligation
to the same victim is not a matter of insurance coverage or indemnity. It
does not construe Go’s insurance policy as covering restitution, rather, it
deems the insurer’s payment to Silva as coming directly from Go within the
meaning of the restitution statute, entitling him to offset his restitution
24
obligation for the attorney fees she incurred that are properly allocated to the
recovery of her medical costs or other economic damages. (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1); Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 155; Vasquez,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134; Short, supra, 160 Cal.4th at p. 905.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of defendants Jay McClaugherty and
McClaugherty and Associates is reversed and the matter remanded with
directions that the court enter a new order overruling defendants’ demurrer.
Go shall recover his costs on appeal.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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