CourtListener 10325196•People v. Chavez CA3
Testo completo
Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Chavez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099797
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR2013-2857)
v.
SERGIO CHAVEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Sergio Chavez, who was serving a 34-year sentence, filed a motion for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 (undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code). Defendant was not present at the resentencing hearing. Although
defense counsel purported to waive defendant’s presence at the hearing, the record does
not contain a written waiver or demonstrate that defendant’s waiver was knowing and
intelligent. Defendant appeals the judgment imposed following recall and resentencing,
1
contending the trial court prejudicially erred in conducting the resentencing in his
absence and without a valid waiver. The People agree the trial court erred, but argue the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We will reverse the judgment and remand
to the trial court for a new resentencing hearing.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The facts supporting and the procedural background of defendant’s underlying
convictions are taken from the trial court’s statement of facts at the resentencing hearing
and our opinion in defendant’s prior appeal. (People v. Chavez (Mar. 24, 2016, C078834)
[nonpub. opn.].) Neither party objected to the trial court’s statement of facts. On our
own motion, we take judicial notice of our unpublished opinion in defendant’s prior
appeal. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
Defendant was a maintenance worker at an apartment complex. Defendant, his
girlfriend, and another friend, X.F., were socializing together at a bar. When they
returned to the apartment complex, X.F.’s ex-girlfriend, M.G. saw them. M.G. was in a
rage, screaming profanities at X.F. from her apartment. M.G. also threatened to kill
herself. X.F. walked away without engaging with her. Defendant and his girlfriend went
to M.G.’s apartment. (Chavez, supra, (Mar. 24, 2016, C078834) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant stepped into the apartment, with a gun in his waistband. M.G. was terrified,
grabbed a box cutter, and told him to get out. Defendant pulled out the gun and held it to
M.G.’s head. M.G. dropped the box cutter and knocked the gun away. Defendant
pointed the gun at her stomach and then her chest. He again put the gun near M.G.’s
head and fired it. The bullet went into the wall and defendant left the apartment.
A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also
found true a personal use firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) (Chavez, supra,
(Mar. 24, 2016, C078834) [nonpub. opn.].) In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court
2
found true the enhancement allegations that defendant had a prior strike conviction
(§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and served
two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). (Ibid.) The trial court sentenced defendant to
an aggregate term of 34 years, including upper term sentences on the assault conviction
and the firearm enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony enhancement, and
one year for one of the prior prison term enhancements.
In 2023, defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.
The matter was set for hearing on October 27, 2023, and defense counsel filed a
declaration in support of an order to produce defendant telephonically. The declaration
explicitly stated defendant did not waive his presence at the hearing but waived his
physical appearance. The trial court ordered defendant to be produced telephonically.
The matter was continued to November 3, 2023. On October 27, 2023, defense counsel
filed another declaration in support of an order to produce defendant telephonically.
Again, the declaration explicitly stated defendant did not waive his presence at the
hearing but waived his physical presence. The trial court again ordered defendant to be
produced telephonically.
At the outset of the November 3, 2023, hearing, the trial court noted defendant
was not present, and stated it had signed an order to produce defendant and thought
defendant would be in court. The clerk informed the court “there was a problem getting
[defendant] on the line from CDCR.” The court stated it authorized defendant to call his
attorney and they would put defendant on speaker phone. Defense counsel reported she
had not received a call from defendant. She indicated they had tried multiple times to
confirm the correct information with the prison. She then stated, “[a]nd I would like [to]
proceed. I think [defendant] wants to proceed, so we’ll waive his appearance.”
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court considered: defendant’s underlying
convictions; criminal history; aggravating circumstances; post-conviction records,
including his reduced security risk, treatment and programming; and rules violations.
3
The court considered evidence of defendant’s childhood trauma. The court also
considered the mitigation specialist reports as to defendant’s social history and trauma
and section 1385 criteria, and excerpts from defendant’s medical records about his mental
health. These records included information that defendant was diagnosed with PTSD
major depression and experienced significant childhood trauma, including physical and
emotional abuse, neglect, domestic violence, and parental substance abuse. The records
showed defendant sought mental health support services. He also completed vocational
training and substance abuse and anger management programs. Defendant also
committed several rules violations. One rule violation occurred during a therapy session,
when defendant’s PTSD was triggered. The mental health clinician indicated defendant
had been experiencing a dissociative flashback during the incident.
The trial court expressly found defendant suffered childhood trauma. But the
court stated it could not find a nexus between the childhood trauma and the circumstances
of the current offense. In response, defense counsel and the mitigation expert tried to
explain the nexus, including what defendant had told them about the victim threatening to
hurt herself, his fears in the moment, and defendant’s trauma response to seeing a blade.
The trial court found the childhood trauma was not a contributing factor requiring the
court to impose the lower term.
The trial court also considered aggravating factors. The court found the
aggravating factors it had previously found remained true: defendant had numerous prior
convictions which were increasing in seriousness; he was on probation at the time of the
offense; and the crime was a crime of great violence, viciousness, and callousness.
The trial court also considered dismissing the enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c) based on the data showing the potential racially discriminatory impact of
imposing the firearm enhancement and the interests of justice. The court found the
multiple enhancements took the sentence over 20 years and again found the childhood
trauma was not a contributing factor.
4
The trial court denied the motion to strike the prior strike conviction and denied
the motion to strike the firearm enhancement. The trial court struck the five-year prior
serious felony conviction enhancement and the two prior prison term enhancements. The
court imposed an aggregate term of 28 years, consisting of: the upper term of nine years
on the assault, doubled pursuant to the strike, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement,
and a concurrent middle term of two years for the possession of a firearm.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in conducting the
resentencing hearing in defendant’s absence and without a valid waiver of his presence at
the hearing. The People agree the trial court erred, but argue the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of a
criminal proceeding, including sentencing and resentencing. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves);
People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348 (Cutting).) A defendant may waive
that constitutional right, “ ‘as long as [their] waiver is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.’ ” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531 (Davis).) Our Supreme Court
has described the effectiveness of a defense counsel’s waiver of a defendant’s right to be
present at resentencing as “unsettled” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899);
but has explained such a waiver is effective “only if there is evidence that the defendant
consented to the waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there must be some evidence that
the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.”
(Davis, at p. 532; see Mendoza, at p. 899.)
As the parties agree, defendant was entitled to be present at the resentencing
hearing. Counsel purported to waive defendant’s presence, indicating she thought
defendant wanted to proceed. There is no evidence in the record that defendant
5
consented to this waiver or that he understood the right he was waiving or the
consequences of that waiver. Nor is there evidence in the record as to the basis for
counsel’s assertion that defendant wanted to proceed, or the content of any conversations
counsel may have had with defendant about his presence at the hearing. Rather, the
record shows defendant had twice previously explicitly not waived his right to be present
at the hearing, most recently just seven days before the hearing. There is no indication in
the record counsel spoke with defendant in that week or that defendant changed his mind
about his presence at the hearing. Moreover, counsel was not able to speak with
defendant on the day of the resentencing hearing and either get his consent or advise him
of his right and that by waiving it, he would be unable to contribute to the discussion of
his resentencing. Accordingly, we agree with the parties the trial court erred in
proceeding with the resentencing in defendant’s absence, without a valid waiver of his
right to be present.
Because the error implicates defendant’s constitutional right to be present at a
critical stage of the proceedings, we review the error under Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 23 (Chapman). (Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532.) Under that standard,
defendant’s absence from the resentencing hearing requires reversal unless the People
demonstrate the violation of defendant’s constitutional right was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.) That is, the People must
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the deprivation of defendant’s federal
constitutional right did not affect the outcome of the proceeding. (Ibid.)
The People contend the error was harmless because “[d]efense counsel vigorously
litigated every aspect of the resentencing” and presented “vigorous argument at the
resentencing hearing.” The People note the court commended both defense counsel and
the mitigation expert for their work on defendant’s behalf. Accordingly, the People claim
this court “can be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant’s] absence did not
affect the outcome of the resentencing hearing.”
6
It is true that counsel vigorously advocated for her client and presented significant
documentation supporting further reduction of defendant’s sentence. But vigorous
advocacy does not, in and of itself, meet the People’s burden to establish that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the People must show that defendant’s
presence could not have supplemented counsel’s advocacy. The People can meet that
standard, for example, where there is no significant information defendant could add to
the resentencing hearing (see Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 509 [defendant’s absence at
restitution hearing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where record did not indicate she
could have contributed to counsel’s ability to contest the restitution awarded and could
not have provided any significant information beyond that presented by counsel]) or
where the trial court could not have further reduced the sentence imposed (see People v.
Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 666, 678, review granted May 29, 2024, S284341).
Where the defendant can offer information that could contribute to counsel’s advocacy,
for example on mitigating factors that arose after his sentencing, the error is not harmless.
(See Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 349; People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
663 ,674; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 59-60.)
There were several ways in which the trial court could have further reduced
defendant’s sentence. The trial court imposed upper terms on the assault and the firearm
enhancement and doubled the sentence on the assault because of the prior strike
conviction. If the trial court were persuaded by defendant’s additional information, it had
discretion to impose middle or even lower terms on the assault and firearm enhancement,
to strike the firearm enhancement, or to strike the prior strike conviction.
There were also several topics on which defendant could have offered additional
information or insight that might have affected the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
The trial court found defendant suffered childhood trauma, but ultimately concluded it
could not find the nexus between the childhood trauma and the current offense. Defense
counsel and the mitigation expert tried to provide additional information that defendant
7
had shared with them to explain how defendant’s childhood trauma affected defendant at
the time of the offense and contributed to its commission. If defendant had been present
at the hearing, he might have been able to provide additional information and insight on
how his childhood trauma and PTSD where contributing factors in committing this
offense. Even if the court did not conclude his childhood trauma and PTSD were
contributing factors to the offense requiring the lower term, the trial court might have
concluded that information served as sufficient mitigation to impose the middle term.
The trial court might have also considered that additional information in assessing the
aggravating factors of callousness and viciousness. Defendant might have expressed
remorse for his actions, particularly as his substance abuse, anger management and
mental health treatment may have given him additional insight on the harm his actions
caused. Defendant might have provided context for some of his rules violations, the most
recent of which arose in therapy when his PTSD was triggered. This additional context
might have altered the trial court’s consideration of his behavior while incarcerated.
While the trial court might not have believed defendant or been persuaded by the
additional information, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his presence
at the hearing would not have affected the outcome. (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at
p. 350.)
8
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. The trial
court is ordered to conduct a new resentencing hearing at which defendant is present
unless he validly waives his presence.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
DUARTE, J.
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
9
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.