People v. Allard CA4/3

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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Allard CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063612

v. (Super. Ct. No. 18HF0459)

TRAVIS DERECK ALLARD, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
With specific exceptions, one-year prison prior sentencing
enhancements which were “imposed” prior to January 1, 2020 are no longer
legally valid pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (a).1 As a
result, defendants are entitled to recall and resentencing if they are identified
as currently serving a term for a judgment including such an enhancement.
(Id. at subds. (b) & (c).)
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the defendant Travis
Dereck Allard is entitled to recall and resentencing when the trial court
imposes, but strikes a prison prior for purposes of sentencing. Following
People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino), and pending guidance
from the California Supreme Court, we conclude the trial court erred in
finding Allard ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because his
prison prior enhancement had been stricken for purposes of sentencing. We
therefore reverse its order denying Allard’s petition, and remand so the court
can conduct a resentencing hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A felony complaint was filed on March 26, 2018, charging Allard with
one count of second degree robbery (§ 211/212.5, subd. (c)) with an
enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). It was further alleged that he had suffered two prison prior
convictions under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On April 19, 2018, Allard pleaded guilty to the robbery count and
admitted the dangerous weapon enhancement as well as his priors. The court
dismissed one of his prison prior convictions, and struck the other for
purposes of sentencing. The court imposed a sentence of seven years.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
On November 14, 2023, Allard filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under sections 1172.7 or 1172.75. The trial court found Allard
was ineligible for relief under either statute because the related
enhancements were either stayed or stricken at the time of resentencing.2
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo, under well-settled standards. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 961.) In interpreting a statute, ‘“[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning . . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’” (Sierra Club v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.) “We must look to the
statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.)

2 Both the petition and the trial court’s order denying the petition

indicate Allard was identified by the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) as an inmate potentially eligible for relief.

3
II.
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING HEARING
“Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required
trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding
on an allegation the defendant had served a separate prior prison term and
had not remained free of custody for at least five years. [Citation.] Effective
January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) . . . (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590) [(Sen. Bill 136)] amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison
term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.
[Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other
offenses became legally invalid.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379-380.) “Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen[.] Bill 483). This bill sought to make the changes
implemented by [Sen. Bill] 136 retroactive. [Citation.] It took effect on
January 1, 2022, and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to
the [Code]. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)” (Ibid.)
Section 1172.75 directs the CDCR to identify those persons in
custody “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a) . . . to the sentencing court that
imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receiving this
information, “[i]f the court determines that the current judgment includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) “Resentencing . . . shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)

4
The question before us is whether Allard is entitled to be
resentenced under section 1172.75, where his prior prison term
enhancements were imposed by the trial court, but stricken solely for
purposes of sentencing. Pending direction from the Supreme Court, we follow
the reasoning of Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 188, and conclude he is.3
“ . . . [W]e conclude that section 1172.75 should be interpreted
according to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘impose’ and therefore applies
whenever a prison prior is included in a judgment, whether the prior is
executed, stayed, or punishment is struck.” (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 194.)
According to the majority view in Espino: “[I]n some
circumstances, when an enhancement has been imposed but punishment
struck, ‘[t]he fact of the enhancement . . . remains[s]’ and may adversely
impact the defendant in other ways such as restricting the ability to accrue
conduct credits or subjecting the defendant to additional punishment for
future convictions.” (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 201.)4

3 In addition to granting review in Espino, which involved a

request for resentencing where the punishment for a now invalid prison prior
had been stricken, the Supreme Court has granted review to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeal regarding whether section 1172.75 applies where
a now-invalid prison prior was imposed but stayed. (See People v. Mayberry
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853; People v.
Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169;
People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283189; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, review granted
Mar. 12, 2024, S283547.)
4 Although we agree with the Espino majority’s rationale, we

acknowledge the well-reasoned analysis of the dissent in that case and await
the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue.

5
This case presents the same circumstance referenced by the
Espino court. For the reasons set forth in Espino, we conclude Allard is
therefore entitled to resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Allard’s petition for recall and resentencing is
reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing
pursuant to the terms of section 1172.75. Upon conclusion of the new
sentencing hearing, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract
of judgment and forward a certified copy to CDCR.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

6

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