CourtListener 10324844•People v. Bacci CA6
Testo completo
Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Bacci CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051597
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19CR06172)
v.
JOSHUA JOHN BACCI,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before this court for the second time, appellant Joshua John Bacci appeals from
the judgment entered after he was resentenced to a total term in prison of 25 years
8 months following his convictions for carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon, theft of
an automobile, and evasion and resisting police officers. Bacci argues that the trial court
erred at resentencing by failing to sufficiently advise him of the pitfalls of
self-representation, failing to assess his competency at the resentencing hearing, and
failing to dismiss one or more of his sentencing enhancements under Penal Code
section 1385.1 We agree that the trial court erred in its advisements and that Bacci’s
waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent. We conditionally reverse and remand
the judgment.
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Bacci’s Underlying Convictions and First Appeal
In December 2019, prior to the underlying trial on his criminal charges, Bacci
filled out and signed a form indicating he would like to waive counsel under Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835 (Faretta). He also indicated to the trial court at a
pretrial hearing that he would “like to proceed forward by invoking [his] constitutional
right to self-representation” and that he would like to have a bench trial rather than a jury
trial. At that time, Bacci told the trial court: “I’ve represented myself before and I’ve
been certified court competent at the present time to stand trial.” The trial court then
informed Bacci: “[I]f you’re going to be representing yourself at a bench trial, you’ll be
representing yourself. [¶] . . . You’ll be held to the same standards as an attorney.” The
court further warned Bacci, “[Y]ou aren’t going to get co-counsel or advisory counsel or
any type of assistance from counsel.”
After this advisement, Bacci withdrew his request to represent himself and
consented to “let [defense counsel] assist me.” Represented by counsel, Bacci proceeded
to trial by jury rather than a bench trial.
After trial, the jury returned verdicts convicting Bacci of carjacking (§ 215,
subd. (a); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon with an enhancement for personal
infliction of great bodily injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a); count 2), driving
or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3), recklessly
evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4), and forcibly resisting an
officer (§ 69; count 5). After striking two of his prior strike convictions under
section 1385, the trial court sentenced Bacci to a total term of 33 years 8 months in prison
as follows: an aggravated term of nine years for carjacking, doubled to 18 years under
the Three Strikes law; a concurrent aggravated term of four years for assault, doubled to
eight years under the Three Strikes law; an aggravated term of three years for driving or
taking a vehicle without consent, doubled to six years under the Three Strikes law and
2
stayed under section 654; one-third the middle term of two years for a total of eight
months for recklessly evading an officer, doubled to 16 months under the Three Strikes
law; and one-third the middle term of two years for a total of eight months for resisting a
peace officer, doubled to 16 months under the Three Strikes law; 10 years for two serious
felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Bacci appealed, and in August 2022 a different panel from this court reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter solely for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567) and Assembly Bill Nos. 124 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 124) and 518 (2021–2022 Reg Sess.) (Assembly Bill
No. 518). (People v. Bacci (Aug. 17, 2022, H048478) [nonpub. opn.].) This court
concluded that the retroactivity of Senate Bill No. 567, which required aggravating
factors relied upon by the trial court at sentencing to have been either stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial, required a
remand for resentencing. In our opinion, we stated that the trial court at that time “may
reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions as to all counts under the statutes now in
effect . . . .” We also specified that the district attorney on remand could elect to prove
the existence of aggravating factors or submit to resentencing on the current record.
B. The Resentencing Proceedings
At the resentencing hearing, the People declined to prove the aggravating factors.
The district attorney proposed that the court merely substitute the middle terms for the
three aggravated terms originally imposed (counts 1 through 3) but structure the sentence
identically in all other respects for a sentence of 27 years 8 months in prison. Bacci’s
counsel replied: “So my reading of the appellate opinion is I think the [c]ourt, unless [the
prosecution] is intending to essentially try to introduce evidence to prove aggravated
factors, I think the [c]ourt would essentially be bound to do that.” Defense counsel
informed the trial court that Bacci disagreed with the district attorney’s proposal and,
3
counsel believed, wanted to represent himself. Defense counsel then asked Bacci to
address the court (which was the last time defense counsel addressed the court at the
resentencing hearing), and the following colloquy between the trial court and Bacci took
place:
The Court: “Is that right, Mr. Bacci?”
Bacci: “I think I —yeah, at this point in time, I’d rather just go ahead and say
what I need to say from what my understanding is so there can be some clarity from all
the different parties and components in this room right now. That’s what I think would
be the best.”
The Court: “Even if [defense counsel] keeps representing you, you get to do that.
So whether you represent yourself or have him represent you, you get to say your view.”
Bacci: “That’s true, however, if he’s my representative, then I don’t have the
ability to communicate directly with [the district attorney.] [¶] In the past when I’ve
been self-represented, I’ve been able to communicate directly with the district attorney.
And . . . there wasn’t necessarily a barrier between myself, which is the source of truth,
and this person here, which is a sworn representative of the People’s interests . . . and the
community’s interests. Also yours as well as the justice jurisprudence, strength, honor,
integrity, et cetera, et cetera. That’s kind of the reason I want to just speak my own self.”
The Court: “All right. Bad idea.”
Bacci: “No, it’s okay.”
The Court: “I’m telling you. My obligation is to tell you it’s a bad idea. [¶] I
don’t know. If you want to represent yourself, that’s fine. [¶] Today is the hearing and
we’re going to be sentencing you today, but if you have things you want to say, you’re
certainly free to.”
Bacci: “Okay.”
The Court: “Okay.”
Bacci: “Yeah.”
4
The Court: “So your turn.”
Bacci proceeded to argue that the enhancements imposed for his serious felonies
were improper because he claimed those felonies had been reduced to misdemeanors,2 an
argument that the trial court rejected.
The trial court went on with resentencing and imposed the following terms: the
middle term of five years for carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 1), doubled to 10 years
under the Three Strikes law; a concurrent middle term of three years for assault (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 2), doubled to six years under the Three Strikes law; a middle term of
two years for driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
count 3), doubled to four years under the Three Strikes law but stayed under section 654;
one-third the midterm of two years for a total of eight months for recklessly evading an
officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4), doubled to 16 months under the Three
Strikes law, consecutive to the other counts; and one-third the midterm of two years for a
total of eight months for resisting a peace officer (§ 69; count 5), doubled to 16 months
under the Three Strikes law; 10 years for two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)); and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). In sum, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 25 years 8 months in
prison.
II. DISCUSSION
“A defendant has a federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during
all critical stages of a criminal prosecution.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205
At the bifurcated court trial on Bacci’s prior strikes and serious felony
2
allegations, held shortly after his jury trial, the original trial court found that the People
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the two following serious felony allegations under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1): A conviction of first degree burglary in case
number F11849, and a conviction of first degree burglary in case number F09666.
Certified abstracts of judgments were admitted as evidence to support these two
convictions. There is no indication that any argument or evidence was presented at the
court trial that these prior serious felony convictions had been reduced to misdemeanors.
5
(Mickel).) But the Sixth Amendment also “grants to the accused personally the right to
present a defense”; thus, “a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself.”
(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20.) Thus, “[a] trial court must grant a
defendant’s request for self-representation if three conditions are met. First, the
defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and
intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.]
Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his
request within a reasonable time before trial.” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913,
931–932.)
On appeal, Bacci makes several arguments about his waiver of counsel, arguing
that he made an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel under Faretta, supra,
422 U.S. at p. 835 and that the trial court erred by failing to first inquire about his mental
competency to waive counsel. He further argues that the trial court failed to advise him
of the consequences of self-representation and that his waiver of counsel was therefore
neither knowing nor intelligent. The Attorney General, in addition to countering Bacci’s
claims, argues that the trial court’s colloquy with Bacci at the sentencing hearing suggests
that no valid Faretta request was made and that even if it was made, the trial court did
not grant it. After reviewing the record, we agree with Bacci that the trial court permitted
him to represent himself and that his waiver of counsel was not knowing or intelligent,
requiring a conditional reversal.
A. The Trial Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Attorney General argues that the colloquy between Bacci and
the trial court render it unclear in the first instance whether Bacci in fact requested to
waive counsel and whether the trial court granted any supposed request. We disagree and
conclude that the trial court did in fact grant Bacci’s request for self-representation.
At the start of the resentencing hearing, defense counsel stated his belief that the
court was “essentially . . . bound” to sentence Bacci to 27 years 8 months given the
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prosecutor’s election to not pursue the aggravated term. But defense counsel also stated
that Bacci would “certainly not . . . agree to” accept this sentence and that Bacci
“wish[ed] . . . to represent himself.” Bacci himself confirmed that he wanted to waive
counsel because he wished to make his views known and to speak directly to the trial
court and to the prosecutor. And when told that he could speak directly to the court even
with representation, Bacci affirmed that he wanted to “communicate directly” with the
prosecutor and in past experiences as a self-represented litigant, doing so while
self-represented presented less of a “barrier” between himself and the district attorney.
In short, Bacci twice stated unequivocally his desire to waive counsel. He
reiterated this intention even once assured that self-representation was a “bad idea” and
that continued representation by counsel would not prevent him from personally
addressing the court on sentencing. And the trial court then assented, saying “that’s fine”
after Bacci made clear he still wished to represent himself. We recognize that the trial
court never expressly relieved Bacci’s counsel. But after indicating to Bacci that it was
his “turn” to speak, Bacci made his arguments, and at no point afterward did the trial
court invite defense counsel to comment on the sentence, on Bacci’s opposition to a
sentence of 27 years 8 months, or on Bacci’s claims about his prior convictions. From
this, we understand that the trial court accepted Bacci’s waiver of his right to counsel.
The Attorney General disagrees with this characterization and argues that any
Faretta motion would have been untimely, rendering it unlikely that the trial court would
have considered Bacci to have made a valid waiver of counsel. But trial courts may grant
untimely Faretta motions, even as they need not do so. (See, e.g., People v. Clark (1992)
3 Cal.4th 41, 109 (Clark) [explaining that the requirement of a timely request is designed
to serve the efficient administration of justice rather than to protect a defendant from the
defendant’s own decision].)
The Attorney General also argues that the Faretta request was equivocal not
unequivocal, which also weighs against a finding that a valid Faretta motion was made
7
and that the trial court granted it. “To invoke the constitutional right to
self-representation, a criminal defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of that
right . . . .” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1087.) A trial court is “not
required to grant an equivocal request for self-representation.” (People v. Michaels
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 524.) But here, after the trial court informed Bacci he could speak
on his own behalf even if represented by counsel, Bacci again stated that he wished to
represent himself—stating that he believed that while represented by attorney, he would
not “have the ability to communicate directly with [the district attorney].” From this, it
appears that his request was unequivocal.
Finally, the Attorney General points out that the trial court’s statement—“If you
want to represent yourself, that’s fine”—did not constitute a dispositive ruling on the
Faretta motion and that the court did not make findings “necessarily appurtenant” to
accepting a valid waiver of counsel. The Attorney General thus argues that even if a
valid Faretta motion had been made, no clear ruling followed, and Bacci’s failure to
request a ruling after speaking on his own behalf at the resentencing hearing essentially
constituted an abandonment of his request for self-representation. (See People v. Skaggs
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8 [failure to request ruling on Faretta motion abandoned the
motion that the defendant claimed he made].) But the Attorney General does not cite
authority for the proposition that the trial court is required to make certain express
findings on the record when granting a Faretta motion, nor are we aware of any such
authority. (See, e.g., People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 607 [failure of trial
court to make express finding on whether defendant made unequivocal Faretta request
does not obligate reviewing court to find that Faretta rights were infringed].)
We thus agree with Bacci’s characterization of the record that the trial court
granted his mid-resentencing Faretta request and permitted him to represent himself for
the remainder of the sentencing hearing.
8
B. Bacci’s Waiver of Counsel was not Knowing or Intelligent
“When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual
matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel [under the
Sixth Amendment]. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must
‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” (Faretta, supra,
422 U.S. at p. 835.) Bacci argues that the trial court’s admonition to him that
representing himself would be a “bad idea” was insufficient to apprise him of the pitfalls
of self-representation; therefore, his waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent. We
agree and conclude that the error was prejudicial, requiring a conditional reversal.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
There is no specifically prescribed language or admonition that a trial court must
give to a defendant seeking to waive counsel, so long as the record as a whole
demonstrates that the defendant understands the disadvantages of electing
self-representation. (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241 (Burgener).) The
court “must discuss with the defendant the consequences of self-representation, i.e., that
it is almost always unwise; the defendant will have to follow the same rules that govern
attorneys; the prosecution will be represented by experienced, professional counsel; the
court may terminate the right to self-representation if the defendant engages in disruptive
conduct; the defendant will lose the right to appeal on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel; and the defendant will not receive help or special treatment from
the court and does not have the right to standby cocounsel.” (People v. Best (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 747, 756–757.)
“On appeal, we independently examine the entire record to determine whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” (Burgener, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 241.) In so doing, we recognize that the breadth of the required
advisement depends on the stage of criminal proceeding during which counsel is waived.
For example, at trial, “ ‘counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to
9
the rules of procedure and evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and
cross-examine witnesses effectively . . . , object to improper prosecution questions, and
much more.’ ” (Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77, 89 (Tovar).) Therefore, at that stage
of the criminal proceeding, “[w]arnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without
counsel . . . must be ‘rigorous[ly]’ conveyed.” (Ibid.) But in contrast, “at earlier stages
of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice.” (Ibid.) Thus
we must apply a “ ‘pragmatic approach to the waiver question,’ one that asks ‘what
purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and
what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage,’ in order ‘to determine the
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and procedures
that should be required before a waiver of that right will be recognized.’ ” (Id. at p. 90.)3
2. Analysis
After independently reviewing the record, we find that Bacci did not knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the resentencing hearing. We recognize
that at a resentencing proceeding, the situation “differs markedly from a trial on the
merits” and a less exhaustive colloquy may have been sufficient for Bacci to have
knowingly waived his rights. (See Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 242.) But here, the
trial court did not discuss with Bacci any of the potential hazards that lay ahead should he
choose to waive counsel. The trial court only obliquely referenced twice that choosing to
waive counsel would be a “bad idea.”
We find Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th 231 to be instructive. There, the trial court
granted a defendant’s request to represent himself at a resentencing hearing seeking to
3
Citing Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, the Attorney General claims that any error in
granting Bacci’s request to represent himself at resentencing was forfeited. But as
described ante, Clark does not stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot complain
on appeal that his Faretta motion should not have been granted. Indeed, Clark concluded
that a defendant cannot complain that the trial court erroneously granted an untimely
motion that a defendant had him or herself requested. (Id. at p. 109.)
10
modify his penalty of death to life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at pp. 233–234.)
Prior to granting the defendant’s waiver, the trial court had stated it “ ‘would be remiss if
[it] didn’t advise [defendant] at least with regard to certain possible pitfalls with regard to
self-representation’ ” but then did not explain the potential hazards. (Id. at p. 238.)
Instead, the court added that it believed the defendant was “ ‘fully aware, probably more
so than most of us, as to what is taking place and has taken place in this case.’ ” (Id. at
p. 239.) On appeal, the Burgener court held that the record was “plainly insufficient to
establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel” and
that the colloquy would have “conveyed to the listener that the greater danger lay with
continuing to be represented by counsel.” (Id. at p. 242.) Although the limited purpose
of the resentencing hearing “may have justified a less searching or formal colloquy in
response to defendant’s request to represent himself,” the nature of the hearing did not
“relieve the court of its duty altogether to ensure that defendant be made aware ‘of the
hazards ahead’ if he proceeded without the assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.)
Although the trial court in Bacci’s case did not go quite as far as the trial court in
Burgener—the court never implied that self-representation would favor Bacci—the
advisement here was insufficient for us to find that Bacci knowingly and intelligently
waived counsel. True, the resentencing proceeding, unlike a trial, was limited in scope.
But as we will explain below, the outcome of the resentencing was not a foregone
conclusion, despite defense counsel’s apparent belief, given the new ameliorative laws by
then in effect. (See post, at p. 16; Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 81); Assem. Bill No. 124; Assem. Bill No. 518.) Thus the “ ‘purposes a lawyer can
serve’ ” (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 90) at a resentencing hearing like Bacci’s included
advisements or arguments about sentencing issues that a self-represented litigant might
not be aware of. And the limited nature of the resentencing proceeding did not mean that
the trial court was completely relieved of its duty to advise Bacci about why a waiver of
counsel would be to his detriment.
11
The Attorney General would have us rely on the trial court’s advisements in 2019,
when Bacci first tried to waive counsel before trial to vitiate the inadequacy of the
advisement on remand. But nearly four years had elapsed between Bacci’s abortive
request to waive counsel in December 2019 and the resentencing hearing in November
2023. (See People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1106 (Hall) [“[d]ue process
requires a knowing waiver of the right to counsel at the revocation/sentencing stage, not
speculation that the defendant might know, or even the expectation that the defendant
should know because he or she was informed of the right to counsel at an earlier and in
some respects unrelated segment of the prosecution”].) We cannot presume that Bacci
recalled the specifics of a form he signed four years earlier or any colloquy he had with
the trial court at that time. And even though Bacci made representations at the
resentencing hearing that he had represented himself in the past, nothing in the record
before us confirms his account, aside from Bacci’s assertion on his 2019 Faretta form
that he had done so.
We thus find that the trial court’s generic warning that choosing to waive counsel
would be a “bad idea” is simply insufficient. The record does not “ ‘ ‘as a whole
demonstrate[] that [Bacci] understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including
the risks and complexities of the particular case.” ’ ” (Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 241.) There was no discussion of the risks of self-representation in a proceeding where
this court had remanded for consideration of three new sentencing laws and, as we will
explain, a fourth had also taken effect. (See People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536,
546 [no knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel when court’s oral comments merely
suggested it was unwise for defendant to represent himself].) The waiver was therefore
not knowing or intelligent.
3. Prejudice
We next turn to the issue of prejudice. The United States Supreme Court has not
yet decided whether a defective Faretta waiver is reversible per se or subject to review
12
for harmlessness under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (Burgener, supra,
46 Cal.4th at pp. 244–245 [assuming without deciding Chapman applies]; compare Hall,
supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1108–1109 [reversible per se] with People v. Wilder (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 489, 500–502 [reversible under Chapman if the People demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant would still have waived counsel if properly
advised] and People v. Cervantes (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 281, 293–294 [reversible under
Chapman if the People demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of
counsel had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding at hand].) But even if not per se
reversible, the error here was not harmless under Chapman, so reversal is required.
We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bacci, if he had been properly
advised of the risks of self-representation, would have still proceeded to resentencing
without counsel. Although Bacci orally informed the trial court that he had represented
himself in proceedings in the past, Bacci had not represented himself at any stage of the
proceedings in this particular case. And as described ante, prior to the underlying trial in
2019, Bacci had at one point executed a Faretta form and had requested to waive
counsel. But after being advised by the trial court that he would be held to the same
standards as an attorney without the benefit of “advisory counsel,” Bacci withdrew his
waiver of counsel. This abortive waiver suggests that, if properly reminded of the risks,
Bacci may have thought better of waiving his right to counsel, just as he did in 2019.
The Attorney General likewise has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
absence of counsel had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding at hand. (See
Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 244.) The Attorney General argues that Bacci’s counsel
“conferred with the prosecutor and settled upon a mutually agreeable new sentence,”
pointing to defense counsel’s remark at the start of the resentencing hearing that the court
would “essentially be bound” to impose a sentence of 27 years 8 months. But we
consider defense counsel’s statement to be too ambiguous, taken in context, to satisfy the
13
high burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Bacci was not prejudiced by his
uninformed waiver of counsel.
To be sure, the Attorney General’s reading of counsel’s statement is a facially
plausible one—that counsel misread this court’s directions on remand by overlooking our
express references to Assembly Bill Nos. 124 and 518, was unaware of Senate Bill
No. 81 and its amendment of section 1385, and that he intended to submit without
argument as to any ameliorative sentencing law except Senate Bill No. 567. But another
facially plausible reading is that counsel agreed with the prosecutor on only one facet of
the sentence—that the trial court was limited to the middle terms unless the prosecution
chose to prove aggravating factors (see § 1170, subd. (b)(1))—not that the trial court had
no other discretionary authority to impose a lesser sentence under other new ameliorative
laws. Furthermore, defense counsel in responding to the district attorney’s proposal was
unequivocal that Bacci was “certainly not going to . . . agree to what [the prosecutor] has
proposed” and that he had spoken to Bacci about the “nature and scope of the appellate
issue” in his case, without further elaboration. And however one parses counsel’s preface
to Bacci’s request to represent himself, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the
judgment would have been the same had counsel been present. (Burgener, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 245.)
To hold otherwise would ignore the fact that this court reversed and remanded the
matter for resentencing under section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 and
Assembly Bill No. 124, and under section 654, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 518.
When we reversed Bacci’s prior appeal, we concluded that we were unable to determine
harmlessness on the record under any standard, and by striking that part of Bacci’s
sentence, “ ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) Thus, both under the express terms of our remand
and under the full resentencing rule, the trial court needed to consider all components of
14
Bacci’s sentence under new sentencing laws that did more than condition the upper term
on aggravating factors found true by a jury: Assembly Bill No. 124 made the lower term
the presumptive sentence if certain enumerated factors—including “psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma”—contributed to the commission of the offense (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(A); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.1, p. 8744), and Assembly Bill No. 518 gave
trial courts the discretion to choose which sentence to stay under section 654 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 441, § 1, p. 6434).
Furthermore, Bacci’s sentence included several sentencing enhancements totaling
13 years: 10 years for two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and
three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). And at the
time of his resentencing hearing in 2023, further new legislation had been enacted,
effective January 1, 2022. Senate Bill No. 81 added subdivision (c) to section 1385,
which allows the trial court to dismiss an enhancement in the furtherance of justice,
further providing that nine enumerated mitigating circumstances “weigh[] greatly in favor
of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1, p. 8988.)
Bacci argues that several mitigating circumstances apply in this case: (1) “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C)); (3) there is evidence indicating “[t]he current offense is connected to
mental illness” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)); and (4) “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior
conviction that is over five years old” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).
Although the California Supreme Court in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024 decided that section 1385, subdivision (c) did not create a presumption in favor of
dismissing an enhancement (Walker, at p. 1033), the high court also recently clarified that
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court must assign significant value to the enumerated mitigating
15
circumstances when they are present.” (Walker, at p. 1038.) The court observed, “In
practice, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in
the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight
of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, had counsel proceeded with the sentencing hearing and in fact failed to raise
or request dismissal of enhancements that added years to Bacci’s sentence, we would be
hard pressed to envision or presume a sound tactical reason for the omission. (See
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689; cf. People v. Harris (1977)
65 Cal.App.3d 978, 987–988 [holding that a defendant who effectively waives the right
to counsel also waives the right to complain of ineffective representation].) The trial
court had no duty to sua sponte consider striking any of the enhancements (see People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375), and Bacci himself appears to have been unaware
of the amendments made to section 1385, subdivision (c), arguing only that his serious
felony enhancements were inoperative because they had been reduced to misdemeanors.4
Accordingly, the Attorney General does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
counsel would have advanced no arguments on this point or that the trial court would
have declined to strike all three enhancements had a section 1385 argument been raised
by counsel.
4. Remedy
Accordingly, having found prejudicial error, we must reverse and remand the
matter for further proceedings. The remaining question is exactly what relief Bacci is
4
There is nothing in the transcript of the resentencing hearing that reflects that any
request was made to dismiss the enhancements under section 1385. Nor is there any
document in the record that would suggest that defense counsel (before the trial court
accepted Bacci’s Faretta waiver) or Bacci filed any written motions seeking dismissal of
any enhancements.
16
entitled to. In this case, we find that it is appropriate to remand the matter so that the trial
court can properly advise Bacci of the pitfalls of self-representation and to redetermine
whether to grant his Faretta motion. (See, e.g., People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th
150, 161–162 [conditionally reversing judgment when defendant was not informed of his
constitutional right to counsel].) If, upon proper advisements, Bacci decides to waive
counsel, then the trial court should reinstate its prior judgment.
Bacci on appeal argues that the matter must be remanded for resentencing—
independent of whether Bacci persists in his waiver once properly advised—on the theory
that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss his enhancements under section 1385. Not
so. Representing himself, Bacci forfeited any sentencing argument other than the sole
argument that his enhancements should be dismissed because the convictions they were
predicated on had been reduced to misdemeanors. (See People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [failure to ask trial court to dismiss enhancement under § 1385
forfeits claim on appeal].)5 If he chooses again to represent himself following our limited
remand and the trial court again relieves him of counsel, we see no basis for relieving
him of that forfeiture. As for Bacci’s appellate claim that the trial court erred by failing
to inquire sua sponte as to his competency, “[a] trial court is not required to ‘routinely
inquire’ into a defendant’s mental competence when evaluating a Faretta motion.
5
In his reply brief, Bacci attempts to distinguish Coleman by arguing that the
record here reflects that the trial court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss the
enhancements under section 1385. But as we have explained, section 1385 does not
create a mandatory duty for the trial court to dismiss enhancements, and generally, “[a]
party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) Likewise, though this court
remanded the matter for resentencing in light of Assembly Bill Nos. 124 and 518, neither
was discussed at the sentencing hearing. And a defendant “may not claim on appeal the
trial court failed to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices”
absent an objection in the trial court. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778
[failing to seek lower term under § 1170, subd. (b)(6) forfeits claim on appeal]; People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.)
17
[Citation.] Indeed, a trial court need only do so where it has doubts about the defendant’s
[mental] competence . . . .” (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 208.) “Only where the court is
presented with substantial evidence of mental incompetence is a defendant ‘entitled to a
section 1368 hearing as a matter of right.’ ” (Mickel, at pp. 201–202.) On remand,
however, if the trial court were to doubt Bacci’s mental competence and is “presented
with substantial evidence” of incompetency, Bacci would be entitled to a competency
hearing as a matter of right. (Id. at p. 202.)
If Bacci declines to waive counsel, or the trial court doubts Bacci’s competency to
waive his right to counsel or otherwise denies any renewed request to waive counsel, the
trial court should conduct further proceedings as required, including a new resentencing
hearing with Bacci assisted by defense counsel.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to properly advise Bacci of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation. If, after being properly advised, Bacci knowingly and intelligently
waives his right to counsel, and the trial court grants Bacci’s request for
self-representation, the trial court shall reimpose the judgment sentencing Bacci to
27 years 8 months in prison. If Bacci declines or is otherwise denied self-representation,
the trial court shall conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
18
_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
GROVER, Acting P. J.
_____________________________________
WILSON, J.
People v. Bacci
H051597
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