People v. Dennis CA2/1

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Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Dennis CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B332987

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA063518)
v.

NATHANIEL DONIEL DENNIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
____________________________
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in not striking a prior “strike conviction,” that is, a
strike conviction within the definition of the “Three Strikes” Law
(Pen. Code, § 667(b)–(i)), when the court resentenced defendant
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Section 1172.75
provides for resentencing if a defendant received a one-year prior
prison enhancement except for prior prison sexually violent
offenses.2 We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. As
set forth in our discussion, defendant raises arguments he
forfeited by not raising them below, or that are not supported by
the record and applicable legal authority.
Even though the People below conceded defendant was
entitled to resentencing because of the now invalid prior prison
enhancement, on appeal, respondent asserts we have no
jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s

1 Undesignated statuary citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each prior prison or county jail term the defendant served if
the defendant had not remained free of custody for the preceding
five years. (§ 667.5, former subd. (b); People v. Jennings (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681 (Jennings).)
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), by limiting the
enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 667.5, subd. (b); Jennings, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 681.) In
2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), which made Senate Bill No. 136’s changes to the law
retroactive (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1), and added former
section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the Penal Code. (Stats.
2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)

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refusal to strike a prior strike offense when it resentenced
defendant. More specifically, the People contend because the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
did not initiate the resentencing process, neither the trial court
nor we have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s appeal from the
trial court’s resentencing order. As set forth in our Discussion,
we deem defendant’s motion for resentencing filed in the trial
court to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We also deem
defendant’s opening brief on appeal to be a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Respondent’s jurisdictional challenge is thus
moot.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002, a jury convicted defendant of attempted
premeditated murder, corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant, or
child’s parent, assault with a firearm, shooting at an inhabited
dwelling, four counts of criminal threats, possession of a firearm
by a felon, and two counts of battery with serious injury. The
jury found true several enhancements. Pursuant to the Three
Strikes law, the trial court found defendant suffered a prior
strike conviction. (People v. Dennis (Mar. 24, 2004, B165979)
[nonpub. opn.].)
The original sentencing court indicated, “This is a second
strike case” referring to the Three Strikes law and the court
sentenced defendant to a total of 53 years to life. The original
abstract of judgment dated April 2, 2003 erroneously failed to
include the section 667.5, subdivision (b) and section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancements imposed by the original
sentencing court.
In August 2023, the trial court stated, and it is undisputed,
that the abstract of judgment was amended because the CDCR

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“sent [the trial] court a letter indicating that the abstract of
judgment did not contain either the five-year or one-year prior.”
An amended abstract of judgment dated February 7, 2022
included a one-year sentence for the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
prison prior.3
On February 9, 2023, the People conceded defendant “is
eligible” for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.4 It was
undisputed that the original sentencing court imposed a one-year
sentence for the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement,
which is now invalid under section 1172.75.
After a resentencing hearing on August 17, 2023, the trial
court struck the five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the
(now invalid) one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements. The court denied defendant’s request to strike

3 The minute order detailing the original sentencing
court’s sentencing choices reflects that the court included the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) one-year enhancement and the
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year enhancement, but failed
also to include those enhancements in the 2003 abstract of
judgment. The terms not stayed by the original sentencing court
totaled 47 years to life. The enhancements added the additional
six years to reach the 53-years-to life sentence. A trial court
always has jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in its judgments
to reflect the true facts. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181,
185.)
4 Section 1172.75 provides in relevant part: “(a) Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.”

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his prior strike conviction. Defendant’s only challenge on appeal
is to the court’s refusal to strike the prior strike conviction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Defendant’s criminal history
Defendant was born in May 1967. Even before committing
the offense underlying defendant’s current incarceration,
defendant had an extensive criminal record. In 1984, when he
was a juvenile, defendant stole a car and served one year in a
camp placement. In 1987, defendant committed a bank robbery.
On March 1, 1997, he was discharged from parole for that
offense. On November 2, 1997, defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana, and the trial court initially suspended
his sentence. After defendant violated probation, the court
revoked probation and sentenced defendant to two years in
prison. In 1998, defendant was convicted of infliction of corporal
injury on a spouse and sentenced to two years in state prison.

2. Facts underlying defendant’s convictions for which
he sought resentencing
In defendant’s appeal from the judgment of conviction, we
described the facts underlying defendant’s current convictions as
follows: “Defendant and Quinn Carr had been in a relationship
for several years. They sometimes lived together in a house in
Compton with Quinn’s parents, Mary Carr and Willie Smith, and
her brother, Castillo Carr. Defendant and Quinn were parents of
a baby girl.
“Quinn testified that in early 2002 defendant was living
with her in the Carr residence. During that time, defendant was
acting very possessively of Quinn. He said that he would hurt

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Quinn if he saw her with anyone else and that if he could not
have her, no one else could. Quinn told defendant that she was
tired of being abused by him.
“On January 20, 2002, Quinn had a date with another man.
During the day, defendant called Quinn several times from his
mother’s house. Quinn told defendant that she wanted to end the
relationship. Defendant’s mother testified that following this
conversation defendant seemed agitated, borrowed her car, and
left the house.
“Several hours later, around 10:00 p.m., Quinn’s date drove
Quinn back to the Carr residence. When Quinn started walking
toward the house, defendant emerged from behind a tree with a
metal baseball bat, stating, ‘ “Aha, bitch. You are busted.” ’
Defendant hit Quinn with the bat on her head, mouth, arms, ribs,
back, knees, and feet, ‘everywhere on [her] body.’ Quinn fell to
the ground, put her arms over her head in an attempt to protect
herself, and screamed for help. She felt like she was going to die
as defendant continued to hit her for two or three minutes.
Castillo came out of the house and asked defendant to stop
hitting Quinn, but defendant hit Quinn even harder. Smith next
came out and defendant fled. Quinn was taken to the hospital,
where she was treated for head lacerations, broken arms, and
bruising.
“As a result of the January 20 incident, defendant was
convicted of attempted premeditated murder (count 1), corporal
injury to the mother of his child (count 2), and battery with
serious bodily injury (count 12).5

5 The reference to count 12 appears to be in error as that
count refers only to the January 28, 2002 incident.

6
“On the morning of January 28, 2002, Mary was
approaching the front door of the residence after getting out of
her car when defendant approached, pointed a handgun at her
head, and said, ‘ “I want Quinn and the baby.” ’ Quinn, who was
inside and had heard Mary’s car pull up, was opening the front
door when she heard Mary tell her not to open it because
defendant was outside with a gun. Defendant struggled for the
keys that were in Mary’s hand. Mary asked defendant if he was
going to shoot her, and he said that he would do so if Mary
did not open the door. Defendant also hit Mary on the head with
the barrel of the gun.
“Meanwhile, Smith opened the front door and stood inside
behind a locked screen door. Defendant told Smith to open the
screen door and threatened to shoot him if he did not do so.
Smith did not comply, and defendant fired his gun at the
doorknob and lock. Defendant also fired one or two shots that hit
Mary in the head. Defendant next began to reload his gun, but
fled when he heard sirens approaching. Mary was taken to the
hospital, where she was treated for ‘two wounds in the left frontal
temporal area.’
“While the police were still at the Carr residence, defendant
called Quinn several times. He said that he was not going to stop
until Quinn stopped breathing and that Quinn should get money
from the bank so he could take her and the baby somewhere else.
He also said that he would be back to finish the job and to ‘ “[t]ell
[Castillo] that he’s next.” ’
“Quinn told Castillo of defendant’s comment. At trial,
when Castillo was asked what he thought when Quinn told him
defendant’s words, he responded, ‘I didn’t think nothing.’ But
when asked what he thought defendant meant, Castillo said,

7
‘That he was going to try to kill me, too.’ Castillo thought so
‘[b]ecause [defendant] tried to kill everyone else in my house.’
“As a result of the January 28 incident, defendant was
convicted of assault with a firearm on Mary (count 4); shooting at
an inhabited dwelling house (count 5); criminal threats against
Mary (count 6), Quinn (count 7), Smith (count 8), and Castillo
(count 9); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count 10);
and battery of Mary with serious bodily injury (count 12). He
was found not guilty of the attempted murder of Mary (count 3).”
(People v. Dennis, supra, B165979, fn. omitted.)

3. Defendant’s request for resentencing
On June 3, 2022, defendant filed a resentencing petition
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (renumbered as
section 1172.6). On December 1, 2022, defendant filed a “motion
to withdraw [his] 1170.95 petition” and to “proceed with
resentencing pursuant to P.C. 1172.75 . . . .” (Some capitalization
omitted.) Among other things, defendant asked the court to
dismiss his 1987 bank robbery strike conviction under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero).6
In Romero, our high court “ ‘held that a trial court may
strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes
law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious
and/or violent felony, on its own motion, “in furtherance of
justice” pursuant to . . . section 1385(a).’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony).)

6 Defendant also argued that the court should strike the
five-year section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), which the court did.

8
Defendant represented that his current parole eligibility
date was in February 2028. Defendant argued that “by striking
the strike, the Court can modify Mr. Dennis’ sentence to allow
him to become immediately eligible for parole consideration. The
basis for this request is Mr. Dennis’ exemplary conduct while in
prison. The strike alleged in this case i[s] a conviction for bank
robbery from April 24, 1987” and is remote. On appeal, however,
defendant no longer contends that even if his motion were
granted, he would be eligible for immediate parole.
A “Mitigation and Social History Report” attached to
defendant’s motion, indicated that defendant’s stepfather
physically and sexually abused defendant. As a result of the
abuse defendant spent a week in MacLaren Hall where he
“ ‘learned to be a fighter.’ ” Also according to the mitigation
report, at age 14, defendant joined a gang. Defendant’s “moniker
was ‘psycho’ because of his willingness to fight.” Someone shot
defendant when he was 15 years old, and he reported being shot
additional times. The mitigation report further indicated that in
2014, defendant renounced his gang. He completed numerous
courses while incarcerated including a “basic course in nonviolent
conflict resolution”, a “victim awareness” correspondence class,
multiple domestic violence courses, a 12-step program, “creating
a healing society” program, and a workshop “for training in
nonviolence.” (Capitalization omitted.) Defendant also obtained
two associate’s degrees.
The mitigation expert who wrote the report concluded
defendant’s “brain development was altered starting at a young
age due to sexual abuse, violence in the home, and his
participation in gang violence.” “In the past two decades
[defendant] has managed to transform his trauma responses.”

9
A document entitled “CDCR Chron” and attached to
defendant’s motion, indicated that on March 15, 2003, while
serving as an inmate, defendant struck a sergeant “in the head
with his fist rupturing [the sergeant’s] cornea and iris, and
damaging the lens to the eye.” On November 19, 2003, while
defendant was incarcerated, he pleaded guilty to “mutual
combat.” In 2010, defendant was placed in a special program
because of “behavior that could lead to violence” and was
provided all meals in his cell. After that incident, no disciplinary
issues were reported.
In 2021, defendant wrote two essays, which he submitted in
support of his resentencing request. In the first entitled “My
Pathway to Crime,” defendant wrote that his stepfather abused
his mother, throwing her against a wall and choking her in
defendant’s presence. Defendant’s stepfather also abused
defendant.
Defendant wrote, “I was 15 years old when I slapped my
first girlfriend. I saw her flirting with one of my homeboys, so I
slapped her and threw her in a dumpster.” “I eventually ended
up robbing a bank and spent over six years in Federal prison.”
Defendant acknowledged hitting a former girlfriend and
attacking Quinn Carr “with a bat” and then “look[ing] down at
her broken body . . . .” After that, defendant assaulted Carr’s
mother with his gun, hitting her in the head. While incarcerated,
defendant hit a sergeant and “hurt him pretty bad.” According to
defendant, after a medical issue, he chose to “accept personal
responsibility for [his] actions.” Defendant explained that he
both left his gang and enrolled in school.
In his second essay entitled “My Road to Rehabilitation”
(some capitalization omitted), defendant reported that he learned

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that “violence is never an option.” He learned “insight on how I
became the monster I was.” He saw that he previously had
“conducted [himself] as a controlling monster.” Defendant
indicated he was “ashamed of what [he] did.”

4. The People agreed to resentencing, but opposed
striking a prior-strike offense
The People conceded defendant was eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. The People opposed
striking the strike offense because the circumstance of
defendant’s offenses showed extreme brutality and violence. The
People argued the 1987 conviction was not remote because
defendant was incarcerated for the majority of time that elapsed
prior to his convictions in the current case. The People further
emphasized, “2 days after he was sentenced in this matter, the
defendant punched a sergeant in his jail module.” (Italics
omitted.) Defendant injured the sergeant’s eye. A report
attached to the People’s opposition indicated that the sergeant
“sustained severe trauma to his [right] eye” and his cornea was
“detached” from his eye. The sergeant received a cornea
transplant and required extensive rehabilitation.7

7 Defendant filed pro per supplemental papers in the trial
court. Citing section 1172.7, defendant argued he was eligible for
release. That statute applies to sentencing enhancements
pursuant to section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code.
(§ 1172.7, subd. (a).) This case does not include an enhancement
pursuant to the Health and Safety Code.

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5. The trial court resentences defendant without
striking his prior-strike conviction
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court indicated it
wanted to consider each sentencing decision separately. The
court stated with respect to the request to strike the bank
robbery strike offense, it had to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the defendant’s currently charged crimes, the
defendant’s prior serious or violent felonies, the defendant’s
criminal history, and particulars regarding the defendant’s
background, character and prospects.” The court further
indicated the “remoteness” of the strike offense was relevant.
The court noted that the original sentencing court described the
case as “ ‘a particularly aggravating case.’ ” The court
summarized defendant’s criminal history. The resentencing
court acknowledged that after 2004, defendant “did very well;
stopped getting into trouble, actually engaged in activities that
bettered himself, [and] educated himself.”
The court then asked for argument. Defense counsel
contended this case presented similar issues to evaluating
whether an inmate is suitable for parole, specifically whether the
inmate presents a continuing threat to public safety. Defense
counsel later clarified that it is the job of the parole board “to
figure out if someone is a danger to the community and if they
have parole plans . . . .”
After defense counsel referenced case law concerning
parole, the trial court asked defense counsel to limit his
argument to factors relevant to whether to strike a strike
conviction. Defense counsel responded the court should consider
“remoteness in time” and “[defendant’s] youth at the time” of the

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bank robbery. Defense counsel emphasized defendant’s
“extraordinary” conduct since 2004 during his incarceration.
The People opposed striking the strike conviction. The
prosecutor emphasized the nature of the offenses underlying
defendant’s incarceration. The prosecutor also argued that
defendant’s offenses were not remote in time because defendant
had been incarcerated most of the time between the bank robbery
and his offenses. The prosecutor asserted the crimes were
extremely violent and involved a bat and a firearm.
Defendant made the following statement to the court: “[A]
lot of the stuff that occurred back then was horrendous . . . .” “In
1987, truly, I did rob a bank, and I stayed up in there six years,
eight months. I was paroled in 1992. I caught the violation in
1994. I paroled after nine months, in 1995. I stayed out, I
believe it was like two to three years.” Defendant continued, “I
was arrested in 1998 for domestic violence . . . . I pled guilty
because I knew I was wrong.” Defendant admitted that he
violated his parole and that it was his second parole violation.
Defendant admitted attacking Carr with a bat. Defendant also
admitted injuring the sergeant who had been working in the
prison. Defendant stated, “[B]ottom line is that I’m not the same
person I was . . . .”
The court then explained its rationale for denying
defendant’s request to strike his prior strike offense. The court
described the circumstances of defendant’s offenses and noted
they arose out of separate incidents. The court quoted the
original sentencing judge’s description of the case as
“ ‘particularly aggravating.’ ” The court reviewed defendant’s
criminal history dating back to 1984. The court noted that after
defendant’s 1987 bank robbery, defendant was out of custody only

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for “brief stints.” The court also stated that after the original
sentencing, defendant punched a sergeant. After that incident,
defendant “stopped getting into trouble, actually engaged in
activities that bettered himself . . . .”
The court concluded it was not in the interest of justice to
strike the prior strike offense. “I do believe that based on the
defendant’s criminal history that he falls within the spirit of the
Three Strikes law and the remoteness argument is not
persuasive at all. Any remoteness-in-time argument is offset by
the fact that since the strike, Mr. Dennis, unfortunately had
either picked up new cases and/or had been in custody.” The
court reiterated that it considered all of the Romero factors. The
court indicated it “recognize[d] that Mr. Dennis had done well.”
The court told defendant, “[Y]ou having done well . . . is relevant
to this hearing . . . .”

DISCUSSION
We begin with respondent’s challenge to the jurisdiction of
the trial court to consider defendant’s request for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75. We then provide background on the
Three Strikes law. As to defendant’s appellate challenges, we
first address whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to strike a strike conviction pursuant to
Romero and conclude the applicable law and record do not
support that the trial court abused its discretion in not striking
the prior strike conviction.
We next address defendant’s argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in not applying section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) in deciding whether to strike defendant’s strike
conviction. We conclude defendant forfeited that argument by
not raising it below and that on its merits, the argument fails.

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We next address defendant’s argument based on
section 1172.1, which similarly is forfeited and lacking in merit.
Lastly, we conclude case authority defendant argues
supports reversal is inapplicable.

A. Because We Deem Defendant’s Motion for
Resentencing and His Appeal to be Petitions for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Respondent’s Jurisdictional
Argument Is Moot
The parties do not dispute that that on the merits,
defendant was entitled to section 1172.75 resentencing because
his prior offense did not involve sexual violence and the original
sentencing court had imposed a section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement, which is now invalid. To repeat, the prosecutor so
conceded in the trial court.
On appeal, respondent argues for the first time that the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resentence
defendant because the CDCR did not notify the trial court of his
eligibility.8 Respondent explains, “[T]he trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to resentence [defendant] because section
1172.75 does not allow [an inmate] to initiate proceedings with a
petition.” Respondent requests this court reverse the trial court’s
order resentencing defendant.

8 Section 1172.75 subdivision (b) provides: “The Secretary
of the [CDCR] and the county correctional administrator of each
county shall identify those persons in their custody currently
serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a) and shall provide the name of each
person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant
case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that
imposed the enhancement.”

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“ ‘Under the general common law rule, a trial court is
deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once
execution of the sentence has commenced.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 984.) As respondent argues,
People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382–384 (Burgess)
followed by People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447
(Escobedo), holds that unless the CDCR is involved in the
resentencing process, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
resentence a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, Burgess and
Escobedo thus dismissed the resentencing appeals. (Burgess,
supra, at p. 385; Escobedo, supra, at p. 444.)
Burgess explained, the Legislature created a procedure “for
the orderly implementation of relief for affected defendants” and
the procedure was “triggered by receipt of the necessary
information from the CDCR Secretary or a county correctional
administrator, not by any individual defendant.” (Burgess, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.) Neither Burgess nor Escobedo followed
a resentencing hearing at which the trial court resentenced the
defendant and the People conceded the defendant was entitled to
resentencing.
Respondent does not request this court follow Burgess or
Escobedo to the extent those cases dismissed the appeals.
Instead, respondent requests this court reverse the trial court’s
resentencing order, a course of action that would eventually
require holding new proceedings both in the trial court and this
court after receipt of a letter from the CDCR.
The procedure respondent requests in this case
undermines judicial economy and for that reason, we deem
defendant’s motion for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75
filed in the trial court to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus

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seeking resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. “ ‘A defendant
who is serving a longer sentence than the law allows may
[always] challenge the sentence in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Indeed, the purpose of the writ is to give summary relief
against such illegal restraints of personal liberty.’ [Citation.]”
(Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
We also choose to deem defendant’s appeal to be a petition
for writ of habeas corpus filed in the appellate court. (In re
Dohner (2002) 79 Cal.App.5th 590, 594 [court has discretion to
deem an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus to be an original habeas petition filed in Court of Appeal];
People v. Garrett (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1423 [appellate
court deemed appeal of denial of writ of habeas corpus, which
does not lie, as an original petition in interest of judicial
economy].) At oral argument, respondent agreed to this
procedure under the peculiar circumstances of this case where
the abstract of judgment did not correctly reflect defendant’s
enhancements. As such, respondent’s jurisdictional challenge is
moot. (Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)

B. Background on the Three Strikes Law
The purpose of the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds.(b)–(i),
added by Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, effective Mar. 7, 1994; see also
§ 1170.12, added by initiative, Gen. Elect. (Nov. 8, 1994)
[Proposition 184]) is to punish recidivists more harshly. (People
v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1099.) The Three Strikes law is
an alternative sentencing scheme applicable to habitual
offenders. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527; see People v.
Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534 [“ ‘Like the Three Strikes
law, the One Strike law is an alternative sentencing scheme’ ”];
People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102 [same].) It

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“establishes a sentencing norm” and “carefully circumscribes the
trial court’s power to depart from this norm.” (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The law creates “a strong presumption that
any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both
rational and proper.” (Ibid.)
As originally enacted, the Three Strikes law required
sentencing in the following manner: “When a defendant is
convicted of a felony, and it is pleaded and proved that he has
committed one or more prior felonies defined as ‘violent’ or
‘serious,’ sentencing proceeds under the Three Strikes law
‘[n]otwithstanding any other law.’ (§ 667, subd. (c); § 1170.12,
subd. (a).) Prior felonies qualifying as ‘serious’ or ‘violent’ are
taken into account regardless of their age. (§ 667, subd. (c)(3);
§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(3).)” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 505.)
As originally enacted, the Three Strikes law did not require the
current felony be “violent” or “serious.” (§ 667, subd. (c);
§ 1170.12, subd. (a).) If the defendant has only one qualifying
prior felony conviction, the prescribed term of imprisonment (or
the minimum term if the current offense calls for an
indeterminate sentence) is “ ‘twice the term otherwise provided
as punishment for the current felony conviction.’ [Citation.]”
(Romero, supra, at pp. 505–506.) A third strike offender received
a sentence of a minimum of 25 years to life regardless of whether
the current felony conviction was serious or violent. (People v.
Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 680 (Johnson).)
In 2012, the voters approved Proposition 36, the Three
Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act), which amended
sections 667 and 1170.12 and added section 1170.126. (People v.
White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512, 517.) The Reform Act, an
initiative measure, prospectively lessened penalties under the

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Three Strikes law for third strike offenders. (Former §§ 667,
subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12.) Under its revised penalty provisions,
“many third strike defendants are excepted from the provision
imposing an indeterminate life sentence (see [former] § 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(A)) and are instead sentenced in the same way as
second strike defendants (see id., subd. (c)(2)(C)): that is, they
receive a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction’ (id., subd. (c)(1)).”
(People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 653.) The Legislature
also created a procedure for defendants retroactively to seek
resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126. (Johnson, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 682.) Section 1170.126 requires the trial court
consider whether the inmate poses a risk of danger to public
safety, and an inmate sentenced as a third strike offender “will be
denied recall of his or her sentence if ‘the court, in its discretion,
determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 682.)

C. Defendant Demonstrates No Abuse of Discretion in
the Court’s Evaluation of the Romero Factors and
Denial of His Romero Motion
A trial court may strike prior felony conviction allegations
in cases brought under the Three Strikes law when dismissal is
“in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)
We review the court’s decision not to strike a strike
conviction for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 375.) The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) Defendant
has the burden to demonstrate “that the sentencing decision was

19
irrational or arbitrary.” (Carmony, supra, at p. 376.) “A
‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.)
The standards for striking a prior strike are “stringent” and
the circumstances must be “ ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career
criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of’ ” the law.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377–378.) Factors to consider
are “the nature of the charged and prior offenses and the
defendant’s ‘background, character, and prospects.’ [Citation.]”
(Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1193, 1207.) These factors may lead a trial court to conclude that
the defendant may be deemed outside the Three Strikes scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and for that reason strike a prior strike
conviction. (Carmony, supra, at p. 377.) If these factors
“manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no
reasonable minds could differ—the failure to strike would
constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 378.) The trial court
may not rely exclusively on the nature and circumstances of a
defendant’s offense to the exclusion of all other factors. (Id. at
p. 379.)
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request to strike his prior strike for committing a
bank robbery. (Capitalization omitted.) According to defendant,
“Limiting itself to Dennis’s past violence that resulted in the
Three Strikes sentence, or giving those circumstances preemptive
weight, contrary to settled law pertinent to Romero proceedings,
the trial court abused its discretion.” Defendant emphasizes the
evidence in the mitigation report and his personal essays and
argues that evidence shows the trial court should have stricken
his prior strike conviction.

20
The record does not support defendant’s premise that that
the trial court ignored his progress during his incarceration. The
record also does not support that the trial court gave “ ‘primary
weight’ ” to the violence involved in defendant’s convictions. The
trial court indicated it had considered all the Romero factors and
correctly identified those factors as including the “particulars
regarding the defendant’s background, character and prospects.”
The court further recognized “Mr. Dennis had done well” while
incarcerated. More specifically, the court stated that after 2004,
defendant “did very well; stopped getting into trouble, actually
engaged in activities that bettered himself, [and] educated
himself.” The court also told defendant that “you having done
well . . . is relevant to this hearing . . . .” The fact that the trial
court found defendant’s criminal history important does not show
the court failed to consider other Romero factors.
Defendant has not shown that this is an “extraordinary”
case such that no reasonable trial court could conclude he fell
within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See People v.
Anderson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 780, 786 [continuous criminal
conduct places a defendant within the meaning of the Three
Strikes law]; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 331–332
[A defendant with a “virtually uninterrupted” series of crimes
does not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law].)
Notwithstanding defendant’s progress during his incarceration, it
is undisputed he had a continuous course of criminal conduct
from 1987 through 2002 including while on parole and during his
incarceration, that he has been incarcerated since 2002, and that
his numerous commitment offenses, including attempted murder,
involved great violence. The trial court did not abuse its

21
discretion in concluding that defendant fell within the spirit of
the Three Strikes law.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s failure to
strike his strike offense prejudiced him. We do not consider that
contention further because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in not striking his prior strike conviction.

D. Section 1385, Subdivision (C) Does Not Apply to
Three Strikes Sentences and Defendant Has
Forfeited His Contention to the Contrary
Defendant argues that the trial court was required to apply
the factors identified in section 1385, subdivision (c) when
determining whether to strike a prior strike conviction.
According to defendant, those factors require dismissing the prior
strike offense.

1. Defendant forfeited his contention that section 1385,
subdivision (c ) applies to Three Strikes sentences
In the trial court, defendant based his request to strike the
1987 strike on Romero, not section 1385, subdivision (c). “ ‘A
party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate
its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not object to
the sentence at trial. . . .’ ” [Citations.]” (People v. Scott (2015)
61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) “Strong policy reasons support this rule: ‘It
is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal
that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could
have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Therefore,
defendant forfeited his argument based on section 1385.

22
2. We agree with other courts’ conclusion that
section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to
alternative sentencing regimes
Even if defendant had preserved his argument, he
demonstrates no error. Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides:
“(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute.” (Italics added.) Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) identifies numerous mitigating factors a trial
court is required to consider in determining whether to dismiss
an enhancement.9

9 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides:
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances
in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in
a discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph
(4) of subdivision (a) of Section 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single
case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.

23
On appeal, defendant applies the mitigating factors listed
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) that became effective on
January 1, 2022. Appellate courts, however, have uniformly
rejected that the mitigating factors identified in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) apply to a request to strike a strike for
purposes of the Three Strikes law. (People v. Dowdy (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1; People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237
(Burke); People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 67 (Olay);
People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 404, review granted on
another issue May 29, 2024, S283924; see also People v.

“(C) The application of an enhancement could result
in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental
illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they
committed the current offense or any prior offenses,
including criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications,
that trigger the enhancement or enhancements applied in
the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current
offense, it was inoperable or unloaded.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).)

24
McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1154.) Defendant argues
Burke was wrongly decided. We disagree.
Burke reasoned section 1385 applies to dismissal of an
“ ‘enhancement,’ ” and that “ ‘ordinarily,’ ” words used in a
statute are “ ‘presumed to be used in accordance with their
established legal or technical meaning.’ ” (Burke, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, quoting People v. Carter (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1536, 1540.) It further reasoned that
“enhancement” has a “well-established technical meaning in
California law,” to wit, it is “ ‘ “an additional term of
imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ [Citations.]” (Burke,
supra, at p. 243.) Equally “well established [is] that the Three
Strikes law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing
scheme.” (Ibid.) Although the legislative history of section 1385
was before the court (Burke, at p. 242), and in a footnote the court
observed, “[M]uch of the legislative history is inconsistent with
this plain language,” it concluded, “To the extent this history
reflects a legislative intent different than that expressed in the
plain language of the bill, that is a matter for the Legislature to
correct.” (Burke, at pp. 243–244, fn. 3.)
Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 60 agreed with Burke’s
“ultimate conclusion” in rejecting that a trial court had to
consider section 1385, subdivision (c) mitigating factors in
deciding whether to strike a prior strike conviction. (Olay, supra,
at p. 67.) It also addressed an argument apparently not made in
Burke that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(G)’s10 reference to a

10 One of the mitigating factors in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) is subdivision(c)(2)(G): “The defendant was a
juvenile when they committed the current offense or any prior

25
criminal conviction or juvenile conviction counseled against
applying the plain meaning of “enhancement” because no
enhancement is triggered by a juvenile adjudication, but a
juvenile conviction can still be a strike. (Olay, at p. 66.) In doing
so, Olay observed, “[W]e are skeptical the Legislature would have
expressed an intent to reject the well-established legal meaning
of ‘enhancement’ in such a roundabout manner by obliquely
referencing ‘juvenile adjudications’ as one of the relevant
mitigating circumstances.” It also concluded, “The legislative
history confirms the Legislature had no such intent.” (Id. at
p. 67.) Specifically, Olay relied on the Assembly Committee on
Public Safety’s June 2021 bill analysis of Senate Bill No. 81,
which distinguished an “ ‘enhancement’ ” from “ ‘an alternative
penalty scheme’ ” like the Three Strikes law and expressly recited
that “ ‘[t]he presumption created by this bill applies to
enhancements [ ] but does not encompass alternative penalty
schemes.’ ” (Olay, at p. 67, quoting Assem. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81, as amended Apr. 27, 2021, at p. 6,
italics added.)
We agree with Burke and Olay that section 1385,
subdivision (c) applies to enhancements not to alternate
sentences like the Three Strikes law. Because section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not apply, we do not consider defendant’s
argument that the factors identified in that subdivision
demonstrate the trial court committed reversable error in
refusing to strike defendant’s strike conviction.

offenses, including criminal convictions and juvenile
adjudications, that trigger the enhancement or enhancements
applied in the current case.”

26
E. Defendant Forfeited His Argument Based on
Section 1172.1 and the Argument Fails on its Merits
Defendant cites section 1172.1 in arguing that it “adds
specific factors the court must consider” in resentencing.
Defendant does not explain or show that section 1172.1 sets forth
factors relevant to a trial court’s determination whether to strike
a prior strike conviction. Defendant therefore does not show the
relevance of section 1172.1 to the sole issue he raises on appeal—
whether the court erred in denying his motion to strike his 1987
bank robbery conviction. In any event, defendant has forfeited
reliance on section 1172.1.
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a) provides: “When a
defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been
committed to the custody of the Secretary of the [CDCR] or to the
custody of the county correctional administrator pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the court may, on its own motion,
within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time if the
applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law, at
any time upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board
of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in
state prison, the county correctional administrator in the case of
a defendant incarcerated in county jail, the district attorney of
the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney
General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the
case, recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still
in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater
than the initial sentence. Recall and resentencing under this

27
section may be initiated by the original sentencing judge, a judge
designated by the presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction
in the case.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) The court is required to
state its reasons “for its decision to grant or deny recall and
resentencing.” (Id., subd. (a)(7). Defendant did not rely on
section 1172.1 in the trial court to support striking his prior
conviction. He therefore has forfeited this challenge. (People v.
Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)
Defendant, moreover, could not have requested that the
trial court resentence him pursuant to section 1172.1. The
authority to request the trial court to recall a felony sentence
under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), is with: the court on its
own motion, the secretary of CDCR or the Board of Parole
Hearings for state prison commitments, the county correctional
administrator for county jail commitments under section 1170,
subdivision (h), the district attorney of the county in which the
defendant was sentenced, and the Attorney General for cases
originally prosecuted by the Department of Justice. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) Defendant does not show that any of these entities
recommended recall and resentencing. “A defendant is not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this
section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under
this section, the court is not required to respond.” (Id., subd. (c).)
In short, resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 was not raised
in the trial court and defendant does not show the issue
is properly before this court.

28
F. Defendant Relies on Inapplicable Case Authority,
None of Which Demonstrates Error in the Trial
Court’s Refusal To Strike His Prior Strike
Conviction
Defendant cites People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
726, 746 (Esparza), for the proposition that when deciding
whether to strike a prior strike conviction, “the proper focus is on
whether the petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.” Esparza does not support that
proposition.
Esparza discussed the defendant’s current risk of danger in
the context of considering resentencing under section 1170.126,
part of the Three Strikes Reform Act. (Esparza, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 740–746.) Section 1170.126,
subdivision (g) requires the trial court to consider whether “a new
sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (g)(3).) This case does not involve
resentencing under section 1170.126.
Defendant cites cases holding that a court cannot modify a
third strike sentence under section 1172.75, an issue currently
pending in the Supreme Court. (People v. Superior Court
(Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978, 981, review granted
Mar. 12 2024, S283305; People v. Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
666, 673, review granted May 29, 2024, S284341); People v.
Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, 754, review granted
Apr. 24, 2024, S284259.) Defendant was a second strike offender,
not a third strike offender. Whether or not a trial court can
modify a third strike sentence under section 1172.75 is thus not
relevant to this appeal.

29
Defendant cites In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241,
1255 for the proposition that the trial court’s inquiry “cannot be
undertaken simply by examining the circumstances of the crime
in isolation, without consideration of the passage of time or the
attendant changes in the inmate’s psychological or mental
attitude.” In re Shaputis involved review of whether a defendant
was suitable for parole. (Id. at p. 1255.) Here, the trial court
was not evaluating defendant’s suitability for parole. Defendant
fails to explain how jurisprudence regarding eligibility for parole
is relevant to this appeal.
In his reply brief, defendant relies on People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, which involved a trial court’s
invocation of public safety over mitigating factors in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) in refusing to dismiss a firearm enhancement.
(Gonzalez, supra, at pp. 219–220.) Gonzalez is not relevant
because the issue before us involves an alternative sentence
under the Three Strikes law and not an enhancement. (See
Discussion, part D, ante.)

DISPOSITION
We deny the petition and affirm the trial court’s order
resentencing Dennis pursuant to section 1172.75.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.

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