People v. Webb CA2/6

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Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Webb CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335343
(Super. Ct. No. 23F-06427)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

JOHN ALLEN WEBB, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

John Allen Webb, Jr., appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance
for sale (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1), Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351, count 1), possession of a controlled substance while
armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a),
count 2), felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1), count 3), felon in possession of ammunition (Pen.
Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 4), falsely identifying himself to
a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a) (misdemeanor),
count 5), and possession of a controlled substance in jail (Pen.
Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a), count 6). The jury also found true an
enhancement that he was on bail during the commission of
counts 1 through 4 (Pen. Code, § 12022.1). The trial court
sentenced Webb to three years in state prison.1
Webb contends the trial court erred when it admitted his
statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436 (Miranda) and admitted text messages referencing earlier
drug deals. He also contends that cumulative errors resulted in
an unfair trial. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Two San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s deputies drove into
the parking lot of a McDonald’s and Chevron gas
station/convenience store in Nipomo at 9:14 p.m. They saw two
white Toyota Corollas parked next to each other. Webb and
Kameron M.2 were sitting in the 2018 Corolla owned by Kameron
M.’s wife. Abigail M., later identified as Webb’s girlfriend, was in
the 2017 Corolla owned by Webb’s grandmother. As deputies
drove into the lot, the three occupants of the Corollas got out and
walked into the store.
The deputies went on another call, then a few minutes later
returned to the parking lot. Abigail M. walked to a gray Toyota
Tundra truck with an orange ladder rack, got in the rear seat,
and covered her face with her hands.
Deputy Joel Molina opened the door to the truck and saw
Abigail M. had injection sites on her arm. She was holding a

1 The court also imposed a consecutive sentence of three
years for a violation of Penal Code section 4573, subdivision (a) in
case 22F-07479-D.

2 First names and last initials are used to protect personal
privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10) & (11).)

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torch-style lighter typically used by narcotics users. He ordered
her out of the truck. She dumped white powder from a plastic
baggie onto the ground which later tested to be
methamphetamine. Kameron M. told Deputy Daniel Brooks that
Abigail M. was Webb’s girlfriend. A hypodermic syringe
containing fentanyl was found in the car associated with
Kameron M.
Brooks went inside the store. He heard the toilet in the
men’s room flush approximately six times in less than a minute.
Brooks believed the occupant was flushing narcotics. Brooks
went into the men’s room and saw through a gap to the single
stall a person he believed to be Webb.
When Webb left the restroom, Brooks observed symptoms
that made him “suspect . . . potential narcotics use”: Webb was
fidgety and sweaty, his pupils were constricted, and an elevated
pulse was visible on his neck. They then had a conversation
recorded on Brooks’s body camera. After conducting drug
recognition tests, Brooks concluded Webb was under the
influence of a stimulant and arrested him. Webb was
handcuffed, placed inside a police car, and read his Miranda
rights.
Deputies searched the car associated with Webb and found
an EBT card with his name, a container with a powdery residue,
empty coin-sized plastic bags, a digital scale, a credit card reader,
a .38 Special bullet, a handgun holster, and a gun lock. In the
driver’s side door pocket was a hypodermic needle containing
methamphetamine. A loaded .40 caliber handgun was found
under the trash can liner in the trash can in the men’s room.
A cell phone was seized from Webb’s pocket and searched
pursuant to a search warrant. It showed that at 5:00 that

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afternoon, Richard B. sent a Facebook Messenger message to
Webb’s phone asking if he had a “half piece” (12.5 grams of
fentanyl) for a buyer. Webb’s phone responded that he had
already sold it, but would get another one. They agreed on a
price of $500 and arranged for “Shane” to pick up the drugs at the
Nipomo McDonald’s at 8:45 p.m. At 8:33 p.m., Richard B.
messaged that Shane was in a gray Toyota Tundra truck with an
orange ladder rack. A message from Webb’s phone said he was at
pump 11 in his grandmother’s white 2017 Corolla.
Richard B. then messaged that Shane was delayed until
9:15 p.m. Webb’s phone responded that he had things to do so he
would “leave it with abby in my car and he can meet her.” At
9:21, Richard B. messaged, “Tell her to go to truck.” Richard B.
messaged, “Sheriff took off he said.” Webb’s phone responded,
“Negative.”
At 9:35 p.m., Webb’s phone texted, “Shane this is rick’s
buddy what’s up. [¶] I’m hiding in the bathroom I need u to take
me Back Home tell me when it’s clear to mob out.”
Webb’s phone contained a Facebook message at 9:45 p.m. to
his former girlfriend asking for a name, date of birth, and social
security number. She responded with the name Michael F. and a
birth date.
Webb’s phone included a photograph of his California
identification card. It also included a photograph of two
handguns on the legs of a person sitting in a car. The
individual’s face was not visible in the photograph, but he was
wearing a sweatshirt similar to one found in Webb’s car. One of
the handguns was identified as the one found in the men’s room
trash can.
The phone included messages where the user identified

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themselves with Webb’s nickname, JDub. The phone was logged
into the Facebook page of “John Webb,” with a profile photo of
Webb. After reviewing the contents of the phone, a detective
concluded it belonged to Webb and he was the primary user.
The “half piece” and the $500 were never found. The
defense presented no evidence at trial.
DISCUSSION
Miranda
An individual who is in custody must be advised of their
constitutional rights before they are interrogated. (Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) On appeal, we defer to the trial court’s
factual findings supported by substantial evidence and
independently determine from the factual findings whether
appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation for Miranda
purposes. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.)
Following a hearing (Evid. Code, § 402), the trial court
admitted the first part of the audiovisual body camera recording
of the interaction between Brooks and Webb after he left the
men’s room. Webb contends the court erred because it was a
custodial interrogation without Miranda advisements. We
disagree.
When Webb left the men’s room, Brooks observed
symptoms of drug use and “detain[ed] him to speak to him about
[Brooks’s] suspicions.” Three deputies in uniform were present.
It was “made clear to [Webb] . . . that he was not free to leave.”
Webb was not advised of his Miranda rights at that time. Webb
sipped from a drink in his hand during the interaction.
Brooks asked Webb, “Hey, what’s up man?” and “What’s
goin’ on tonight?” Webb said he did not know. Brooks asked,
“What’s the deal with you?” Webb responded, “I was just in there

5
taking a shit.” The conversation continued:
“[Brooks]: Are you on probation?
“[Webb]: No.
“[Brooks]: Parole?
“[Webb]: No.
“[Brooks]: When was the last time you were arrested?
“[Webb]: Uh, a couple of years ago.
“[Brooks]: What’d you get arrested for a couple years ago?
“[Webb]: Uh, possession, or something like that.
“[Brooks]: Oh. Possession.
“[Webb]: Yeah.
“[Brooks]: When was the last time you used anything?
“[Webb]: Uh, s–like three, four months? I don’t know.”
Webb then gave Brooks the false name and date of birth of
Michael F. that his former girlfriend had messaged his phone.
Later in the conversation, Webb asked if he was under arrest and
was told he was “just being detained.” Brooks then conducted a
drug recognition examination “before [he] came to an opinion as
to whether he in fact was under the influence for purposes of
arresting him.”
The trial court reviewed the body camera recording. The
court stated that Webb was detained and the deputy conducted
drug recognition tests, which “tends to indicate that he was
investigating.” The court noted the “conversational tone” of the
interaction and denied the motion to exclude the statements.
1. Custody
Miranda advisements are required when “there is a ‘formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983)
463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) But “Miranda warnings are not required

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‘simply . . . because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Absent “custodial interrogation,” Miranda
simply does not come into play.’ ” (People v. Clair (1992) 2
Cal.4th 629, 679.) “[T]he term ‘custody’ generally does not
include ‘a temporary detention for investigation’ where an officer
detains a person to ask a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” (People v.
Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180.)
Here, Brooks’s questions about Webb’s use of intoxicants
and the subsequent administration of drug recognition tests were
part of an investigative detention to determine whether Webb
was under the influence of drugs. The investigation was similar
to the roadside field sobriety tests for driving under the influence
and questions about use of intoxicants the United States
Supreme Court has held to be noncustodial. (Berkemer v.
McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 423, 442.)
Webb’s reliance on People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d
653, 668-669, does not compel a contrary result. That case,
decided shortly after Miranda, held that Miranda warnings need
not be given “by police officers who lack probable cause to make
an arrest or bring an accusation.” (Manis, at p. 669.) Similarly
here, Brooks had not yet formed probable cause to arrest Webb
during his questioning. Brooks detained Webb to investigate
whether he was under the influence and the trial court made that
finding. It was not until Brooks completed the drug recognition
tests that he arrested Webb. Subsequent cases also make clear
that probable cause to arrest does not determine custody for
Miranda purposes. (Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. at p.
435, fn. 22; People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 606-607

7
[declining to follow Manis].)
As we noted in People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
966, 971-973, whether a person is in custody for purposes of
Miranda depends on the totality of the circumstances including
whether the person has been formally arrested, the length of the
detention, whether the location is a coercive environment, the
ratio of officers to suspects, and whether the officer’s demeanor is
“brief and casual” or “aggressive, confrontational, accusatory,
coercive, or sustained.” Here, Webb was not formally arrested or
handcuffed during the detention. The detention was brief. It
occurred, not in a police station, but in a convenience store with
the public present. Only Brooks spoke to Webb and the other
deputies stood to the side. And, as noted by the trial court, it had
a “conversational tone.” Under the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude Webb was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
2. Interrogation
“While the term ‘interrogation’ refers to any words or
actions on the part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response, it does not extend to inquiries . . . that
are ‘essentially “limited to the purpose of identifying a person
found under suspicious circumstances or near the scene of a
recent crime[.]” ’ ” (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at
p. 180.) As the high court recognized in Miranda, “General
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other
general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding. . . . In such situations the compelling
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is
not necessarily present.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477-
478, fn. omitted.)
Here, Brooks asked Webb his name and what he was doing.

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Questions about probation or parole would indicate whether he
was subject to a warrantless search. (People v. Reyes (1998) 19
Cal.4th 743, 752; see People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 115
[requesting search consent does not require Miranda warnings].)
Questions about drug use would help resolve whether the
symptoms he displayed were caused by use of narcotics. (See
People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1751, 1754
[questioning DUI suspect detained in customs office about alcohol
consumption not custodial interrogation].) We conclude the
questions were part of an investigative detention, not an
interrogation. The trial court did not err in admitting the
statements.
Previous text messages
Webb contends the trial court erroneously admitted text
messages prior to the day of the charged offenses. We again
disagree.
Over defense objection, the trial court admitted several text
and Facebook Messenger messages setting up drug deals starting
two months before the charged offenses and continuing until an
hour before those offenses. One text message to Webb’s phone
says, “Johnny please call me back it’s time to make
money$$$$$$.” Also included was a Facebook Messenger thread
the day before the charged offenses between Webb’s phone and
Omar G. setting up a drug sale and stating that the person using
Webb’s phone was at pump 11 at McDonald’s Chevron. At 8:33
the evening of the arrest, Webb’s phone texted Omar “I’m in
Nipomo.”
Uncharged conduct evidence is inadmissible to show a
defendant’s propensity to commit a particular crime. (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (a); People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299.)

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However, it may be admitted “when relevant to prove some fact
(such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident . . .) other
than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (b).)
Even if offered to prove a fact other than propensity, “[t]he
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
We review admission of evidence pursuant to Evidence
Code sections 1101 and 352 for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 23, 25.) “The exercise of discretion
is not grounds for reversal unless “ ‘ “the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner.” ’ ” (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 437.) We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion here.
The jury was instructed that the messages were admitted
for a “limited purpose,” i.e., “only to evaluate the defendant’s
statements and to prove the defendant’s intent as to Count 1,
conspiracy.” The messages were relevant to show that Webb’s
intent to possess drugs was not only for personal use (like the
syringe with methamphetamine found in his car), but also for
purposes of sale. (People v. Scally (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 285,
292 [texts showed intent to engage in pimping and negated claim
defendant was innocent bystander to prostitution activity].)
Moreover, the evidence would have been properly admitted
to show Webb’s identity as the person who sent the texts
regarding the charged conspiracy. The earlier messages include
a reference to “Johnny” and to another drug deal at the same

10
pump 11 at the McDonald’s Chevron. This evidence was relevant
to counter the defense argument that the evidence did not show
Webb was the person “behind the keyboard” who sent the
messages on his phone. And contrary to Webb’s contention, it
was not offered to establish identity through a distinctive
“signature” requiring a high degree of similarity with the charged
offenses. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.) Instead,
the messages were admissible as circumstantial evidence that
Webb was the person using his phone. (See People v. Robinson
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 434, 445.)
“The ‘prejudice’ which [Evidence Code] section 352 seeks to
avoid is that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little
effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256,
275.) In our view, the discussion of other drug deals here would
not evoke an emotional bias in comparison to the charged
offenses and was not “unduly prejudicial” pursuant to Evidence
Code section 352. (Cage, at p. 275.) And because the messages
were relevant to whether the phone belonged to Webb and
whether he possessed the drugs for sale, we conclude the
evidence was not “ ‘merely cumulative’ ”and had “substantial
probative value.” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303,
318.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted the messages.
Cumulative errors
Webb contends that cumulative errors resulted in an unfair
trial. “[W]e have found no error to cumulate.” (People v. Koontz
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1094.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Catherine J. Swysen, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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