CourtListener 10322280•People v. Singh CA5
Testo completo
Filed 1/28/25 P. v. Singh CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, Consolidated Cases Nos.
F082580 & F082584
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. MCR060145,
v. MCR060560)
HARMAN PREET SINGH,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Dale J. Blea,
Judge.
Joshua G. Wilson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General, Julie A.
Hokans, Christopher J. Rench, Doris A. Calandra, and R. Todd Marshall, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J.
This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) and Erlinger v. United States
(2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), which settled a division among Courts of Appeal on the
appropriate standard for assessing prejudice in the context of noncompliance with the
requirements of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), (2), and (3)1 as modified by
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567). In accordance with
the direction of the Supreme Court, we have vacated our earlier decision and permitted
supplemental briefing from the parties.
Defendant Harman Preet Singh pled guilty to arson and making criminal threats,
charged in two separate cases. In both cases, he was granted probation, was found to
have violated probation, and his probation was revoked. Upon revocation of probation,
the upper term was imposed on the arson count. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s
conclusion he violated a condition of probation, resulting in a revocation of that
probation. Defendant also challenges the sentence imposed as violating section 1170,
subdivision (b). The People contend that the trial court correctly determined that
defendant violated a condition of probation but agree that defendant is entitled to
resentencing in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b). We vacate defendant’s
sentence and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
This opinion addresses two separate appeals from cases brought against defendant
in the Madera County Superior Court cases Nos. MCR060145 and MCR060560. On this
court’s own motion, the appeals were consolidated. On August 20, 2018, the Madera
County District Attorney filed a complaint against defendant in case No. MCR060145,
alleging defendant committed arson (§ 451, subd. (d); count 1) and attempted to set fire
to a structure (§ 455; count 2). On September 28, 2018, the Madera County District
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
Attorney filed a second amended complaint against defendant in case No. MCR060560,
alleging he made a criminal threat that was likely to result in death or great bodily injury
to his mother (§ 422, subd. (a); count 1), made a criminal threat that was likely to result
in death or great bodily injury to his father (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and committed
misdemeanor battery against his mother (§ 242; count 3).
On April 22, 2019, defendant pled guilty to count 1 in case No. MCR060560.
During the same hearing, defendant also pled guilty to count 1 in case No. MCR060145.
The trial court then suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation
for a period of five years for both cases Nos. MCR060145 and MCR060560, and
dismissed the remaining counts alleged against him. At the time probation was granted,
various conditions were imposed, including requirements that defendant attend all future
court appearances and “[r]eport monthly or as directed by the Probation Officer.”
On September 29, 2019, a petition to revoke defendant’s probation was filed in
case No. MCR060560. A similar petition was filed in case No. MCR060145 on
September 30, 2019. While both petitions stated defendant failed to “[r]eport monthly or
as directed by the Probation Officer,” the petition in case No. MCR060145 also included
the failure to register as required by section 457.1 (requiring registration after a
conviction for arson). On August 21, 2020, defendant admitted the violations listed in
both petitions. On September 21, 2020, the trial court ordered defendant to serve 120
days in jail in case No. MCR060145, then reinstated the same terms and conditions of
probation in both cases as set out earlier.
New petitions to revoke probation were filed on November 13, 2020, alleging
defendant violated two conditions of probation in each case.2 Specifically, both petitions
2 On the same date, defendant was also found to have violated probation in
Madera County Superior Court case No. MCR066207 and it revoked defendant’s
probation. He was ordered confined to jail and granted credit for time served for the full
duration of the ordered confinement. Our record does not contain information regarding
what offenses were charged in that case nor does it contain a petition to revoke that grant
3.
alleged defendant failed to “[o]bey all laws, federal, state and local,” and did not “[r]eport
monthly or as directed by the Probation Officer.” Following a contested hearing,
defendant was found to have violated the probation condition requiring him to report to
his probation officer as ordered.
On March 24, 2021, the trial court revoked defendant’s probation and sentenced
him to three years (the upper term) on count 1 in case No. MCR060145 and designated
this the principal term. The trial court then imposed a consecutive term of eight months
(one-third the middle term of two years) for count 1 in case No. MCR060560,3 for a total
prison term of three years eight months.
On the same date, defendant filed a notice of appeal as to both cases.
On September 6, 2022, we issued an opinion affirming the judgment and directing
the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment.
Defendant’s petition for review was granted and, on December 11, 2024, our
Supreme Court transferred the matter with directions for us to vacate our decision and
reconsider in light of Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730, and Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. 821.
We afforded the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing and
vacated our prior decision.
of probation. However, our record reflects that defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor
vandalism in violation of section 594 and was granted misdemeanor probation for a term
of three years.
3 The trial court indicated it imposed a sentence on count 2 of case
No. MCR060560. However, defendant pled guilty to count 1 in case No. MCR060560
and count 2 was dismissed. Both counts alleged a violation of section 422. Other than
being imposed on the wrong count, the sentence imposed was consistent with the plea
agreement. The trial court mistakenly imposed a sentence on count 2 that should have
been imposed on count 1. Because we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the
matter for resentencing, we note the error for the benefit of the trial court rather than
correcting the error.
4.
FACTUAL SUMMARY4
Case No. MCR060145
On August 17, 2017, Madera Police Officer Kellom was dispatched to assist “Cal
Fire” (Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) personnel who were fighting a fire
near a home. The individual who was seen setting the fire on surveillance footage
returned to the scene while the firefighters were there. The firefighters pointed out this
individual, who was later identified as defendant, to Kellom. Kellom reported defendant
smelled of alcohol, seemed agitated, and tried to leave. Defendant was detained and
placed in the back of Kellom’s vehicle. A lighter was eventually found in defendant’s
front pocket.
Case No. MCR060560
On September 23, 2018, Madera Police Officer Garcia was dispatched to a home
where he encountered defendant’s brother. Defendant’s brother reported defendant
threatened to assault their mother after getting angry. His brother also stated defendant
grabbed an oxygen tank and threatened to “blow up the house and kill his family.”
Probation Revocation Proceedings
The revocation hearings for both cases Nos. MCR060145 and MCR060560 were
held concurrently on December 4, 2020. During the hearing, Madera County Probation
Officer Magallanes testified defendant was required to report to the probation department
at least monthly, and that he was specifically instructed to report on November 3, 2020.
Defendant did not meet with Magallanes on November 3. Magallanes also determined
there were no records showing defendant met with anyone else in the probation
department on November 3. Magallanes testified that in the past defendant kept some
appointments, but not all.
4 The specific facts underlying the charges in our factual summary are found in the
probation reports.
5.
Defendant testified in his own behalf and admitted knowing he had an
appointment with probation on November 3, 2020. Defendant testified he called the
probation department on November 3, and that it was “on [his] phone history.”
Defendant claimed he was unable to reach anyone in the office because no one picked up
the phone. During his testimony, defendant mentioned he had been arrested, but provided
no specific evidence verifying this fact. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that
his attempt to call probation did not occur until two to three days after November 3, 2020.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found defendant “violated the
terms of his probation in failing to contact [the probation department] on the date
specified,” and that this violation applied to both cases.
DISCUSSION
I. The Revocation of Probation
Defendant argues the revocation of his probation was improper because the trial
court permitted the People to prove his state of mind to a lesser standard than that
required by case law. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court used a strict liability
test rather than one considering whether his violation of a condition of probation was
“willful.” Both below and on appeal, defendant appears to suggest the violation of the
probation condition was “negligent” rather than “willful.” We do not agree with
defendant’s characterization of the case law on this issue or the distinctions he is
attempting to draw.
When an individual is suspected of violating terms or conditions of their
probation, they may be rearrested and subject to a hearing at which the trial court
considers whether to revoke probation and impose a sentence. (§ 1203.2.) The
prosecution has the burden of proving the grounds supporting revocation by a
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447.) Case
law has held a decision to revoke probation can be supported by the conclusion it serves
the “ ‘interests of justice.’ ” (People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 981.) While
6.
the facts supporting revocation may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, “the
evidence must support a conclusion the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful
violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (Id. at p. 982.)
Ultimately, the evidence must show a defendant has not complied with the terms
of probation, justifying the revocation of probation. (People v. Urke (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 766, 772 (Urke).)
“ ‘Probation revocation proceedings are not a part of a criminal
prosecution, and the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether
the probationer has violated probation.’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . [A]nd great
deference is accorded the trial court’s decision, bearing in mind that
‘[p]robation is not a matter of right but an act of clemency, the granting and
revocation of which are entirely within the sound discretion of the trial
court. [Citations.]’ ” (Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 772−773.)
The discretion to revoke probation is analogous to a court’s power to grant
probation, and should not be disturbed absent abuse or some form of arbitrary action.
(Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) We therefore review the trial court’s decision
to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Butcher (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 310, 318.) However, the trial court’s factual findings will be reviewed for
substantial evidence, and we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or determine
credibility on appeal. (Ibid.; see People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 200.)
Magallanes testified defendant had been informed when he was released from jail
in October 2020, to report to his probation officer on November 3, 2020. Defendant then
failed to meet with Magallanes on November 3. Magallanes also had no record showing
defendant attempted to reach her by phone on or around November 3. Magallanes later
testified that this was not the first time defendant failed to appear for an appointment on a
designated day.5
5 In September 2020, defendant faced the risk of having his probation revoked and
not reinstated when he failed to report for a meeting with probation. Instead, the trial
court ordered defendant to serve 120 days in jail, then reinstated probation.
7.
In his own testimony, defendant admitted missing the November 3, 2020
appointment. Defendant claimed he was arrested, but provided no details about that
arrest. Defendant then testified he tried to call his probation officer, but that no one
picked up the phone. Later in his testimony, defendant acknowledged his attempt to
reach his probation officer was not until two to three days after his missed appointment.
Defendant’s primary contention is that his failure to appear for the appointment
was not “willful” and cannot support the revocation of his probation. Defendant relies
heavily on the opinion in Galvan to make this point. This reliance on Galvan is
misplaced, however. In Galvan, the appellant failed to appear for an appointment with
his probation officer because he had been arrested and deported to Mexico. (People v.
Galvan, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 981.) The court concluded this failure to report was
not willful. (Id. at p. 985.)
Defendant’s reliance on this court’s decision in People v. Zaring (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 362, is also misplaced. In Zaring, the defendant was 22 minutes late to court
due to an unforeseen problem with childcare. (Id. at p. 379.) The trial court revoked
probation. (Ibid.) This court held the failure to report was not “the result of
irresponsibility, contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and expectations of
the court,” nor was it a willful violation of the relevant condition of probation. (Ibid.)
In an effort to analogize his facts to those stated in Galvan and Zaring, defendant
points to his testimony that he was arrested. Defendant specifically testified:
“I got arrested. Like, I knew I missed the appointment. I was going to call
them back. But it was just only two days in between, like a couple of days,
and this incident happened.”
This was the only mention of an arrest in the record. No document was placed into
evidence memorializing the arrest, and no further testimony was provided. As a result,
the trial court may have been skeptical about the authenticity of this claim.
8.
The burden of demonstrating a trial court abused its discretion rests squarely on
the defendant. (Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) An appellate court should
interfere with a trial court’s exercise of discretion on denying or revoking probation only
in extreme cases. (Ibid.) “ ‘Many . . . circumstances not warranting a conviction may
fully justify a court in revoking probation granted on a prior offense.’ ” (Ibid.)
We conclude the trial court’s finding that defendant willfully violated a condition
of probation when he failed to appear for his November 3, 2020 appointment with his
probation officer, is supported by substantial evidence. We, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion.
II. Senate Bill No. 567
At the time defendant was sentenced, section 1170 provided the choice between
the lower, middle, and upper term “shall rest within the sound discretion of the court,”
who determines which term “best serves the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, former
subd. (b).) On March 24, 2021, applying the law that existed at the time, the trial court
found true four circumstances in aggravation and imposed an upper-term sentence on
count 1 in case No. MCR060145. On January 1, 2022, amendments to section 1170
made by Senate Bill No. 567 went into effect. Defendant contends his sentence is invalid
following those amendments. The People concede that, in light of Lynch, defendant’s
sentence must be vacated and the matter must be remanded for resentencing.
Specifically, they acknowledge none of the circumstances in aggravation were proved in
compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b), and the record does not provide a clear
indication that the trial court would have exercised its discretion to impose the upper term
in light of the alteration of the trial court’s sentencing discretion—to wit, the presumptive
middle term—resulting from Senate Bill No. 567. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 771,
773.) We agree.
9.
A. Background
When imposing the sentence after revoking probation, the trial court chose the
upper term for the violation of section 451, subdivision (d) in case No. MCR060145,
stating:
“The Court selected the aggravated term based on the facts that [1]
[defendant’s] prior convictions as an adult are numerous and increasing in
seriousness. [2] He was on probation at the time that he committed the
offense. [3] His performance on probation prior to the conviction was
unsatisfactory, and [4] his performance on probation following the
conviction was likewise unsatisfactory.”
The trial court also considered defendant’s “mental health issues as a factor [in]
mitigation, but even in considering that as a factor in mitigation, the Court f[ound] that
the aggravating factors justif[ied] an imposition of the aggravated term.”
B. Compliance with Section 1170, Subdivision (b), as Modified by Senate
Bill No. 567
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now
provides, “[t]he court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” As an exception to the general
rule, the court may consider the fact of the defendant’s prior convictions based on a
certified record of conviction without it having been stipulated to by the defendant or
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); see Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838 [“[A] judge may ‘do no
more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what
elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ”].)
10.
The parties agree that none of the aggravating circumstances were proved to a jury
or admitted in full by defendant. The People also acknowledge that no certified records
of prior convictions were admitted into evidence and the trial court’s reliance on a
probation officer’s report to find true prior convictions does not meet the requirements of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3).
In sum, none of the aggravating circumstances were established as required by
section 1170, subdivision (b).
C. Harmless Error
1. Legal Standard
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that where a trial court employed a former
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), and relied on facts not proved in compliance
with section 1170, subdivision (b) to impose the upper term, the sentence must be vacated
and the matter remanded unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would necessarily have found the facts underlying all circumstances in aggravation relied
upon by the trial court true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 742–743, 761.) “In making this determination, we may ‘ “examine[] what the jury
necessarily did find and ask[] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the
jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.” [Citation.] . . .’ [Citation.]
We may also find the omission harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
‘that the omitted [fact] was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ”
(Id. at p. 775, italics omitted, brackets in original.) Further, because Senate Bill No. 567
“altered the scope of the trial court’s discretion,” for sentences imposed under the former
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), “the record must clearly indicate that the court
would have found an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited
discretion.” (Lynch, at p. 743; see id. at p. 777 [providing examples of the “kind of
definitive statements” that our Supreme Court has found to clearly indicate a trial court
“would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances”].)
11.
2. Analysis
The People argue that “the lack of certified records of conviction . . . was likely
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” However, because the People concede, and
we agree, that the record provides no clear indication that the trial court would have
imposed the same sentence in light of the new presumptive middle term, we need not
determine whether the failure to establish all four aggravating circumstances in
compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sentencing defendant, the trial court listed the circumstances in aggravation and
mitigation and commented “the aggravating factors justif[ied] an imposition of the
aggravated term.” The trial court’s statement was not the “kind of definitive statement[]
that [our Supreme Court] ha[s] found to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser
sentence under any circumstances.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) The Lynch
court provided two examples of such statements: first, where the trial court found the
defendant was “ ‘ “deserving [of] the ultimate sentence of death,” ’ [the] trial court
observed that the defendant was ‘ “the worst of the worst,” ’ that he ‘ “show[ed]
absolutely no remorse” ’ and that ‘ “[i]t’s as if he has no soul” ’ ”; and second, “where
‘the sentencing court announces that it is aware of forthcoming legislation and then
explains how it would exercise its discretion under that legislation.’ ” (Ibid., citing
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432, and People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
431.) Neither is the case here. The trial court’s comment that the upper term was
justified under the prior standard does not provide a clear indication that the trial court
would not impose a lesser term in light of the new middle-term presumption. (See Lynch,
at p. 777; Salazar, at p. 431.) For this reason, defendant’s sentence must be vacated and
the matter must be remanded for full resentencing.6
6 “ ‘ “The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where . . . [aggravating
facts] were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity to
retry” ’ the aggravating facts.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776, brackets in original.)
12.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for full resentencing in
conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b). The People may elect to retry the
aggravating facts on remand. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
13.
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