CourtListener 10320737•Sims v. Farmers Group CA3
Testo completo
Filed 1/24/25 Sims v. Farmers Group CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
LIZA SIMS, Individually and C097755
as Guardian ad litem, etc.
(Super. Ct. No. 19CV01700)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Liza Sims’ mother owned a house in Magalia, California, that was insured
under a policy issued to her by Farmers Insurance. Before the Camp Fire, Sims lived
alone in her mother’s house and operated a cosmetic tattoo business there. After the
house was destroyed by the Camp Fire in 2018, the insurance company paid Sims’
mother the limits available under her policy but denied Sims’ claim for the loss of her
personal and business property. Sims sued Farmers Group, Inc. (Farmers) and insurance
1
agent Dawn Foster (Foster or agent) (collectively, defendants) for negligent
misrepresentation and professional negligence.
The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding
Sims’ claims against them fail as a matter of law because Sims (1) cannot establish the
agent’s alleged misrepresentations caused any harm to Sims, and (2) cannot establish
defendants owed or breached any duty of care to Sims. Sims appeals, arguing that the
court erred because she raised a triable issue of material fact regarding causation and the
court applied an incorrect standard in finding no duty. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE1
Sims’ mother, Edna Gleason (Gleason), was the owner of a house located on
Andover Drive in Magalia, California (the Andover property). In October 2013, Sims
moved from Alaska and began living alone at the house. Several months later, Sims
began operating her cosmetic tattoo-related business out of the house.
When Sims first moved into the house, the property was insured under a
homeowners’ insurance policy issued to Gleason by a Farmers Insurance Group
company. In August 2017, the homeowners’ insurance policy was changed to a landlord
insurance policy. Because Sims was not a named or additional insured on either policy,
she was not informed of the change. Although the new policy remained in place through
the date of the Camp Fire, neither Sims nor Gleason ever asked the insurer to add Sims as
a named insured.
1 Review of this matter was made more difficult by the poor quality of the separate
statements, which omit facts that are material and include facts that are immaterial.
Nevertheless, we have discretion to overlook these procedural errors and consider
evidence not cited in the separate statements. (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 171, 183.) We exercise that discretion here to determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist and whether the moving parties are entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
2
On November 8, 2018, the Camp Fire destroyed the Andover property. Thereafter,
Sims submitted an insurance claim for the loss of the dwelling as well as the loss of Sims’
personal property and business equipment and inventory. Within weeks of receiving the
claim, the insurer (Fire Insurance Exchange) paid Gleason $392,480, which represented
the limits under the policy. The insurer orally advised Sims that her personal and
business property was not covered under the policy.
In June 2019, Sims, on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for Gleason, filed
a complaint for damages against Foster, Farmers, PG & E Corporation, and Pacific Gas &
Electric Company. With respect to defendants, the complaint alleges two causes of
action, for negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that, at or about the time Sims occupied the property, she had a
conversation with Foster regarding insurance coverage for the property and Foster
assured her “the homeowners insurance policy then in force covered the premises and its
contents.” The complaint alleges that Sims relied upon this “misrepresentation” and
therefore did not purchase a separate “tenant” policy to cover her personal and business
property. The complaint also alleges that Foster breached a duty of care to Sims by
failing to advise her of the availability and advisability of purchasing a separate policy to
cover such property. As a proximate result of Foster’s acts, the complaint alleges that
defendants are liable for damages in excess of $400,000.
In March 2022, Foster and Farmers each filed a motion for summary judgment.
Foster argued that Sims’ claims against her failed because: (1) Sims cannot establish
Foster made the alleged misrepresentations; (2) Sims cannot establish that she reasonably
and detrimentally relied on the alleged misrepresentations; and (3) Sims cannot prove that
Foster breached any duty of care owed to Sims.
Farmers, in its motion, argued that it cannot be held vicariously liable for Foster’s
alleged acts because: (1) it is not an insurance company and Foster was not acting as a
Farmers agent; (2) the statements that Foster allegedly made about the homeowners’
3
policy were true; (3) Sims cannot establish that she justifiably relied, to her detriment,
upon Foster’s alleged misrepresentations; (4) Foster did not breach any duty to Gleason
or owe any duty to Sims.
In opposition, Sims presented evidence that Foster, acting as an agent, made
representations during two meetings in 2013 and 2014 that Sims’ personal and business
property would be covered under Gleason’s then-existing homeowners’ insurance policy.
Sims did not dispute that the homeowners’ insurance policy subsequently was changed to
a landlord insurance policy in 2017, before the Camp Fire. But Sims disputed that
Gleason requested the change, arguing that Gleason “did not have the mental capacity to
make or understand the effect of such a change.” And since Sims was not informed of
the change, she argued that it was reasonable for her to rely upon Foster’s representations
about coverage under the prior homeowners’ insurance policy.
In addition, Sims argued that Foster, by making representations, assumed a duty to
advise Gleason and Sims about the adequacy of the insurance coverage. Sims argued that
Foster breached that duty by terminating the homeowners’ policy and failing to advise
Sims that she needed to purchase additional insurance.
Defendants replied to the oppositions and filed evidentiary objections to Sims’
declaration and to portions of the declaration of Sims’ expert, David Frangiamore.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. The
court ruled that Sims could not establish Foster’s alleged misrepresentations caused harm
to Sims because Foster’s statements related to a different insurance policy, which was no
longer in effect at the time of the Camp Fire. The court further ruled that Sims could not
establish Foster breached a duty to Sims because the duties of an insurance agent run
only to the client and the evidence established Sims was not Foster’s client. Because the
claims against Farmers were derivative of the claims against Foster, the court ruled that
they failed for the same reasons. In reaching its decision, the court sustained defendants’
objections to the Sims declaration because it did not comply with Code of Civil
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Procedure section 2015.5,2 which requires declarations to be made “under the laws of the
State of California.”3
Sims filed a corrected declaration and sought reconsideration of the trial court’s
ruling, arguing that the corrected declaration constituted a new circumstance, and that
admissibility of the declaration created triable issues of material fact to defeat the
motions for summary judgment. Defendants opposed the motion.
The trial court ruled that the motion for reconsideration satisfied the criteria of
section 1008 but concluded that the corrected declaration did not create a triable issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment. Thus, the practical effect of the court’s ruling
was to grant the motion for reconsideration, but to affirm the prior ruling granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants. (Randy’s Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Kern County (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818, 844.)
Sims timely appealed from the judgments entered after the order granting
summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Under the summary judgment law (§ 437c),
any party to an action may move for summary judgment on a claim or defense. (Aguilar,
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 The trial court also (1) sustained in part Farmers’ objections to David
Frangiamore’s declaration; and (2) sustained Sims’ objections to the declaration of
Gustavo Garcia that Gleason “signed” an application for landlord insurance in 2017.
5
supra, at p. 843.) Generally, the court must grant the motion if the papers submitted
show that “there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).)
To meet its initial burden on summary judgment, a moving defendant generally
must show, by admissible evidence, that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of
action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Serri v. Santa
Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 859.) Once the defendant makes this
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Id. at pp. 859-860.) In opposing the motion,
the plaintiff may not simply rely upon the allegations or denials of the pleadings. (Seo v.
All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201.) The plaintiff must set
forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) A genuine
issue of material fact exists only if the evidence reasonably would permit a trier of fact,
under the applicable standard of proof, to find the contested fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion. (Catholic Healthcare West v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 15, 23.)
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we independently review the
record, applying the same standard as the trial court to determine if there are genuine
issues of material fact. (Rheinhart v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1024.) “We are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasoning or rationales.”
(Ibid.) We view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, resolving any doubts about the
propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Ibid.)
II
Foster’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Sims argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims
against Foster. We disagree.
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A. Negligent Misrepresentation
Negligent misrepresentation is a species of the tort of deceit. (Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407; Civ. Code, § 1710.) To prove negligent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show (1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing
material fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with
intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on
the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed, and (5) resulting damage.
(Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 196; Shamsian v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 983.)
Sims’ negligent misrepresentation cause of action is based on alleged
representations by Foster about the insurance coverage on the Andover property. In
particular, Sims alleges that she had two in-person conversations with Foster in 2013 and
2014. During the first conversation, in late 2013 or early 2014, Sims claims that she told
Foster that she was moving her personal belongings to the Andover house and wanted to
know if they would be covered by her mother’s insurance policy. Sims claims that Foster
told her they would be covered. During the second conversation, in the Fall of 2014,
Sims claims that she specifically asked Foster whether her business property would be
covered, and Foster assured her that it would. Sims claims that she relied on these
“misrepresentations” to her detriment by failing to secure additional coverage for her
personal and business property before it was destroyed in the Camp Fire.
In granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Sims cannot
establish the elements of causation (justifiable reliance and resulting damage) because
Foster’s alleged misrepresentations pertain to coverage under the prior homeowners’
insurance policy, which was replaced by the landlord policy more than a year before the
Camp Fire. We agree.
It is undisputed that at the time of Foster’s alleged misrepresentations in 2013 and
2014, the policy of insurance in effect was Gleason’s prior homeowners’ insurance policy.
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Thus, to the extent Foster made any representations about the scope of Gleason’s
insurance coverage, her representations were tied to that policy. Foster met her initial
burden on summary judgment by showing Sims could not reasonably have relied on
Foster’s representations about the homeowners’ insurance policy because Gleason
subsequently replaced it with a different, landlord policy in August 2017.
In her attempt to create a triable issue, Sims disputes that Gleason authorized or
knew about the policy change. She asserts that the handwritten note requesting the policy
change is a forgery and that Gleason, because of her age and declining mental condition
(i.e., the onset of dementia), would not have had the capacity to make such a change.
And since Sims was not advised of the change, she contends it was reasonable for her to
rely on Foster’s prior representations about the scope of coverage.
We find Sims’ evidence insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact. It is
well established that a party cannot create a disputed issue of fact by a declaration that
contradicts that party’s prior deposition testimony or sworn discovery responses. (Shin v.
Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12; Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dep’t (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 853, 860.) This is because “admissions against interest have a very high
credibility value.” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22.)
Thus, “[w]here a declaration submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
clearly contradicts the declarant’s earlier deposition testimony or discovery responses, the
trial court may fairly disregard the declaration and ‘ “conclude there is no substantial
evidence of the existence of a triable issue of fact.” ’ ” (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.)
In her deposition testimony and discovery responses, Sims admitted facts that
directly contradict the statements in her declaration. In response to requests for
admissions, Sims admitted that Gleason applied for the landlord insurance policy in
August 2017, and that the signature on the relevant policy documents appeared to be her
mother’s. Likewise, when asked about the handwritten note requesting the policy
8
change,4 Sims testified that, while it did not look like her mother wrote the body of the
note, the signature and date appeared to be her mother’s writing. These admissions
contradict the statements in Sims’ declaration that Gleason did not request the change to
her policy or sign the relevant policy documents.
Sims’ deposition testimony also contradicted her assertion that Gleason lacked the
mental capacity to change the policy. At her deposition, Sims testified that when she
moved to Magalia in 2013, her mother was “beginning to show signs of loss of certain
faculties,” but was “still able to handle her own affairs.” She testified it was not until
after the Camp Fire—when Gleason “went into complete dementia”—that she assumed
control of her mother’s affairs. In August 2017, when the insurance policy change
occurred, Gleason was still making her own decisions.5 Although her mother required
“some help” at that time, Sims admitted she did not review her mother’s bills and
correspondence; did not accompany her mother when she met with her insurance agent;
did not review any of the insurance documents sent to her mother; and never informed
anyone at Farmers that her mother needed assistance making decisions. As a result, Sims
was completely unaware that Gleason made the change to the landlord insurance policy
in 2017.
Sims’ admissions during discovery control over her contrary declarations in
opposition to the summary judgment motions. (Visueta v. General Motors Corp. (1991)
234 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1613.) It follows that Sims’ declaration is insufficient to create a
triable issue of fact. The trial court correctly ruled that the cause of action for negligent
4 The signed note, dated August 15, 2017, states: “I, Edna Gleason, no longer live
in my home at [Andover Drive], in Magalia. Please rewrite my primary to Landlord
policy.”
5 Sims’ testimony is consistent with Farmer’s “notes,” which show that Gleason had
numerous conversations with staff the year before and the year after the August 2017
policy change.
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misrepresentation fails as a matter of law because Sims cannot prove causation. The
alleged misrepresentations pertained to the scope of coverage under a different policy that
was no longer in effect at the time of the loss.
B. Professional Negligence
The elements of a cause of action for professional negligence are “(1) the
existence of the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as
other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty;
(3) a causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)
actual loss or damage resulting from the professional negligence.” (Oasis West Realty,
LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Sims could not establish
Foster owed or breached a duty of care to Sims because the evidence showed Foster was
neither Gleason’s nor Sims’ agent.
Sims contends that the trial court erred because she presented evidence showing
that Foster was Gleason’s agent. Sims contends that, as Gleason’s agent, Foster had a
continuing duty to advise on the adequacy of coverage, and she contends that this duty
extended not only to Gleason, as the named insured, but also to Sims, as Gleason’s
daughter and tenant. Sims contends Foster breached that duty by terminating the
homeowners’ insurance policy and failing to advise Sims that her coverage was
inadequate.
We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the negligence
cause of action because even if there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Foster was
Gleason’s agent, Sims cannot establish that Foster owed or breached a duty of care to
Sims.6
6 Although Sims argues in her briefs that Foster breached a duty to both Sims and
Gleason, since the operative complaint alleges only a breach of duty to Sims, it is
10
“Ordinarily, an insurance agent ‘assumes only those duties normally found in any
agency relationship. This includes the obligation to use reasonable care, diligence, and
judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured.’ ” (Wallman v. Suddock
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1309; Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1123.) However, an insurance agent generally does not have a duty
to investigate a customer’s coverage needs, to procure coverage to meet those needs, or to
point out the advantages of additional or different insurance coverage. (Wallman, supra,
at p. 1309; Vulk v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 254 (Vulk);
San Diego Assemblers, Inc. v. Work Comp for Less Ins. Services, Inc. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369-1370; Ahern v. Dillenback (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 36, 40-43;
Jones v. Grewe (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 950, 954, 956.) Instead, “ ‘ “the onus is
. . . squarely on the insured to inform the agent of the insurance he [or she] requires.” ’ ”
(Vulk, supra, at p. 254; see Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 561, 578 (Travelers).)
There are exceptions to the general rule limiting an insurance agent’s duty of care.
(Vulk, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254-255.) They apply when “(1) the agent
misrepresents the nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided; (2)
there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage; or
(3) the agent assumes an additional duty by either express agreement or by holding
themself out as having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the
insured.” (Ibid.; see Fitzpatrick v. Hayes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 916, 923-927.) In such
circumstances, the agent may be found to have assumed a special duty of care toward the
insured. (Vulk, at p. 255; Murray v. UPS Capital Ins. Agency, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
628, 639-640.)
immaterial whether Foster breached a duty to Gleason, except insofar as it may relate to a
duty owed to Sims. (See Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1244, 1250 [the materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings].)
11
We do not find the evidence in this case sufficient to establish a triable issue of
fact on a special duty of care. The only substantial evidence offered was that Foster
answered Sims’ questions about insurance coverage under Gleason’s prior homeowners’
insurance policy. There was no evidence that Foster made misrepresentations about
coverage under the landlord insurance policy; that Foster was asked to obtain a certain
type of coverage that was not obtained; or that Foster held herself out as an expert in a
specialized area of insurance.
Moreover, to the extent Foster had a special duty of care, it was a duty owed to
Gleason, not Sims. An insurance agent ordinarily owes no duty to anyone other than the
client or customer. (Travelers, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 578-580 [insurance broker
owed a duty only to clients, not to a third party investor]; The MEGA Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1530 [agent
owed no duty to a spouse who was not the prospective purchaser of an insurance
contract]; see also Giacometti v. Aulla, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1137 [general
rule is that privity of contract is a requisite to professional negligence claim].) Sims was
neither a client (see Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Services
West, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [defining client]), nor an insured.
Accordingly, Foster had no duty to advise Sims on the adequacy of coverage or the
availability of different or additional coverage.
That Sims’ expert reached a contrary conclusion is not relevant. The issue of
whether a duty of care exists is a question of law for the court. (Fitzpatrick v. Hayes,
supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 920, 929; Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1179-1180, 1184.)
III
Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Sims’ claims against Farmers are premised on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
i.e., that Farmers is the principal of Foster and therefore vicariously liable for the torts
12
allegedly committed by her. (Civ. Code, § 2338.) The trial court ruled that because the
underlying claims against Foster failed as a matter of law, so too must the derivative
claims against Farmers. We agree.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Duarte, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Wiseman, J.*
7 Our disposition makes it unnecessary for us to consider Farmers’ alternative
argument that the judgment should be sustained because Foster was not acting as
Farmers’ agent when she allegedly engaged in the tortious conduct.
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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