CourtListener 10320679•Khorshidi v. Javaheri CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 1/24/25 Khorshidi v. Javaheri CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MICHAEL KHORSHIDI et al., B326824 consolidated with
B329257
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. Nos. BC567865, BC408948)
ALEXANDER JAVAHERI et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, Scott E. Gizer,
Padideh Zargari and Zachary C. Hansen for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Reuben Raucher & Blum, Stephen L. Raucher, Yunfei Ni
for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
In 1987, appellants Michael Khorshidi1 and Nejatolah
Rabbanian (collectively, K&R) began a joint venture with
respondents Alexander Javaheri and David Javaheri, and a fifth
partner, non-party Paul Abdi. Following litigation and an
arbitration between K&R and the Javaheris, in 2008 an
arbitrator found in favor of the Javaheris. The 2008 arbitration
award instructed the Javaheris to recoup their damages by
adjusting ongoing partnership distributions the joint venture
owed to K&R. In 2014 K&R filed a lawsuit alleging that
beginning in 2010 the Javaheris owed them full (not adjusted)
partnership distributions. The Javaheris asserted that the
continued adjusted distributions were justified under the 2008
arbitration award. After a bench trial, the court found that based
on the 2008 arbitration award, K&R owed the Javaheris the
lump sum of $276,100 each in December 2009, the Javaheris
were entitled to recoup that amount through adjusted
distributions from 2010 to 2015, but that the Javaheris had taken
too much. The court therefore entered a judgment requiring the
Javaheris to repay K&R the excess amount they had collected.
Most of the court’s findings were confirmed on appeal. However,
the matter was remanded to address the Javaheris’ contention
that because the court calculated their damages as a lump sum
due in 2010, they were entitled to prejudgment interest on that
amount.
1 Michael Khorshidi died on October 1, 2024. Appellant’s
wife and successor in interest, Jaleh Khorshidi, has been
substituted in as a party.
2
In the proceedings following remand, the trial court found
that the Javaheris were entitled to prejudgment interest, and
that after subtracting the adjusted partnership distributions
between 2010 and 2015, K&R still jointly owed the Javaheris
over $77,000. K&R appealed. The court then awarded the
Javaheris attorney fees. K&R also appealed that order, and we
consolidated the appeals.
We affirm. The Javaheris were entitled to prejudgment
interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), because
the damages were certain or capable of being made certain based
on information known to all parties. We also reject K&R’s
argument that they were entitled to an offset of damages based
on case law addressing offsets arising from the same contract.
Here, the Javaheris’ damages arose from the 2008 arbitration
award, which was not the basis for K&R’s claims, so the claims
were not based on the same contract. In addition, K&R were
awarded no damages to offset. K&R’s challenge to the attorney
fee award is contingent upon reversal of the judgment in favor of
the Javaheris. Because we affirm the judgment, we also affirm
the attorney fee award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Previous litigation and 2008 arbitration award
There has been extensive litigation among the parties as
discussed in three prior nonpublished opinions, Javaheri v.
Khorshidi, Nov. 13, 2006, B183177 (Khorshidi I), Khorshidi v.
Javaheri, Aug. 5, 2021, B285132 (Khorshidi II), and Khorshidi v.
Javaheri, May 15, 2024, B329246 (Khorshidi III). We limit this
summary to the facts relevant to this appeal.
In April 1987, the five parties—K&R, the Javaheris, and
Abdi—entered into a joint venture agreement (the JV Agreement)
3
regarding a commercial property in downtown Los Angeles, 5th &
LA. Under the JV Agreement, K&R each held a 30 percent
interest in the joint venture, Abdi held a 20 percent interest, and
the Javaheris each held a 10 percent interest. K&R were the
managing partners of the joint venture; they were required to
make regular distributions of net cash flow to the other partners
according to each owner’s interest.
In 1999, without the consent of the Javaheris, K&R
refinanced the joint venture to take out a loan; they used the
money to invest in a competing property. These actions led to
litigation among the partners in 2002. After a 2005 trial, a jury
found against K&R and awarded actual damages of
$1,130,519.60, and punitive damages of $1.7 million against each
of them. This court affirmed the judgment in Khorshidi I.
In July 2005 the Javaheris sued K&R again in two lawsuits
that were sent to arbitration. In a 2008 ruling, the arbitrator
found in part that K&R’s use of joint venture funds to pay the
1999 loan between February 2005 and April 2008 “resulted in
$2,418,423.74 less being available for partnership distributions
during the time applicable to the arbitration proceeding.” The
arbitration award ordered K&R, jointly and severally, to pay the
Javaheris each 10 percent of that figure, $241,842.37, reflecting
the Javaheris’ 10 percent ownership in the joint venture. The
2008 arbitration award also held that K&R used joint venture
funds to pay their attorney fees and costs in the 2002-2005
litigation and the 2005-2008 litigation/arbitration, and ordered
K&R to repay those amounts. (Khorshidi II, supra.)
The arbitration award further ordered management of the
joint venture to be shifted to the Javaheris. The award
authorized the Javaheris “to adjust partnership distributions
4
commencing May 1, 2008, to recognize an additional distribution
to themselves of an amount calculated as 10% each of the
amount(s) paid by [the joint venture] during any given month to
discharge the obligation of the existing encumbrance against 5th
& LA,” i.e., the 1999 loan. We call these adjusted partnership
payments the “10 percent redistributions.” The arbitration award
was confirmed as a judgment in November 2008.
The 1999 loan came due in December 2009 with an
outstanding balance of $2,761,000. The Javaheris did not pay off
the loan, but on February 28, 2010 entered into a “change in
terms agreement” with the lender, Community Bank, which
extended the loan term to March 2015.2 When the extended
Community Bank loan came due in March 2015, the five partners
paid the outstanding balance with personal funds. The Javaheris
continued adjusting K&R’s partnership distributions through
October 2015 based on the payoff amount.
B. Litigation leading to this appeal
1. Allegations and statement of decision
In 2014 K&R sued the Javaheris, alleging in part that the
Javaheris were not entitled to the 10 percent redistributions they
withheld after the initial term of the 1999 loan ended in
December 2009.3 In their amended complaint filed in May 2015,
K&R alleged that when the Community Bank loan came due in
December 2009, the Javaheris could have paid off the loan or
2 Based on these dates, the end of the 1999 loan is variously
characterized in the record as occurring in December 2009,
February 2010, and March 2010. The date discrepancy is not
relevant to our analysis, as the parties stipulated to the final
balance of the loan.
3 In Khorshidi II, we referred to this lawsuit as “the loan
action.”
5
refinanced it on more favorable terms with another bank.
Instead, the Javaheris entered into the change in terms
agreement “with the intent and for the purpose of perpetuating
the appearance of the same ‘existing obligation’ to Community
Bank,” which would purportedly entitle them to continue
collecting 10 percent redistributions under the 2008 arbitration
agreement. K&R alleged that the Javaheris were not entitled to
collect the redistributions from 2010 to 2015, because “as of
December 9, 2009, the damages attributed to the [1999] Loan (for
which the Arbitrator sought to compensate the Javaheris by the
award of 10% Distribution Award) effectively had been fully
repaid.”
In their cause of action for breach of contract, K&R alleged
that all parties were bound by the JV Agreement, and as
managers of 5th & LA, the Javaheris “were contractually
obligated . . . to distribute the entire net cash flow received by the
Joint Venture.” The Javaheris failed to do so in part because
“[u]nder the auspices of” the 2008 arbitration award the
Javaheris continued to collect 10 percent redistributions. K&R
alleged that the “total amount wrongfully deducted by the
Javaheris . . . from the distributions otherwise due to [K&R] from
5th and LA” was in excess of $360,000. K&R also sought a
declaration from the court that under the 2008 arbitration award,
“‘the existing obligations’ represented by the 1999 Refinance
Loan were discharged by December 9, 2009.” In addition, K&R
requested an accounting because “[t]he precise amounts due to
[K&R] by 5th and LA, and wrongfully diverted from [K&R] by the
Javaheris under the auspices of the [2008 arbitration award], are
presently unknown and cannot be ascertained without an
accounting of (i) all amounts paid by 5th and LA to Community
6
Bank, and (ii) all amounts paid by 5th and LA to the Javaheris,
and deducted from distributions otherwise payable to [K&R].”
K&R’s 2014 lawsuit was consolidated with an existing
action that had been pending since 2009, in which the partners
cross-complained against each other for various alleged breaches
of the JV Agreement. The case proceeded to a bench trial
between August 2016 and February 2017.
The parties stipulated to certain facts before trial,
including the following. In December 1999, K&R arranged for
the 5th & LA property to be refinanced with a 10-year,
$8,000,000 mortgage from Community Bank; the loan had a
maturity date of December 9, 2009. The Javaheris, after taking
over the management of the joint venture pursuant to the 2008
arbitration award, entered into the change in terms agreement
with Community Bank, extending the loan’s termination date to
March 1, 2015. On February 28, 2010, the date of the change in
terms agreement, the principal balance owed on the 1999 loan
was $2,761,554.31. Relying on the 2008 arbitration award, the
Javaheris “deduct[ed] from the monthly distributions payable to
[K&R] an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of the amounts paid
by 5th and LA to Community Bank from February 28, 2010
through February 18, 2015.” Thus, from “December 24, 2010
through February 18, 2015, the Javaheris adjusted the
distributions payable by 5th & LA by deducting a total of
$347,776.07 from [K&R’s] distributions ($173,776.07 from each
[ ]) [sic] and paying that amount to the Javaheris.”4 Through
October 2015, the Javaheris collected additional redistribution
payments tied to the 2015 loan payoff amount.
4 As noted below, the parties stipulated to slightly different
amounts in the retrial following remand.
7
In their closing briefs after trial, K&R asserted again that
the Javaheris were not entitled to collect the 10 percent
redistributions after the 2010 change in terms agreement. K&R
requested a damages award of $347,552.14 total, or $173,776.07
each. (Khorshidi II, supra.) The Javaheris argued that the 2008
arbitration award entitled them to the distributions they
collected. (Ibid.)
On June 1, 2017, the trial court issued a written statement
of decision. The court agreed with K&R that “the 10 percent
redistribution scheme” in the 2008 arbitration award “was tied to
the Joint Venture’s payment of the then existing ‘obligation’ or
loan.” The court found that the change in terms agreement
“constituted a new loan that extinguished the 1999 Community
Bank obligation”; in other words, the 1999 loan was discharged
with the funds from the new loan.
The trial court noted that at the time of the change in
terms agreement, there was an approximately $2,761,000
balance on the 1999 loan. Because the Javaheris each were
entitled to 10 percent of the amounts paid by the joint venture “to
discharge the obligation,” the Javaheris were entitled to $276,100
from K&R at the time of the 2010 change in terms agreement.
The court held that the Javaheris were entitled to collect this
amount by continuing to collect redistribution payments: “[T]he
Javaheris were entitled to ‘adjust partnership distributions’ to
reflect $276,100 owed to them by each of [K&R].” Between 2010
and 2015, however, the Javaheris actually “received a total of
$365,464.90 from each of” K&R, which was more than the
Javaheris were entitled to collect. So the court ordered that K&R
were “each entitled to judgment against the Javaheris jointly and
severally in the amount of $89,364.90. (365,464.90 less 276,100
8
equals 89,364.90.)” The trial court later added $23,208.69 in
prejudgment interest to the amounts owed K&R, and in March
2018 entered a judgment for a total award of $112,573.59 each.
2. Motion for new trial and partial reversal
The Javaheris filed a motion for new trial in April 2018,
asserting that because K&R owed the Javaheris $276,100 in
February 2010, the Javaheris were entitled to prejudgment
interest on that amount, which must be factored into any
damages award. The Javaheris asserted that a new trial was
warranted on the grounds of surprise. (Code Civ. Proc. § 657,
subd. 3.) They argued that the court’s holding—that K&R owed
the Javaheris 10 percent of the loan payoff amount in February
2010—did not reflect any of the parties’ positions throughout the
litigation, so the Javaheris had not previously sought interest on
the 2010 loan payoff amount. K&R opposed the motion, in part
because the Javaheris had never requested prejudgment interest.
The trial court issued a written ruling granting the
Javaheris’ motion for new trial. A few days later, however, the
trial court issued a second ruling stating that its first ruling had
been untimely under the 60-day deadline in former Code of Civil
Procedure section 660, and therefore the motion for new trial was
denied as a matter of law.
In Khorshidi II, filed in August 2021, a different panel of
this division reversed the judgment in the loan action and
remanded the matter for the limited issue of determining the
Javaheris’ entitlement to prejudgment interest. We stated, “The
facts of this case were largely uncontested. The parties
understood the scope of the 2008 arbitration award, the amounts
of the 10 percent redistributions, and the details of the 1999 and
2010 loans. The parties’ positions at trial were based on their
9
understanding of those factors. They did not expect, however,
that the trial court would reach a decision that did not quite
match what either party advocated—a finding that [K&R] owed
the Javaheris a lump sum of $276,100 in February 2010—and
that such a decision would affect any claims of prejudgment
interest. Because the parties did not anticipate such a ruling,
they did not tailor their arguments to address the issues
regarding prejudgment interest that arose from it. The court’s
unexpected ruling constitutes a surprise under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 657, subdivision 3.” We found that “a new
trial is warranted to allow the court to consider the Javaheris’
entitlement to prejudgment interest, if any, in the calculation of
damages.” We stated, “Given the complex nature of the parties’
claims here, including liability based on the 2008 arbitration
award and the piecemeal manner by which the competing debts
were collected through monthly partnership distributions, the
trial court is in the best position to determine whether
prejudgment interest is warranted . . . .”
C. Retrial
1. Phase one
Upon remand, the court bifurcated trial into two phases:
phase one to determine whether the Javaheris were entitled to
prejudgment interest, and if so, phase two to determine the
interest amount.
The Javaheris filed a brief asserting that they were entitled
to prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a), which states in part, “A person who is entitled to
recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by
calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person
upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon
10
from that day.” The Javaheris asserted that their right to
recover damages vested on the day the 1999 loan terminated,
“and their damages were certain, or at least capable of being
made certain given that [K&R] could have computed the amount
owed from reasonably available information.”
The Javaheris also contended that interest should be
calculated without consideration of any offset based on K&R’s
claims in their 2014 complaint. The Javaheris anticipated that
K&R would rely on case law holding that “[w]hen a plaintiff sues
for a liquidated sum and the defendant establishes an offsetting
claim based upon defective performance of the same contract by
the plaintiff, the amount of the plaintiff’s liquidated sum must be
offset against the defendant’s unliquidated sum as of the due
date of the original debt and only the balance bears interest.”
(Burnett & Doty Development Co. v. Phillips (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d
384, 391 (Burnett).) The Javaheris argued that their claim and
K&R’s claim were not “based upon defective performance of the
same contract,” because the Javaheris’ damages were based on
the 2008 arbitration award, while K&R’s claim arose from the
alleged failure to pay distributions from 2010 to 2015 as required
by the JV Agreement.
In their opposition, K&R asserted that the Javaheris were
not entitled to any prejudgment interest. K&R argued that
prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a party for loss of
use of funds, but “the Javaheris had access to, and collected the
damages award throughout the prejudgment period and in fact
recouped more than the entire amount of the award during that
period” by collecting the 10 percent redistributions from K&R
from 2010 to 2015. In addition, the Javaheris “had dominion and
control” over the award throughout the prejudgment period,
11
because they controlled the joint venture. K&R further argued
that the damages were not certain or reasonably calculable
because there was “a dispute between the parties concerning the
imposition of recoverable damages, as well as when the recovery
of such damages became vested in the Javaheris.” K&R argued
in the alternative that the damages award should be offset
because K&R asserted a liquidated damages claim based on the
JV Agreement, the award to the Javaheris was also based on the
JV Agreement, and the Javaheris’ claim was unliquidated
“because it was not certain until the judgment was rendered.”
The court held that the Javaheris were entitled to
prejudgment interest. In its written ruling issued on May 2,
2022, the court stated, “In the court’s view, there is no question
as of March 1, 2010, the amount due from [K&R] to [the
Javaheris] was certain and/or capable of being made certain.
That the parties disputed liability or the interpretation of the
2008 Arbitration award is not controlling. The 2008 Arbitration
award made clear the Javaheris were entitled to 10 percent of the
amounts paid by the Joint Venture to pay off the 1999 loan . . . .
Thus, Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) entitles the
Javaheris to prejudgment interest as of March 1, 2010 on the
amounts due from [K&R].” The court considered and rejected
each of K&R’s arguments to the contrary. The court held that
the arguments about an offset would be addressed in phase two
of the trial.
2. Phase two
Before phase two, the parties submitted a list of stipulated
facts and a joint exhibit list. The stipulated facts included the
monthly redistribution payments Alexander and David Javaheri
received from March 2010 to October 2015—a total of
12
$364,157.01 to Alexander and $368,411.05 to David. The parties
filed simultaneous trial briefs.
In K&R’s trial brief, they asserted that “the calculation of
prejudgment interest should be offset by K&R’s competing claim
for liquidated damages in this case.” K&R reasoned, “In
commencing this action K&R sought $365,464.90 each, based on
the Javaheris’ alleged failure to pay distributions to K&R
pursuant to the terms of the JV Agreement between 2010 and
2015.” Because the court’s 2017 order determined “the
percentage of the outstanding 1999 loan amount that the
Javaheris were entitled to on their respective ownership interest
in the Joint Venture as set forth in the JV Agreement,” “these
two competing damages claims both clearly originated from and
were based on the terms of the same contract – the JV
Agreement.” K&R stated, “In this case, the damages award the
Javaheris were found to be entitled to was $276,100 each,
whereas K&R sought $365,464.90 each, which [in the 2017
ruling] resulted in an offset award of $89,364.90 for K&R
respectively. [Record citation.] Thus, the Javaheris are not
entitled to prejudgment interest here because the amount of their
claim was eclipsed by that of the K&R.”5
The Javaheris asserted in their trial brief that the
redistributions they collected from K&R from March 2010 to 2015
followed applicable rules relating to interest, in that “when a
redistribution amount was received by either of the Javaheris, it
was first applied to the interest accrued, and the remaining
amount, if any, was then applied to the outstanding principal.”
They stated that using these calculations, the debt had not yet
5 K&R also asserted several arguments that are not relevant
to this appeal and are not summarized here.
13
been satisfied: “[A]fter the Javaheris received their last JV
redistributions on October 14, 2015,” the “outstanding principal
owed to Alexander Javaheri was $26,203.75,” and “the
outstanding principal owed to David Javaheri was $19,055.74,”
which had continued to accrue interest. The Javaheris stated
that as of the scheduled phase two trial date, “the total amounts
due to Alexander Javaheri and David Javaheri, respectively, will
be $44,211.21 and $32,147.50.”
Following a short bench trial, the court issued a written
ruling on November 7, 2022. The court rejected K&R’s argument
that an offset should apply, stating, “The court . . . finds
offsetting claims is not appropriate here as the claims do not
arise from the same contract. [The Javaheris’] claim is based on
the 2008 arbitration award and judgment. [K&R’s] claims are
based on breach of the joint venture agreement.”
The court found that the appropriate prejudgment interest
rate was 10 percent. The court stated that based on the
stipulated facts, K&R remained indebted to Alexander Javaheri
in the amount of $26,203.75, which had remained unpaid since
October 14, 2015. Thus, Alexander Javaheri was “entitled to
prejudgment interest of $18,531.58. (That is, $7.18 per day from
October 14, 2015 to November 7, 2022 [2,581 days].) [K&R] shall
pay to Defendant Alexander Javaheri $44,735.33.” (Brackets in
original.) The court found that K&R remained indebted to David
Javaheri in the amount of $19,055.74, which had remained
unpaid since October 14, 2015. Thus, David Javaheri was
“entitled to prejudgment interest of $13,472.82. (That is, $5.22
per day from October 14, 2015 to November 7, 2022 [2,581 days].)
[K&R] shall pay to Defendant David Javaheir [sic] $32,528.56.”
(Brackets in original.)
14
The court also noted that as in phase one, it found
“unpersuasive” K&R’s argument that the Javaheris’ damages
were not certain or capable of being made certain. The court
stated, “While [the Javaheris] may have alleged surprise as
grounds for a new trial, [the Javaheris’] surprise was the court
finding the 10 percent redistribution obligation ceased in 2010,
not 2015. [The Javaheris’] litigation position was an attempt to
extend liability to [K&R] as long as possible. The court does not
find on these facts the underlying liability ‘was uncertain and not
reasonably calculable by either party until this Court issued its
judgment.’ ([Citation to K&R’s trial brief.]) [K&R’s] underlying
liability was clear and the amount outstanding was capable of
determination when the 1999 loan was extinguished.”
The court entered judgment in favor of the Javaheris on
November 21, 2022. The judgment also stated that this judgment
superseded the prior judgment, and that K&R took nothing on
their claims against the Javaheris. K&R moved for a new trial,
and the trial court denied the motion in a written order filed on
February 3, 2023. K&R timely appealed.
D. The Javaheris’ motion for attorney fees
The Javaheris filed a motion seeking $163,945.17 in
attorney fees. They asserted that as the prevailing parties, they
were entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code sections 1717 and
1033.5, as well as the JV Agreement. K&R opposed the motion,
asserting that there was no final disposition of the matter in light
of the pending appeal, and that the Javaheris were not the
prevailing parties over the entire litigation. The Javaheris filed a
reply.
In a written ruling, the trial court granted the motion,
stating, “[T]he court finds no dispute about who prevailed on the
15
action on the contract. The Javaheris received a net monetary
recovery; K&R received nothing.” The court awarded the amount
of attorney fees the Javaheris requested. K&R filed a second
notice of appeal. The parties moved to consolidate the two
appeals, and we granted the motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Prejudgment interest
With respect to prejudgment interest, the parties agree
there are two issues to be addressed on appeal: whether the
Javaheris are entitled to prejudgment interest, and if so, in what
amount.
1. Entitlement to prejudgment interest
K&R argue the trial court erred in finding that the
Javaheris were entitled to prejudgment interest. They assert
that the amount of damages was not certain or reasonably
calculable before the trial court issued its 2018 judgment, and the
Javaheris did not know they were entitled to an amount certain
until 2017, when the court issued its written ruling stating as
much. The Javaheris contend the trial court’s ruling on retrial
was correct.
The facts are not in dispute; K&R contend the court erred
as a matter of law. In the absence of a factual dispute, an
appellate court independently determines whether damages were
ascertainable for purposes of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision
(a). (Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1320, 1321-1322 (Glassman); State of
California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017,
1038 (Continental).)
As noted above, Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a),
states in part, “A person who is entitled to recover damages
16
certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the
right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular
day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day.”
“What is critical is not whether the defendant actually knows
how much it should pay; rather, it is whether the defendant could
have calculated how much it should pay, if it had known how a
court would ultimately rule on the legal issues.” (Continental,
supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043.) “‘Courts generally apply a
liberal construction in determining whether a claim is certain.’”
(Id. at p. 1038.)
K&R argue “there can be no dispute that the amount of
damages” awarded to the Javaheris “depended on judicial
determination” because “prior to the 2018 Judgment . . . there
was a dispute between the parties concerning the imposition of
recoverable damages, as well as when the recovery of such
damages became vested in the Javaheris.” K&R assert that in
Khorshidi II, by finding that a new trial was warranted on the
issue of “surprise,” this court “specifically acknowledged” that
damages could not have been calculated by the parties without
judicial involvement.
K&R misstates our previous holding. We found that the
court reached a conclusion that differed from the parties’ legal
arguments in the previous trial; we did not find that the damages
could not have been calculated by the parties. Indeed, based on
the information available, either party could have advocated for
the position the court reached. The parties stipulated before the
initial loan action trial that “As of the February 28, 2010, the
date of the 2010 Change In Terms Agreement, the principal
balance owed on the Community Bank Loan was $2,761,554.31.”
The surprise was that the court did not adopt either party’s legal
17
position, which does not mean the damages were not capable of
being made certain by calculation based on the information
available to both parties.
Prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a) is available if the defendant knows or is “able to
calculate from reasonably available information the amount of
the plaintiff’s liquidated claim owed as of a particular day.”
(Glassman, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1294.) Here, had the
Javaheris claimed damages based on the loan payoff amount in
2010, the damages would have been easily calculable. (See
Continental, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043.)
K&R argue “it is evident” the damages were not calculable
because “neither the Javaheris nor K&R made such an argument
at any time before the Trial Court issued it 2018 Judgment.”
However, it is irrelevant for purposes of Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a) that the parties did not advocate for a certain
position or that they disagreed about liability. “[D]amages are
ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the
amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of
damages.” (Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
140, 151.) Here, the court determined the measure of damages
based on facts that were known to both parties. K&R therefore
could have calculated the damages with certainty.6
6 In their reply brief, K&R argue for the first time that the
doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the Javaheris from arguing that
they are entitled to prejudgment interest, because the Javaheris’
argument in 2018 that the verdict constituted a surprise
contradicts their argument now that the damages were certain.
“We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief” (Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178),
18
K&R also assert that they were unable to calculate any
damages because the Javaheris managed the joint venture and
failed to provide K&R with accounting information. This
argument, which is not supported by any record citations in
K&R’s briefing, is belied by K&R’s own first amended complaint,
which stated that as of December 1999, the outstanding principal
on the 1999 loan was approximately $2.7 million—the figure that
was the basis of the trial court’s award to the Javaheris. K&R
further alleged in that complaint that they were aware of the
loan’s maturity date and payoff amount at the time, and they
“secured, and presented the Javaheris with, alternative
refinancing options from multiple lending institutions,” which in
K&R’s opinion were better options than extending the loan’s term
with Community Bank. These included specific offers to lend the
joint venture $2.7 to $2.85 million for five-year terms. Thus,
K&R’s own pleadings demonstrate that they were aware of the
loan’s balance and other joint venture financial issues at the time
the loan matured in 2009. For this reason, the case is unlike
Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149
Cal.App.3d 901, which K&R cite. There, the Court of Appeal
disallowed prejudgment interest where neither party could
ascertain its liability without an accounting by the trial court (see
and will not do so here, because the Javaheris have not had an
opportunity to rebut these arguments on appeal. Moreover,
judicial estoppel applies when a party takes two positions that
are “totally inconsistent.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) The Javaheris have maintained
throughout these proceedings that based on the 2008 arbitration
award, they were entitled to damages arising from the continuing
effects of the 1999 loan. The trial court ultimately found that the
Javaheris were correct.
19
149 Cal.App.3d at pp. 909-911), and the creditor “cross-claim[ed]
for an accounting to determine the amount due and then
charge[d] the debtor who had no knowledge of the sum due with
prejudgment interest on that same adjudicated sum.” (Id. at p.
914.) Here, K&R were aware of the relevant financial
information before the action was filed.
K&R assert in the alternative that if the Javaheris were
entitled to prejudgment interest at all, the calculation of the
interest should run only from 2014, the date K&R filed their
complaint. They base this argument on Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (b) which states that for a claim “based upon a cause
of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated,”
prejudgment interest is permitted only from “the date the action
was filed.” K&R acknowledge that an “unliquidated” claim is
“uncertain.” As discussed above, we reject the contention that
the damages were uncertain. K&R therefore have not
demonstrated that the trial court erred in holding that the
Javaheris were entitled to prejudgment interest.
2. Amount of prejudgment interest
Turning to the amount of the prejudgment interest, K&R
argue that any damages award should be calculated by offsetting
the parties’ competing claims. As noted above, “When a plaintiff
sues for a liquidated sum and the defendant establishes an
offsetting claim based upon defective performance of the same
contract by the plaintiff, the amount of the plaintiff’s liquidated
sum must be offset against the defendant’s unliquidated sum as
of the due date of the original debt and only the balance bears
interest.” (Burnett, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 391.) K&R argue
that “if offsetting is applied . . . the amount ultimately found to be
owed to the Javaheris . . . ($276,100 from K&R each) had been
20
repaid in full (plus a surplus of $27,418.46) and, thus, the
Javaheris would not be entitled to prejudgment interest.”7
The reasoning of Burnett does not apply here because, as
the trial court held, the parties’ claims were not “based upon
defective performance of the same contract.” K&R’s liability to
the Javaheris flowed from the 2008 arbitration award and the
related judgment. K&R did not have any claims against the
Javaheris based on the 2008 arbitration award. Thus, the
parties’ claims were not “based upon defective performance of the
same contract.” (Burnett, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 391.)
Moreover, as noted above, the Javaheris’ claim was not
unliquidated; it was calculable by the parties based on
information known to them. Furthermore, the trial court did not
find that K&R successfully made a competing claim; it ultimately
held that K&R owed the Javaheris, and the Javaheris owed K&R
nothing, so there was no competing award to offset.
In Burnett, the plaintiff, Burnett & Doty, alleged the
defendant, Phillips, failed to timely complete the work required
by the parties’ construction contract. Phillips cross-complained
that Burnett & Doty failed to pay the balance on the same
contract. (Burnett, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 387.) The
appellate court stated, “Phillips’ claim for the balance due under
the contract was reduced by the existence of an unliquidated
setoff or counterclaim attributable to Phillips’ breach of contract;
7 K&R do not explain their math. Instead, they cite to over
120 pages in the record documenting the 10 percent
redistribution payments made to the Javaheris from March 2010
to October 2015. As noted above, the parties stipulated that in
this period Alexander Javaheri collected $364,157.01 and David
Javaheri collected $368,411.05 in redistributions.
21
therefore interest was to be allowed only on the balance found to
be due after deduction of the offset. As the amount of damages
awarded to Burnett & Doty for Phillips’ breach of contract
exceeds [Phillips’] demand, ‘there remains nothing on which to
compute or allow interest.’” (Burnett, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp.
391-392.)
K&R also cite Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. Roel
Construction Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 761, 770 (Great
Western). That case involved a general contractor, Roel, and a
subcontractor, Great Western. Great Western sued Roel for
breach of contract and related counts, alleging that Roel
underpaid it; Roel cross-complained against Great Western for
breach of contract and negligence, asserting that Great Western
failed to adequately perform its work. (Id. at p. 765.) After a
bench trial, the court awarded Great Western $332,106 and Roel
$320,848. (Ibid.) Roel argued on appeal that the trial court erred
in awarding Great Western prejudgment interest on its
liquidated damages claim, “since Roel’s damages exceed Great
Western’s damages and entirely offset the interest award.” (Id.
at p. 764.) The Court of Appeal noted that “an offset is allowed
‘on the theory that the contractor is entitled to interest only on
such amount of the use of which he has been deprived during the
period of default.’” (Id. at p. 768.) The appellate court held that
Roel was entitled to an offset because “[b]oth parties had claims
against each other under the [same] subcontract, thus setoff
serves the interests of justice and the purposes of the
prejudgment interest statute.” (Id. at p. 770.)
This case is unlike Burnett and Great Western because
there were no competing damages awards on the same contract,
the trial court ultimately held that K&R were not entitled to any
22
damages, and the Javaheris’ claim was not unliquidated. The
reasoning for the offsets in Burnett and Great Western does not
apply here.
K&R further argue that despite finding that no offset was
warranted, the trial court nevertheless “offset the improper
distributions made by the Javaheris against the $276,100 plus
prejudgment interest.” K&R argue that “prejudgment interest
should have also run on each improper redistribution from the
time it was made,” and had the court calculated damages that
way, K&R would “come out ahead.”
We disagree that the court offset competing claims. Not
only did the court expressly reject an offset, it also did not find
that K&R successfully made a competing claim. Thus, the court
credited the payments K&R already made to the Javaheris, then
ordered K&R to pay the remainder of the debt. Crediting
payments against a judgment can be called an “offset.” (See, e.g.,
Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 753 [“To
prevent a double recovery, equity demands credit be given for
payments received on the judgment. Such a balance acts as an
offset against the judgment.”].) But here the court did not offset
the Javaheris’ claims against K&R’s competing claims, as the
court did in Burnett.
In addition, we disagree with K&R’s contention that the
court should have considered prejudgment interest on K&R’s
claims when calculating the judgment award. K&R were not
awarded damages on retrial. No consideration of prejudgment
interest to K&R was warranted under the circumstances. The
judgment is therefore affirmed.
23
B. Attorney fees
K&R assert that “[i]f the Javaheris are not entitled to
prejudgment interest and the damages award[ ] in favor of K&R
is reinstated, then necessarily the fee award in the Javaheris’
favor must be reversed.” They offer no additional arguments
regarding the attorney fee award. Because we affirm the
judgment, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to the Javaheris.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Javaheris are entitled to
recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J. ZUKIN, J.
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