CourtListener 10320675•People v. Hernandez CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/24/25 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084306
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV21000386)
JOSE FELICIANO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Corey G. Lee, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Jose Feliciano Hernandez of one count of raping his
13-year-old niece, Jane Doe, and two counts of committing a forcible lewd act
on her person. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on an additional count
of forcible oral copulation. It is undisputed that all of the offenses occurred
on a single occasion.
Hernandez contends his convictions for the two counts of forcible lewd
acts must be reversed because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 1191B on the permissible use of propensity evidence in
sex crime cases. The standard instruction was given by the trial court
without any material change. It told the jury that, if they found Hernandez
committed any one of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, they
were permitted, but not required, to infer he was generally inclined to
commit sex offenses, and to then further consider this fact when assessing
whether he committed any of the other offenses.
Hernandez contends CALCRIM No. 1191B provides a correct statement
of the law under most circumstances, but it is incorrect when given in a case
in which all of the charged offenses occur on the same occasion. He contends
the instruction may only be given when a defendant has been charged with
sexual offenses committed on separate occasions. We disagree. Hernandez’s
contention is based on a faulty premise and lacks merit in the face of settled
holdings by the California Supreme Court. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Prosecution Case
When she was 13 years old, Jane lived in a two-bedroom apartment
with her mother, father, brother, grandmother, and Hernandez. Hernandez
was her uncle, and her grandmother’s son. Jane’s mother and father slept in
one of the bedrooms. Jane, her brother, and her grandmother slept in a
second bedroom in three separate beds. Hernandez slept in the dining room
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behind a curtain that partitioned it from the rest of the main living area into
a makeshift bedroom.
One afternoon, in November 2020, Jane fell asleep in her room while
everyone in the family except Hernandez was out shopping. Jane awoke to a
burning sensation in her vagina. She was lying on her back and Hernandez
was on top of her. His penis was inside of her vagina. His hands were
squeezing her arms above her head, “smashing” them.
Jane felt frozen and she could not move. She tried to yell and scream,
but her mind went blank and she could not make a sound. Hernandez moved
his penis back and forth inside her for five or 10 minutes.
Hernandez squeezed both of Jane’s breasts while his penis was inside
her vagina. He licked her nipples and she thought to herself, “This is so
disgusting.” After he removed his penis, he licked her vagina. Jane was still
unable to move.
When Hernandez finally stood up, Jane was able to run to her bedroom
door. The door had been locked, so she unlocked it. She ran to a bathroom in
the hallway and locked the door behind her. Hernandez followed her. He
knocked on the door and told her to not say anything about what had
happened. His tone of voice was serious and he seemed mad. She was afraid.
She urinated and saw some blood on the toilet paper. She also saw mucous
“[l]ike when you have a cough and you cough something.”
Jane stayed in the bathroom for about 10 minutes until she heard what
she thought was her parents returning from the store. She opened the
bathroom door just enough “to peep out [her] head,” and she saw her mother,
father, grandmother, and brother back in the apartment. She said “hi” to
them and did not tell them what happened. At the time, she did not think
they would believe a relative did this to her.
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One or two weeks later, Hernandez told Jane again to not say anything
about what had happened. He again used a “serious strong tone of voice” and
she “felt like [her] heart almost stopped beating [out] of fear.”
Jane disclosed the rape to her grandmother on January 24, 2021, about
two months after it took place. She did this the night before a scheduled
doctor’s appointment. Jane had been crying as she lay in bed, trying to fall
asleep, and she was worried she might be pregnant. Jane told her
grandmother about the rape, but did not tell her that Hernandez had also
squeezed her breasts, licked her nipples, and orally copulated her. Jane later
testified at trial that she did not provide these details because, as soon as
Jane told her grandmother about the vaginal penetration, her grandmother
got angry and went to confront Hernandez.
The morning after the disclosure, Jane’s mother brought her to the
police station. Jane was subsequently interviewed twice by a police detective
and once by a forensic interviewer. Jane consistently recounted that
Hernandez penetrated her vaginally with his penis, but she did not always
tell the interviewers that he also squeezed her breasts, licked her nipples,
and licked her vagina.
The first police interview took place on January 25, 2021, the day
Jane’s mother first brought her to the police station. Jane felt nervous,
scared, and uncomfortable. The detective who interviewed her described her
as “very shy, very timid.” “It was hard for her to make eye contact.” Jane
told the police detective that Hernandez put his penis in her vagina, but she
did not report that he had touched her breasts or licked her nipples. When
asked if Hernandez had put his mouth on her vagina, Jane specifically said
no.
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The second police interview took place the next day, January 26, 2021,
at Jane’s home. Jane felt more comfortable. But she nevertheless appeared
to the police detective who interviewed her to be even more emotional. Jane
told the interviewer that Hernandez had raped her, and also told her that he
touched her breasts, licked her nipples, and licked her vagina.
The forensic interview took place approximately three weeks later, on
February 16, 2021. Jane was “really scared” at this next encounter. She felt
herself shaking at one point, and she remembered “[her] throat being
completely closed off.” She was “crying a lot” and “couldn’t stop.” One of the
interviewers again described her as scared and “incredibly timid,” “[v]ery
withdrawn.” Jane told the forensic interviewer that Hernandez vaginally
penetrated her, but she did not tell her he had touched her breasts, licked her
nipples, and licked her vagina.
A nurse conducted a forensic examination the same day as the forensic
interview. The nurse made no findings one way or another as to whether
Jane had been vaginally penetrated. This was “normal” given her age and
that it had been two months since the assault.
Hernandez attempted to commit suicide on January 26, 2021, the same
day as Jane’s second police interview. He called 911 from a hotel room and
told the operator he did not want to live anymore. He said he wanted to turn
himself in to police because he had family problems.
Hernandez called a friend after the suicide attempt. During that call,
Hernandez said, “I did something to my niece.” His friend asked what he did,
but Hernandez changed the subject and did not respond to further questions.
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II.
Charges, Convictions, and Sentence
The San Bernardino County District Attorney charged Hernandez with
one count of rape of a child under age 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 269, subd. (a)(1);
count 1), one count of forcible oral copulation of a child under 14 (§ 269,
subd. (a)(4); count 2), and two counts of forcible lewd act on a child under 14
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 3 & 4).
On January 20, 2023, a jury convicted Hernandez on counts 1, 3, and 4.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the forcible oral copulation count,
and the court declared a mistrial as to that count.
The trial court sentenced Hernandez on March 1, 2023, to a total term
of 31 years to life, consisting of 15 years to life on count 1, plus two
consecutive 8-year middle terms on counts 3 and 4. Count 2, the forcible oral
copulation count, was dismissed on the People’s motion. Hernandez timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Additional Background
As detailed above, the prosecution charged Hernandez with four sex
offenses against Jane based on allegations he: (1) vaginally raped her,
(2) squeezed her breasts, (3) licked her nipples, and (4) licked her vagina. It
is well-settled that “evidence of sexual offenses charged in the current
prosecution” may be used “to show a propensity to commit other charged
offenses in the same case.” (People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1185,
italics omitted.) The trial court accordingly instructed the jury on the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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permissible use of propensity evidence to infer a general disposition to
commit sex crimes. The court based its instruction on CALCRIM No. 1191B
as follows:
“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed
the crimes of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under the
Age of 14 - Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats, as charged in Count
One; Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under the Age of 14 -
Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats, as charged in Count
Two; and Forcible Lewd Act Upon a Child Under the Age of 14, as
charged in Counts Three and Four.
“If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may but
are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses,
and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was
likely to commit and did commit the other sex offenses charged in
this case.
“If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these
crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with
all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that
the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still
prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Trial counsel for Hernandez specifically acquiesced to the use of this
instruction when the trial court asked whether either side had an objection.
During closing argument, the prosecutor also briefly read the language of this
instruction to the jury without defense objection.
II.
Merits Review Despite Failure To Object
The People argue that Hernandez forfeited his instructional error claim
by failing to object to the instruction at trial. “Generally, a party may not
complain on appeal about a given instruction that was correct in law and
responsive to the evidence unless the party made an appropriate objection.”
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(People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.) Under section 1259,
however, there is no forfeiture of an instructional error claim on appeal when
the substantial rights of the defendant have been affected. “Ascertaining
whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the
defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim.”
(People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.) We will therefore
consider the merits of Hernandez’s contention despite the lack of objection.
Doing so, we find no error that could have affected Hernandez’s substantial
rights.
III.
The Trial Court Correctly Instructed the Jury
Hernandez contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury
that they were allowed to infer he had the propensity to commit sex offenses
if they found he was guilty of committing at least one of the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends CALCRIM No. 1191B does not
correctly state the law under the particular circumstances presented here.
“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing
whether instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32
Cal.4th 193, 218.) We find no error in our independent review.
Hernandez’s argument acknowledges binding California Supreme
Court authority. First, he acknowledges there is a strong public policy in
favor of instructing jurors to consider propensity evidence in cases involving
sexual assault. As explained by our high court, “ ‘[t]he propensity to commit
sexual offenses is not a common attribute among the general public.
Therefore, evidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity is
especially probative and should be considered by the trier of fact when
determining the credibility of a victim’s testimony.’ ” (People v. Villatoro
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(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1164 (Villatoro).) “[C]ase law clearly shows that
evidence that [a defendant] committed other sex offenses is . . .
circumstantially relevant to the issue of his disposition or propensity to
commit [such] offenses.” (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915
(Falsetta), italics omitted.)
Second, Hernandez acknowledges that our Supreme Court has
specifically held that juries are permitted to consider evidence of a
defendant’s propensity to commit sexual offenses based on evidence the
defendant committed other sexual offenses, and that this principle holds even
when the other offenses have been simultaneously charged in the same
prosecution. (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1164.) As the Court
explained, “[w]hether an offense is charged or uncharged in the current
prosecution does not affect in any way its relevance as propensity evidence.”
(Ibid.)
Within the boundaries of these holdings, Hernandez argues there must
be an exception to the rule allowing the jury to consider propensity evidence
that applies in cases where multiple sex offenses have been charged and all of
the offenses took place on the same occasion. In his view, an exception to the
rule is required because “[p]ropensity evidence permits the jury to consider
the fact that [a] defendant has engaged in conduct on one occasion as
circumstantial evidence that he engaged in similar conduct on another
occasion. It has no relevance in a case where all of the alleged conduct took
place on a single occasion.” (Italics omitted.) He asserts that “[i]nherent in
[the] definition of propensity evidence is that [a] specific instance of conduct
occurred on some occasion different than the charged offense.” We disagree.
Hernandez’s definition of relevant character evidence is incorrect to the
extent it places temporal restrictions on the jury’s ability to infer propensity
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from manifestations of a defendant’s character that occur at the same time as
the charged offense. This is not the law.
“Character evidence [is] sometimes described as evidence of a
propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct.” (Villatoro, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 1159.) Character evidence—a.k.a. propensity evidence—may be
proven “in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of
specific instances of [a person’s] conduct.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
Important here, a person’s character at the time of the charged offense is the
relevant consideration. (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 447
(Shoemaker).) It is true, as Hernandez points out, that in the case of “specific
instances of [a person’s] conduct,” it is often appropriate to draw inferences
“ ‘either forward or backward’ ” from manifestations of character during time
periods that are earlier or later than the charged offense. (Id. at pp. 446,
fn. 1 [quoting Evid. Code, § 1103], 447–448 [quoting 5 Wigmore, Evidence
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) § 1618, p. 595].) But it is not the case, as
Hernandez contends, that conduct used to prove character evidence is
exclusively limited to conduct that took place on another occasion. To the
contrary, “ ‘[c]haracter at an earlier or later time than that of the deed in
question is relevant only on the assumption that [the individual’s character]
was substantially unchanged in the meantime.’ ” (Shoemaker, at p. 447,
italics omitted.)
Thus, based on settled law, the trial court’s instruction here accurately
told the jury that if they found Hernandez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of one of the charged sex offenses, they were permitted but not required to
conclude he was a person who was disposed to commit other sex crimes.
(Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1164.) This portion of the instruction was a
correct statement of the law because evidence a defendant has committed a
10
sex crime is highly probative that the defendant has a disposition or
propensity to commit these types of offenses. (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 915.) And indeed, the evidence here was potentially even more probative
than the typical case precisely because the sex offenses all occurred on the
exact same occasion. As noted, a person’s character at the time of the charged
offense is the relevant consideration. (Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at
p. 447.) The more remote in time a prior or subsequent sexual offense takes
place, the less probative it is likely to be of the defendant’s character at the
time of the charged offense. (See Falsetta, at p. 917.) Because there was no
significant gap in time between any of the sex offenses, a conclusion by the
jury that Hernandez committed any one of the charged offenses would have
been exceptionally probative of his character—including his disposition to
commit sex crimes against young girls—at that exact point in time.
Hernandez’s other criticisms of the instruction also lack merit. He
claims the inferences allowed by the instruction in the instant case were
“irrational,” because “a single sexual assault charged as multiple discrete
acts cannot logically establish a character trait to establish propensity to
commit all of the charged acts.” We disagree. We find it both logical and a
matter of common sense for a jury considering multiple charges based on a
variety of acts alleged to have taken place on a single occasion to draw the
inferences discussed in CALCRIM No. 1191B. Here, for example, if the jury
concluded Hernandez was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of vaginally
raping Jane, it is not an “irrational” inference to conclude he is the type of
person who is disposed to commit other sex crimes against a girl under the
age of 14, such as squeezing her breasts, licking her nipples, and licking her
vagina. It is also not irrational to then consider this conclusion as weighing
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in favor of concluding he did in fact commit these other alleged offenses as
well.
Hernandez’s final contentions are that the instruction requires jurors
to engage in circular logic and encourages them to find victims who allege
multiple sex acts more credible than those who allege a single offense. We
are not persuaded. The instruction here clearly told the jury that any offense
used to draw an inference of propensity must first be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The instruction thereby contains a foundational
requirement—in the form of a required independent factual finding made
beyond a reasonable doubt—that must be met before jurors are permitted to
draw an inference of propensity or witness credibility. Given this clear
starting point for drawing any inference—a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to one of the offenses—the instruction does not
require circular logic, it does not encourage credibility findings where they
are unwarranted, and it does not permit improper “ ‘bootstrapping of
verdicts.’ ” (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1165, 1168.)
For all of these reasons, we conclude the jury was correctly instructed
with CALCRIM No. 1191B. Having reached this conclusion, we do not need
to reach or otherwise address prejudice.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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