People v. Escobar CA2/5

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Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Escobar CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B334101

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA097063-01)
v.

ALAN ESCOBAR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Walgreen, Judge. Judgment Affirmed;
Sentence vacated and remanded.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A.
Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury found Alan Escobar guilty of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (b); count 1) and
carrying a loaded handgun on his person or in a vehicle (§ 25850,
subd. (a); count 3). The jury acquitted Escobar of attempted
murder. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 2.) As to count 1, the jury
found true the allegation that Escobar personally used a firearm
in the commission of the offense in violation of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). As to counts 1 and 3, the jury found true the
allegation that Escobar attempted to flee from the crime scene
and to conceal and/or destroy evidence of the crime, within the
meaning of Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subdivision (c). The jury
found not true as to counts 1 and 3 the allegation that the victim
of the above offenses was particularly vulnerable within the
meaning of Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subdivision (a)(3).
On appeal, Escobar contends that (1) the matter must be
remanded for resentencing because the trial court relied on
improper aggravating factors to impose the 10-year high term on
the firearm enhancement, and (2) that the trial court violated his
federal and state constitutional rights by improperly instructing
the jury regarding the mental state required for the assault in
count 1.
We vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial
court for re-sentencing. We affirm the judgment in all other
respects.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
DISCUSSION2

A. Imposition of the Upper Term on the Firearm
Enhancement

1. Law

Prior to 2022, when a statute specified a triad of possible
punishments, trial courts had discretion to choose between the
three terms, “ ‘select[ing] the term which, in the court’s
discretion, best serves the interests of justice’ and stating reasons
for its decision. (Former § 1170(b), enacted by Stats. 2007, ch. 3,
§ 2, pp. 6−7.)’ ” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747
(Lynch).) “[A]s of January 1, 2022, the Legislature . . . amended
section 1170 to provide that the trial court ‘shall,’ in its discretion
impose a sentence ‘not to exceed the middle term’ (id., subd.
(b)(1)) except in the following circumstance: ‘The court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of’ an upper term sentence, and ‘the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ (§ 1170(b)(2); Stats. 2021,
ch. 719, § 2 . . . .).” (Id. at p. 748, fn. omitted.) The same rule
applies to enhancements that are punishable by one of three
terms, such as section 12022.5, subdivision (a), which is
implicated here. (§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(1), (2).)

2 Because the issues presented are purely legal, we do not
include a recitation of the facts.

3
“The trial court’s substitution of its own factfinding for that
of a jury, and its application of a lower standard of proof, are not
mere state statutory errors. They are errors that run counter to
the high court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution.
Neither are they mere errors affecting the court’s exercise of
discretion. This is true even if the court might have imposed the
same sentence based on fewer aggravating circumstances than
those it cites on the record. When the trial court actually relies
on improperly proven aggravating facts to ‘justify’ an upper term
sentence, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs and Chapman [v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18] must be satisfied. That is to say
the reviewing court must be able to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have found the unproven aggravating
facts to be true had it been properly instructed.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 760–761, fn. omitted.)

2. Proceedings

The trial court sentenced Escobar to the middle term of six
years in prison in count 1, plus the high term of 10 years for the
associated firearm enhancement. The court imposed a
concurrent term of three years in count 3. The court relied on the
following aggravating factors in support of its determination to
impose the 10-year upper term on the firearm enhancement:
“The Court does note as factors in aggravation, the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, or threat of great
bodily harm. The defendant was armed with a loaded ghost gun
which he testified he purchased on the Internet, entirely
untraceable because it has no serial number.

4
“The defendant arrived at the location already armed with
that loaded ghost gun. The victim at the time of the shooting was
particularly vulnerable as he was backing away with his arms
down retreating to get away from the situation and posed
absolutely no danger whatsoever to the defendant.
“As to factors in mitigation, I do note the defendant is
relatively young. He was 21 years old at the time, and he does
have no prior criminal record.
“However, the court does find that the factors in
aggravation greatly outweigh any factors in mitigation based on
the brazen callousness of the shooting.”
The court subsequently discussed that Escobar fled the
location, which was inconsistent with Escobar’s assertion that he
acted in self-defense, that Escobar was the aggressor and
needlessly escalated the situation, and that Escobar callously
tossed a loaded, untraceable gun into the street where anyone
could pick it up. The court stated that the jury specifically found
true the allegation that Escobar attempted to flee from the crime
scene and to conceal and/or destroy evidence of the crime, within
the meaning of Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subdivision (c).

3. Analysis

Escobar contends that the trial court erred by relying on
improper factors to impose the upper term of 10 years in prison
on the firearm enhancement associated with count 1.
Specifically, he argues that (1) the jury did not find that the
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, or threat of
great bodily harm; (2) the jury found not true the allegation that
the victim was particularly vulnerable; and (3) flight and

5
destruction of evidence are not proper aggravating factors
because they do not reasonably relate to the defendant or the
circumstances under which the crime was committed as
California Rules of Court rule 4.421, subdivision (c) requires, and
(4) rule 4.421, subdivision (c) is unconstitutionally vague. To the
extent that counsel failed to object to the trial court’s imposition
of the high term on these bases, Escobar contends that counsel
provided ineffective assistance.
The People counter that Escobar forfeited his arguments by
failing to raise them below, but argue that, even if we find that
counsel provided ineffective assistance, Escobar cannot establish
prejudice because he cannot show that he would have achieved a
more favorable result if counsel had objected.
We address the issue on the merits because even if forfeited
it affects Escobar’s substantial rights.3 (§ 1259.) The resolution

3 In his sentencing memorandum, defense counsel argued
that all but one of the aggravating factors enumerated in Rules of
Court, rule 4.421, subdivision (a)—including the aggravating
factors that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, or threat of
great bodily harm—were not admitted by Escobar or found true
by a jury and could not justify imposition of a term exceeding the
middle term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. Although counsel
did not object at the sentencing hearing following the court’s
ruling, “arguments [that] do not invoke facts or legal standards
different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but
merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as
wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had
the . . . legal consequence of violating the Constitution. . . . are
not forfeited on appeal.” (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141,
155, fn. 4.)

6
of the issue is clear. The trial court erroneously relied on the
particular vulnerability of the victim despite the fact that the
jury expressly found not true the allegation that the victim was
particularly vulnerable. The error is not harmless. The jury
made an explicit finding that the factor was not true; we need
look no further.4 (Lynch, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 760–761.) We reject
the People’s argument that Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730, does
not apply in this case because Lynch involved a retroactive
application of the amendments to section 1170.1, whereas in this
case the trial court sentenced Escobar nearly two years after the
amendments became effective. Although we presume that a trial
court properly understood its sentencing discretion absent
evidence to the contrary (People v. Weddington (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 468, 492), in this case there is evidence to the
contrary—the trial court relied on an aggravating factor that the
jury expressly found not true. Such an error cannot be harmless
because by definition we cannot say that the jury would have
found the aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt.
The distinction between this case and Lynch is one without a
difference—in Lynch the court could not have understood its
discretion because the amendments to section 1170.1 were not in
place; here the record shows that the court blatantly misapplied
the amendments to section 1170.1 and must not have understood
its discretion. In both cases, the court’s sentence contravened the
amendments to section 1170.1 and violated the Sixth
Amendment. We vacate the sentence and remand the matter to

4 Because we conclude that the jury would not have found
true all of the unproven aggravating facts on this basis, we need
not address Escobar’s remaining contentions.

7
the trial court to resentence Escobar in compliance with section
1170, subdivision (b)(2).

B. Assault with a Semiautomatic Firearm Instruction

At trial, the court instructed the jury under CALCRIM
No. 875 regarding the elements of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm. Escobar contends that the instruction does not properly
define the mental state required to commit assault. The People
argue that Escobar forfeited his challenge by failing to raise it in
the trial court, but that regardless, it lacks merit because the
instruction accurately reflects the Supreme Court’s articulation
of the mental state required for assault as articulated in People v.
Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams). As Escobar
acknowledges, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Williams and could not contravene it even if we agreed with
Escobar that Williams “erroneously defined” the requisite mental
state for assault. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455–456.) Following Willams, as we must,
we find no error in the trial court’s instruction.

8
DISPOSITION

We vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for
resentencing. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

9
The People v. Alan Escobar
B334101

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

I agree with the opinion for the court’s disposition of the
appeal. But I reach that conclusion not by way of Penal Code
section 1259, but because the absence of an objection to the
sentence imposed in this case constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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