People v. Estrada CA2/5

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Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Estrada CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B333577

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA151209)
v.

RICARDO ESTRADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
The jury found Ricardo Estrada guilty of two counts of
attempted deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code,1
§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664; counts 1 and 2), one count of shooting at
an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3), and one count of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 4). As to count 4, the jury
found true the allegation that Estrada personally discharged a
firearm, killing the victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and the
aggravating circumstance that he was armed with and used a
weapon within the meaning of Rules of Court rule 4.421,
subdivision (b)(2). As to all four counts, the jury found true
aggravating circumstances pursuant to Rules of Court rule 4.421,
subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(8), and (b)(1).
On appeal, Estrada contends that the trial court: (1)
abused its discretion and violated due process by admitting gang
evidence, (2) abused its discretion by denying his motion for
mistrial, (3) erred by refusing to instruct regarding the testimony
of an in-custody informant, and (4) abused its discretion by
refusing to dismiss the firearm enhancement in count 4.
We affirm the judgment.

FACTS

A. M.M. and J.R. (Counts 1-3)

On May 25, 2018, at about 7:00 p.m., M.M. was driving on
166th Street with his brother J.R., on their way to their cousin’s
house. A car approached the driver’s side and the people in the
car yelled things in English that M.M., a Spanish speaker, did

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
not understand. M.M. saw a weapon. He feared for his life, so he
drove past his cousin’s house, got onto the freeway, and went to a
sheriff’s station.
M.M.’s cousin, J.A., was waiting for M.M. and J.R. at his
house near Harvard Drive and Gard Avenue. J.A. saw M.M.’s car
drive past quickly, followed by a KIA Soul. He heard gunshots,
and saw one shot fired from the KIA.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Pedro
Cruz responded to the scene. The deputy recovered two .40
caliber bullet casings. Adrian Ahmed, who lived nearby,
approached Deputy Cruz and gave him four more .40 caliber
bullet casings that he collected from the area. Ahmed had gone
outside after hearing gunfire. He found the casings about two
blocks from Harvard Drive and Gard Avenue. Deputy Cruz also
discovered what appeared to be the plastic encasement from a car
mirror at the scene.
Later, it was determined that all six bullet casings
discovered at the scene were .40-caliber. Deputy Cruz obtained
surveillance footage from a house situated on the corner of
Harvard Drive and Gard Avenue. The video showed a vehicle
chasing M.M.’s car and included the sound of gunshots.
M.M. and J.R. were unable to identify the shooters, who
were wearing hats that covered their faces. When Deputy Cruz
examined M.M.’s vehicle, he noticed the back hatch and the
driver’s side mirror had been struck by bullets.

B. Jose Felix (Count 4)

At approximately 7:30 p.m. on the same night, Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Daisy Rosales responded to

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shots fired on Hermosura Street in Norwalk. When she arrived
at the scene, Deputy Rosales encountered Jose Felix lying on the
sidewalk unconscious. Felix had suffered gunshot wounds to the
chest. Felix was transported to the hospital, but died of his
injuries.
A neighbor reported that she heard four gunshots and saw
a Kia Soul speeding away. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Deputy James Potts obtained surveillance camera
footage from nearby houses that depicted a greenish brown Kia
Soul traveling on Clarksdale Avenue perpendicular to Hermosura
at around 7:30 p.m. The Kia had a distinctive green elephant
sticker on the bottom left of the rear window. The last three
digits on the Kia’s license plate were 634. The video depicted a
person in the front passenger seat wearing a hat and glasses.
Forensic identification specialist Yvette Gonzalez processed
the scene of Felix’s murder. Gonzalez recovered two fired bullets,
a bullet fragment, and a cartridge casing. She found a bullet
impact on a wall five or six feet away from where Felix lay on the
ground.
Firearm expert Tracy Peck examined two bullets recovered
from Felix’s body during the autopsy. One of the bullets
recovered from Felix’s body was consistent with .40-caliber Smith
and Wesson. Peck determined that this bullet and the cartridge
case found in the Kia were both manufactured by Glock. The
second bullet recovered from Felix’s body was consistent with .38-
special and .357-magnum caliber cartridges, and was fired from a
different gun.
Authorities searched Estrada’s house and recovered an
expended .38-caliber cartridge casing inside a backpack in
Estrada’s bedroom.

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C. The Kia Soul

Five days later, Deputy Potts spotted a green Kia Soul with
an elephant sticker on the rear window and a license plate
ending in 634. The Kia’s side mirror was damaged, with portions
of the trim missing. Deputies determined that Estrada’s mother
owned the Kia. The car was subsequently impounded, and
Estrada’s cell phone and his high school identification card were
discovered inside the center console. Firearm expert Tracy Peck
determined that the damage to the Kia’s mirror was caused by a
bullet impact. She identified a bullet casing she found under the
front passenger seat as a .40-caliber Smith and Wesson cartridge
case. Expert Robert Crisafulli processed the Kia for gunshot
residue, and discovered 107 characteristic particles present in the
vehicle.

D. Additional Ballistics Evidence

Peck examined the ballistics evidence from both shootings.
She concluded that the same Glock pistol was used to fire the six
.40-caliber cartridge casings recovered at Harvard Drive and
Gard Avenue, the cartridge casing found outside of Felix’s house,
and the .40-caliber cartridge casing recovered from the Kia.
These casings also were all manufactured by Tulammo. Peck
was unable to determine whether the .40-caliber bullet recovered
from Felix’s body was from the same gun as the cartridge casings,
but the jacket of the bullet suggested that it was manufactured
by Tulammo.

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E. Gang Evidence

Los Angeles County Police Department Detective Tera
Frudakis was assigned to Artesia and Norwalk, where she had
contact with Chivas gang members and rival Varrio Norwalk
gang members. The two gangs were in an active war over
territory, centering on 166th Street, which is the boundary
between their territories. Felix’s murder occurred in Varrio
Norwalk territory, and the attempted murders of M.M. and J.R.
occurred within contested territory. Although neither gang
controlled the contested territory, both gangs tried to keep the
other from gaining a foothold there.
Detective Frudakis testified that generally, associates of a
gang hang around with and are trusted by gang members, but
they are not yet full members themselves. Only full members can
claim the gang and use their symbols. Members often get gang
tattoos to show their allegiance. Members “put in work” or
commit crimes to gain respect within a gang. In order for their
crimes to be recognized, gang members usually commit them
with other gang members who can vouch for what occurs. Gang
members will vouch for each other in front of other members and
associates. Gang members go on “missions” together in which
they enter rival territory to shoot rival gang members.
Detective Frudakis knew Jose Ruezga as a member of the
Chivas gang. Ruezga’s house was a common Chivas gang
hangout. Detective Frudakis had not met Estrada, but she
reviewed photographs of him before the jury and verified that he
had several Chivas gang tattoos that only a full-fledged gang
member would be permitted to have. She also verified that
Estrada was throwing Chivas gang signs in other photographs

6
that were shown to the jury. Detective Frudakis identified a
photograph of Rolando Rodriguez, who was also believed to be
involved in the shootings, throwing Chivas gang signs.

F. B.C.’s Testimony

On November 30, 2018, detectives interviewed B.C., who
was in custody on separate charges, and had told authorities he
had information on the murder.2
B.C. was an associate of the Chivas gang. He was in
Chivas gang member Ruezga’s front yard when he overheard two
Chivas members who he knew by the names “Junior” and/or
“Wolfy” and “Twist” arguing. Junior and Twist were wearing
dark colored shirts and black hats. Junior had his hat pulled
down low and was wearing thick black sunglasses. B.C. saw
them putting gloves on. Junior had a .40-caliber Glock “sticking
out of his waist.” Twist asked Junior why he kept driving by and
did not let Twist kill someone when Twist told him to stop the
car. Junior responded, “that wasn’t a― a gang member that you
know—that we were—we were looking at.” Twist said, “Let’s go
back. I got a feeling.” Junior and Twist then left in Scion or a
Kia. Twist was driving. Twist had been driving the car for a
week and previously said it belonged to his mother.
B.C. knew that Junior and Twist committed the murder
because he heard a “whole commotion with the helicopters,” soon
afterwards. For a few weeks prior to the murder there had been
“drive-by’s going back and forth” between Varrio Norwalk and

2 B.C. testified at trial that he did not recall much of what
he said in the interview. An audio recording of the interview was
played for the jury.

7
Chivas. B.C. left Ruezga’s yard “after new word got around” that
night because “the first thing that came in my mind is those guys
are gonna come back here and retaliate.” A few days later, B.C.
was in Ruezga’s front yard again and overheard Junior telling
another gang member that he buried the murder weapon in the
park. In another conversation the same week, Junior or Twist
said “ ‘Are you sure it wasn’t me who hit him?’ ” The other
responded, “ ‘No.’ ” Junior said, “I’m the one who left off first. I
got him. And then, you got off once I already, you know—you
know, shot him.” They bragged that they caught the victim as he
was leaving his house. Junior said they had to get rid of the
Glock .40.
B.C. knew that the person who was killed was a gang
member from Norwalk, but he did not know the person’s name.
B.C. did not think that Junior and Twist knew the victim—they
were just trying to shoot any Varrio Norwalk gang member they
could find.
B.C. did not know what type of gun was used in the murder
in addition to the Glock, but about a month earlier he had seen
Twist with a “snub-nosed” Smith and Wesson “.38 Special”
revolver.
When the detectives showed B.C. a photo of the Kia, B.C.
said that it looked exactly like Twist’s mother’s car. When they
showed him a photo of Estrada, B.C. identified him as Twist.
B.C. identified a photo of Rodriguez as Junior/Wolfy.
One of the detectives who interviewed B.C. said he could
look into the charges against B.C., but that he could not make
any promises. Before the interview the detective emphasized
they were not there to discuss the “pickle” B.C. was in.

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DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Gang Evidence

Estrada contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting gang evidence although (1) no gang allegation was
charged, (2) the motivation behind the shootings was not relevant
to any element of the charged offenses, and (3) motive itself was
largely irrelevant to establish identity. Specifically, Estrada
argues that Detective Frudakis’s testimony, which tended to
show that the shootings were motivated by a violent feud
between the Chivas gang and Varrio Norwalk gang, did not tend
to show that Estrada was one of the perpetrators—the testimony
implicated every Chivas gang member equally. Estrada further
contends that the trial court’s admission of the gang evidence
violated his right to due process, rendering his trial
fundamentally unfair. The contentions lack merit.

1. Law

“Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) ‘Relevant evidence is broadly defined as that having a
“tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence” to resolving the case.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.) “ ‘ “A trial court has
‘considerable discretion’ in determining the relevance of evidence.
[Citation.] Similarly, the court has broad discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it
determines the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by its possible prejudicial effects.” ’ [Citation.]

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Evidence is relevant when it ‘ “ ‘tends “logically, naturally, and by
reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as identity,
intent, or motive.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Parker (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1, 53.)
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity,
motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force
or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Chhoun).)
“Such evidence is admissible [under Evidence Code section 352]
even when a gang enhancement is not charged, provided the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th
997, 1095 (Ramirez).)
We review the trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence
for abuse of discretion. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31.) The
trial court abuses its discretion to admit evidence under Evidence
Code section 352 when the probative value of the evidence is “far
outweighed by its tendency to incite a jury to resolve the issue of
guilt or innocence on [an accused’s] character rather than on
proof of the essential elements of the crime.” (People v. Cardenas
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 906–907, quoting People v. Bartlett (1967)
256 Cal.App.2d 787, 793–794.)
“ ‘Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may
draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.
Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily

10
prevents a fair trial.” [Citation.] Only under such circumstances
can it be inferred that the jury must have used the evidence for
an improper purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘The dispositive issue is . . .
whether the trial court committed an error which rendered the
trial “so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it violated
federal due process.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229–230, fn. omitted.)

2. Proceedings

The information charged Estrada with gang enhancements
pursuant to section 186.22, which the trial court dismissed on
defense counsel’s motion prior to trial. Subsequently, defense
counsel filed a motion in limine requesting that all gang evidence
be excluded and arguing that the charges were not predicated on
Estrada’s gang membership, no gang enhancements were alleged,
and the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative and
would require an undue consumption of time.
The prosecutor argued to admit as relevant to motive
general evidence regarding gang history and territory, symbols,
and signs, as well as photographic evidence that Estrada had
Chivas gang tattoos and threw Chivas gang signs. Defense
counsel countered that without the testimony of a Chivas gang
shot-caller who could say that the shootings were committed in
retaliation for a prior Varrio Norwalk shooting, any gang-related
motive was speculative. The gangs at issue had been rivals for
decades, so any suggestion that the rivalry motivated the crimes
was speculative and would only impugn Estrada’s character.
Counsel argued that although video evidence captured Estrada’s
mother’s car leaving the scenes of the crimes, there was no

11
evidence that Estrada was in the car at the time. The jury would
likely jump to the conclusion that Estrada was involved in the
crimes due to the gang evidence. If the court did admit the gang
evidence, counsel urged the court to limit it to evidence that was
strictly relevant to the case. The prosecutor agreed that the gang
evidence should be limited to motive and that the jury should be
so instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1403.
The court ruled the gang evidence was admissible. There
were ample facts to suggest that the crimes were gang-related,
and the evidence was probative of motive and identity. The
evidence served a legitimate purpose and was not being used to
“just dirty[] people up” in order to secure a conviction. The court
stated it would instruct the jury that its consideration of the gang
evidence was limited to motive, and it would limit the content of
the gang evidence to topics relevant to Estrada’s case. Given the
relevance and limitations on the gang evidence, the court did not
view its admission as involving confusion or undue consumption
of time.
At trial, Detective Frudakis testified regarding the rivalry
of the Chivas and Varrio Norwalk gangs and gang culture
generally, as detailed above.
The trial court instructed the jury under CALCRIM
No. 1403: “You may consider evidence of gang activity only for
the purpose of deciding whether: [¶] The defendant had a motive
to commit the crimes charged. [¶] You may not consider this
evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that
he has a disposition to commit crime.”

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3. Analysis

Estrada contends that the gang evidence should have been
excluded because the prosecution did not charge a gang
enhancement and the evidence was not relevant to any element
of the charged crimes. We disagree. “Gang evidence is relevant
and admissible when the very reason for the underlying crime,
that is the motive, is gang related.” (People v. Samaniego (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167 (Samaniego).) “ ‘A “motive” is
defined as a “[c]ause or reason that moves the will and induces
the action[,]” “[a]n inducement, or that which leads or tempts the
mind to indulge a criminal act.” [Citation.] Motive is an
intermediate fact which may be probative of such ultimate issues
as intent [citation], identity [citation], or commission of the
criminal act itself [citation].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Megown
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 166.) Evidence of a gang-related
motive may be admissible regardless of whether a gang
allegation is charged. (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1095.)
“ ‘ “[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal
behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial
effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its
existence.” [Citations.]’ ” (Samaniego, supra, at p. 1168.)
In this case, the gang-related motive was highly relevant to
identity. It demonstrated that the shootings were not random
but rather the result of a violent feud between members of the
Chivas and Varrio Norwalk gangs, and that Estrada, as a
member of the Chivas gang, had a reason to commit the crimes.
The jury did not view the gang evidence in a vacuum. In
conjunction with other evidence, the gang evidence tended to

13
establish that Estrada personally committed the crimes.
Estrada’s motivation to further the gang by shooting a rival gang
member combined with the physical evidence—including the
evidence tying Estrada to both the vehicle and one of the
weapons used in the shootings—tended to show that Estrada,
and not some random person, or even some random Chivas gang
member, committed the offenses.
Estrada analogizes his case to People v. Perez (1981) 114
Cal.App.3d 470, 473 (Perez). The two cases are readily
distinguishable, however. In Perez, the defendant was charged
with kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, robbery, and the
unlawful taking of a vehicle, which he allegedly committed with
another person. (Id. at p. 473.) At trial, the victim identified the
defendant, who was in the stolen car with him for over 15
minutes. (Id. at p. 477.) Afterwards, the prosecution was
permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant’s gang
membership to show that the defendant and another gang
member who was allegedly involved in the crimes had associated
with each other. (Id. at p. 476.) The defendant offered to
stipulate that he drove the car in question three days after it was
stolen, and that he was acquainted with the other gang member,
but the prosecutor rejected the offer. (Id. at pp. 478–479.)
Although the defendant invoked Evidence Code section 352, the
trial court did not weigh the probative value of the evidence
against its potential prejudicial effect as required. (Id. at p. 478.)
The court of appeal held that the gang evidence had no
“ ‘tendency in reason’ ” to prove the identity of the person who
committed the crimes. (Id. at p. 477.) Rather, the gang evidence
allowed the jury to find the defendant “guilty of the offense[s]

14
charged on the theory of ‘guilt by association [with the gang].’ ”
(Id. at p. 477.)
The instant case differs markedly from Perez. In Perez,
there was no evidence that the defendant had a gang-related
motive to commit the crimes. The gang evidence was cumulative
to the already strong evidence of identity, which was established
through the testimony of the victim who observed the defendant
during the crime. The gang evidence was not necessary to
establish that the two perpetrators were acquainted because the
defendant offered to stipulate that he knew the other perpetrator.
Moreover, the trial court did not exercise its discretion, as it did
not consider the probative value of the gang evidence against its
prejudicial effect. In sum, in Perez the gang evidence had little
probative value and was unduly prejudicial.
Here, the prosecution presented evidence that the
shootings were gang-related and had been committed because of
a violent feud between Estrada’s gang and the Varrio Norwalk
gang. There was no other evidence that could explain the motive
for the crimes. The motive was relevant to identity—it
demonstrated the likelihood that a Chivas gang member was the
perpetrator, and together with the physical evidence it tied a
specific Chivas member—Estrada—to the crime. The trial court
balanced the probative value of the gang evidence against its
prejudicial effect and found that it was more probative than
prejudicial, and not confusing or cumulative. The court admitted
the evidence for the purpose of showing motive and instructed the
jury that it was to limit its consideration of the gang evidence to
motive and not to consider it as evidence of Estrada’s character.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang
evidence.

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Nor did the prosecutor’s use of the gang evidence render
the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of Estrada’s right to
due process. Detective Frudakis’s testimony provided context for
Estrada’s actions, which were not explained by other evidence.
The gang-related evidence corroborated other evidence of identity
that did not pertain to motive. The evidence was highly
probative and neither cumulative nor unduly prejudicial. The
jury was specifically instructed that it could only consider the
evidence as probative of motive, and we presume the jurors
understood and followed that instruction. (Chhoun, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 30.) The gang evidence served legitimate purposes
and did not implicate Estrada’s right to a fair trial.

B. Motion for Mistrial

Estrada next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for mistrial because Detective
Frudakis referenced the Mexican Mafia during her testimony,
which irreparably damaged his ability to obtain a fair trial.
Although we agree that the detective’s comment had minimal
probative value, we reject the contention because this single
reference to the Mexican Mafia was not unduly prejudicial and
did not irreparably damage Estrada’s chances of receiving a fair
trial.

1. Law

“ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or
instruction. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020)

16
10 Cal.5th 195, 298.) “ ‘ “Whether a particular incident is
incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and
the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on
mistrial motions.” ’ [Citations.] . . . ‘[a] trial court should grant a
mistrial only when a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have
been irreparably damaged . . . .’ [Citations.] ” (People v. Schultz
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 673.) We review the trial court’s denial of
a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

2. Proceedings

At trial, the prosecutor asked Detective Frudakis to “talk
about just gangs in general” and explain the difference between a
gang associate and a gang member. Detective Frudakis testified
regarding a full-fledged member’s initiation into a gang: “the
most common thing for Hispanic gangs is to get jumped in for 13
seconds. Now, you’re asking why the number 13? The number
13 is because the 13th letter of the alphabet is the letter “M” as in
Mary. The reason why gangs, Hispanic gangs, have that number
13 behind their name is because they show allegiance to the
Mexican Mafia.”
Defense counsel objected that the testimony was irrelevant.
The trial court overruled the objection.
Before Detective Frudakis’s testimony concluded, defense
counsel filed a motion for mistrial arguing that Detective
Frudakis presented “rambling and narrative testimony” that was
highly prejudicial and inflammatory and went beyond merely
establishing motive and intent. The motion noted that Detective
Frudakis “made statements about the ‘Mexican Mafia’, general
crimes committed by gang members, and intimidation tactics of

17
gang members.” Alternatively, the defense requested that
Detective Frudakis’s testimony be stricken, that the detective be
admonished not to testify in such a manner, or that the court give
a curative instruction.
The court denied the motion for mistrial. The court made
its rulings during the testimony and did not feel that the
testimony was overbroad. The court stated, “The record speaks
for itself when it’s alleged she made the statement about the
Mexican Mafia. It was just explaining the 13, the 13th letter of
the alphabet, the ‘M’, allegiance to the Mexican Mafia. The
defense can cross-examine as to any of those issue[s]. Other than
that, it was just the general gang culture that she was testifying
to, which the court allowed in. The appropriate objections were
made at the time. The court ruled on those and so they’re
preserved.” The court stated that it was willing to revisit its
ruling, and invited counsel to make any further objections
counsel found necessary.
When Detective Frudakis’s testimony resumed, she made
no further references to the Mexican Mafia.

3. Analysis

The cases that Estrada cites in support of his position that
Detective Frudakis’s testimony regarding the Mexican Mafia was
so prejudicial as to irreparably damage his chances of a fair trial
are distinguishable. In People v. Roof (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 222
(Roof) and People v. Bentley (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 687 (Bentley),
witnesses volunteered testimony regarding the defendants’
uncharged criminal activity. (People v. Roof, supra, at p. 225
[contributing to the delinquency of a minor with the proceeds of

18
the charged crime]; People v. Bentley, supra, at p. 689 [reference
to defendant being a suspect in a separate child molestation case
and defendant denying same upon questioning].) In People v.
Schiers (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 102, 108, an officer testified that
the defendant failed a lie detector test and that the defendant
said the machine must not have been working when told that he
failed the test. In People v. Navarrete (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
828, an officer referenced a statement that the defendant made to
him, but then stated that he could not say more because the court
had instructed him not to. All of these cases involved testimony
that directly related to the defendant personally and regarded
either his criminal conduct or his inferentially self-incriminating
statements. As Estrada acknowledges, courts have found that a
trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion where a witness volunteered brief, less serious
comments about a defendant. (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th
175, 197 [witness testified defendant made phone call from
“Susanville,” a state prison]; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th
491, 574 [witness relayed he was told defendant had just been
released from prison, was crazy, and would kill him; court
admonished jury to consider only as to codefendant and not for
the truth of the matter]; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515,
554–555 [police officer testified the Department of Corrections
parole office his defendant’s address].)
Here, Detective Frudakis mentioned the Mexican Mafia
once when describing the general practices of Hispanic gangs.
Unlike the testimony in Roof, Bentley, Schiers, and Navarrete,
the detective’s testimony was general. She did not testify
regarding anything that would tie Estrada personally to the
Mexican Mafia. To the extent her Mexican Mafia remark related

19
to Estrada, it applied equally to the murder victim, a gang
member whose mother had just testified that he was “jumped in”
to Varrio Norwalk. Detective Frudakis’s testimony did not relate
to Estrada’s conduct or his self-incriminating statements.
Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed under CALCRIM
No. 1403 that it could not consider any of the gang evidence as
evidence of Estrada’s character. We presume that the jurors
understood and followed the trial court’s instruction. (Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 30.) Estrada’s chances of receiving a fair
trial were not irreparably damaged. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.

C. In-Custody Informant Instruction

Estrada next contends that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jurors under CALCRIM No. 336 that B.C. was an
in-custody informant. The contention is without merit.
Section 1127a, subdivision (a) defines an in-custody
informant as follows: “a person, other than a codefendant,
percipient witness, accomplice, or coconspirator whose testimony
is based upon statements made by the defendant while both the
defendant and the informant are held within a correctional
institution.” Pursuant to section 1127a, subdivision (b), “In any
criminal trial or proceeding in which an in-custody informant
testifies as a witness, upon the request of a party, the court shall
instruct the jury as follows: [¶] ‘The testimony of an in-custody
informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In
evaluating such testimony, you should consider the extent to
which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or
expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness.

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This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such
testimony, but you should give it the weight to which you find it
to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in the case.’ ”
CALCRIM No. 336 mirrors the language of section 1127a,
subdivision (b). It further instructs: “You may use the
(statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant against the
defendant only if: [¶] 1. The (statement/ [or] testimony) is
supported by other evidence that you believe; [¶] 2. That
supporting evidence is independent of the (statement/ [or]
testimony); AND [¶] 3. That supporting evidence connects the
defendant to the commission of the crime[s] [or to the special
circumstance/ [or] to evidence in aggravation]. The supporting
evidence is not sufficient if it merely shows that the charged
crime was committed [or proves the existence of a special
circumstance/ [or] evidence in aggravation].”
At trial, defense counsel requested that the court instruct
the jury under CALCRIM No. 336 with respect to B.C. The
prosecutor expressed his concern that CALCRIM No. 336 was a
very narrow exception that did not apply, but averred that the
court might need to instruct the jury because defense counsel
requested the instruction. The court stated that B.C. did not
meet the definition of an in-custody informant. B.C. and Estrada
were not in a correctional facility when Estrada and Rodriguez
made the statements that B.C. overheard. Applying the
exception under such circumstances would improperly stretch the
definition of an in-custody informant. The court noted that
defense counsel could argue B.C. was not credible if B.C. received
some promise or benefit in exchange for his testimony.
Defense counsel agreed that B.C. did not meet the strict
definition of an in-custody informant, but argued that the

21
situation fell within the spirit of the legislation. Counsel
proposed that the court modify CALCRIM No. 336 and “instead of
calling him an in-custody informant . . . we say he is an
informant who was in custody at the time of the cooperation or
the informing . . . .” The court declined to give CALCRIM No. 336
or the proposed modification, explaining that an important aspect
of the instruction was that it did not permit the jury to convict
based on the in-custody informant’s testimony alone, and thus
did not apply to a witness who did not meet the definition of in-
custody informant. CALCRIM No. 226, which instructed on the
credibility and believability of witnesses, would address any
concerns with B.C.’s testimony.
The trial court did not err in refusing to give CALCRIM
No. 336. B.C. was a percipient witness who was later
incarcerated and approached authorities with information
regarding the crimes. In addition to overhearing Estrada and
Rodriguez’s conversation, he saw them leave in Estrada’s
mother’s car, which he had seen Estrada driving the week before
the murder. Soon after B.C. saw Estrada and Rodriguez leave in
the Kia, B.C. heard helicopters that he associated with a
shooting.
In People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 120–121, our
Supreme Court discussed CALJIC No. 3.20, the predecessor of
CALCRIM No. 336, and distinguished a situation like the one
before us with that of an in-custody informant: “An examination
of the legislative history of section 1127a, which was enacted in
1989 and formed the basis for cautionary instruction CALJIC
No. 3.20, reveals the Legislature made a deliberate and rational
distinction between in-custody percipient witnesses and in-
custody informant witnesses. . . . The Legislature recognized that

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in-custody informant witnesses differ in nature and character
from in-custody percipient witnesses. Section 1127a and CALJIC
No. 3.20 specifically distinguish between the two. In-custody
informant witnesses have no personal knowledge of the crime,
but testify that a defendant made an inculpatory statement to
them while in proximity in a county jail or state prison, often in
exchange for favorable treatment by law enforcement. In-custody
percipient witnesses, by contrast, like other percipient witnesses,
codefendants, accomplices, and coconspirators, testify on the
basis of personal knowledge of the crime.” Giving CALCRIM
No. 336 in connection with the testimony of a percipient witness
who happened to later be incarcerated would contravene section
1127a, subdivision (a), which specifically excludes a percipient
witness from the definition of an in-custody informant. (See id.)
Additionally, in this case the trial court addressed any
concerns regarding B.C.’s credibility by giving CALCRIM
No. 226, which instructs the jury to consider whether a witness
has engaged in conduct that reflects on his believability, whether
a witness has been convicted of a felony, and whether the witness
was promised leniency or immunity in exchange for their
testimony, as well as CALCRIM No. 316, which specifically
instructs that the jury may consider whether a witness has been
convicted of a felony when assessing credibility.

D. Section 12022.53 Enhancement

Finally, Estrada contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to dismiss the 25 years to life firearm
enhancement attached to the murder conviction in count 4.

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“Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), as added by Senate Bill
No. 81 [(Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1)], provides that
‘[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.’ (Italics added.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides
in pertinent part, ‘In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.’ (Italics added.)” (People v. Walker (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)
lists as one circumstance that: “[t]he application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this
instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.”
As Estrada concedes, the Courts of Appeal are in
agreement that the “shall be dismissed” language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not require trial courts to dismiss every
enhancement of 25 years to life imposed pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (d). (See People v. Hiller (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 335, 351; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 290–293; People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335;
People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1286–1287; People
v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21.) Previously,
however, there was a split of authority regarding whether the
“shall be dismissed” language created a rebuttable presumption
that dismissal of the enhancement is in the interests of justice

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unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029
[recognizing split of authority].)
After the opening brief was filed, but before the filing of the
respondent’s brief and the reply brief, our Supreme Court decided
the issue adversely to Estrada’s position that the “shall be
dismissed language” creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of
dismissal.3 The Walker court held that “the plain language of
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not erect a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be overcome by a
finding that dismissal endangers public safety[.]” (Id. at p. 1033.)
“ ‘[T]he ultimate question before the trial court remains whether
it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement’
[citation] and this ‘furtherance of justice’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1))
inquiry requires a trial court’s ongoing exercise of ‘discretion’ (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating
circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an
enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to
the “furtherance of justice” inquiry.’ ” (Ibid.)
Estrada’s construction of the statute is contrary to Supreme
Court precedent, so the trial court could not have erred in the
manner Estrada contends that it did. Absent some contrary
indication in the record, we presume that a trial court understood
and properly exercised its discretion. (See People v. Lee (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 861, 867 [“if the record is silent” on the court’s
awareness of its discretionary authority in sentencing, we must
presume the court understood the scope of its discretion and

3 The parties disagree as to whether Estrada’s claim has
been preserved for appeal. For the purposes of argument, we
presume, without deciding, that his claim was not forfeited.

25
affirm]; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 [“in
light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is
aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at
sentencing, [the reviewing court] cannot presume error where the
record does not establish on its face that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of [its] discretion”].) On this record,
there is nothing to indicate that the trial court did not
understand its discretion.
To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial
court understood and appropriately exercised its discretion. Prior
to trial, defense counsel filed a motion requesting that the court
dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) because imposition
of the 25 years to life enhancement would result in a sentence of
greater than 20 years. The trial court declined to decide the
motion prior to trial, but discussed the substance of the motion
with the parties at that time. Subsequently, the jury found true
multiple aggravating circumstances relevant to sentencing. As to
all four counts, the jury found that the crimes “involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, and
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness[,]” “the manner in which the defendant carried out
[the offenses] . . . indicates planning, sophistication, and
professionalism[,]” and “the defendant engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a danger to society[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421, subds. (a)(1), (a)(8), & (b)(1).) As to the murder in count 4,
the jury found that Estrada was armed with and used a weapon
within the meaning of Rules of Court rule 4.421, subdivision
(b)(2).

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The trial court considered Estrada’s youth and his troubled
childhood at the sentencing hearing, but found these factors did
not outweigh Estrada’s violent conduct such as to warrant
imposition of a lesser sentence. The facts in the record indicate
that the court was aware of its discretion and determined that it
was not in the interest of justice to dismiss the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement. Nothing suggests otherwise. We
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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