People v. Gallardo CA4/3

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Testo completo

Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Gallardo CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062981

v. (Super. Ct. No. 16WF2497)

ROBERTO RAFAEL SAAVEDRA OPINION
GALLARDO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel and Seth M. Friedman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Roberto Rafael Saavedra Gallardo
(defendant) of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);
count 1) and found true the special circumstance of murder for financial gain
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(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to life without the
possibility of parole.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the
court incorrectly instructed the jury on motive as it pertained to the financial
gain special circumstance. Second, he argues the court imposed an
unauthorized parole revocation fine. We agree with defendant’s latter
contention and modify the judgment by striking the $300 parole revocation
fine. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTS2
Defendant met Olga Vasquez-Collazos (Olga) in Peru. Defendant
and Olga dated, but Olga ultimately married another man, Adrian Zapata
(Adrian). Adrian owned a condominium in Peru and lived in the United
States. After their marriage, Olga remained in Peru, where she had an
ongoing affair with defendant.
In 2013, Olga and her two sons moved from Peru to Westminster
to be with Adrian. About a year later, defendant moved from Peru to Van
Nuys and continued to see Olga, who communicated with him via a secret cell
phone. In May 2014, two months after defendant arrived in California,
Adrian was murdered in his apartment.

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Because this appeal concerns jury instructions and a parole
revocation fine, we need not summarize all the facts in detail.

2
According to phone records, it appeared defendant travelled from
Van Nuys to Orange County the night before the murder and communicated
with Olga that evening. The next morning, defendant and Olga continued to
communicate, and Adrian was asleep in his bed. Olga left Adrian’s apartment
around 8:00 a.m. and took her children to school, but defendant remained
near Adrian’s apartment. Around 8:45 a.m., defendant and Olga were both
near the UCI Medical Center, and by 9:13 a.m., defendant was heading back
to Van Nuys.
Around 10:22 a.m., the police were dispatched to Adrian’s
apartment, where they found him dead in his bed. Adrian had been
repeatedly stabbed and bludgeoned around the head. Investigators suspected
the scene had been staged to look as if the apartment had been burglarized.
Defendant and Olga continued their relationship after the
murder. In her conversations with the police, Olga discussed recovering funds
from Adrian’s life insurance, social security, and 401(k) account. Around six
months after the murder, the police told Olga they found defendant’s DNA on
Adrian’s body even though this was not true. Olga seemed surprised and
denied seeing defendant on the day of the murder. She also falsely claimed
she did not know where defendant was or how to contact him. In 2017,
authorities arrested defendant in Peru.3

3
Authorities also arrested Olga, who was separately tried and
convicted of Adrian’s murder. In her case, the jury found the financial gain
special circumstance not true. (See People v. Vasquez-Collazos (Nov. 10, 2022,
G060525) [nonpub. opn.].)

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DISCUSSION
Defendant claims the court erred by providing jury instructions
that essentially relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove the murder
was motivated by financial gain. According to defendant, the error was
prejudicial and violated his constitutional rights to due process and a jury
trial. Defendant also argues the court improperly imposed a $300 parole
revocation fine. For the reasons below, we agree the court erred by imposing
the parole revocation fine but disagree with defendant’s remaining
contentions.
I.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE FINANCIAL GAIN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE
A. Relevant Background
Two jury instructions are central to the instant appeal:
CALCRIM Nos. 370 and 720. As given to the jury, CALCRIM No. 370 stated:
“The People are not required to prove that the defendant had a motive to
commit the crime charged. In reaching your verdict you may, however,
consider whether the defendant had a motive. [¶] Having a motive may be a
factor tending to show that the defendant is guilty or a special circumstance is
true. Not having a motive may be a factor tending to show the defendant is
not guilty or a special circumstance is not true.” (Italics added.)
The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 720, which
stated: “The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder for
financial gain in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(1). [¶] To prove this
special circumstance is true, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant
intended to kill; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The killing was carried out for financial gain.”
(Italics added.)

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Defendant argues the court erred by providing CALCRIM No.
370 because it improperly relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove the
murder was motivated by financial gain. According to defendant, the
instruction effectively told the jury that motive was merely a “factor” rather
than an element of the financial gain special circumstance. Although
defendant did not challenge the instruction in the trial court proceedings, we
address the merits because defendant claims the instruction violated his
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constitutional rights. (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1164.)
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The financial gain special circumstance requires the murder to
have been “carried out for financial gain.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) “Carried out
‘for’ financial gain implies motive.” (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d
1142, 1178.) In cases involving crimes that require a particular motive, some
courts have found CALCRIM No. 370 “effectively ‘remove[s] the mental state
element’ from the jury’s consideration.” (People v. Valenti, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) In so doing, “‘“‘we must assume that
jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating
all jury instructions which are given.’”’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1
Cal.5th 838, 915.) “‘[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a
jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.’” (Id. at p. 906.)
“[W]e inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in a manner that violates the

4
Because defendant did not forfeit the issue, we need not address
his argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object below.

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Constitution.” (Ibid.) When conducting our inquiry, “‘[a] single instruction is
not viewed in isolation, and the ultimate decision on whether a specific jury
instruction is correct and adequate is determined by consideration of the
entire instructions given to the jury.’” (Ibid.)
C. Harmless Error
Defendant argues any prejudice resulting from the instructional
error must be evaluated under the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” of
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. The People suggest any error
can be evaluated under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Assuming
the court erred by providing CALCRIM No. 370, any error was not prejudicial
under either standard.
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury she had the
burden of proving “the killing was carried out for financial gain” to establish
the financial gain special circumstance. The prosecutor elaborated: “The law
does not require financial gain to be the dominant, substantial, or significant
motive. Just that it was a motive. [¶] The law does not require that the
defendant actually get any money or property. It’s just that that was the
plan. The plan was to get the condo and the other money so the two of them
could live happily ever after.” By making these statements, the prosecutor
clearly told the jury that the killing had to be carried out for financial gain
and clarified any possible confusion caused by CALCRIM No. 370. In other
words, the prosecutor resolved any ambiguity regarding the motive issue in
defendant’s favor.
Defendant claims the prosecutor’s closing argument was not
definitive because the prosecutor, at one point, stated: “People are not
required to prove that there’s a motive, but there’s motive all over here.” It
appears this statement was made in regards to the murder charge as opposed

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to the financial gain special circumstance. After making the above
statement, the prosecutor summarized the law regarding the financial gain
special circumstance and specifically stated she had the burden of proving
“the killing was carried out for financial gain.” The prosecutor also
emphasized the evidence suggesting defendant’s financial motive. For
example, after the murder, defendant contacted others to help Olga “get . . .
[Adrian’s] condo in Peru” and to recover funds from Adrian’s social security.
The prosecutor plainly argued the primary motive for the murder was for
defendant and Olga to be together while the secondary motive was financial.
The prosecutor stated: “There’s a secondary motive, the financial gain. You
can get that nice penthouse condo in Peru, the 401(k), and the life insurance,
and as you know, that’s exactly what she set about to do.” Considering the
prosecutor’s argument and the entire instructions given to the jury, any error
was not prejudicial and does not require reversal. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1
Cal.5th 513, 545 [finding no prejudice where the parties argued a correct
interpretation of the jury instructions]; People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663,
680 [“[W]e do not presume the jury blindly followed an instruction that was
inconsistent with other correct instructions and the arguments of counsel.
Rather, we view the record as a whole, and consider the instructions in
context.”].)
II.
PAROLE REVOCATION FINE
Defendant argues, and the People agree, that a parole revocation
fine of $300 was improperly imposed on defendant pursuant to section
1202.45. This fine was imposed in a minute order, the abstract of judgment,
and by the court on the record at the sentencing hearing. We agree with the
parties’ view of the issue. Because defendant was sentenced to life in prison

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without the possibility of parole, section 1202.45 is inapplicable to his
sentence. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 380; People v.
Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184–1185.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by striking the $300 parole revocation
fine. The court is instructed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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