CourtListener 10320015•People v. Jackson CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Jackson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081779
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD245817)
TIM JACKSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Alana C. Butler, and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Tim Jackson was convicted of robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211),
attempted robbery (§§ 211 & 664) and two counts of assault (§ 240). The trial
court originally sentenced Jackson to two indeterminate terms of 25 years to
life under the Three Strikes Law. During a recent resentencing hearing, the
trial court dismissed four prison priors that were previously imposed and
denied Jackson’s renewed Romero2 motion to dismiss his prior strikes.
Jackson appeals from the order denying his renewed motion to dismiss
the prior strikes. His appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 stating counsel was unable to identify
any arguable issues on appeal. Based on our independent review of the
record, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing
whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to strike
the prior strikes where the court’s decision was based in part on factual
findings that appeared to be unsupported by the record. Having considered
the supplemental briefing by Jackson’s appointed counsel and the Attorney
General, we find no reversible error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction Offenses and Resulting Judgment
In 2015, a jury convicted Jackson of robbery (§ 211), attempted robbery
(§§ 211 & 664) and two counts of assault (§ 240). Jackson also pleaded guilty
to failure to appear while on bail (§ 1320.5). In addition, the trial court (Hon.
David M. Rubin) found true allegations that Jackson had four prison priors
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and three strike priors (§§ 667, subs. (b)–(i), 1170.12). The
court sentenced Jackson to a determinate term of eight years and a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
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consecutive indeterminate term of 50 years to life. This court affirmed the
judgment in the direct appeal. (People v. Jackson (July 21, 2016, D067888)
[nonpub. opn.].)
B. Resentencing Proceedings
In 2022, Jackson filed a petition to recall his sentence under
section 1172.75 in the superior court on the basis that his enhancement
imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) was legally invalid. The court
appointed counsel, the People filed an opposition, and Jackson’s appointed
counsel filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. The
record for resentencing also included the probation officer’s report dated
April 9, 2015 regarding Jackson’s criminal history.
In its report, the probation officer described the factual circumstances
of Jackson’s two commitment offenses. In January 2013, Jackson and a
codefendant robbed a check-cashing business, Cash Plus, as the business was
closing. The defendants had their faces covered with bandanas, wore gloves
and hooded sweatshirts. Jackson’s codefendant sequestered the storeowner
to a bathroom of the store with what appeared to be a semiautomatic
handgun. The codefendant told the storeowner to get on his knees in the
bathroom and threatened to shoot him if he came out. While the codefendant
held the storeowner in the bathroom at gunpoint, Jackson rifled through the
store looking for cash.
Then, on August 14, 2014, Jackson attempted to rob another check
cashing business, Check Into Cash. Jackson was wearing a reflective vest
and placed orange cones around the parking lot of the business, apparently
as an attempt to disguise himself as a construction worker. As the manager
of the business was opening the store, Jackson grabbed her by the neck and
tried to push her inside, forcing her to the ground. Jackson then pointed a
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handgun at employees from the neighboring businesses who chased after him
as he attempted to flee.
The probation officer also discussed Jackson’s prior strikes, which were
committed when he was a juvenile. In 1985, he received a juvenile true
finding for shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246) and assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). In a separate incident from 1985, he received a
juvenile true finding for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). In addition to the prior strikes, Jackson had juvenile true
findings between 1983 and 1985 for burglary, drug possession, and receipt of
stolen property.
Jackson had also incurred numerous convictions as an adult in addition
to his commitment offenses. Between 1988 to 2006, he received numerous
convictions for drug possession, firearm possession, and parole violations.
The probation report described Jackson’s performance while on probation and
parole as poor.
In Jackson’s motion for resentencing, he requested that the court
invalidate the four one-year prison prior enhancements, strike two of the
three strike priors pursuant, and conduct a full resentencing hearing
pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483. He emphasized in his request to strike the
prior strikes that his codefendant was the “primary assailant” during the
2013 robbery, since only the codefendant was identified by the victim as
using a firearm. He further alleged in mitigation that his prior strikes were
committed when he was a juvenile and thus less culpable, he suffered from
childhood trauma, he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and he has
incurred no violations in prison involving violence.
Jackson was resentenced on January 20, 2023. At the hearing,
Jackson’s counsel again noted in support of his Romero motion that while the
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2013 robbery conviction was serious, the weapon involved in the incident was
his codefendant’s. Counsel continued to ask that the court take into
consideration Jackson’s young age at the time of the prior strike offenses and
resentence him as a second striker.
Before imposing the sentence, the trial court (Hon. Lisa R. Rodriguez)
stated that it had reviewed the complaint, the abstract of judgment, the
probation report, the sentencing memoranda filed by the parties when
Jackson was originally sentenced in 2015, the appellate court’s opinion in the
direct appeal, and the parties’ resentencing memoranda. The court then
invalidated all the prison priors pursuant to section 1172.72, recalled
Jackson’s sentence, and considered his request for resentencing under
current law.
The court found Jackson did not fall outside the Three Strikes Law and
declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strikes. After
considering his juvenile record, criminal history, prison record, and prospects
if released, the court concluded there was “insufficient evidence that . . .
Jackson’s risk for future violence has significantly been decreased [or] is
there sufficient evidence that reflects that age and time served have reduced
his risk for future violence or that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.”
As relevant to this appeal, the court discussed various aspects of
Jackson’s criminal history that indicated a pattern of firearms use when it
denied Jackson’s Romero motion. As to Jackson’s 2013 robbery conviction,
the court stated that “the defendant and his co-defendant pointed a gun at
the owner of the Cash Plus store,” and “[h]e and the co-defendant took the
cell phone and keys from the victim before moving him to the back of the
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business at gunpoint. They forced the victim to get on his knees and
threatened to shoot him if he came out of the bathroom.” The court further
noted that Jackson’s criminal history began in 1983 with a “residential
burglary with a gun.” The court also noted that in connection with Jackson’s
conviction in 2002 for drug possession, police discovered ammunition and
loaded handgun. Then, in explaining its decision not to dismiss the prior
strikes, the court emphasized that Jackson is almost always armed with a
firearm. The court concluded that it was “particularly concern[ed]” by
Jackson’s “continued utilization of firearms and victimization of the
community[ ],” and thus resentencing Jackson to the lesser term would
present a danger to public safety.
The trial court then resentenced Jackson to the low determinate term
of 32 months, plus an indeterminate term of 50 years to life, to be served
consecutively, and dismissed all prison priors.
DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Jackson contends the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his renewed motion to dismiss the prior strikes,
because factual findings critical to the court’s decision are not supported by
substantial evidence. Jackson contends that in summarizing his juvenile and
adult criminal record, the court incorrectly found Jackson had used a firearm
in three separate offenses when he had not. Specifically, Jackson claims the
court improperly found firearm use in two cases where the firearm charges
were dismissed. Jackson further claims the court gave an incorrect account
of his involvement in the 2013 robbery, falsely stating that Jackson was
responsible for threatening the victim at gunpoint when only his codefendant
possessed a firearm during the incident. Jackson asserts that since firearms
use was a particularly concerning factor for the court, these factual errors in
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the court’s decision amount to prejudicial error and a violation of his state
and constitutional due process rights. We disagree.
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) grants trial courts discretion
to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that
a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent
felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 158 (Williams). The court’s discretion to strike prior strike convictions
“is not boundless but must be exercised strictly within the requirements of
section 1385.” (People v. Smith (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197.)
Section 1385 “ ‘ “requires consideration both of the constitutional rights of the
defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, in
determining whether there should be a dismissal.” ’ ” (Williams, at p. 159,
italics in original.)
In Williams, the California Supreme Court addressed what factors
courts may consider for ruling on a Romero motion: “[T]he court in question
must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the]
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of [the defendant’s] background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside [the spirit of the three strikes sentencing
scheme], in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had
not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.”
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
We review the trial court’s election not to strike prior strike convictions
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375
(Carmony).) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is
so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
(Id. at p. 377.) “A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings
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critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.” (People v. Cluff (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.)
“The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that
the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (People v. Superior
Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978.) Absent a showing that the
court’s ruling was irrational or arbitrary, we must presume the trial court
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its decision to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 376–377.) “Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might
have ruled differently in the first instance.” (People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).)
We disagree with Jackson’s contentions that the trial court’s denial of
his Romero motion relied on factual inaccuracies that amount to reversible
error. First, Jackson contends the trial court erred when it considered
firearms charges in his criminal record that were dismissed. He cites a
section 12022.5 allegation that was dismissed from his 1983 residential
burglary case, and a firearm enhancement that was dismissed in his 2002
drug possession case. The relevant facts relating to these prior cases were
discussed in the probation officer’s report. We conclude the court was
authorized in ruling on Jackson’s Romero motion to consider the underlying
facts of those offenses as set forth in the probation report, including facts
pertaining to the dismissed firearms charges.
Subject to certain limitations, the Penal Code and California Rules of
Court permit courts to rely on hearsay evidence contained in probation
reports. Section 1203 contemplates the inclusion of hearsay in a probation
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report, which the defendant is then given the opportunity to refute. (See
People v. Barajas (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 932, 939–940.) California Rules of
court, rule 4.411.5(a)(3) provides: “Records of an arrest or charge not leading
to a conviction or the sustaining of a petition may not be included unless
supported by facts concerning the arrest or charge.” Rule 4.411.5(c) provides:
“The source of all information must be stated. Any person who has furnished
information included in the report must be identified by name or official
capacity unless a reason is given for not disclosing the person’s identity.”
Accordingly, “[c]ourts routinely rely upon hearsay statements contained in
probation reports to make factual findings concerning the details of the
crime.” (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 212; People v. Tran 2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 877, 888, fn. 5 [“The court may also consider and rely upon
hearsay statements contained in a probation report, including the police
reports used to prepare the crime summaries contained in the report.”].)
Here, the dismissed firearms charges recounted in the probation report
constitute hearsay evidence the court was authorized to consider at Jackson’s
resentencing hearing. The probation officer included in the report a factual
description of Jackson’s criminal history and a description of the source of the
information. In describing the 1983 burglary case, the probation officer
stated that one of the victims identified Jackson as threatening him with a
gun and a gun was subsequently found at Jackson’s home. The probation
officer also discussed that in connection with Jackson’s 2002 drug case,
officers searched Jackson’s home and found ammunition and a loaded
handgun. Jackson does not argue that any information provided in the
probation report was inaccurate. The information pertaining to the
dismissed firearm charges thus conformed with the relevant rules and was
properly considered by the trial court at sentencing.
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Jackson also contends the trial court gave an incorrect account of his
involvement in the 2013 robbery when it stated that both Jackson and his
codefendant had threatened the victim at gunpoint. Jackson contends that
his conduct was “significantly less egregious” than what the court described,
since it was only the codefendant who possessed the firearm during the
offense. Because firearms use was a particular concern for the court, Jackson
contends the court’s factual errors played a critical role in the denial of his
Romero motion and resulted in an abuse of discretion.
The court’s statements, however, do not necessarily demonstrate that it
misunderstood Jackson’s role in the robbery. The trial court stated: “[T]he
defendant and his co-defendant pointed a gun at the owner of a Cash Plus
Store . . . . Mr. Jackson’s face was covered. He wore gloves. He and the co-
defendant took the cell phone and keys from the victim before moving him to
the back of the business at gunpoint. They forced the victim to get on his
knees and threatened to shoot him if he came out of the bathroom. Mr.
Jackson’s co-defendant threw away the victim’s cell phone and his keys. The
defendant took money from his safe and the case drawers.” The court’s
statements accurately reflect that there was some level of planning involved
and that Jackson and his codefendant were working together during the
robbery. Thus, when read in context, the court’s statement could be
interpreted to mean the court understood that Jackson was acting in concert
with his accomplice even if he himself was not personally armed with a
firearm during the incident.
Regardless, we conclude that even if the court had a mistaken
understanding of Jackson’s 2013 robbery offense and improperly relied on the
dismissed firearm charges, any error was harmless. Even when a trial court
takes improper factors into account in sentencing, “[a] remand for
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resentencing is required only where it is reasonably probable a different
result would have occurred had the improper factor[s] not been considered.”
(People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 949, 962–963; People v. Price (1991)
1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [“When a trial court has given both proper and improper
reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence
only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a
lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.”].)
Setting aside the 2013 robbery conviction and dismissed firearm
charges, Jackson’s criminal history is replete with firearms use. Most
notably, Jackson was armed during his most recent offense in 2014 for
attempted robbery, during which he directly threatened two individuals with
a handgun. Jackson’s prior strike offenses were also related to firearms use.
In his prior strikes from 1983, he was identified as the shooter who fired four
shots at a vehicle driven by a rival gang member. Then, in the 1985 prior
strike, he shot a rival gang member at a high school. The victim suffered five
gunshot wounds: one in the cheek, two in the abdomen, and two on the right
side of his neck. Since Jackson’s prior strikes and his most recent offense
indisputably involved the use of a firearm, the court was appropriately
troubled by Jackson’s pattern of firearms use when it denied his Romero
motion.
Moreover, the trial court’s sentencing decisions were not based
exclusively on Jackson’s history of firearms use. In explaining its ruling, the
court recognized in mitigation that Jackson’s priors strikes all occurred when
he was a juvenile, he was diagnosed with a mental illness, and he suffered
childhood trauma. However, the court found any factors in mitigation were
outweighed by a myriad of aggravating factors. These aggravating factors
included that Jackson’s commitment offenses “are more sophisticated crimes
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and that there was some planning that went into them.” The court was also
concerned by Jackson’s prison behavior, finding that he “systematically failed
to comply with the rules of prison.” Specifically, Jackson had four rules
violations for improper cell phone possession, which the court found
suggested a level of criminal sophistication. The court concluded, “[T]here is
insufficient evidence that Mr. Jackson’s risk for future violence has
significantly been decreased nor is there sufficient evidence that reflects that
age and time served have reduced his risk for future violence or that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” Given the court’s
sentencing comments in their entirety, we conclude that even assuming the
trial court erred by considering Jackson’s dismissed firearms charges or
incorrectly recounted his involvement in the 2013 robbery, there is no
reasonable probability that the trial court would have reached a different
result on his Romero motion.3
3 Because we conclude the trial court’s statements, even if considered
factually unsupported, do not amount to an abuse of discretion that warrants
a new resentencing hearing, we need not address the parties’ arguments
regarding forfeiture.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
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