People v. Smith CA2/4

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Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Smith CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337530

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA461118)
v.

DRESHAUN OSCAR SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Dreshaun Oscar Smith (Smith) appeals his conviction for
second-degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1 On appeal, Smith
argues the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to question him on
the details of his prior convictions involving firearms. We affirm, as even if
we were to assume the trial court erred, Smith has not established any
prejudice flowing from the purported error.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2017, Smith shot and killed Jonette Robinson
(Robinson) while she was sitting in her car with her boyfriend. The car was
parked in front of Robinson’s home and she was sitting in the driver’s seat.
Smith was across the street with friends. Smith became angry and threw a
bottle at Robinson’s car. Robinson opened her car door and asked Smith why
he threw the bottle. In response, Smith walked toward the car, drew a
firearm, and shot at Robinson, hitting her in the arm. Robinson’s boyfriend
reached across her body and tried to close the car door, but it would not close
all the way. Smith then approached the car, opened Robinson’s door, and
fired a second shot, this time hitting Robinson’s head. Smith then casually
walked down the street away from the car. Robinson died shortly thereafter.
An amended information was filed charging Smith with murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) with a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The information also

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.

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alleged that Smith suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, 667, subd.
(a)).2

I. Trial
Smith and Robinson lived in separate houses located on the same
property and had been part of the same friend group for several years. At
trial, Smith admitted to shooting Robinson but argued he acted in self-
defense because he saw a gun in Robinson’s hand. No gun was found on
Robinson or in her vehicle. The shooting was captured by surveillance
cameras in the area, and a video of the shooting was played for the jury.
Smith claimed he feared that other people in Robinson’s car meant him
harm because he had gotten into a fistfight with Robinson’s brother, Cory,3
the night before the shooting. The altercation eventually led to Cory
standing in front of Smith’s house with a group of people (including Robinson)
and firing a gun.
As Smith’s only claim of error on appeal concerns a line of questioning
during his cross-examination, we limit our discussion of the trial to the
relevant portions of Smith’s testimony.

2 The amended information also alleged three prior convictions under
section 667.5 that were stricken before trial.

3 As Cory Robinson and Jonette Robinson share a last name, we refer to
Cory by first name only for clarity. No disrespect is intended.

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A. Smith’s Direct Examination
Smith admitted he threw the bottle at Robinson’s car, claiming he did
so because Robinson insulted him and made him angry.4 After throwing the
bottle he began walking toward his house. While he was walking, he saw
Robinson getting out of her car with a gun in her hand. When he saw the gun
in Robinson’s hand, he fired two shots and walked away. He did not know
whether either of his shots hit Robinson. He found out hours later that
Robinson had died.
Smith also testified that he was not sure who else was in Robinson’s car
and that he was worried Cory might try to harm him again. He believed
Cory was threatening his life by firing a gun outside his house the previous
day. Smith had been shot at on four prior occasions.

B. Smith’s Cross-Examination
Before cross-examining Smith, the court held a sidebar with counsel.
At the sidebar, the prosecutor asked for permission to question Smith about
his prior gun use. The prosecutor indicated there was a report from one of
Smith’s prior felonies in which he robbed an eight-year-old child at gunpoint.
The prosecutor argued Smith “said he’s been shot at four times. . . . I think,
because he’s been saying he’s been shot, I can ask, ‘Have you used a gun
before on someone else?’” In response, Smith’s counsel said “I would object
and submit to the court” without identifying any specific grounds for the
objection. The court ruled the prior incident was relevant because Smith
testified that “he was fearful because he’d been shot in the past.”

4 There was conflicting evidence regarding Smith’s motive for throwing
the bottle. According to Smith, he threw the bottle at Robinson’s car because
she called him “a police-ass nigger.” However, Robinson’s boyfriend testified
that Robinson did not say anything to Smith before Smith threw the bottle.
4
On cross-examination, Smith admitted he used guns on other people
before the shooting with Robinson. When the prosecutor asked Smith if he
used a gun to rob an eight-year-old child, Smith denied it. The prosecutor
then asked if he was convicted of a robbery in 2001. Smith admitted he was.
When asked if he used a gun during that robbery, Smith said one of the other
people involved in the robbery had used a gun but he had not used one
himself.
Smith also testified that he had been friends with Robinson for years,
that she was kind to him and never said anything negative to him. He also
admitted he never saw Robinson carry any weapons or attack a person
before. He admitted he did not know why he thought Robinson was going to
shoot him. He also admitted he had no reason to believe Robinson was
carrying a gun at the time.
When he thought he saw a gun in Robinson’s hand, he drew his gun
and took two steps toward her car before firing the first shot. He fired
because he was scared and thought someone was going to harm him. He said
he feared for his life because he did not know who else was inside the car
with Robinson and was still worried about the incident with Cory the night
before. Even though he was afraid for his life, he continued walking toward
the car, opened Robinson’s door, and shot into the car again. He said he was
still scared after the shooting, claiming he did not even realize he had fired
shots. When asked why he casually walked away from Robinson’s car after
the shooting if he was still scared for his life, he said “At that point, I don’t
even know what was going on, in my head.”

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II. Verdict
The jury convicted Smith of second-degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
found true the allegation that he personally and intentionally used a firearm
to commit the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court struck Smith's
prior strike conviction and sentenced him to 40 years to life in state prison.
Smith timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Smith alternatively claims the evidence of his prior robbery was
inadmissible because it was irrelevant (Evid. Code, § 350), unduly prejudicial
(Evid. Code, § 352), and improper character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101).
“We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.]” (Nevarrez v. San Marino Skilled Nursing & Wellness
Centre, LLC (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 102, 117; People v. Kipp (1998) 18
Cal.4th 349, 369.) We do not disturb that ruling on appeal absent a showing
that the court exercised its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner” that resulted in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People
v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.) A judgment may be set aside for the
erroneous admission of evidence only if the error complained of was
prejudicial. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.) Appellants
bear the burden on appeal to show a purported error was prejudicial. (Pool v.
City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; In re Marriage of McLaughlin
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) The parties agree that prejudice in this
context is reviewed under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). Under Watson, reversal is only required if Smith
establishes a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more

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favorable outcome at trial if the challenged evidence had not been admitted.
(Id. at p. 836.)
Smith does not provide any analysis on the subject of prejudice.
Instead, he sets forth general legal principles under the Watson standard and
then states in a conclusory fashion that “Given the entire state of the
evidentiary record, had the specifics of Smith’s 2001 robbery conviction not
been admitted there is a ‘reasonable chance’ that a different result would
occurred [sic]; i.e., a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.” This sentence is
the entirety of Smith’s argument on the point. Smith does not provide a
summary of the evidence he relies on to establish prejudice, nor does he
provide any citations to the record where this evidence is located. Smith also
does not explain how the challenged evidence supposedly led the jury to
convict him of second-degree murder rather than voluntary manslaughter.
In response, the Attorney General contends any error was harmless,
arguing the evidence of Smith’s guilt was overwhelming as the video footage
shown to the jury showed Smith acting inconsistently with his claim of self-
defense. We agree there was significant evidence contradicting Smith’s
version of events. Specifically, the video showed Smith walking to Robinson’s
car, opening her door, firing the fatal shot to Robinson’s head, and then
casually walking away. These actions contradicted Smith’s testimony that he
was afraid of Robinson, that he was worried others could be in the car who
meant him harm, and that he did not know whether any of his gunshots had
struck Robinson. Smith also admitted he had never known Robinson to carry
a weapon and had no reason to believe she was carrying a firearm on the day
of the shooting. In his reply, Smith offers no rebuttal to this argument and
does not discuss the evidence cited by the Attorney General. Instead, he

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simply states, “Appellant has addressed the subject of prejudice in his
opening brief.” We disagree.
Smith’s conclusory reference to the “entire state of the evidentiary
record” is insufficient to carry his burden to establish prejudice on appeal.
(People v. Cardenas (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 240, 248 [“broad and conclusory
assertions of prejudice are not enough; appellant must develop an argument
that specifically substantiates his claim”]; People ex rel. City of Santa Monica
v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 887 [merely “asserting in conclusory
fashion that [appellant] was prejudiced” is insufficient]; People v. Yuksel
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850, 857 [“Appellant’s discussion of harmless error
principles is conclusory. He merely recites the federal and state tests for
error and asserts they apply here. Appellant’s conclusory discussion waives
the point on appeal”].)
Our role is not to examine the entire evidentiary record to construct
arguments for Smith. Rather, “our duty to examine the entire cause arises
when and only when the appellant has fulfilled his duty to tender a proper
prejudice argument.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
68, 106.) Smith has not tendered any such argument on appeal, nor can he.
Smith makes it clear that he is not challenging the introduction of evidence
that he was previously convicted of a robbery, instead he only challenges the
prosecution’s reference to “the details of his prior robbery offense.”
Specifically, he objects to the reference that he robbed a child. But these
details of his prior robbery conviction were never admitted into evidence. The
prosecutor asked Smith if he had previously robbed an eight-year-old child by
pointing a gun at him, and Smith denied it. The prosecutor then asked if he
had previously been convicted of robbery and Smith admitted that he had.
However, no one indicated the robbery conviction involved a child. Thus, the

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only reference to a child victim came in the form of the prosecutor’s question,
which is not evidence. (People v. Margarejo (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 102, 107
[“Counsel’s questions themselves are not evidence”].)
As the Attorney General notes, the jury was specifically instructed that
“[n]othing that the attorneys say is evidence. . . . Their questions are not
evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’
questions are significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses’
answers. Do not assume that something is true just because one of the
attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.” “We presume the
jurors understood and followed the instructions.” (People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 734, 770 (Johnson).) Smith does not address this argument in his
reply and has not put forth any evidence or argument suggesting the jury
ignored this instruction from the trial court.
Smith’s unsupported speculation that he might have been convicted of
manslaughter but-for the prosecutor’s question does not overcome the
presumption that the jury followed the court’s instructions. (Johnson, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 770; People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1279
[speculation alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the jury
followed the court’s instructions].) “[I]n light of the trial court’s instruction
that any statement made by an attorney in the course of the trial did not
constitute evidence and ‘may be considered only in so far as it supplies
meaning to this witness’s answer,’ there is no danger” Smith was prejudiced
by the prosecutor’s question. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 844.)
As Smith has not carried his burden of establishing prejudice, we
affirm his conviction. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.)
Therefore, we need not determine whether the trial court erred in allowing

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the prosecution to question Smith about his prior conviction and gun use and
decline to do so.5
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

5 It also appears that Smith may have forfeited any claim of error with
respect to this line of questioning because he failed to articulate any specific
grounds for his objection at trial. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [judgment
cannot be reversed for evidentiary error unless “There appears of record an
objection to . . . the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make
clear the specific ground of the objection”].) At trial, Smith’s counsel stated a
general objection without identifying any specific ground or grounds the
objection was based on. This is generally insufficient to preserve the issue for
appellate review. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228 [“A general
objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or one based on a different
ground from that advanced at trial, does not preserve the claim for appeal”].)
However, as we nonetheless affirm the judgment based on a lack of prejudice,
we elect not to determine whether Smith separately forfeited his claim by
failing to raise a proper objection at trial.
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