People v. Thomas CA2/4

CourtListener 10318201Calctapp21 gen 2025

Testo completo

Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Thomas CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B330465

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA497310)
v.

DONALD DUANE THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Daniel C. Chang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Donald Duane Thomas fatally stabbed his
neighbor Jorge Veliz-Velasquez during an altercation. A jury
rejected appellant’s heat of passion and self-defense theories and
found him guilty of second degree murder. Appellant contends
the court misstated the law and violated his constitutional right
to adequate instructions by failing to instruct the jury with
bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 3472, which provides that a
defendant who provokes a fight using non-deadly force has the
right to defend himself or herself with deadly force if the
opponent suddenly responds with deadly force. Appellant also
contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the
bracketed language. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An information filed in June 2022 charged appellant with
the July 2021 murder of Veliz-Velasquez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a)).1 The information further alleged that appellant suffered
prior strike convictions for robbery (§ 211) in 1967 and 1983 (§§
667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). Appellant proceeded to jury trial in
March and April 2023. The jury found him guilty of second
degree murder on April 13, 2023 and found the strike allegations
true after a bifurcated trial.
The trial court granted appellant’s motion to strike his
strike convictions in the interests of justice pursuant to section
1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497. It sentenced appellant to a term of 15 years to life.
Appellant timely appealed.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
In July 2021, appellant lived in his Jeep, which he parked
on the street near the St. Andrews Place Recreation Area in Los
Angeles. Veliz-Velasquez and his partner, Fatima Garmendia,
lived in an RV parked behind appellant’s Jeep. Minor Daniel C.
and his mother lived in an RV parked in front of appellant’s Jeep.
The neighbors were friendly with one another; Garmendia
provided appellant with power from her RV and watched his
belongings when he was away.
Garmendia and Daniel C., who was 14 at the time of trial,
both testified that on July 25, 2021, a man named Danny walked
by the parked vehicles. Garmendia testified that Danny used to
live in the area and frequently came by for food. She added that
Danny was “a little crazy” and “would always be yelling
throughout the streets.” Daniel C. also testified that Danny
“would walk every day in front of the RV’s” and “was always
yelling and asking for his money.”
Daniel C. testified that as Danny walked by, yelling,
appellant got up and asked Danny why he was yelling at
appellant. Garmendia told appellant that Danny was not yelling
at him. Both Daniel C. and Garmendia testified that appellant
“wanted to” fight or attack Danny, and proceeded to push Danny
and chase him into the street. Daniel C. and Garmendia testified
that Garmendia yelled at appellant to stop; Daniel C. added that
Garmendia grabbed appellant. They both testified that appellant
stopped going after Danny and approached Garmendia, looking
“very upset,” “angry,” and “furious.”

3
According to both Garmendia and Daniel C., appellant and
Garmendia then began yelling at one another. Around that time,
Veliz-Velasquez arrived at the scene in his Cadillac. Veliz-
Velasquez told appellant not to yell at Garmendia and stood
between her and appellant. Appellant began yelling at Veliz-
Velasquez. Garmendia and Daniel C. gave slightly different
testimony about what happened next.
According to Garmendia, Veliz-Velasquez pushed appellant
once with both hands, knocking him to the ground. While he was
on the ground, appellant told Veliz-Velasquez, “You’re going to
pay for it.” Garmendia told Veliz-Velasquez to run; he did, and
appellant chased him. Appellant pushed Veliz-Velasquez against
a fence surrounding a nearby basketball court. A man on the
court who was wearing a yellow shirt came over and told
appellant to stop fighting with Veliz-Velasquez. At some point
thereafter, appellant reached his arm toward Veliz-Velasquez’s
chest and stabbed him with a small knife Veliz-Velasquez said
he was going to go grab a bat, and went to his RV to do so. Veliz-
Velasquez held the bat in his hands but did not use it. At some
or all points during the chase and ensuing altercation with
appellant, Veliz-Velasquez was holding a small dog or puppy.
Daniel C. initially testified that Veliz-Velasquez got upset,
grabbed a bat from his RV, and told appellant he would fight him
with the bat if appellant did not leave. Veliz-Velasquez did not
strike appellant with the bat, however; he “threw the bat in front
of his RV” while he and appellant verbally sparred. Later in his
direct examination, after viewing surveillance video of the
incident that was admitted into evidence,2 Daniel C. testified

2 Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer Thorsten
Timmermans testified that he retrieved surveillance video from

4
that he did not see Veliz-Velasquez with the bat until later in the
altercation, after appellant had stabbed Veliz-Velasquez.
Daniel C. testified that Veliz-Velasquez was holding a little
dog or puppy while he and appellant yelled at one another.
Appellant then walked to the basketball court, where he talked to
a man wearing a yellow shirt. Garmendia and Veliz-Velasquez
were nearby, and Veliz-Velasquez was still holding the puppy
and yelling at appellant. After Veliz-Velasquez told appellant to
stay away from him and Garmendia, appellant “attacked” Veliz-
Velasquez, punching him in the face with a closed fist and
stabbing him in the chest with a “pocketknife.” Daniel C. saw
appellant stab Veliz-Velasquez twice. Veliz-Velasquez dropped
the puppy and ran back toward the RVs, where Daniel C. saw
him with a bat. He fell to the ground in front of Daniel C.’s RV.
LAPD officer Nelson Portillo testified that he was the first
officer to arrive on the scene. Appellant approached Portillo,
handed him a knife, and said, “I stuck him.” Portillo took
appellant into custody. Another officer retrieved the bat over
Garmendia’s objections, and bodycam footage recorded
Garmendia saying, “he brought it to save . . . because he was
having the knife.” Garmendia continued, “Look as soon as he get
that for save his self [sic] he came with the knife and cut him. …
We didn’t have no chance to hit him.” LAPD detective Gabriela
Saucedo wrote in her notes that Garmendia told her Veliz-

two cameras at St. Andrews park. The surveillance video was at
least 12 minutes long and captured appellant’s encounters with
both Danny and Veliz-Velasquez, albeit without audio and from
some distance away. Defense counsel stated during closing that
“we can all agree that what’s on the video is what actually
happened.”

5
Velasquez “retrieved a bat and threatened, ‘I’m going to beat your
ass.’” The next note Saucedo wrote stated, “The suspect removed
the knife from pocket and stabbed victim in the torso, front.”
Saucedo testified that the notes were not sequential.
Later testing of the knife, a pocketknife with no spring-
action, revealed blood on the blade that matched Veliz-
Velasquez’s DNA profile. DNA retrieved from the knife’s handle
matched both appellant and Veliz-Velasquez. Testing of
bloodstains on the bat matched only Veliz-Velasquez’s DNA. The
medical examiner who performed the autopsy of Veliz-Velasquez
testified that Veliz-Velasquez suffered a superficial “incise” or
“slashing” wound to the neck and two “stab” or “thrusting”
wounds to the chest. One of the stab wounds was five inches
deep and lacerated Veliz-Velasquez’s heart; the other was four
inches deep and pierced his right lung. Both were fatal.
II. Defense Evidence
On July 25, 2021, Arte Miura was driving toward the St.
Andrews Recreation Center when he saw an altercation between
two men (appellant and Danny). Miura identified appellant as
one of the men and said appellant was being “back[ed] out to the
street” and “started defending himself back.” Another man
(Veliz-Velasquez) pulled up in a Cadillac, and Miura thought it
“looked like he was going to jump in.” On cross-examination,
after viewing video of his interview with police, Miura stated that
the man in the Cadillac did not show up until after the fight had
concluded. He further testified that he did not see that man “get
physical” or “fight” appellant, though he “had a look on his face.”
Percipient witness Agent Alexander testified that he was
playing basketball at St. Andrews Park on July 25, 2021. He was
wearing a yellow shirt. He heard “loud noise back and forth” and

6
saw two people, an older man and a younger man, “altercating”
and “fighting” for “maybe 10 minutes.” He initially said the
people were “wrestling,” but after viewing surveillance video
testified that there was no physical fighting, only people “being
loud.” At some point, appellant approached Alexander at the
fence. Appellant was repeatedly yelling things like, “Leave me
alone. Stop effing with me. Leave me alone.” and “Get away from
me.” Appellant then threw a punch at Veliz-Velasquez.
Alexander did not see a knife in appellant’s hand at any point.
Darrell Prins was also playing basketball at St. Andrews
Park on July 25, 2021. He “saw parts of the altercation” and
went to see what was going on after the stabbing. He did not see
anyone flee the scene.
The defense played a police bodycam recording of an
interaction between a police officer at the scene and an
unidentified witness. During the conversation, the officer asked
the witness if he had seen what happened, and the witness
responded, “Yeah [unintelligible] … he got hit by a bat and all
that.” When the officer asked “Somebody hit him with a bat?,”
without clarifying or describing “him,” the witness gave an
unintelligible reply. The officer then asked if the witness knew
“who pushed him down and who hit him with a bat,” and the
witness said, “I guess That [sic] dude right there,” without
clarification. The officer asked if “they were fighting,” again
without clarifying who “they” was, and the witness responded,
“Pretty much, yeah.”
Garmendia’s brother, Nelson Magana, testified that
Garmendia had called him on “several occasions” to report
domestic violence between herself and Veliz-Velasquez. On one

7
occasion, in July 2015, Magana called the police because
Garmendia said Veliz-Velasquez had “pulled a knife on her.”
Appellant also testified on his own behalf. On July 25,
2021, appellant heard a “bad talker” who walked by “all the
time.” Appellant asked the man why he was doing this, and “he
kept pulling back away from me.” Appellant kept asking the man
questions as the man backed into the street. The man then
pulled out a knife, so appellant pulled his own knife from his
pocket. Appellant kept his knife in his hand as the man walked
away.
Appellant, who had about $3,000 or $4,000 in cash in his
pocket, then went over to talk to Garmendia. He had planned to
give Garmendia some of the money, but she was “put off” by
appellant’s interaction with the man. Before appellant had a
chance to say much to Garmendia, Veliz-Velasquez arrived in his
Cadillac. Garmendia ran up to Veliz-Velasquez and said
something to him about appellant’s encounter with the man. She
then told appellant to “stand right here” next to her, and he
responded, “You talkin’ to me like you would a dog.”
Veliz-Velasquez then “did a whole lot of cursing” and
chided appellant for “disrespecting” Garmendia. Appellant said
he had not disrespected anyone and started backing away. Veliz-
Velasquez, Garmendia, and a third person continued to advance
toward him. Veliz-Velasquez somehow knocked appellant out,
and he fell to the ground and soiled himself. He managed to keep
hold of his knife in his hand, however, while someone held him
down and Veliz-Velasquez kneed and kicked him in the side of
the head. Appellant repeatedly reiterated that he had his knife
out the whole time, after drawing it during the altercation with
the other man.

8
At some point, Veliz-Velasquez and the others stole
appellant’s money from him, and Veliz-Velasquez told him, “I’m
going to kill you.” Appellant “was scared” and “cut the man” one
time. Appellant believed he had cut Veliz-Velasquez in the arm
and testified that he “reacted” and did not “intend to do the
damage to that man.” Veliz-Velasquez went to his RV and got a
bat at some point; appellant gave inconsistent testimony about
whether it happened before the stabbing or after Veliz-Velasquez
was bleeding.

DISCUSSION
I. Background
The prosecution requested that the trial court instruct the
jury with three pattern instructions on self-defense: CALCRIM
Nos. 3471, 3472, and 3474.3 The parties submitted on CALCRIM
No. 3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial
Aggressor. The court gave that instruction, which as given
provided:
“A person who engages in mutual combat or who starts a
fight has a right to self-defense only if:
1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting;
AND
2. He indicated, by word or by conduct, to his opponent, in a
way that a reasonable person would understand, that he wanted
to stop fighting and that he had stopped fighting;
AND

3 At defense counsel’s request, the court also gave pattern
instructions on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter due to heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570) and
imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571).

9
3. He gave his opponent a chance to stop fighting.
If the defendant meets these requirements, he then had a
right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.
However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and
the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that
the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the
defendant had the right to defend himself with deadly force and
was not required to try to stop fighting, communicate the desire
to stop to the opponent, or give the opponent a chance to stop
fighting.
A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by
mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly
stated or implied and must occur before the claim to self-defense
arose.”
Defense counsel objected to CALCRIM No. 3474, Danger
No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled, arguing that “there’s
evidence of continuous course of conduct” such that “the threat
was omnipresent.” The trial court overruled the objection and
gave the instruction, which as given provided, “The right to use
force in self-defense continues only as long as the danger exists or
reasonably appears to exist. When the attacker withdraws or no
longer appears capable of inflicting any injury, then the right to
use force ends.”
Defense counsel also objected to CALCRIM No. 3472, Right
to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived, which the prosecution
apparently proffered without the bracketed language at issue in
this case. Defense counsel asserted the instruction was
unwarranted because there was no “evidence that a fight was
provoked with intent to create an excuse to use force.” He
contended, “I think that this is an organic, spur-of-the-moment

10
fight. I don’t think that there was any evidence of a motive to
induce a fight and then respond with deadly force.” The
prosecution responded that the surveillance video showed
appellant following Veliz-Velasquez as the latter kept moving
away.
The court found that the instruction was supported and
gave the following first sentence of the instruction: “A person
does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes a fight or
quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” There
was no discussion of, and the court did not give, the following
bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 3472: “However, if the
defendant used non-deadly force, and the opponent responded
with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not
withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to
defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to
try to stop fighting.” Notably, this language was included,
verbatim, in CALCRIM No. 3471.
During closing argument, which occurred after the jury was
instructed, the prosecution argued that the evidence did not
support a finding that appellant acted in self-defense. Referring
to language from the voluntary manslaughter instructions, the
prosecution argued it was unreasonable for appellant to believe
he was in imminent danger because the surveillance video
showed appellant approaching Veliz-Velasquez, following him
around, and turning his back to Veliz-Velasquez while appellant
was talking with Alexander at the basketball court. The
prosecution added, “You cannot use self-defense in mutual
combat. You cannot set up your own self-defense claim. You
cannot be the initial aggressor for self-defense. And you cannot
claim self-defense if the threat or the danger has already ended.”

11
Defense counsel argued that there was conflicting evidence
as to when Veliz-Velasquez got the bat and appellant drew the
knife, and urged the jury to find that appellant did not draw the
knife until after Veliz-Velasquez got the bat. He also contended
that appellant was provoked and reacted with passion in
response to seeing the bat. Defense counsel asserted that
appellant was much older than Veliz-Velasquez, and thus had no
other option but to draw his knife when he saw Veliz-Velasquez
with the bat. He further argued, “if the defendant uses non-
deadly force and the opponent responds with deadly force, the
defendant has the right to defend himself with – so in this
narrative, if Donald was following Mr. Veliz, Mr. Veliz responds
to what was originally a fistfight and pulls out the big guns with
the bat, that immediately makes deadly force appropriate in
response because in this story Mr. Veliz is ratcheting up the
intensity from what would just be mutual combat, fist to fist, to
something where deadly force is absolutely necessary.”
II. Analysis
Relying on People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940
(Ramirez) appellant contends that CALCRIM No. 3472, as given,
misstated the law and violated his constitutional rights to jury
trial, a complete defense, and adequate instructions on his theory
of the defense. Correctly anticipating respondent Attorney
General’s forfeiture argument, appellant asserts that his counsel
either preserved these arguments by objecting to CALCRIM No.
3472 as a whole, or rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
expressly request that the court instruct the jury with the
bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 3472. He alternatively
contends that we can and should reach his arguments because
the trial court violated its sua sponte duty to correctly instruct

12
the jury and the omission of the bracketed language affected his
substantial rights. (See § 1259.)
The general rule is that “‘[a] party may not complain on
appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the
evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has
requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’”
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 901; see also People
v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 671.) Appellant contends
CALCRIM No. 3472 as given was legally incorrect, but the
Supreme Court has held that the similarly worded CALJIC No.
5.554 correctly states the law. (People v. Enraca, supra, 53
Cal.4th at pp. 760-761.) Division Five of this district also has
held that CALCRIM No. 3472 as given “is a correct statement of
law” in all but “the very rare case in which a defendant intended
to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and the victim
responds with deadly force.” (People v. Eulian (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334.) Appellant asserts that this case is one
such rare case because it is on all fours with Ramirez, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th 940. We disagree.
In Ramirez, there was evidence that the defendants
confronted rival gang members intending to start a fight, but not
to shoot or kill anyone. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p.
944.) One of the defendants, Armando, testified that after a
fistfight broke out, one of the rival gang members, Rivera,
appeared to be holding an object that looked like a gun. Armando
then pulled his own gun from his sweatshirt pocket and fatally

4 “The right of self-defense is not available to a person who
seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real or apparent
necessity of exercising self-defense.” (CALJIC No. 5.55; People v.
Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761.)

13
shot Rivera. (Id. at p. 945.) The defense argued that because
Armando’s group started the fight intending to use only non-
deadly force, and Rivera responded with sudden and deadly force,
Armando had a right to use deadly force in self-defense. (See id.
at p. 948.) The prosecutor, relying on the current first sentence
(and then-entirety) of CALCRIM No. 3472, repeatedly argued in
rebuttal that Armando had no right to claim self-defense because
he instigated the fight. (See id. at pp. 948-949.) The jury found
Armando guilty of first degree murder and circled CALCRIM No.
3472 in the instructions. (Id. at pp. 943, 947.)
On appeal, Armando argued that CALCRIM No. 3472
“erroneously directed the jury to conclude a person has no right to
self-defense against an adversary’s deadly attack, even if the
defendant contrived to provoke a confrontation to use only
nondeadly force against the adversary.” (Ramirez, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 945, emphasis in original.) A divided panel of
the court of appeal concluded that although “CALCRIM No. 3472
states a correct rule of law in appropriate circumstances,”
including where a defendant contrives a deadly assault or
attempts to claim self-defense against a victim’s lawful
resistance, “under the facts before the jury [it] did not accurately
state governing law.” (Id. at p. 947.) The court explained that
“the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument erroneously
required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even
to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right
to self-defense.”5 (Id. at p. 953.)

5 The dissent disagreed, arguing that CALCRIM No. 3472 by
its plain terms applies only “to a subset of individuals who not
only instigate a fight, but do with the specific intent that they
contrive the necessity for their acting thereafter in ‘self-defense,’

14
We find Ramirez to be distinguishable. In contrast to
Ramirez, the prosecution argued self-defense did not apply
because appellant was not in imminent danger, not as a matter of
law because appellant started the quarrel. This accordingly is
not the “rare case” in which CALCRIM No. 3472 is legally
incorrect, and appellant therefore failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. Moreover, even if any of the prosecution’s arguments
could be construed to suggest that appellant had no right of self-
defense if he contrived to use only non-deadly force, appellant did
not object and has therefore forfeited any claim that the
prosecutor misstated the law. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60
Cal.4th 659, 674.)
Even if we were to assume the court erred by giving
CALCRIM No. 3472 without the bracketed language or other
modification, we would find the error to be harmless under any
standard. (See People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 303
[applying harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 where court gave erroneous self-
defense instruction]; People v. Sojka (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 733,
738 [“error arising from the failure to instruct on a defense to a
charge is most commonly analyzed under the test articulated in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ ]”].) Under the more
stringent Chapman standard, we must reverse the conviction

and thus justify further violent actions.” (Ramirez, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 954 (dis. opn. of Fybel, J.).) “Hence, if the
initial aggressor simply provokes a fight using nondeadly force—
without an intent to create a larger conflict for the purpose of
covering for him or her to engage in further violence in the name
of self-defense—he or she is not precluded from claiming self-
defense or imperfect self-defense in responding to the adversary's
response of deadly force.” (Id. at p. 955.)

15
unless we conclude “that no ‘rational juror who made the findings
reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial court could
have had a reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to
convict the defendant [absent the instructional error].’” (People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 244.) That standard is satisfied
here.
In CALCRIM No. 3471, the jury was instructed, largely
verbatim, with the language appellant contends was improperly
omitted from CALCRIM No. 3472. Defense counsel also argued,
without objection, that “if the defendant uses non-deadly force
and the opponent responds with deadly force, the defendant has
the right to defend himself,” and deadly force was “absolutely
necessary” because Veliz-Velasquez “ratchet[ed] up the intensity
from what would just be mutual combat, fist to fist.” The jury
accordingly had before it the correct principles, both in the
instructions and in counsel’s argument. (See People v.
Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 919 [finding error harmless
where “other instructions adequately conveyed the
requirement”].) Appellant contends “the exact same factual
scenario was present in Ramirez,” but here the prosecution did
not misconstrue the instructions or undermine the legal
underpinnings of the defense argument.
Moreover, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was
overwhelming. Surveillance video of the encounter showed that
appellant pursued Veliz-Velasquez, who was unarmed and
possibly holding a puppy when he was fatally stabbed. The bat
was stained with Veliz-Velasquez’s own blood, and not
appellant’s, indicating he wielded it only after being injured. To
the extent Veliz-Velasquez may have had the bat prior to being
stabbed, testimony established that he dropped it and did not use

16
it against appellant. Contrary to appellant’s assertion that
“there was no evidence that appellant intended to provoke a
deadly confrontation at the time that it began,” appellant himself
repeatedly testified that he had his knife in his hand for the
duration of the confrontation. The evidence did not support a
finding that Veliz-Velasquez escalated the conflict such that
appellant was justified in responding with deadly force.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

17

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.