CourtListener 10316932•People v. Williams CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/17/25 P. v. Williams CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166856
v. (Mendocino County
HARLAN NELSON HAWK Super Ct. Nos. 22CR00379 &
WILLIAMS, 22CR00412-A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Harlan Nelson Hawk Williams appeals a judgment
sentencing him to 20 years in prison for carjacking (Pen. Code,1 § 215,
subd. (a)) with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)). Williams contends that the trial court violated the prohibition on
dual use of facts by imposing the middle term for the carjacking while also
imposing sentence on the firearm use allegation. Williams further argues
that the trial court erred by failing to strike the firearm use allegation in the
interests of justice and failing to recognize that it could substitute a lesser
firearm enhancement.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Williams forfeited these claims by failing to object to the trial court’s
statement of reasons at sentencing, and even if he had objected, the claims
fail on their merits. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Day of the Carjacking
On an afternoon in February 2022, I.C.2 was driving his car with his
friend Juan C. in the passenger seat. I.C. saw Williams in the road with a
woman. Williams pulled out a gun and pointed it at I.C. from in front of the
car. Williams was yelling at I.C., but I.C. did not understand. Williams
opened the driver’s side door and pulled I.C. out of the car by his shirt.
Williams gestured for I.C. to get on the ground, and he obeyed.
When I.C. was on the ground, Williams hit him in the cheek with the
gun. I.C. was afraid and thought that he was going to die. Williams then
pulled Juan out of the car and told him to get on the ground. Once Juan was
on the ground, Williams got into the driver’s seat of I.C.’s car. The woman
accompanying Williams, later identified as his wife Bridgette Frank, got into
the passenger seat and Williams drove away.
Officers came to the scene of the carjacking. While they were on scene,
the stolen vehicle drove by them. The vehicle fled with officers in pursuit and
crashed into a tree, raising a cloud of dust. When the dust cleared, officers
saw Frank running from the scene of the crash and detained her. Officers
found Williams’s cell phone inside the crashed stolen vehicle. Williams was
2 To protect personal privacy interests, we refer to the victims in this
case by their initials or first name and last initial, and thereafter by their
initials or first name only. No disrespect is intended. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
detained approximately an hour later. In a post-Miranda3 interview with
police, he denied the carjacking but said he would “take all these charges.”
B. Jury and Bench Trials
In case No. 22CR00412-A, the Mendocino County District Attorney
charged Williams and Frank with carjacking of I.C. (§ 215, subd. (a)) and
other felonies. The district attorney alleged that Williams personally used a
firearm in the carjacking (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and had previously suffered a
“strike” conviction (§§ 1170.12, 667). The district attorney alleged seven
circumstances in aggravation applicable to Williams. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421.)
Williams and Frank were initially tried together. The jury deadlocked,
and the court declared a mistrial. The trial court granted Frank’s motion to
sever her trial from Williams’s.
After the district attorney dismissed the other felony charges, Williams
was retried for carjacking. The trial court bifurcated trial on the strike
allegation and aggravating circumstances, and Williams waived jury trial on
those issues. The jury convicted Williams of carjacking and found the firearm
use allegation true. The court held a bench trial and found true the strike
prior and the following aggravating circumstances: the offense involved a
threat of great bodily harm, Williams was armed with a weapon at the time
of the offense, Williams had served a prior prison term, Williams was on
postrelease community supervision (PRCS) at the time of the offense, and
Williams’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (2) & (b)(2)–(4).) The court declined to
find that Williams’s prior performance on supervision was unsatisfactory.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5).) It failed to rule on the allegation that
3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
3
Williams had engaged in violent conduct that represented a serious danger to
society. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).)
C. Sentencing
In advance of sentencing, Williams filed a statement in mitigation. He
submitted a report by a licensed psychologist documenting his history of
childhood trauma and argued that this history required a low-term sentence.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Williams reminded the trial court of the prohibition
against dual use of facts, pointing out that the court could not rely on his
firearm use to choose a particular term if it also imposed sentence on the
firearm use allegation. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.420(g).) He invited the trial court to dismiss the prior strike conviction
in the interests of justice. He further asked the court to strike the firearm
use allegation in the interests of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c).) Recognizing that
he was “not before [the trial] court with an unblemished record,” Williams
requested a six-year sentence, consisting of “the low term of three years,
enhanced by the special allegation that defendant was previously convicted of
a strike offense.”
The district attorney filed a sentencing memorandum opposing
Williams’s motion to strike the prior conviction based on his criminal history,
the violence of the carjacking, and his “dangerous conduct that puts the
public at risk of being seriously harmed.” The district attorney acknowledged
the trial court’s discretion to strike the firearm enhancement, but urged the
court to deny Williams’s motion based on a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety. The People sought imposition of the upper term of
4
nine years, doubled based on the strike conviction, with imposition of the 10-
year firearm enhancement for an aggregate term of 28 years in prison.
The trial court began the sentencing hearing by affirming that it had
read and considered the parties’ sentencing briefs. At oral argument,
Williams’s counsel emphasized the mandatory dismissal language of section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)4 and the evidence of childhood trauma referenced
in her statement in mitigation.
The trial court sentenced Williams to the middle term of five years for
carjacking, doubled to 10 years based on the strike prior, with an additional
10-year enhancement for the firearm use allegation, resulting in a total
aggregate sentence of 20 years in prison.
D. Case No. 22CR00379
In case No. 22CR00379, the Mendocino County Probation Department
filed a petition for revocation of community supervision. The petition alleged
that Williams had been released from prison on January 26, 2022, and had
violated three terms of his PRCS: failure to comply with instructions of his
supervising county representative by missing an appointment, engaging in
conduct prohibited by law based on the February 2022 carjacking described
above, and using a firearm based on an initial charge of assault with a
firearm in case No. 22CR00412-A. The trial court found Williams in violation
of PRCS during the bench trial on his prior strike conviction in case
4 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) pertains to the application of an
enhancement that could result in a sentence of over 20 years. On appeal,
Williams expressly abandons his claim that the trial court was required to
dismiss the firearm enhancement under this provision and does not address
several other mitigating circumstances he urged the trial court to apply. He
limits his contention of error to the trial court’s failure to accord great weight
to his childhood trauma.
5
No. 22CR00412-A. At the sentencing hearing in that case, the trial court
revoked PRCS and sentenced Williams to 180 days in county jail. Williams
had completed his sentence based on credit for time served at the time of
sentencing.5
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s decision to impose a particular sentence is reviewed for
abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless its decision is
so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’
[Citation.] ‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two
fundamental precepts. First, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 860–861
(Jones).) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew and applied the governing law” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1390 (Gutierrez)), and “considered all of the relevant factors” (People v.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310).
5 Although Williams’s notice of appeal includes both cases, he made no
objection to the trial court’s finding of a PRCS violation or sentence. He also
makes no substantive arguments in either opening or reply regarding the
PRCS case. An appellate court will ordinarily not consider erroneous rulings
where an objection could have been made in the lower court but was not.
(People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) Failure to offer
substantive argument to support a claim on appeal forfeits the claim. (People
v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 914.) We therefore do not further discuss the
PRCS case.
6
Second, a “ ‘ “ ‘decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable
people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor
warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Even if a trial court has stated both proper and
improper reasons for a sentence choice, ‘a reviewing court will set aside the
sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have
chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were
improper.’ ” (Jones, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.)
B. Williams Forfeited His Claims by Failing to Object
The Attorney General argues that Williams has forfeited all of his
claims by failure to object to the trial court’s statement of reasons at the time
of sentencing. Williams acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to
the trial court’s statement of reasons at sentencing.
A party may not raise on appeal “ ‘claims involving the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if
the party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies
to ‘cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a
particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state
any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons’ [citation], but the
rule does not apply when the sentence is legally unauthorized [citation].”
(People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751, quoting People v Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 353–354 (Scott).) A forfeiture may be found only where there
was “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to object’ ” during the course of the
sentencing hearing, i.e., where parties were “ ‘clearly apprised of the
sentence’ ” the court intended to impose and the reasons supporting its
discretionary choices. (Gonzalez, at p. 751, italics omitted.)
7
Here, Williams had a meaningful opportunity to object to the trial
court’s sentence. In addition to filing a statement in mitigation, the record
reflects that after pronouncing sentence and before advising Williams of his
appellate rights, the trial court paused to allow Williams and his counsel to
confer about whether he wanted to be present for further restitution
proceedings. After that consultation, Williams’s counsel addressed the trial
court regarding future restitution hearings and voiced no objection to the
sentence just imposed. We agree with the Attorney General that Williams
has forfeited his claims.
C. No Violation of Dual Use Prohibition
Williams also fails to show that the trial court’s selection of the middle
term, coupled with its sentence for the firearm use enhancement, violated the
dual use prohibition. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) establishes a
presumption that the trial court shall impose the lower term where the
defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma”
that was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” The trial
court “may only depart from this lower term presumption if it finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that
the lower term would be contrary to ‘the interests of justice.’ ” (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419.) In addition, a sentencing court generally
cannot make dual use of a single fact by using it “both to aggravate the base
term and to impose an enhancement.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 350; see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(g) [“a fact charged and found as an
enhancement may be used as a reason for imposing a particular term only if
the court has discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and
does so”].)
8
The trial court began its pronouncement of sentence by finding that
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) applied because Williams had experienced
childhood trauma that was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense. The court then explained its election to impose the midterm
sentence: “But I still have to . . . look at the aggravating factors and
mitigating factors that apply in this case, and the aggravating factors clearly
outweigh—not necessarily just in number, although they do, but in
significance as well.” The court found the factors in aggravation
“substantially outweigh the factors in mitigation and . . . the appropriate
sentence in balancing those interests is the midterm.” It continued: “[T]hat
five-year term is doubled with the imposition of the strike. I cannot in good
conscience find that this would be an unusual case where it would be in the
interest of justice to dismiss that strike given the fact that Mr. Williams was
on PRCS at the time of this event, there have been no significant breaks in
criminality during the time . . . between where he suffered the strike and has
been placed on . . . PRCS.”
Turning to the firearm enhancement, the court explained: “[T]he
carjacking in this case did not require the use of a firearm. It was more than
just the presentation of a firearm; it was the actual use of a firearm.
Although the firearm wasn’t discharged, . . . it was personally used to strike
the victim in order to gain access of the vehicle that was ultimately carjacked.
[¶] And so I . . . find that the enhancement is appropriate in this case, that it
is in the interest of justice to impose it, and it would not be in the interest of
justice to strike it.”
Williams contends the trial court relied on firearm use to both
aggravate the base term for carjacking and to sentence on the
9
section 12022.53 enhancement.6 But he fails to overcome the presumption of
correctness to which the trial court’s determination is entitled on appeal. The
trial court expressly referenced section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) in choosing
the term of imprisonment for the carjacking, acknowledging that its finding
of childhood trauma required it to “start[] with” the lower term. The court
then expressly found that the “aggravating circumstances substantially
outweigh the mitigating circumstances” in both number and significance in
determining that the middle term was the appropriate sentence. As noted
above, the court found four other aggravating circumstances to be true in
addition to the use of a firearm: (1) the threat of great bodily harm in the
offense, (2) Williams’s increasingly serious criminal history, (3) his recent
release on PRCS at the time of the commission of the carjacking, and (4) his
prior service of a prison term. Contrary to Williams’s argument that “the
trial court did not . . . suggest that other aggravating factors . . . supported its
selection of the midterm,” the court focused heavily on Williams’s status on
PRCS, his prior criminal history, and the lack of any significant break in
Williams’s record of imprisonment, supervision, and criminal conduct in
determining that he did not fall outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes”
sentencing law, making no reference to his firearm use. Indeed, the trial
court’s only comments on Williams’s firearm use occurred during its
explanation for its choice to impose sentence on the enhancement.
While Williams complains that the trial court did not list each
aggravating factor it relied on in imposing the midterm sentence to make it
clear it did not rely on firearm use, the court was not required to be so
6 In reply, Williams correctly concedes that the trial court was entitled
to rely on the aggravating circumstance that the offense involved the threat
of great bodily harm because the threat of great bodily harm is not an
element of carjacking. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).)
10
specific. It only had to “ ‘ “state in simple language the primary factor or
factors that support[ed]” ’ ” its discretionary sentencing choice. (People v.
Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 900.) The trial court is presumed to have
considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in the rules and to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and Williams bears
the burden to demonstrate error. (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
757, 765.) On this record, he has failed to do so. Williams has similarly
failed to demonstrate that the resulting sentence was irrational or arbitrary.
(See Jones, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 860–861.) We find no abuse of
discretion.
Even if the trial court had impermissibly relied on firearm use to
impose the middle term, any error was harmless. “[I]f a trial court has stated
both proper and improper reasons for a sentencing choice, ‘a reviewing court
will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons
were improper.’ ” (Jones, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) In this case,
there is no reasonable probability that the trial court would have selected the
lower term. Had the court believed that a sentence of less than 20 years was
appropriate, it had multiple avenues to impose a lesser sentence, including
striking Williams’s prior conviction or the firearm enhancement. Instead, the
court emphasized Williams’s criminal history and status on PRCS in
concluding that it could not “in good conscience” find Williams outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes sentencing law—a conclusion Williams does not
challenge on appeal. The record amply supported that finding, particularly
in light of the extremely short duration of Williams’s release on PRCS prior
to the carjacking. The trial court also declined to strike the firearm
enhancement, recognizing that it had the discretion to do so and finding that
11
it would not serve the interests of justice. In short, the trial court made every
discretionary sentencing choice it could in a manner adverse to Williams with
the exception of selecting the middle term rather than the upper term. With
a plethora of other proper aggravating circumstances to rely on, this record
affords no basis to believe that the trial court would have selected the lower
term absent dual use of the firearm aggravating circumstance.7
D. Failure to Strike Enhancement Did Not Abuse Discretion
Williams argues that the trial court erred in two ways by imposing
sentence on the firearm enhancement. First, he contends that the trial court
failed to give great weight to his childhood trauma in denying his
section 1385 motion to dismiss the firearm enhancement in the interests of
justice. Second, he argues that the trial court was unaware of its discretion
to impose a lesser uncharged firearm enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) when striking an allegation under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b), and therefore failed to exercise informed discretion.
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.) We find no abuse of discretion.
1. Weight to Childhood Trauma
Williams initially argued that section 1385 creates a rebuttable
presumption requiring dismissal of enhancements whenever a court finds the
specified mitigating factors present and fails to also expressly find that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety as defined in the
statute. After Williams filed his opening brief, the California Supreme Court
held that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not “create[] a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement that can only be
7 Because we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the
trial court would have chosen a lower term sentence, we also conclude that
Williams has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to object to the sentence as a basis for avoiding forfeiture.
12
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.” (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1034 (Walker).) Instead, “a trial court must
‘engage[] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated
mitigating factors,’ in which the mitigating factors weigh ‘strongly in favor of
. . . dismissal’ [citation] . . . . Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that
dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances
strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must
determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that,
absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing
factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036, italics added by Walker.)
In reply, Williams acknowledges Walker’s holding and concedes the
lack of a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal. He nonetheless argues
that the trial court’s comments demonstrate that it “focused solely on the fact
that Williams not only displayed the firearm during the carjacking, but also
used it to strike the victim,” and that “the court’s reasoning does not reflect
that the court gave any weight, let alone ‘great weight,’ to the mitigating
circumstance of Williams’s childhood traumas.”
Williams’s argument focuses too narrowly on only one portion of the
trial court’s comments. Williams would have us require that the trial court
repeat each aggravating and mitigating circumstance it considered at each
separate sentencing choice—but section 1170, subdivision (c) does not require
any particular form of statement or the specific identification of
“ ‘aggravating and mitigating factors . . . or . . . “ultimate facts” that
13
“justify[]” ’ ” discretionary sentencing choices. (People v. Buford, supra,
4 Cal.App.5th at p. 900.) “ ‘Rather, the court must “state in simple language
the primary factor or factors that support the exercise of discretion.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
Here, the trial court began its statement of reasons by recognizing the
significance of Williams’s childhood trauma in selecting the appropriate term.
It then acknowledged Williams’s increasingly serious criminal record, service
of prison time, and recent release on PRCS before concluding that imposing
sentence on the firearm enhancement would further justice considering
Williams’s use of a firearm to pistol-whip a victim (who the record reflects
was already out of his car and on the ground). We agree with the Attorney
General that the entirety of the court’s comments reflect that it “acted within
its discretion by concluding that these actions constituted ‘countervailing
factors’ that neutralized the ‘great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement [was] not in furtherance of justice.’ ”
2. Discretion to Substitute a Lesser Enhancement
Williams’s second contention, that the trial court failed to exercise
informed discretion to substitute a lesser firearm enhancement, fares no
better. Prior to 2018, section 12022.53 enhancements were mandatory and
could not be stricken by the trial court. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th
688, 695 (Tirado).) Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the
statute to allow the court to strike an otherwise mandatory enhancement in
the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h);
Tirado, at p. 696.) The Courts of Appeal split on the question of whether a
court could now strike an enhancement charged under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) and, in its place, impose a lesser enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c), even if the lesser enhancement was
14
not specifically charged in the information or found true by a jury. (Tirado,
at p. 696.) The Tirado court resolved the split, holding the trial court has
this discretion. (Id. at p. 700.)
Tirado relied on a long line of prior cases holding that a court is not
categorically prohibited from imposing a lesser included, uncharged
enhancement so long as the prosecution has charged the greater
enhancement and the facts supporting imposition of the lesser enhancement
have been alleged and found true. (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 697–698,
citing People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, People v. Fialho (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1389, People v. Dixon (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 985, and
People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721.) The opinion approved the
reasoning of People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217, which it described
as “[e]xtending the principle” of Strickland, Fialho, Dixon, Lucas, and People
v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616. (Tirado, at p. 696.) Notably, Fialho
addressed the specific lesser enhancement raised by Williams here, holding a
trial court could impose personal firearm use enhancements under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) after determining that section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancements found true by the jury no longer applied to the
lesser included offenses of which the defendant was convicted. (Fialho, at
pp. 1398–1399.)
After Tirado and before Williams’s sentencing hearing, multiple
published Court of Appeal decisions considered whether a sentencing court
striking a found-true section 12022.53 enhancement could impose a lesser
section 12022.5 enhancement. Two held that it could. (People v. Fuller
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394, review granted Nov. 2, 2022, S276762, review
dism. June 26, 2024; People v. Johnson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074, review
granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277196, review dism. June 26, 2024.) One reached
15
the opposite conclusion, holding that the plain language of section 12022.53,
subdivision (j)8 prohibited a court from substituting a more lenient
enhancement from another statute. (People v. Lewis (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
34, 39, disapproved of by People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1030.)
Williams cited Tirado in his statement in mitigation but requested only
that the trial court strike the enhancement in its entirety. He did not ask the
court to consider substituting a lesser section 12022.5 enhancement, nor did
he cite Fuller, Johnson, or Lewis.9
After Williams filed his opening brief, the California Supreme Court
resolved the split between Fuller, Johnson, and Lewis, disapproving Lewis,
and holding that “[w]hen a court has exercised its discretion under
subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and finds that no
other section 12022.53 enhancement is appropriate, the second sentence of
subdivision (j) is inapplicable” and the court may impose “a lesser included,
uncharged enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53” if the
8 Section 12022.53, subdivision (j) states in relevant part:
“When an
enhancement specified in this section has been admitted or found to be true,
the court shall impose punishment for that enhancement pursuant to this
section rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other law,
unless another enhancement provides for a greater penalty or a longer term
of imprisonment.”
9 Here, we continue to reject Williams’s argument that his forfeiture of
this issue below should be waived for ineffective assistance of counsel, but for
a different reason. Acknowledging his criminal history, Williams’s trial
counsel specifically requested a six-year sentence in the statement in
mitigation filed prior to sentencing. Substitution of the lesser section 12022.5
enhancement would not have allowed the trial court to reach Williams’s
requested result without granting the motion to strike the prior strike
conviction—a sentencing choice that was unlikely due to Williams’s criminal
history. The record reveals a strategic choice for Williams’s failure to argue
for substitution of the lesser enhancement in the trial court.
16
enhancement “is supported by facts that have been alleged and found true.”
(People v. McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.) McDavid described
Tirado as “affirm[ing] the general rule that when an adjudicated
enhancement has been dismissed, ‘imposition of an uncharged enhancement
is permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are alleged and
found true,’ ” and “recogniz[ing] that a court’s discretion to impose a lesser
included, uncharged enhancement may be restricted by statute.” (McDavid,
at p. 1025.)
The Attorney General argues that Williams cited Tirado in his
statement in mitigation, and the trial court therefore was presumably aware
of its discretion to impose lesser enhancements. In reply, Williams points out
that the presumption that a trial court has followed established law does not
apply where the law in question was uncertain when the lower court acted,
citing People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 1000 (Jeffers). Williams argues
that the scope of the trial court’s discretion to substitute a lesser included
enhancement “was unresolved when Williams was sentenced” and we should
not “presume[] that the trial court anticipated and then correctly applied the
legal principles that would later be announced . . . in McDavid and Walker.”
We find Jeffers distinguishable. In Jeffers, the Court of Appeal
construed a former version of section 1203.066, subdivision (c)(1) to prohibit a
grant of probation because the defendant was not a member of the victim’s
household at the time of sentencing. (Jeffers, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 991.)
The trial court had denied probation, apparently believing the evidence
would not permit a finding that the defendant was part of the household at
the relevant time. (Id. at pp. 991, 1001.) In so doing, the trial court stated,
“ ‘but for the legislative prohibition I think this could clearly be an
appropriate case for probation.’ . . . ‘. . . Lives are truly being shattered
17
unnecessarily, but I don’t make the law.’ ” (Id. at p. 991.) The Supreme
Court held the statute referred to the victim’s household at the time of the
offense rather than the time of sentencing. (Id. at p. 1000.) It concluded that
the evidence on the household’s composition at the time of the offense was
inconclusive, and the trial court could have found probation eligibility under
this construction of statute. (Ibid.) Considering “the ambiguity of the
statutory language in question, and the lack of any authoritative
construction,” it found “a substantial likelihood that the trial court relied on
an incorrect interpretation” of the statute, confirmed by the court’s remark
“that it was ‘incapable totally’ of finding eligibility” for probation. (Id. at
p. 1001.)
By contrast, at the time of sentencing in this case there were three
“authoritative constructions” of the statutes at issue—Fuller, Johnson, and
Lewis.10 Fuller and Johnson, both of which favored Williams’s current
position, were decided months before the sentencing hearing. Unlike the
situation in Jeffers, the trial court’s sentencing comments expressly
recognized it had the authority to strike the section 12022.53 enhancement in
the interests of justice, and in no way indicated that it perceived
subdivision (j) as a barrier to a sentencing choice that it otherwise wished to
make. We may not presume error from a silent record. (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.)
10 Review had not yet been granted in either Johnson or Lewis, so both
were fully citable for their precedential effect. Although review had been
granted in Fuller a month prior to the sentencing hearing, the Supreme
Court’s order granting review did not alter the trial court’s ability to cite it
for persuasive value. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1) [permitting
citation for potentially persuasive value while case pending review unless
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court].)
18
3. Remand for Resentencing Is Not Required
Where the trial court fails to recognize the full scope of its discretion,
“ ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record
“clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People
v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 424.)
Here, the trial court was clearly aware of its discretion to strike the
section 12022.53 allegation in its entirety and expressly found that it would
not be in the interests of justice to strike the allegation. Substituting a lesser
included section 12022.5 enhancement would have permitted the court to
select from a triad of three, four, or 10 years, resulting in an aggregate
sentence of 13, 14, or 20 years.11 Williams is currently sentenced to 20 years,
and there is no reason to think the court would strike one enhancement and
substitute another just to impose the same sentence. Had the trial court
believed that an aggregate sentence of 13 years was the appropriate
punishment for Williams’s conduct, it could have chosen that sentence
without substitution of the lesser enhancement by imposing a lower term
sentence of three years for carjacking, striking Williams’s prior strike, and
imposing sentence on the 10-year section 12022.53 enhancement. It chose
not to do so. Similarly, had the trial court chosen to strike the prior
conviction, sentence Williams to the middle term of five years for carjacking,
and impose the 10-year section 12022.53 enhancement, it could have
achieved an aggregate sentence of 15 years in prison.
11 These aggregate sentences result from doubling the five-year middle
term for carjacking and adding three, four, or 10 years for the substituted
enhancement.
19
In declining to strike Williams’s prior strike, the court applied the same
“furtherance of justice” standard that it would have applied in declining to
strike the firearm enhancement and impose a lesser one. (See § 12022.53,
subd. (h).) And the decisions would have essentially the same result: a 20-
year aggregate sentence versus a 15-year or lower aggregate sentence. The
trial court’s finding that the interests of justice did not support striking the
section 12022.53 enhancement, combined with its choices to decline existing
options in favor of a 20-year aggregate sentence, clearly indicate that it would
not have chosen to substitute a lesser firearm enhancement even had
McDavid been decided prior to Williams’s sentencing.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HILL, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BANKE, ACTING P. J.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
* Judge of the San Mateo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
20
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.