CourtListener 10316857•People v. Heers CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/17/25 P. v. Heers CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083761
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN446923)
ANGELA HEERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Angela Heers of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code1 § 245, subd. (a)(1)). Heers was placed on formal probation for two
years.
Heers contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting into
evidence (1) allegations Heers made against the victim in an application for a
restraining order she filed approximately a month before she committed the
assault charged in this case; and (2) Heers’s prior conviction for a crime of
moral turpitude in 2018, for the purpose of impeaching Heers’s credibility as
a witness. We conclude that Heers’s contentions lack merit, and we
accordingly affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
M.W. owns and lives on a multiacre property in Oceanside, some of
which he rents out to F.R. to run a plant nursery. Heers works for M.W. on
the property and lives in a room in M.W.’s house. Heers and F.R. were not on
good terms with each other. In July 2023, Heers unsuccessfully petitioned for
a restraining order against F.R., in which she sought, among other things, an
order requiring F.R. to stay away from the property and from M.W.
On the morning of August 23, 2023, F.R. walked up to M.W.’s house to
check on M.W., who was sick. Heers was in front of the house painting a
gate. When Heers saw F.R. approaching, she confronted him near the front
door and told him to leave. Heers and F.R. then got into a physical
altercation, which resulted in F.R. incurring a cut on his left torso and an
injury to his hands. During their trial testimony, Heers and F.R. gave
different descriptions of the incident.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
According to F.R., after Heers told him to leave, Heers started the
physical altercation by swinging a long heavy metal tool at F.R.’s torso while
he was near the front door.2 The tool struck him and inflicted a cut. F.R.
explained that when Heers tried to hit him with the tool a second time, he
grabbed the tool and struggled with Heers while she kicked him multiple
times. Heers also hit him in the face several times during the incident. F.R.
eventually released his grip on the tool, ran away, and called 911.
Heers testified that F.R. was the aggressor. Heers explained that she
was trying to block the front door with her body, but F.R. pushed her. Heers
tried to protect herself by slapping F.R.’s face, and she kicked him one time.
She also tried to bar the door with the metal tool, resulting in a tug-of-war
between her and F.R. over the tool.
Heers was charged with assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)).) The jury found her guilty of that offense, and Heers was placed
on formal probation for two years.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Evidence Regarding the Petition for a Restraining Order Heers Filed
Against F.R.
We first consider Heers’s contention that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence regarding the July 19, 2023 petition for a restraining
order that Heers filed against F.R. approximately a month before the incident
at issue in this case (the Petition).
2 At trial, the tool was identified as a “spud bar,” which is a roofing tool
weighing 15 to 20 pounds. It consists of a five-foot long metal pole, with a flat
metal square blade on the end.
3
1. Relevant Proceedings
The People filed a motion in limine to introduce a certified copy of the
Petition. The motion in limine argued that the Petition was relevant to prove
Heers’s motive for attacking F.R. because it showed her “prior disdain” for
him.
The parties and the trial court discussed the motion in limine during
an unreported chambers conference, which was later continued on the record.
As described on the record, the trial court indicated during the unreported
conference that it would allow the People to introduce evidence about some of
the contents of the Petition to show Heers’s motive, but it would not allow
admission of the Petition itself.3
The record contains no evidence that defense counsel ever took the
position that the contents of the Petition should be excluded from evidence in
their entirety. Defense counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of prior restraining order petitions that F.R. and other people had
filed against Heers, but that motion in limine did not seek to exclude
evidence of the Petition that Heers had filed against F.R. Moreover, when the
unreported chambers conference was later discussed on the record, neither
the trial court nor defense counsel referred to defense counsel having made
any objection regarding the Petition during that conference.
3 The trial court later summarized its understanding of why the Petition
was relevant. “The reason that the People are seeking to admit this evidence
is to argue that Ms. Heers had a motivation, a motive, to have [F.R.] removed
from the property, that that in some way would motivate her to commit an
assault on him; and that she was motived [sic] for him to leave.” As the trial
court understood the People’s position, “the argument here is that she filed
this restraining order and then, essentially, she didn’t want him on the
property so bad that she took it into her own hands.”
4
At the in limine hearing, the trial court explained that, during the
chambers conference, it suggested that counsel “take some of the statements
that were made by [Heers] in the declaration to support the restraining order
and transfer them onto a different document[.] [I]f the attorneys would
stipulate to that, that . . . could be presented as statements made by
[Heers].” Accordingly, the next day, the prosecutor presented the trial court
with a stipulation that she had drafted describing the contents of the
Petition, but she explained that defense counsel did not agree to the inclusion
of several items that the prosecutor believed should be included. After
hearing from the parties about those disputed items, the trial court agreed
with defense counsel that the disputed allegations should be omitted
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 because they were “either . . . so
outrageous that they would lead a jury to perhaps speculate and wonder or
they really don’t make sense in some way.”4 However, the trial court
clarified that “if [Heers] will testify, then the calculus changes. Certainly, if
she testifies, you can ask her about all of these things because she’s there on
the stand to either admit or deny that she said these things and the reason
for them.” Thereafter, defense counsel and the prosecutor signed a revised
version of the stipulation.
During F.R.’s testimony, the prosecutor introduced the stipulation and
read it to the jury. As read, that stipulation stated,
4 The only items that the trial court kept in the stipulation, over defense
counsel’s objection, were two of the orders that Heers had sought in the
Petition: (1) an order that F.R. not be within a thousand yards of the mailbox
at M.W.’s property; and (2) an order that F.R. not be allowed to sell or move
any of his nursery plants. The trial court ruled that those items were
probative of the relief Heers was requesting, and their admission would not
violate Evidence Code section 352. On appeal, Heers makes no argument
specifically singling out those items as prejudicial.
5
“It is stipulated by and between the parties that, one, on July
19th, 2023, Angela Heers petitioned the Court for a restraining
order against [F.R.].
“In that petition, Ms. Heers made the following accusations about
[F.R.]: He cocked his hand back and punched her; he pushed her
through the gate onto her residence;
“He yanked her hand through a chain fence, crippling her hand;
he hit her with a shovel; he chased her with a shovel; he
threatened to have her kicked off the property;
“He trespasses; he commits verbal abuse; he commits physical
abuse; he commits psychological abuse; he commits emotional
abuse; he commits financial abuse;
“He has broken city codes; he is illegally mining and grading; he
has illegally hooked up to home utilities, water and electricity; he
has stolen her items, such as vehicles, keys, computers, phones,
money, work materials;
“He has filed false police reports; he has broken her tools; he has
unleashed dogs against her and have them bite her. He is
illegally working on the property.
“It is further stipulated, item number 2, that on July 19th of
2023, in the same petition, Angela Heers made the following
request with respect to [F.R.]: That he must stay 1000 yards
away from the mailbox on [M.W.’s real property], that he must
not come near [M.W.’s real property], that he must not come near
[M.W.], and that he cannot sell or move any plants on any of his
nursery sites.”
Pursuant to the trial court’s ruling, the jury did not learn that the
Petition was denied. However, during his testimony, F.R denied having done
any of the things that Heers alleged in the Petition.
When Heers did testify at trial, the prosecutor sought to question her,
on cross examination, about the remaining items in the Petition that the trial
6
court had ruled should not appear in the stipulation. Defense counsel
objected, explaining that those allegations were “prejudicial because they
imply a level of mental instability, potentially,” and counsel was “concerned
about evidence of potential mental health issues coming through and the jury
using that against” Heers. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to question
Heers about the allegations, but with leading “yes” or “no” questions about
whether Heers made those allegations. The trial court agreed that “some of
the statements were arguably . . . what one would consider farfetched, in an
objective sense,” but it explained that “at this point she’s taken the stand and
I think [it] is relevant and probative as to her credibility. She’s now a
witness. The jury can judge her credibility.” The trial court also indicated
that, as with the allegations appearing in the stipulation, the evidence was
relevant to Heers’s motive in assaulting F.R. Further, the trial court
observed that defense counsel would have the opportunity on redirect to allow
Heers to explain any of the allegations.
The prosecutor then elicited testimony from Heers about the additional
allegations in the Petition. Heers confirmed that the Petition included
allegations that F.R. (1) committed “judicial abuse”; (2) had people who work
in the court inform him when Heers filed motions; (3) sexually abused his
employees; (4) had his twin brother abuse her; (5) had his wife abuse her;
(6) stole exotic fruits and nuts from her; (7) poisoned the ground; (8) poisoned
the water; (9) severely tortured her; and (10) kept illegal roosters, with
collars that make them crow “24/7” to intentionally deprive her of sleep.
Further, Heers confirmed that the relief she sought in the Petition included
that F.R. be detained for (1) an agricultural investigation; (2) an investigation
of a biological attack on U.S. soil; (3) an investigation of a biological attack on
livestock; and (4) an investigation of a biological attack on west coast
7
waterways. During redirect, defense counsel asked Heers to clarify the
statements in the Petition regarding a “biological attack” and “waterways.”
2. Heers’s Argument Lacks Merit
Heers argues on appeal that the “entirety” of the Petition should have
been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 because it was only
marginally relevant to show her motive, but it was highly prejudicial.5
However, as we will explain, in light of the procedural history we have set
forth above, Heers’s appellate argument regarding the Petition is misguided.
As we have discussed, some of the allegations in the Petition were
admitted into evidence by means of the stipulation because the trial court
viewed them as relevant to Heers’s motive. The record contains no indication
that defense counsel made a general objection to the admission of the Petition
when the People brought a motion in limine seeking its admission. Further,
the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the specific allegations
from the Petition that defense counsel argued were too prejudicial to include
in the stipulation. Later, however, those more prejudicial allegations from
the Petition were admitted into evidence during the prosecutor’s cross
examination of Heers because they were relevant to her credibility as a
witness. Defense counsel did object to the admission of those allegations.
5 Evidence Code section 352 provides that “[t]he court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Heers’s challenge to the
admission of the evidence is based solely on Evidence Code section 352. She
does not dispute that, in the absence of exclusion under that provision, any
relevant statements made in the Petition were admissible under the hearsay
exception for statements of a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220).
8
On appeal, Heers argues that none of the allegations from the Petition
should have been admitted, even those that were described in the stipulation
read to the jury. She argues that the evidence was introduced to prove
Heers’s motive, but motive was only a “collateral” issue, and the allegations
in the Petition were “highly prejudicial” to Heers because they “cast her in an
unfavorable light” and “materially affected [her] credibility.”6 However,
Heers does not acknowledge, and seems not to be aware, that additional
allegations from the Petition were later admitted during the prosecutor’s
cross examination of Heers, and that they were admitted precisely because
they were relevant to Heers’s credibility as a witness. Specifically, referring
to the allegations appearing in the stipulation, Heer’s opening appellate brief
argues that “although the trial court properly curbed several of the excesses
from the prosecutor’s attempts to introduce such evidence, its failure to
exclude such evidence in its entirety constituted an abdication of its
responsibilities under Evidence Code section 352.” (Italics added.) Once
again appearing not to realize that additional allegations in the Petition were
eventually admitted during Heers’s cross examination because they were
relevant to Heers’s credibility, that brief focuses on the admission of the
stipulation alone, arguing that “[e]ven as limited by the trial court, the
stipulation included twenty separate allegations by [Heers] against [F.R.],
including not only specific acts including acts of violence, but also broad
allegations of verbal, physical, psychological, emotional, and financial abuse.
6 Heers argues in her appellate brief that the trial court improperly
admitted the allegations from the Petition, despite their inflammatory
nature, on the further ground that they were relevant to show Heers’s
character. The premise of Heers’s argument fails. We see no indication in
the record that the trial court allowed evidence from the Petition into
evidence based on its relevance to show Heers’s character.
9
As such, those allegations constituted precisely the kind of inflammatory
statements to which section 352 has historically been directed.”
To the extent Heers’s appellate challenge is focused on the evidence
described in the stipulation read to the jury, that argument has been
forfeited. “[A] challenge to the admission of evidence is not preserved for
appeal unless a specific and timely objection was made below.” (People v.
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 586; see also Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)
[error in admitting evidence may not be the basis for the reversal of a
judgment unless “an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the
evidence . . . was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific
ground of the objection or motion”].) Here, as we have explained, the record
contains no indication that defense counsel ever objected to the admission
into evidence of Heers’s allegations against F.R. that were described in the
stipulation read to the jury.7 Accordingly, Heers may not bring an appellate
challenge to the admission of that evidence.
Defense counsel did object in the trial court when the prosecutor
sought to cross examine Heers about the additional allegations she made in
the Petition, which were not included in the stipulation. However Heers’s
appellate briefing does not develop an argument challenging the admission of
those additional allegations. In fact, Heers’s appellate briefing does not even
acknowledge that any additional allegations were admitted during Heers’s
cross examination. Moreover, as we have explained, the trial court’s
principal reason for allowing the admission of the additional allegations was
7 As we have described, defense counsel did unsuccessfully object to the
inclusion in the stipulation of two of the items of relief Heers requested in the
Petition. However, Heers makes no specific argument on appeal challenging
the inclusion of those items in the stipulation or explaining why they were
unduly prejudicial.
10
to allow the jury to evaluate Heers’s credibility as a witness, with the
understanding that defense counsel could try to rehabilitate Heers’s
credibility by allowing her to explain herself on redirect. Heers makes no
attempt to discuss whether, in light of the relevance of the evidence to
Heers’s credibility as a witness, and defense counsel’s opportunity to
rehabilitate her, the evidence should nevertheless have been excluded under
Evidence Code section 352.
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the
judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see also People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866,
881 [“on appeal a judgment is presumed correct, and a party attacking the
judgment, or any part of it, must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial
error”].) “ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine
the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ” (Flores v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 204
(Flores).) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
1014, 1075.)
Because Heers has failed to make any argument challenging (or even
acknowledging) the trial court’s admission of evidence from the Petition
during the prosecutor’s cross examination of her, any such challenge has been
forfeited. We therefore do not analyze whether the trial court was within its
discretion to admit, during the prosecutor’s cross examination of Heers, the
additional allegations that were not already described in the stipulation.
11
B. Heers’s Challenge to the Admission of Evidence That She Was Convicted
of a Crime of Moral Turpitude
We next consider Heers’s contention that the trial court erred in
allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from Heers that she had been
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
1. Relevant Background
Heers incurred a misdemeanor conviction in 2018 for brandishing a
weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)).8 Defense counsel filed a motion in limine
requesting that evidence of the conviction be excluded at trial. Conversely,
the People filed an in limine motion to admit the evidence for the purpose of
impeachment if Heers chose to testify. At an in limine hearing, the trial
court ruled, over defense counsel’s objection, that if Heers testified, the
prosecutor could impeach her with the conviction, but without revealing any
information about what crime was committed.
When Heers testified, the prosecutor asked if she had been convicted of
“a crime of moral turpitude.” Heers stated that she had pled guilty because
she “had to,” even though she was not guilty. The jury did not learn any
details about the conviction.
2. Applicable Legal Standards
“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral
turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial
court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. [Citations]
‘[T]he admissibility of any past misconduct for impeachment is limited at the
8 The prosecutor explained at an in limine hearing that the factual basis
in Heers’s change of plea form for the 2018 conviction stated, “I, in the
presence of a person, exhibited a deadly weapon in a threatening manner.”
12
outset by the relevance requirement of moral turpitude. Beyond this, the
latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment
evidence in individual cases is broad.’ ” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th
856, 931 (Clark).) Thus, when the “least adjudicated elements”9 of a
misdemeanor offense involve moral turpitude, a witness may be impeached
with that conviction, subject to Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Chavez
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 28 (Chavez).)
“The California Supreme Court has divided crimes of moral turpitude
into two groups. [Citation.] The first group includes crimes in which
dishonesty is an element (i.e., fraud, perjury, etc.). The second group includes
crimes that indicate a “ ‘general readiness to do evil,’ ” from which a
readiness to lie can be inferred. [Citation.] Crimes in the latter group are
acts of ‘baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’ ” (Chavez,
supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28–29.) Those crimes include “conduct involving
violence, menace, or threat.” (People v. Williams (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1460,
1464).
Once it is established that the prior conviction involves moral
turpitude, “the latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of
impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.’ [Citations] When
determining whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment purposes,
the court should consider, among other factors, whether it reflects on the
9 The phrase “least adjudicated elements” is a term of art, also used in
other legal contexts, that refers to “the elements of the offense of which the
witness was previously convicted,” as opposed to the underlying facts of the
conviction. (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 316 (Castro).)
13
witness’s honesty or veracity, whether it is near or remote in time, whether it
is for the same or similar conduct as the charged offense, and what effect its
admission would have on the defendant’s decision to testify.” (Clark, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 931.)
“A trial court’s discretionary ruling under Evidence Code section 352
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374.) In particular, “[b]ecause the court’s
discretion to admit or exclude impeachment evidence ‘is as broad as
necessary to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the
issue arises’ [citation], a reviewing court ordinarily will uphold the trial
court’s exercise of discretion.” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 932.)
3. Heers Has Not Established That the Trial Court Abused Its
Discretion
Heers contends that, for several reasons, the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from Heers that she
had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
As to the threshold issue of whether brandishing a weapon is a crime of
moral turpitude, Heers contends that determination depends on the
underlying facts of the offense, and that the facts underlying her conviction
may not qualify. We reject the argument based on People v. Lepolo (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 85.
In Lepolo, the trial court admitted evidence that the defendant waved a
machete towards a police officer and threatened him with it. (Lepolo, supra,
55 Cal.App.4th at p. 88.) Lepolo explained that, even without considering
any particular facts involved in the case beyond defendant’s commission of
the crime of brandishing a weapon, that conduct qualified as moral turpitude
based on the crime’s “least adjudicated elements.” (Lepolo, supra,
55 Cal.App.4th at p. 91 [“Even if we were to view [defendant’s] conduct
14
narrowly, as constituting merely brandishing a weapon, [defendant] cites no
authority holding that even the least adjudicated elements of brandishing do
not involve moral turpitude.”].) Thus, there is no merit to Heers’s contention
that in Lepolo “the conviction became a crime of moral turpitude not because
of the act of brandishing, but because of the defendant’s other conduct.” The
fact that Heers was convicted of brandishing a weapon establishes she
committed a crime of moral turpitude.
Next, Heers identifies several factors that she contends the trial court
should have relied upon in deciding to exclude evidence of the conviction
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
First, she notes that the conviction occurred “five years earlier,”
apparently referring to case law directing a court to consider whether a prior
conviction was “near or remote in time” in deciding whether to exclude it
under Evidence Code section 352. (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 931.) To
the extent Heers intends to argue that a conviction occurring five years
earlier was “remote in time,” we reject the argument. Although the phrase
“remote in time” does not have an exact meaning, something that occurs only
five years prior is not normally considered remote. (Cf. People v. Mireles
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 237, 246 [“Although ‘[t]here is no consensus among
courts as to how remote a conviction must be before it is too remote.
[Citation.] . . . [A] conviction that is 20 years old . . . certainly meets any
reasonable threshold test of remoteness.’ ”]; see also People v. Campbell
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1497 [“a 10-year-old conviction is not too remote
in time to be admissible under [Evidence Code] section 352”]; People v. Lewis
(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1297 [“In 1983, appellant was convicted and
sentenced for two rapes committed in 1977, and a robbery committed in 1981.
The present offenses were committed in 1985. None of the prior offenses
15
were so remote as to diminish their probative value.”].) Therefore, we are not
convinced that the age of Heers’s prior conviction should have weighed in
favor of its exclusion.
Second, Heers points out that brandishing a weapon is not the type of
offense that “necessarily reflects [Heers’s] veracity or credibility.” We
understand Heers to be referring to the fact that brandishing does not belong
to the category of crimes in which “dishonesty is an element,” but rather to
the group of crimes that “indicate a ‘ “general readiness to do evil,” ’ from
which a readiness to lie can be inferred.” (Chavez, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at
p. 28.) Although that consideration is certainly relevant in deciding whether
to exclude a conviction from evidence under Evidence Code section 352, the
trial court was not required to exclude it on that basis. “[C]onvictions which
are assaultive in nature do not weigh as heavily in the balance favoring
admissibility as those convictions which are based on dishonesty or some
other lack of integrity.’ [Citation.] ‘Not as heavily’ does not, of course, mean
‘not at all.’ ” (Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 315.) Here, we see no basis for
concluding that the trial court abused its “broad” discretion in admitting
evidence of the conviction for impeachment (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 932) merely because it did not involve an offense that has dishonesty as an
element.
Third, Heers points out that the prior conviction was a misdemeanor
rather than a felony. We understand Heers to be relying on our Supreme
Court’s observation that “a misdemeanor offense . . . is less probative of moral
turpitude or dishonesty than is a felony.” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 932.)
However, that consideration alone does not establish that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior conviction. (See id. at
p. 931 [“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral
16
turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction,” subject to the trial
court’s exercise of “broad” discretion under Evid. Code § 352 (italics added)].)
Fourth, Heers argues that the admission of the prior conviction was
unduly prejudicial, and thus should have been excluded, because of the facts
associated with the prior conviction. Heers argues that because the prior
conviction “involved a weapon,” admitting evidence of that conviction “created
the very “real possibility that the jury would use the prior conviction not only
to impeach [Heers’s] credibility, but as evidence of [Heers’s] alleged
propensity for the use of such weapons.” The argument is misplaced because
the trial court specifically ruled that the prosecutor should not elicit
testimony about the nature of the prior conviction. The jury therefore did not
learn that the prior conviction was for brandishing a weapon.
Finally, Heers states that the evidence was prejudicial and therefore
should have been excluded because it “materially affected the jury’s
perception of [Heers’s] credibility in what was otherwise a factually close,”
“he said, she said” case. However, that point does not weigh in favor of
excluding the conviction. Because credibility was especially relevant in this
case, the trial court could consider that relevance as a reason toward deciding
that the conviction’s probative value outweighed the grounds for excluding it
under Evidence Code section 352. Moreover, “ ‘ “[p]rejudice,” as used in
Evidence Code section 352, is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ [Citation.]
Rather, it refers to evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant as an individual, and has little to do with the legal
issues raised in the trial.’ ” (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587.) The
prejudice that section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage
to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.
(People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1089.) Evidence that served to
17
lessen Heers’s credibility was prejudicial in that it addressed a central
disputed issue in the case, but that is not the type of prejudice addressed by
Evidence Code section 352.
In sum, Heers has not established that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony that Heers incurred a
prior conviction of moral turpitude.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
18
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