CourtListener 10315208•People v. Bruce CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 1/16/25 P. v. Bruce CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B329013
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. NA111849)
v.
ROGER ALLEN BRUCE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a jury found Roger Bruce (defendant) guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon, defendant’s trial counsel moved for mental
health diversion. The trial court denied the motion on the sole
ground that it was untimely. On appeal, defendant concedes the
motion’s untimeliness and asserts his counsel was ineffective for
failing to act sooner. We agree and will conditionally reverse the
judgment and remand this matter for the court to consider the
merits of defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. We
also direct the court to award defendant 1,398 days in conduct
credit.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges and Conviction
On December 30, 2019, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney (District Attorney) filed an information charging
defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(1)).1 The District Attorney further alleged that
defendant had two prior convictions for robbery (in 2003) and
assault with a deadly weapon (in 2010) within the meaning of the
Three Strikes Law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) and 1170.12, subds.
(a)–(d).)
On November 4, 2020, a jury found defendant guilty of
assault with a deadly weapon and the parties agreed that a bench
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
trial on defendant’s alleged prior convictions would take place at
a later date.
B. Motion for Mental Health Diversion and Romero2 Motion
On July 1, 2021, before the bench trial on defendant’s prior
convictions, defendant filed a motion for diversion pursuant to
section 1001.36. In support of his motion, defendant submitted a
report by Dr. Pietro Ingillo, dated May 5, 2021, which included a
summary of defendant’s psychiatric history, including from 2003
and 2004, and Dr. Ingillo’s opinion that: (1) defendant’s mental
illness played a significant role in the commission of the charged
offense; (2) the symptoms motivating defendant’s behavior would
respond to mental health treatment; (3) defendant did not pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if he received
treatment; and (4) the proposed treatment plan met defendant’s
specialized mental health treatment needs.
On that same date, defendant also filed a motion to strike
his prior strike convictions under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497
and section 1385. Defendant supported that motion with, among
other items, Dr. Ingillo’s May 5, 2021, report.
On July 9, 2021, the parties appeared for a hearing and
bench trial on defendant’s prior convictions. At the outset of that
hearing, the trial court referenced a split in authority as to
whether a court must consider mental health diversion for a
defendant who has been convicted at a jury trial but has not yet
been sentenced. Defense counsel responded: “I might as well say
it now. After reading [defendant’s] doctor’s psych evaluation, I
2 People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
3
realize that I was wrong in not filing that petition [for mental
health diversion] prior to trial. I looked at the evidence. I looked,
frankly—”
The trial court interjected, stating “[t]here is nothing in
this trial record, nothing from anything that I have seen so far
that shows that [defendant] would be suitable [for mental health
diversion]. However, the court is required and will read
everything.” The prosecutor then requested to continue the
hearing to a later date so that it could respond to defendant’s
motions, and the court granted that request.
On July 23, 2021, the parties appeared for the continued
hearing, at which the trial court advised defendant that he “may
or may not be eligible for mental health diversion.” Defendant
asked, “How come this was never considered before trial?”
Defense counsel explained, “I didn’t think he was eligible.”
Defendant responded, “For the record, I mentioned it to him.”
The court then continued the hearing multiple times to allow for
the Supreme Court to decide the then existing split in authority
as to “the latest point at which a defendant’s request for mental
health diversion is timely under . . . section 1001.36.” (People v.
Braden (July 14, 2021, S268925) 2021 WL 2965455.)
The trial court then proceeded with the hearing on
defendant’s motions and sentencing on March 3, 2023, prior to
our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Braden (2023) 14
Cal.5th 791 at page 800 [a request for mental health diversion
“must be made before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry
of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first”]. At that
hearing, defense counsel advised the court, “I filed a petition for
diversion posttrial. I should have done it before the trial. I have
no tactical reason for not doing so. . . . I didn’t have a reason to
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not do it before.” The court denied the motion for pretrial
diversion on the sole ground that it was untimely.
The trial court then considered the merits of defendant’s
Romero motion. The court explained that the crime involved
“great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” It also noted that defendant was armed at the time
of the crime and the victim was particularly vulnerable. Finally,
the court considered defendant’s criminal history and prior prison
and county jail terms and determined that defendant was “a
danger to society as these two strike priors reflect.” It therefore
denied defendant’s Romero motion and sentenced defendant to 25
years to life for assault with a deadly weapon, and imposed but
stayed two five-year sentences for the two prior convictions. The
court awarded defendant actual credit of 1,399 days but denied
him conduct credits.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant concedes that his motion for mental
health diversion was untimely, but contends that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion before trial. Accordingly, he
seeks a conditional reversal and remand for the trial court to
determine his eligibility and suitability for mental health
diversion.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in
declining to award him 1,398 days in conduct credit. The People
concede that the court erred in failing to award conduct credits
5
and we agree.3
A. Legal Principles
A criminal defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to
effective legal assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009 (Mai).) A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel must show (1) his counsel’s “performance was deficient,
in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms,” and (2) “resulting prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Ibid.)
A claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal (as
opposed to a habeas corpus proceeding), will prevail only if
“(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational
tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 1009.) A defendant asserting ineffective assistance
bears the burden of proving his entitlement to relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Jimenez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 373, 385.)
The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 in
2018 to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with
certain mental health disorders. (Vaughn v. Superior Court
3 When the actual time served is an odd number, the
resulting conduct credits are the next lower even number.
(People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827, fn. 3.)
6
(2024) 105 Cal. App. 5th 124, 133.) Pretrial diversion “‘allows for
the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of
charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment.’”
(Ibid.)
The criteria for eligibility and suitability for mental health
diversion are set forth in section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) and (c).
A defendant is eligible if: (1) the defendant has been diagnosed
with a recognized mental health disorder; and (2) the disorder
was “a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) A defendant is suitable for
diversion if: (1) a mental health expert opines that the
defendant’s mental health disorder contributing to the offense
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and waives his right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and
(4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)
A trial court retains discretion to deny diversion even if the
statutory requirements are met, but this discretion is not
unfettered: it must be exercised in a manner consistent with the
principles and purpose of the law governing diversion. (People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888, 891–892.)
B. Deficient Performance
Here, defense counsel advised the trial court that he had no
tactical reason for not requesting mental health diversion prior to
trial. Notwithstanding defense counsel’s concession, the Attorney
General proposes two purportedly plausible reasons for trial
counsel’s failure to earlier request mental health diversion. First,
7
the Attorney General argues that “[n]othing in the record
suggests that [Dr. Ignillo’s] report would have been available
before trial.” We disagree as Dr. Ignillo’s report was based, in
part, on defendant’s prison records from 2003 and 2004
documenting defendant’s paranoia, his medication for “mood and
psychotic disorder,” and his diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
Further, the record reflects that defendant earlier “mentioned”
the availability of mental health diversion to his counsel.
Second, the Attorney General proffers that defense counsel
“could have reasonably concluded that such a petition could wait
until after trial” and cites People v. Curry (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
314, 320–326 (Curry), review granted July 14, 2021 (S267394),
vacated and cause remanded in light of People v. Braden, supra,
14 Cal.5th 791 in support. Curry, however, was decided after the
completion of the jury trial in this matter. In any event, we
decline to reject defense counsel’s concession that he did not act
with a tactical purpose when he failed to earlier move for pretrial
diversion. Instead, we accept defense counsel’s concession as it is
supported by the record. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 691 [“the reasonableness of counsel’s actions may
be determined or substantially influenced” by the information the
defendant provided him]; In re Edward S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
387, 406 [if defense counsel fails to make a rational and informed
decision on strategy and tactics founded on adequate
investigation and preparation, counsel’s action, no matter how
unobjectionable in the abstract, is professionally deficient].)
8
C. Prejudice
We next consider whether defendant has demonstrated
prejudice, that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the trial court would have
granted defendant’s request for mental health diversion. As the
Attorney General impliedly concedes, Dr. Ingillo’s report satisfied
the elements of defendant’s eligibility for mental health
diversion. And, as to whether defendant was suitable for such
diversion, defendant stated that he had “mentioned” such
diversion to his counsel, which supports a finding that he would
have consented to diversion and waived his right to a speedy
trial. Further, Dr. Ingillo opined that the symptoms motivating
defendant’s behavior would respond to mental health treatment
and defendant did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the
public if he received treatment. Thus, defendant has
demonstrated that he could establish the elements of his
suitability for mental health diversion.
The Attorney General, however, contends that the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion, which also relied on
Dr. Ingillo’s report, demonstrates that the court would have
exercised its discretion to similarly deny defendant’s request for
mental health diversion. Motions for mental health diversion
and Romero motions to strike prior convictions, however, serve
distinct purposes and thus involve different analyses.
The Three Strikes Law initiative “was intended to restrict
courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).) Under Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, a trial court may “strike prior felony
conviction allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes
9
law” (id., at pp. 529–530) if the sentencing court “‘“conclud[es]
that an exception to the scheme should be made because . . . [a
particular] defendant should be treated as though he actually fell
outside the Three Strikes scheme.”’” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 377.) Factors for the court to consider in determining
whether “the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit” are “the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
The mental health diversion program, on the other hand,
seeks to increase diversion of defendants with mental health
disorders based on the recognition that “‘incarceration only
serves to aggravate [their] preexisting conditions and does little
to deter future lawlessness’ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 3,
2018, p. 4),” whereas “[s]uccessful mental health treatment . . .
both helps the individual and makes the community safer.”
(Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890–891
(Sarmiento).) Consistent with this purpose, a trial court’s finding
of an “‘“unreasonable risk . . . to public safety,”’” so as to preclude
mental health diversion of an otherwise eligible defendant,
“means a likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the
violent felonies specifically enumerated in [section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(c)(iv)],” also known as a “super-strike offense.”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892, 897, fn. omitted.)
Given the different aims of the two motions and the
nonidentical sets of factors that a court considers in deciding the
merits of those motions, the trial court’s determination that
defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law
10
does not foreclose the reasonable possibility that the court would
have granted defendant’s motion for mental health diversion had
it considered its merits. On this record, a remand is appropriate
for the court to consider the merits of that motion in the first
instance.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is
remanded for the trial court to consider defendant’s motion for
mental health diversion on its merits. The court is also directed
to award defendant 1,398 days of conduct credit. Pursuant to
Business and Professions Code, section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(2),
the clerk of this court is direct to forward a copy of this opinion to
the State Bar upon return of the remittitur, and to notify
defendant’s trial counsel of the referral.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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