People v. Ellis CA4/3

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Filed 1/16/25 P. v. Ellis CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063278

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0028)

JOHN SPENCER ELLIS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Reversed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen
Chenelia and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendant John Spencer Ellis was convicted of one count of
attempted sexual penetration of a person under the age of 18 and sentenced
to one year in prison. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 289, subd. (h).)1 On
appeal, he claims the trial court erred when instructing the jury on the use of
uncharged acts as propensity evidence. We agree this instruction was error.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
S.E. was born in early 1995. She had one sister, A., who was
approximately one year younger. S.E.’s parents divorced when she was five.
Ellis married her mother, K.E., when S.E. was starting high school. S.E., her
mother, and her sister moved in with Ellis.
S.E. described her relationship with Ellis as “cold.” She and her
sister did not trust him. The only improvement occurred because of her
mother’s insistence and pressure. That pressure grew when S.E. was in high
school. S.E. was told that Ellis “was helpful financially with a lot of things.”
She began going to a boxing gym with Ellis as part of the effort to improve
their relationship.
When she was in high school, S.E. decided to participate in a
fitness competition. Ellis, who was a personal trainer, had a gym set up in
the garage. Ellis offered to help S.E. prepare for the competition by training
her. At first the sessions were normal and appropriate, and the improved
relationship with her stepfather pleased S.E.’s mother. She was 17 years old
at the time.

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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During one session, however, Ellis moved his hands under S.E.’s
sports bra and started to touch her. S.E. “froze.” He began messaging her
breasts. She did not later remember how long this went on for. She said that
she was “frozen completely” and Ellis’s conduct was “[c]ompletely
unexpected.” Eventually, she moved, and he stopped and stood up. Ellis said
something to the effect of “‘we’ll work on it again later this week or next’” and
gave her a hug. She ran inside.
After this incident, S.E. was “[t]errified” and felt “shock.” She
stated she “did not have an answer for what to do at that point because you
have to remember, prior to this there was that pressure, ‘Make a
relationship. Do better.’” She felt like she had walked into a trap. She did not
tell anyone because she did not think she would be believed. S.E. thereafter
believed that Ellis was training with her alone during a time when he knew
K.E. and S.E.’s sister would be out of the house.
During the next incident, which also took place during a workout
when the two of them were alone in the house, Ellis put his hand down S.E.’s
pants and tried to stimulate her vagina. He inserted at least one of his
fingers into her vagina. This lasted at least a few minutes. She froze because
she was afraid of his reaction if she resisted. She was “terrified” of his
potential response.
The third incident took place in the living room. Ellis again
touched S.E.’s breasts and put his hands down her pants and penetrated her
vagina. She was silent and frozen. Ellis said to her: “‘Different things feel
good. There are different things that feel good to different people.’” S.E. was
able to get up and walk away, but Ellis stopped her in the hallway, hugging
her and kissing her on the cheek. S.E. pushed him away and went upstairs,
waiting for her mother to return. None of Ellis’s conduct with her was

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consensual. She did not tell her mother what had happened because she
feared retaliation, had no evidence, and did not think she would be believed.
After that incident, S.E. withdrew from Ellis. She sent him a text
message while she was at school, asking, as vaguely as possible, for his
conduct to stop: “‘I want this to stop. I don’t want that to happen again. Can
you please stop?’” He sent back a message that said: “‘Okay. Thank you for
being so cryptic about this.’” S.E. did not retain the text message, but
remembered the contents. To her, Ellis’s response indicated that “he’s well
aware of how dark this is and he’s well aware of his actual intentions, and in
that message, when I read that back, I was sitting in class. I was like, okay,
no one is going to believe me. He’s confident about his ability to overpower me
both physically and probably verbally as well. And at that point I was like, I
just need to stay away as much as I possibly can.” She already had plans to
leave the state for college the following year, and started staying away from
the house as much as possible, spending more time with her boyfriend.
As a result of Ellis’s abuse, she developed a binge-eating disorder
and gained 30 pounds. S.E. described the binge eating as a way for her to
reassert control.
After S.E. graduated from high school, she attended college in
Texas and moved to Spain following graduation. In 2018, her mother visited
her in Spain, and brought up the idea of bringing Ellis to visit. At that point,
S.E. told her about the abuse. Her mother urged S.E. to record a call with
Ellis discussing the abuse.
During the call, S.E. asked Ellis why he “felt the need to be
physical or express yourself sexually with me.” Ellis responded: “I don’t know
what answer I can give you that will be appropriate or justified or accepted or
anything. You’re a pretty lady, I mean obviously that’s one thing.” Ellis told

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S.E. that his conduct had caused him to experience “guilt, shame, every
horrible f[—]ing thing you could think of,” and that he had considered suicide
as a result. Ellis said, “I’m not saying it was appropriate. I’m not saying I’m
pleased. I’m f[—]ing disgusted. Forgive me.” At the end of the call, Ellis was
clear that he wanted no record of it: “Delete, delete, delete, delete. I’m doing
the same.”
S.E. reported the abuse to law enforcement. When confronted
with the call, Ellis’s response was “‘I didn’t have sex with her.’” He claimed he
had considered committing suicide.
In 2021, Ellis was charged with sexual penetration of a minor
with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (h), count one), and two counts of
misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1), counts two and three). One
count of misdemeanor sexual battery was for touching S.E.’s breasts, the
other her vagina. The first two counts were alleged to have occurred between
October 1 and October 31, 2012. Count three was alleged to have occurred
between October 1, 2012, and February 27, 2013. Prior to trial, on October 2,
2023, the prosecution dismissed counts two and three because the statute of
limitations had passed. The case proceeded to trial on count one.
On October 9, 2023, Ellis was found guilty of one count of
attempted sexual penetration of a person under the age of 18. (§§ 664, subd.
(a), 289, subd. (h).) This was a lesser included offense of count one, sexual
penetration of a minor with a foreign object. (§ 289, subd. (h).) Ellis was
sentenced to one year in prison. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION
I.
CALCRIM NO. 1191A
A. Standard of Review
“‘We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.]
“Review of the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court
‘fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.’” [Citation.] ‘Generally, the
trial court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of law
that are closely and openly connected with the evidence and that are
necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case. [Citation.] It also has a
duty to refrain from giving incorrect instructions or instructions on principles
of law that are irrelevant and that would have the effect of confusing the jury
or relieving it from making findings on the relevant issues.’” (People v.
Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 990.)

B. Relevant Instructions
The jury was instructed: “The People presented evidence that the
defendant committed the crimes of sexual battery that were not charged in
this case. This crime is defined for you in these instructions. You may
consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant, in fact, committed the uncharged offense.
“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of
proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence if you conclude it is more likely than not that
the fact is true. If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must
disregard this evidence entirely.

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“If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged
offense, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that
the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses and, based
on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and
did commit sexual penetration by foreign object of a minor, as charged here.
“If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged
offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of
sexual penetration by foreign object of a minor. The People must still prove
each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The jury was also given a unanimity instruction: “The People
have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant
committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty unless you all
agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one
of these acts and you all agree on which act he committed.”

C. Procedural Context
After the prosecution dismissed counts two and three, defense
counsel asked the court not to allow any of the evidence pertaining to those
counts pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. Counsel argued that allowing
such evidence would create substantial danger of undue prejudice under
Evidence Code section 352.
The court ruled: “Okay. All right. I have looked at it, and I don’t
think they are made inadmissible under 352. Even if I just look at them as
the victim testifying about her relationship with the Defendant, I think they
would be relevant as to what went on during the time period that she alleges
the conduct alleged in Count 1. I think it does tie in.” The court further stated

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that the evidence would not be unfairly prejudicial, and any confusing
testimony could be addressed in cross-examination.

D. Relevant Law
Under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), an uncharged
offense cannot be admitted if the only theory of relevance is that the
defendant had a propensity to commit the charged crime. In short, uncharged
crimes cannot be used as circumstantial evidence that the defendant
committed the charged offense. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 588.)
Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a), sets forth an
exception. “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or
offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” An uncharged offense need only be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

E. Failure to Object
Ellis did not object to the instruction. Ellis argues that any
instruction, when given, must be correct, and the incorrect instruction
impacted his substantial rights. If the instruction was incorrect, it would
impact his substantial rights. Accordingly, we consider whether the
instruction was correct.

F. The Instruction was Erroneous
Ellis contends the jury instructions did not specify which offenses
were charged and uncharged, allowing the jury to convict based upon either
alleged incident of penetration and to use propensity evidence under the

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lesser preponderance standard. This, he contends, had the effect of lowering
the burden of proof. When reviewing jury instructions, we read the
instructions as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible manner.
(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)
Evidence of three separate instances of sexual offenses were
presented to the jury. In the first, Ellis touched S.E.’s breasts. In the second,
he touched her vagina and tried to stimulate her, inserting at least one finger
into her vagina. In the last incident, Ellis touched S.E.’s breasts and inserted
one or more fingers into her vagina.
At trial, the only charged offense was a single count of sexual
penetration by a foreign object of a minor. The jury was instructed the
uncharged offenses were “sexual battery.” The instruction did not state which
specific acts constituted sexual battery.
Ellis contends that “[t]he jury was specifically told that it could
rely on the evidence of uncharged crimes (plural) as propensity evidence in
this case [citation], but there was no distinction here as to which of the
alleged incidents of sexual penetration appellant was being charged with.” He
argues that the battery instruction included the penetration incidents and
claims the jury instruction here violated the rule set forth in People v. Cruz
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178 (Cruz).
In Cruz, the jury was instructed: “‘In determining whether
defendant has been proved guilty of any sexual crime of which he is charged,
you should consider all relevant evidence, including whether the defendant
committed any other sexual crimes, whether charged or uncharged . . . .’”
(Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1183–1184, italics added.) The instruction
continued: “‘If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant

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committed any such other sexual offense you may, but are not required to,
infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses. [¶] If
you find that the defendant had this disposition you may, but are not
required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or
crimes of which he is accused.’” (Id. at p. 1184.)
The court held the instructions “presented the jury with a nearly
impossible task of juggling competing standards of proof during different
phases of its consideration of the same evidence” because: “In effect, the
instruction given here told the jury it should first consider whether the
offenses charged in counts 1, 2, and 3 had been established by a
preponderance of the evidence, while holding its ultimate decision on the
same offenses in suspension. Then the jury was required to decide whether
the preponderance finding showed a propensity, and whether this propensity,
in combination with the other evidence, proved those offenses a second time,
this time beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th. at pp.
1185–1186, 1187.)
The instruction in this case was similarly flawed. The charged
crime was sexual penetration. The jury was instructed that the uncharged
crimes they could consider as propensity evidence were “sexual battery.” The
prosecutor, during closing argument, stated: “We heard about three different
incidents, and the judge read you instructions about 1191[A], which is the
evidence of uncharged sex offenses, and those are those three incidents. He’s
obviously charged with one.” The prosecutor continued: “So you got to hear
the conduct kind of leading up to the vagina with a rubbing of the breasts and
everything else just to kind of give you an understanding of the entire
dynamic.” The Attorney General contends these comments differentiated the
charged penetration from the uncharged batteries.

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In addition to the CALCRIM No. 1191A instruction, the jury was
instructed on sexual battery. This crime, they were told, required touching an
intimate part of S.E. against her will, among other elements. (CALCRIM No.
935.) It was easy to conflate this offense with the penetration offense, which
also required a type of touching. To make matters more confusing, the jury
was also instructed on assault (CALCRIM No. 915) and simple battery
(CALCRIM No. 960). Without instructing the jury on the specific acts they
were to consider as propensity evidence, and without excluding the
uncharged incident of penetration from the ambit of sexual battery, this
instruction was simply asking the jury to do too much in the way of mental
gymnastics regarding the two burdens of proof. (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th.
at pp. 1185–1186, 1187.) The potential for confusion and conflation was made
more likely by asking the jury to consider both charged and uncharged acts
that took place during the same incident.
Given the potential for confusion, it is reasonably likely that the
jury applied the instructions in a manner that violated Ellis’s constitutional
rights by reducing the burden of proof on the “charged” offense. (See People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 909.) Accordingly, we conclude this
instruction was erroneous. Because the instruction had the effect of reducing
the burden of proof, the error is reversible without a showing of prejudice.
(People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 365.)

II.
CALCRIM NO. 350
Ellis also argues the court erred in the language it used to
instruct with jury with CALCRIM No. 350. Because we must reverse the

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conviction for the previous instructional error, we need not consider this
argument or Ellis’s argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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