CourtListener 10314308•People v. Verdin CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Verdin CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062866
v. (Super. Ct. No. 06CF0342)
RENE VERDIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and Remanded.
Rene Verdin, in pro. per.; Ellen M. Matsumoto, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2007, Rene Verdin pleaded guilty to three attempted murders.
In 2023, he filed a petition for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking
to vacate his attempted murder convictions and alleging that he could not be
1
convicted of attempted murder under current law. The trial court summarily
denied Verdin’s petition after concluding that his admission in the factual
basis for his plea that he acted with intent to kill rendered him ineligible for
relief.
Verdin challenges this conclusion, asserting that his admissions
did not preclude his eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. As explained
below, we agree that Verdin’s admissions—including his admission to acting
with intent to kill—did not establish all the elements of a valid theory of
attempted murder under current law. Accordingly, we reverse the summary
denial of his petition and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
I.
THE INFORMATION
In August 2007, an amended information charged Verdin with
conspiracy to commit murder, the premeditated and deliberate attempted
murders of Jorge C., M.C., and A.M., and other offenses.2 The information
contained various enhancement allegations, including that Verdin personally
discharged a firearm in committing the attempted murder of Jorge
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
As to the attempted murders, the information alleged that
Verdin “did willfully and unlawfully, and with premeditation, deliberation,
and the specific intent to kill, attempt to murder” the three victims.
2
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and that he personally used a firearm in committing
3
all three attempted murders (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
II.
MISTRIAL AND GUILTY PLEA
Following a trial, the jury was unable to reach unanimous
verdicts on any of the charges, and the trial court declared a mistrial. In
October 2007, the parties reached a plea agreement, and Verdin pleaded
guilty to the attempted murders (without the premeditation and deliberation
4
allegations) and another offense not relevant here. He also admitted the
firearm allegations noted above.
As part of Verdin’s plea, he signed an advisement and waiver of
rights. In that document, he offered the following facts as the basis for his
guilty plea: “[In December] 2005, I willfully & unlawfully & with the specific
intent to kill, did attempt to kill [Jorge, M.C., and A.M.] . . . . During the
attempt to kill [Jorge], I personally discharged a firearm. During the
attempts to kill [M.C.] & [A.M.] . . . , I personally used a firearm.” The trial
court accepted Verdin’s plea, dismissed all other charges, and sentenced him
to 27 years in prison, pursuant to the parties’ agreement.
3
Personal use of a firearm “may be found where the defendant
intentionally displayed a firearm in a menacing manner in order to facilitate
the commission of an underlying crime.” (People v. Carrasco (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059.)
4
Verdin did not plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder.
3
III.
VERDIN’S SECTION 1172.6 PETITION
In 2023, Verdin filed a petition for relief under section 1172.6,
alleging that he had pleaded guilty based on an information that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
After appointing counsel and receiving briefing, the trial court conducted a
prima facie hearing and denied the petition, finding that Verdin had not
established a prima facie case of eligibility for relief. In a written statement
of decision, the court noted Verdin’s admissions in the factual basis for his
plea and concluded: “Therefore, there is an insufficient prima facie showing
that the prosecution relied upon a theory of culpability for attempted murder
that is inconsistent with the present definition (requiring a specific intent to
kill).”
Verdin timely appealed. His appointed counsel filed an opening
brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, raising no issues and
asking this court to review the record independently. After independently
reviewing the record, this court requested further briefing regarding Verdin’s
prima facie eligibility for relief.5
DISCUSSION
Verdin challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his section
1172.6 petition. He contends that, contrary to the court’s conclusion, his
admissions in the factual basis for his plea did not render him ineligible for
5
Before this court issued its briefing order, Verdin filed a
supplemental brief in propria persona stating that his appellate counsel was
rendering ineffective assistance. Because we grant Verdin the relief he seeks
on appeal, we need not address his contention regarding counsel’s
performance.
4
relief, and he was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing. As discussed
below, we agree and therefore reverse the court’s order and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
GOVERNING LAW
“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) As with
other crimes, an aider and abettor to attempted murder—a person who aids
the perpetrator with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and
with the intent that it be facilitated—is guilty of the intended crime. (People
v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611.) Until recently, an aider and abettor
could be found guilty of murder or attempted murder based on their
participation in a different target crime, if murder or attempted murder
resulted and were a natural and probable consequence of the target crime.
(Ibid.; People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456.)
The Legislature recently eliminated the natural and probable
consequences theory of murder and attempted murder liability. (People v.
Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.) Thus, an attempted murder
conviction now requires proof that the defendant personally harbored an
intent to kill. (People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 960.) And if the
prosecution contends the defendant is guilty as an aider and abettor, it must
also prove that the defendant “‘aid[ed] the commission of th[e] offense with
“knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to
assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 463 (Curiel) [addressing murder liability].)
5
Effective January 1, 2022, a defendant convicted of attempted
murder may petition to have the conviction vacated if: (1) the charging
document permitted the prosecution to proceed under the “natural and
probable consequences” doctrine; (2) the defendant accepted a plea offer
instead of going to trial; and (3) the defendant could not now be convicted of
attempted murder “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019,” which eliminated the natural and probable consequences
theory of attempted murder liability. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); former § 1170.95,
subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) The sentencing court must
then determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that
he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The prima facie inquiry is “limited” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971), and the bar “‘was intentionally . . . set very low’” (id. at
p. 972). In assessing the petition at this stage, the court “‘“makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled
to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.”’” (Id. at p. 971.) If so, it
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
The trial court may examine the record of conviction to assess
whether it refutes the petitioner’s claim of eligibility. (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) But “[t]he court may deny the petition at the prima
facie stage only if the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. [Citation.]” (People v.
Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.) To refute the defendant’s
allegation that he could not now be convicted of attempted murder, the record
must “conclusively establish[] every element of the offense.” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
6
“‘When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea
rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts “the defendant
admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.”’ [Citation.] We independently
review the trial court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a
prima facie showing for relief. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 460, 464–465 (Ramos).)
II.
ANALYSIS
We conclude the trial court erred by denying Verdin’s petition at
the prima facie stage based on the factual admissions in his guilty plea.
Verdin admitted that he, “with the specific intent to kill, did attempt to kill
[Jorge, M.C., and A.M.].” This admission largely tracked the charges in the
operative information and provided no specific factual information about the
crimes. It did not conclusively cover all the elements of a still-valid theory of
6
attempted murder.
First, the factual basis for Verdin’s plea did not conclusively
establish that he was the actual perpetrator of the attempted murders.
Verdin admitted to discharging a firearm during the attempted murder of
one victim, Jorge. Yet he made no similar admission in connection with the
attempted murders of M.C. and A.M. Indeed, the operative information did
6
It is undisputed that Verdin has made a sufficient showing as to
the other prongs of his prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.
7
7
not even allege that he had discharged a firearm during the latter crimes.
This implied that he was not the perpetrator of at least two of the attempted
murders. Instead, the phrase “attempt to kill” may have been intended as a
general reference to attempted murder liability, which also encompassed
8
other theories. Thus, Verdin’s admission did not conclusively establish that
he was the perpetrator of the attempted murders.
Next, the factual basis for Verdin’s plea also did not establish the
elements of direct aiding and abetting. Contrary to the trial court’s analysis,
Verdin’s admission to acting “with the specific intent to kill” did not render
him ineligible for relief. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [“A finding of
intent to kill does not, standing alone, cover all of the required elements” and
“does not itself show that a petitioner . . . is liable for murder under any valid
theory”].) As noted, a theory of direct aiding and abetting requires a showing
that the defendant aided the commission of the offense with knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and with an intent to assist in achieving
7
Instead, the information alleged and Verdin admitted only that
he “used” a firearm during those crimes, which, as noted, could have meant
no more than “intentionally display[ing] a firearm in a menacing manner.”
(People v. Carrasco, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059.)
8
The same analysis applies to the attempted murder of Jorge, as
Verdin admitted to discharging his firearm but did not admit to firing at
Jorge. This distinguishes this case from People v. Saavedra (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 444, which the Attorney General cites. The defendant there
admitted to attempting to murder three victims “by personally discharging a
firearm at the vehicle [they] were occupying.” (Id. at p. 447.) Thus, unlike
Verdin, the defendant specified that he committed attempted murder by
shooting at the victims. This admission rendered him ineligible for relief.
(Ibid.)
8
the unlawful purpose. (Ibid.) Nothing in Verdin’s admissions covers this
requirement.
For this reason, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s assertion
that Verdin’s admission to acting with the specific intent to kill “removes any
possibility that his admitted liability was premised on imputed malice.” (Dis.
opn., post, at p. 3.) The question is not whether Verdin’s plea showed that his
liability rested on imputed malice. As our Supreme Court explained in Curiel:
“[the Legislature] did not simply ‘add the element of malice aforethought’ to
existing theories of murder liability. [Citation.] It eliminated the doctrine of
natural and probable consequences in its entirety . . . . [Citation.]” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.) Thus, “[m]urder liability requires a different,
valid theory, such as direct aiding and abetting,” and “a petitioner who
alleges that he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense
‘because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019’
[citation] puts at issue all elements of the offense under a valid theory.”
(Ibid.) The existence of the natural and probable consequences doctrine at the
time of Verdin’s plea meant that there was no need to establish the other
elements of direct aiding and abetting, beyond the specific intent to kill. His
admission to the latter was s therefore insufficient to render him ineligible
for relief.
We are likewise unpersuaded by the dissent’s emphasis of the
admitted facts’ reference to an attempt to kill. (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 3–4.)
The dissent states: “[T]he ‘attempt to kill [the victims]’ portion [of the
admitted facts] is a factual admission that [Verdin’s] actions, whatever they
may have been, were connected to the attempted killings themselves. They
were not simply connected to some other target offense, as would be the case
9
in a natural and probable consequences situation.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 3.) It
suggests the reference to an attempt to kill, instead of murder, must refer to
the actual act of killing rather than to murder liability generally.
We respectfully disagree that the term “kill” necessarily refers to
the lethal act itself. Indeed, the prosecution’s charging documents sometimes
refer to an attempt to “kill,” and on at least one occasion, the Attorney
General conceded that this was “generic” language that “did not limit the
prosecution’s ability to proceed under . . . the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (People v. Torres (June 16, 2023, G061580) [nonpub.
opn.].) We are unaware of any decision holding to the contrary. Thus, as
noted, Verdin’s admissions could refer to attempted murder liability
generally.
Regardless, even a strict reading of the term “kill” as referring to
the lethal act itself would not render Verdin ineligible for relief because it
does not establish all the elements of a still-valid theory of attempted
murder. It is undisputed that Verdin acted with the intent to kill the victims.
From his standpoint, an action aiding the targeting of the victims could be
“connected to the attempted killings themselves” (dis. opn., post, at p. 3), but
does not establish his awareness of the perpetrator’s own unlawful intent,
which is a necessary element under a theory of direct aiding and abetting.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
To be sure, the phrasing of Verdin’s admissions, especially the
reference to his intent to kill, suggests the parties had a theory of at least
direct aiding and abetting in mind. But to “conclusively establish[]” that
Verdin is ineligible for relief, the factual basis must reflect his admission of
10
“every element” of a valid theory. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.) It did
not do so here.
The Attorney General contends this case is similar to Ramos,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at page 466, which found a defendant conclusively
ineligible for relief. We disagree. In Ramos, the defendant admitted he
“‘aided/abetted, with the specific intent to kill, the attempt to kill’” the victim.
(Id. at p. 463.) The Ramos court concluded these admissions “embod[ied] all
the elements of direct aiding and abetting liability for attempted murder.”
(Id. at p. 466.) As particularly relevant here, the court reasoned, “[The
defendant’s] admission he ‘abetted’ the attempt to kill establishes he acted
with ‘knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose [vis-à-vis the
attempted killing] and with the intent that it be facilitated.’ [Citation.]”9
(Ibid.) Unlike the defendant in Ramos, Verdin did not admit that he abetted
the attempts to kill—he admitted only that he acted with intent to kill, which
is insufficient to establish a theory of direct aiding and abetting. (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
We are also unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s citation to
People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145. There, the defendant admitted
that “‘during the commission of [first degree murder], [he] acted
intentionally, deliberately and with premeditation.’” (Id. at p. 149.) The court
held this admission “establishe[d] that he acted with actual malice sufficient
to sustain the murder conviction under [current] law.” (Id. at p. 153.) To the
9
As the court in Ramos explained, the term “abet” addresses the
mental state required for direct aider and abettor liability, “‘knowledge of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and . . . the intent that it be facilitated.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ramos, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.)
11
extent Romero suggested that actual malice was sufficient, on its own, to
sustain murder liability under current law, it was mistaken. (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of his
petition and remand for further proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s denial of Verdin’s petition is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for the court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
O’LEARY, P. J.
I CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
12
DELANEY, J., Dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the outcome of this appeal hinges
on whether Verdin’s guilty plea, including the factual basis admitted by him
in conjunction with it, conclusively establishes all elements of a still-valid
theory of attempted murder. However, I respectfully disagree with its
conclusion that Verdin’s plea is insufficient to meet that legal threshold. On
the record before us, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Verdin’s
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.
A guilty plea is “a judicial admission of every element of the
offense charged.” (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.) It “is the
equivalent of a conviction,” and by pleading guilty a defendant waives a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge. (People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571,
574; In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1181.)
Relevant here, attempted murder is generally comprised of two
elements, namely “(1) a specific intent to kill and (2) a direct but ineffectual
act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 586, 605.) Unlike murder, because attempted murder requires
express malice, it “cannot be proved based upon a showing of implied malice.”
(Ibid.)
Prior to 2019, there generally were three theories through which
one could be convicted of attempted murder: (1) liability as the direct
perpetrator; (2) liability as a direct aider and abettor; and (3) liability as a
natural and probable consequences aider and abettor. (See People v. Perez
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117-
1118.) While the first two of those theories required the defendant to
personally have a specific intent to kill and to engage in some act vis-à-vis the
1
attempted killing (see People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623-624
[discussing direct aiding and abetting attempted murder liability]), the last of
those theories did not. Under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, a defendant who knowingly aided and abetted an intended
nonmurder crime, commonly referred to as the target offense, was also guilty
of any other crime the perpetrator actually committed that was a natural and
probable consequence of the intended crime, commonly referred to as the
nontarget offense, irrespective of whether the defendant had any intent
regarding the nontarget offense. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449 (Curiel); McCoy, at p. 1117; People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
832, 852.) Depending on the circumstances of a given situation, attempted
murder could be a nontarget offense. (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868,
874.)
After legislative changes to the murder statutes which took effect
in January 2019, the natural and probable consequences doctrine may no
longer be used to convict someone of attempted murder, among other crimes.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548.) In contrast, direct perpetrator and direct aider and abettor theories
of liability remain viable. (See Curiel, at p. 462; Coley, at p. 548.)
Here, in the factual basis for his guilty plea, Verdin admitted he,
“with the specific intent to kill, did attempt to kill [the victims].” He further
admitted he “personally used a firearm” “during the attempts to kill [two
victims],” and he “personally discharged a firearm” “during the attempt to
kill [the third victim].”
The firearm related portions of Verdin’s admissions are not
sufficient to conclusively establish any aspect of the attempted murder
2
offenses. As the majority notes, use of a firearm during two of the attempts
could amount to simply “intentionally display[ing] a firearm in a menacing
manner.” (People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059.) And,
because an attempted murder may occur over a period of time, the discharge
of a firearm during its commission does not decisively connect the discharge
to the attempted murder itself. Notably, there are no words expressly linking
Verdin’s admission of the discharge of a firearm to his admission of the
attempt to kill.
In contrast, unlike the majority, I read Verdin’s other above
mentioned admissions, included in a plea form signed under penalty of
perjury that “everything on this form is true and correct,” as providing
specific factual information about the crimes. The “specific intent to kill”
portion is a factual admission that he personally possessed a specific intent to
kill. (See People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 466.) It removes any
possibility that his admitted liability was premised on imputed malice.
Additionally, the “attempt to kill [the victims]” portion is a factual admission
that his actions, whatever they may have been, were connected to the
attempted killings themselves. They were not simply connected to some other
target offense, as would be the case in a natural and probable consequences
situation. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262 [natural and
probable consequences aider and abettor commits act that aids or encourages
commission of target crime]; c.f. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467 [in
natural and probable consequences situation, act that aids or encourages
target crime cannot be said to necessarily also aid or encourage nontarget
crime].) In this respect, of particular importance is the use of the word “kill,”
as opposed to a legal term of art, such as “murder,” which could be
3
interpreted in a more expansive manner. (See Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)
[defining murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought”].)
Because Verdin’s guilty plea is a judicial admission of every
element of attempted murder, and because his factual admissions preclude
the possibility that his plea was made on a natural and probable
consequences theory, or some other imputed malice theory, the plea
necessarily admits liability either under a direct perpetrator theory or direct
aider and abettor theory. Both of those theories remain viable, meaning the
record of conviction conclusively refutes Verdin’s contention that he could not
currently be convicted of murder “because of changes to [Penal Code] [s]ection
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Pen. Code, § 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3).) Accordingly, I would affirm the denial of his resentencing petition.10
(See Curiel, supra,15 Cal.5th at p. 460 [petition may be dismissed at prima
facie stage if record of conviction conclusively establishes defendant is
ineligible for relief].)
DELANEY, J.
10
Prior to a supplemental briefing order issued by this court
concerning Verdin’s prima facie eligibility for resentencing relief, and his
counsel’s further briefing in response thereto, Verdin filed a brief asserting
that this appeal had merit based on the following grounds: “Racial Justice
Act,” “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and “Signed Under Distress.”
However, it is an appellant’s burden to demonstrate prejudicial error, which
includes the obligation to provide reasoned argument and citations to legal
authority. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Providing a topical
list of claimed errors, without more, does not satisfy that obligation and
results in a waiver of the issues. (Ibid.)
4
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