In re Lavender D. CA2/7

CourtListener 10313586Calctapp14 gen 2025

Testo completo

Filed 1/14/25 In re Lavender D. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LAVENDER D., a Person B336673
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02431E)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANNE L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother Anne L. appeals from a disposition order granting
father D.J. sole legal and physical custody of their child,
Lavender D., and terminating jurisdiction. On appeal, Anne does
not challenge the jurisdiction findings or the order granting sole
physical custody of Lavender to D.J. Anne challenges only the
legal custody order, contending the juvenile court improperly
based its order on the mistaken conviction that Anne would be
able to “take” Lavender from D.J. if the court granted joint legal
custody. “‘We uphold judgments if they are correct for any
reason, “regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which
the court reached its conclusion.” [Citation.] “It is judicial action
and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review.”’” (In re
Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876.) The juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion when it granted D.J. sole legal
custody. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anne has six children: A.L., Alondra L., Allan L., Lance A.,
Milo L., and Lavender. Lavender was born in November 2023.
At the time of Lavender’s birth, a dependency proceeding
involving Alondra, Allan, Lance, and Milo was ongoing. All six of
Anne’s children have been removed from her custody. Anne has
not reunified with any of the children.

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On November 21, 2023, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed
a petition alleging Lavender was a child described under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and
(j).1 The juvenile court detained Lavender from Anne and placed
her with D.J., who lived at the paternal great-grandmother’s
home. Lavender lived with D.J. throughout the proceedings and
was observed to be free of marks and bruises, and appropriately
groomed each time the Department conducted a home visit.

A. Jurisdiction Findings
On February 13, 2024, the juvenile court conducted the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The juvenile court found
D.J. to be non-offending. It sustained as pleaded the allegations
for Counts b-8 to b-9 and j-1 to j-11 against Anne. On appeal,
Anne does not contest these jurisdiction findings by the juvenile
court.
Counts b-8 and j-8 alleged, in pertinent part, that Anne “is
a current abuser of marijuana and alcohol, which renders the
mother incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the
child. On 06/20/2022 and on prior occasions, the mother was
under the influence of alcohol while the child’s siblings [Alondra,
Allan, Lance, and Milo] were in the mother’s care and
supervision. The siblings [four-year old] Lance and [newborn]
Milo were of such young age as to require constant care and
supervision and the mother’s substance abuse interferes with the
mother providing regular care and supervision of the siblings.
The siblings Alondra and Lance were dirty and smelled as if they

1 All further references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.

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had not been bathed in several weeks. There was dirt on the
sibling Lance’s legs, feet, and face.”
Counts b-9 and j-9 alleged, Anne “has a history of mental
and emotional problems, including diagnoses of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, Depression, Anxiety, and Bi-polar Disorder and
a history of aggression and suicidal ideations, which render the
mother incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the
child. The mother failed to seek treatment for the mother’s
mental and emotional problems.”
Counts j-1 to j-3 alleged Anne physically abused the half-
siblings. On June 20, 2022, Anne struck Allan’s head with “a
metal hammer, inflicting a large, open, bleeding, swollen
laceration to the sibling’s forehead. The mother provided
inconsistent statements as to how the sibling sustained the
sibling’s injury. On prior occasions, the mother struck the sibling
with a hammer and with the mother’s hand.” The counts further
alleged Anne similarly physically abused Lance, Alondra, and
Milo by striking them on prior occasions with a hammer and her
hand.
In Counts j-4 to j-6, the petition alleged that on June 21,
2022, Lance required stitches for the “large, open, bleeding,
swollen laceration to the sibling’s forehead.” Lance had also
contracted impetigo on his upper lip (a bacterial infection that
typically causes sores in infants and children) and Milo had
contracted conjunctivitis. Anne failed to seek medical treatment
for the children.
Count j-7 alleged Anne created a “detrimental and
endangering home environment . . . in that on 06/21/2022, the
home was found to be messy, disorganized, and cluttered. The
front door of the home was broken. There was a large pile of
clothes in the corner of the room and several belongings were all
over the floor, making it difficult to walk around the room. The

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room was dirty, including having piles of dirty clothes throughout
the room, and emitting a strong odor of urine.”
Count j-10 alleged, “On one or more prior occasions, [Anne]
placed the child’s siblings [Alondra, Allan, Lance, and Milo] in an
endangering situation. The endangering situation consisted of,
but was not limited to, having sexual intercourse in the presence
of the siblings.” Count j-11 alleged, “On one or more occasions,
[Anne] sexually abused the siblings, [Alondra and Allan]. . . . The
mother would [also] bring people over to the home while drunk
and have sexual intercourse with these persons in the presence of
the siblings, where the siblings would watch.”
Each of the counts also alleged Lavender’s half-siblings
were prior dependents of the juvenile court and received
permanent placement services due to the issues specifically
identified in the count. These issues endangered their physical
and emotional health and safety and placed them at risk of
serious physical harm, damage and danger.
The court based its jurisdiction findings on the
Department’s reports, admitting into evidence the Department’s
detention report, jurisdiction and disposition report, and last
minute information, as well as two progress letters submitted by
Anne. The Department described the evidence, including
statements by Allan and Alondra, supporting the physical and
sexual abuse allegations against Anne. Anne denied the abuse.
She claimed she only threw things such as a pillow, teddy bear,
phone, or ball at the children and their injuries resulted from
jumping off the bunk bed. According to Anne, the children would
have died if she had hit them as the petition alleged. She told the
Department’s investigator, “‘As angry as I used to be, I would
have killed them. I’ve done damage to adults with my hands.’”
Although she admitted the children observed her engaging
in sexual acts with her partner because she was “‘so lit’” and

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already “‘in the middle of it,’” Anne vehemently denied engaging
in sexual activity with Allan or Alondra. She claimed the
children were referring to Allan’s father, known as “Big Allan,”
when they described her sex acts with “Allan.” Anne admitted to
her therapist, however, that she “‘did really bad things’” and had
the children “‘participate in really bad things.’” When asked why
Anne continued to deny these acts to the Department, her
therapist explained, “‘People don’t like that thrown in their face.
DCFS has a history of reminding you of your problems. If you
have a history of being scrutinized, you have your guard up.’”
The Department also documented Anne’s failure to comply
with the case plan in the half-siblings’ case, including her failure
to comply with drug testing, her refusal to address the sexual and
physical abuse of the half-siblings, and the Department’s
suspicion she stopped taking medication for her mental health
issues.
When the Department interviewed D.J., he stated he was
aware of the dependency proceedings involving Anne’s other
children. Anne told him the case was opened because she threw
some objects at the children when they refused to listen to her
and the children saw her having sex with a man because they all
shared a room. He expressed his concern when the children’s
social worker disclosed the extent of the half-siblings’ case
findings against Anne. He agreed to take the day off to help care
for the baby and ensure his family would be able to care for her
once he returned to work the next day. He denied any history of
substance or alcohol abuse and disclosed he last smoked
marijuana the day before Lavender was born. According to the
paternal great-grandmother, Anne visited with Lavender only
once during the proceedings.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on February 13,
2024, Anne argued she was “not the same mother she was in

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2022” because she had made progress in addressing her
substance abuse and mental health issues by participating in
programs. She also had taken parenting classes and now
understood what discipline was appropriate. She asserted
Lavender did not test positive for drugs at the time of her birth
and she was observed to be clean and appropriately cared for
when the Department made their initial visit shortly after her
birth. Anne continued to deny sexually abusing Allan or Alondra.
The juvenile court made the jurisdiction findings as
described above, dismissed other allegations not described in this
opinion, and found by clear and convincing evidence that return
of Lavender to Anne would be detrimental to the child. The court
further found there were no safety issues related to D.J.’s custody
of Lavender and that court supervision was therefore no longer
necessary. The court terminated jurisdiction with a disposition
order giving D.J. sole legal and physical custody with monitored
visitation for Anne.
The court explained it based its ruling on “the history of
this case.” It did not credit Anne’s assertion she was taking the
medication prescribed to treat her mental health issues. It also
noted Anne did not comply with the court-ordered drug tests and
had not completed the sexual predator program. The court found
Anne was in denial about the seriousness of the physical and
sexual abuse allegations. The court expressly observed, “This is a
very young child who has no ability to protect herself.” In
making its disposition order, the court stated, “The court’s
concern, joint legal custody, gives [Anne] the ability to take her
daughter, that is not in the child’s best interest, given the
mother’s need to continue to make progress in her case plan.”
The juvenile court signed and entered exit orders consistent
with its disposition on February 16, 2024. Anne timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
“‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case.’
[Citation.] We review a custody (or ‘exit’) order . . . for abuse of
discretion, and will not disturb the order ‘unless the [juvenile]
court “‘“exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’”’”
[Citation.] ‘“‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the [juvenile] court exceeded the bounds of reason.
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing [juvenile] court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the [juvenile] court.’”’” (In re N.M. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) A juvenile court abuses its
discretion if no substantial evidence supports its decision. (See
In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1066.)
Section 362.4, subdivision (a), states: “If the juvenile court
terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a
dependent child of the juvenile court . . . , the juvenile court on its
own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the custody of,
or visitation with, the child.”2 “‘Sole legal custody’ means that

2 We observe the juvenile court had authority under
section 361.2, subdivision (b), to issue its order making D.J. the
legal and physical custodian of Lavender and to terminate
dependency jurisdiction. Because section 361.2 addresses
custody orders when a child is removed from a custodial parent
and placed with a previously noncustodial parent, it would
appear to be the more direct basis for the court’s order. Neither
the parties nor the juvenile court, however, relied on

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one parent shall have the right and responsibility to make the
decisions relating to the health, education and welfare of a child.”
(Fam. Code, § 3006; see In re A.C. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 994,
1003, fn. 5.) “When making a custody determination in any
dependency case, the court’s focus and primary consideration
must always be the best interests of the child.” (In re Nicholas H.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; see In re Chantal S. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 196, 206 [in making a custody determination the
juvenile court focuses on the best interests of the child]; In re
N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) Upon termination of
dependency jurisdiction, there is no presumption that joint legal
and physical custody is in the child’s best interest. (See In re
Chantal S., at p. 206.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Granted Sole Legal Custody to D.J.
Anne’s only contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
based its legal custody ruling on an error of law. That is, the
court expressed its concern that “joint legal custody, gives [Anne]
the ability to take her daughter.” There is no dispute joint legal
custody does not give Anne the ability to take Lavender from D.J.
(See Fam. Code, § 3003 [joint legal custody “means that both
parents shall share the right and the responsibility to make the
decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a
child”].) On appeal, however, we are required to affirm the
court’s legal custody disposition if it is correct regardless of the

section 361.2 as a basis for the court’s custody order. In all
events, whether we evaluate the order at issue in this appeal
under sections 361.2 or 362.4, the outcome is the same.

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correctness of its reasoning.3 (See In re Marriage of Burgess
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32 [“We are required to uphold the [custody]
ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such
basis was actually invoked.”]; In re Daniel B. (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 663, 675, fn. 4; In re Jonathan B., supra,
5 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.)
We therefore consider whether the juvenile court made an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination when it
decided it was in Lavender’s best interest to have D.J. alone
make decisions regarding her health, education, and welfare. We
conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
Here, the record supports a finding that Anne’s
participation in making important decisions relating to
Lavender’s health, education, and welfare would not be in
Lavender’s best interests. Anne does not challenge the juvenile
court’s finding she failed to seek medical attention for the half-
siblings when they needed it. It is also undisputed Anne created

3 We are not persuaded by Anne’s contention that a
“disposition based on an error of law constitutes an abuse of
discretion. (In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 271.).” In
In re D.M., the trial court applied improper criteria to determine
whether the beneficial parental relationship exception applied to
avert the termination of parental rights. As a result, remand was
necessary for the trial court to consider the proper criteria to
exercise its discretion. (Id. at p. 271.) Here, there is no similar
error of law. The juvenile court’s comments from the bench
showed it understood the proper focus was on “the child’s best
interest.” Moreover, its mistaken belief that joint legal custody
would allow Anne to take Lavender from D.J. was not the only
reason for its ruling. As discussed below, the court set out the
factual basis for its ruling in extensive detail.

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a detrimental home environment that smelled of urine and was
dirty. Further, the children looked like they had not been bathed
in weeks. Coupled with Lavender’s inability to care for herself
due to her age, these findings alone support the conclusion that it
is not in Lavender’s best interest to allow Anne to participate in
making health, education, and welfare decisions for a baby.
Additionally, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that it was not in Lavender’s best interest to grant joint
legal custody, “given the mother’s need to continue to make
progress in her case plan.” The record shows Anne’s efforts to
address the issues that led to removal of her other children were
incomplete or otherwise lacking. She admitted and the juvenile
court found she had a history of mental and emotional disorders,
including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety,
bi-polar disorder, aggression, and suicidal ideations, for which
she failed to seek treatment. The court found credible the
Department’s suspicion that Anne was not taking the medication
prescribed to address her mental health disorders.
The court also found Anne failed to address her substance
abuse. Despite asserting she had been sober for two years, Anne
admitted she was “‘so lit’” during sexual intercourse she did not
stop even when she observed the children in the same room.
Anne’s repeated failure to drug test also indicates she had not
fully addressed her substance abuse issues. Further, Anne’s
continued denial of physical abuse, claiming she only threw
things at the children when they failed to listen to her,
demonstrates a lack of understanding of appropriate parenting to
ensure the safety of her children. Anne’s inability throughout
these proceedings to reunify with any of her children, her failure
to make progress in overcoming the problems leading to their

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removal, her denial of the severe physical and sexual abuse she
inflicted on the half-siblings, as well as her failure to complete
the sexual predator program support the court’s finding it was
not in Lavender’s best interest to order joint legal custody.
By contrast, it is undisputed Lavender was safe in D.J.’s
care. D.J. actively made decisions that demonstrated his concern
for Lavender’s health and welfare, including taking the day off
work to care for Lavender when he learned about the findings
against Anne and ensuring the paternal relatives were available
to look after Lavender when he returned to work. D.J. also
denied any history of alcohol or substance abuse and tested
negative at a court-ordered drug test on January 31, 2024.
Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted sole legal custody to D.J. (See In re
Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [award of sole legal
custody to father upheld where, among other reasons, mother
failed to follow through on drug rehabilitation referrals and to
submit to drug tests, irregularly visited with child, and had an
extensive history of untreated serious mental illness].)
We are not persuaded the juvenile court abused its
discretion in making its decision because Anne had made some
progress “in acknowledging the harm that she caused Lavender’s
half-siblings, her progress in addressing her substance abuse and
mental health issues, and her actions to prepare for the care of
Lavender.” As discussed above, the programs and classes Anne
participated in are not enough to require reversal of the juvenile
court’s order. The record supports the court’s finding she was not
taking the medication prescribed for her mental health disorders,
her substance abuse remained a problem, and she continued to
deny she physically or sexually abused Lavender’s half-siblings.

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Under these circumstances, we cannot say the juvenile court
abused its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The disposition order granting sole legal and physical
custody to D.J. is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

PULOS, J. *

* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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