CourtListener 10312706•In re Z.H. CA1/3
Testo completo
Filed 1/13/25 In re Z.H. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Z.H. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170347
v.
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos.
K.L.,
24JD00006, 24JD00007)
Defendant and Appellant.
Minors Z.H. and L.H.1 were taken from their parents’ custody based on
allegations that the parents had unresolved substance abuse problems. The
juvenile court took jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) of
the Welfare and Institutions Code (further unspecified statutory references
are to this code) and entered a disposition order declaring the children
dependents of the court and ordering reunification services to the presumed
1 Minors share the same hyphenated combination of surnames that
begin with the initials H and C, but the record and briefing do not
consistently use the same surname initials for each child. For consistency,
and with no disrespect intended, we use the first surname initial (H) for both
of them.
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father, S.H. (Father), but bypassing reunification services to mother, K.L.
(Mother). On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred because
(1) the Sonoma County Department of Social Services (Department) failed to
make “active efforts” to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as required
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
and related California law (§ 361.7); and (2) reunification with Mother was in
the children’s best interests.
While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court granted Mother’s
modification petition under section 388 and ordered that she receive
reunification services with the children. Because Mother has received the
relief she seeks in this appeal, we agree with the Department that the appeal
is moot and grant its motion to dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2024, the Department filed a dependency petition on
behalf of Z.H. (aged 3) and L.H. (newborn) pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1), and (g), alleging the children have suffered or were at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness due to substance
abuse by Mother and Father.
The petition further alleged that Mother had a long history of
treatment-resistant substance abuse, that she had misused substances
during her pregnancies with both children, and that she had recently failed to
appear for a scheduled intake appointment to enter residential treatment at
Women’s Recovery Services (WRS). Mother was arrested on January 4, 2024,
and held without bail for probation violations and new drug use-related
charges. Father also allegedly struggled with substance abuse and had not
taken adequate steps to protect the children and meet their basic needs.
2
Based on Mother’s report that she was a registered member of the
Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians (“Tribe”),
along with the Department’s report of its interviews with the parents,
relatives, and extended family members, the juvenile court found that ICWA
applied. The court ordered the children detained and temporarily placed
with their maternal grandparents.
On February 8, 2024, the Department filed its jurisdiction and
disposition report recommending that the juvenile court sustain the
dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and
declare the children to be dependents of the court, with family reunification
services to Mother and Father (after he attained presumed father status).
According to the report, Mother stated in an interview that the allegations in
the petition were true and correct. Among other things, she agreed that she
was not capable of taking care of the children due to her struggles to stay
sober, and that the children were safer with their maternal grandparents.
Although the Department believed it was unlikely that Mother would
rehabilitate and be able to regain custody due to her extensive history with
drugs, the Department recommended that she receive reunification services,
noting that her presence was missed in the children’s lives.
At the jurisdiction hearing on February 14, 2024, the juvenile court
elevated Father to presumed father status. The court sustained the petition
as pled under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and found the children to
be Indian children. The court continued the matter for a disposition hearing.
The Department subsequently filed an addendum disposition report
recommending that Father receive reunification services, but that services be
bypassed for Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). According
to the report, Mother left the WRS drug treatment facility on the same day
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she arrived, was hospitalized after overdosing, and was again incarcerated
for violating probation.
At the contested disposition hearing on April 22, 2024, the juvenile
court heard testimony from social workers, ICWA representative and
designated Indian expert, Shayne Platz, and the parents. After the close of
evidence and argument, the juvenile court found, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that the Department had made active efforts to provide
remedial services and a rehabilitative program designed to prevent the
breakup of Mother’s Indian family that proved unsuccessful. The court
declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from their
parents’ custody, and ordered reunification services to Father, but bypassed
reunification services to Mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13),
based on its finding that ordering services for Mother was not in the
children’s best interests.
On April 23, 2024, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. On
November 19, 2024, the Department concurrently filed its respondent’s brief
and a motion to (1) augment the record or, in the alternative, take judicial
notice; and (2) dismiss the appeal. The Department explained that on
October 4, 2024, Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting reunification
services based on evidence that she had graduated from WRS, was engaging
in DAAC Peri Aftercare, and was maintaining her sobriety. On November 7,
2024, the juvenile court granted Mother’s petition.
Mother did not oppose the Department’s motions to augment or
dismiss, nor did she file a reply briefing responding to the Department’s
argument that the appeal is moot. On December 6, 2024, we granted the
motion to augment the record but deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss.
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DISCUSSION
“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness concerns because
the parties have multiple opportunities to appeal orders even as the
proceedings in the juvenile court proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
53, 59 (N.S.).) “[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief
if it finds reversible error.” (Id. at p. 60, citing In re Michelle M. (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 326, 328–329 and In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544,
1546–1547 (Joshua C.).)
Here, Mother’s appeal challenges the juvenile court’s disposition
findings and orders that the Department made active efforts to provide
services to prevent the breakup of an Indian family that ultimately proved
unsuccessful, and that reunification services to Mother were not in the
children’s best interests and would therefore be bypassed under section
361.5, subdivision (b)(13).2 In her opening brief, Mother asks that the
juvenile court’s bypass ruling be reversed “and remanded with instructions to
provide mother with reunification services.” It is undisputed that the
juvenile court granted Mother’s post-appeal request for reunification services,
with the support of the Department, Father, and the Tribe. Thus, although
the dependency case is still ongoing, Mother has already received the specific
remedy she seeks in this appeal.
2 This statute provides in relevant part that reunification services “need
not be provided . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,”
that a parent has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs
and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three-years
immediately prior to the filing of the petition or has refused to comply with a
drug treatment program in the case plan on at least two prior occasions.
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
5
Meanwhile, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings or its decision to declare the children wards of the court. And while
her opening brief makes extensive references to the Department’s various
legal duties regarding inquiry and notice under ICWA, she raises no claim of
error relating to the Department’s satisfaction of those particular obligations.
Rather, Mother’s claim of ICWA error focuses more narrowly on whether the
evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding under section 361.7,
subdivision (a), that “active efforts have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”
Even if we were to find reversible ICWA error, we would not be able to
provide any relief that Mother has not already received through her
successful post-appeal section 388 petition. Mother identifies no continuing
effects of the juvenile court’s initial “active efforts” finding on future
proceedings. (See, e.g., Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1546–1547
[appeal was not moot because jurisdictional findings continued to adversely
affect appellant’s visitation and custody].) And even if Mother later
encounters problems with the sufficiency of reunification services that may
be said to call into question the Department’s “active efforts” under section
361.7, those issues would be based on post-appeal facts and evidence beyond
the scope of this appeal. As such, Mother’s appeal based on her specific claim
of ICWA error is moot.
The same goes for Mother’s second argument that the juvenile court
erred in bypassing reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(13). Under that provision, reunification “need not be provided to a parent
or guardian described in this subdivision” when the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent meets one or more of criteria of
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subdivision (b). Where a parent is described in certain subsections of
subdivision (b) (including subdivision (b)(13), which is at issue here), section
361.5, subdivision (c), provides that “[t]he court shall not order reunification
. . . unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
In challenging the juvenile court’s bypass ruling, Mother contends the
Legislature intended for parents like her “to have at least one chance at
reunification with her children during the first dependency case,” and that
substantial evidence in this case supported the likelihood of a successful
reunification. But even if Mother is correct, there is no effective relief to
grant, as she has now been given the “one chance to reunify” that she claims
the court erroneously withheld from her in its original disposition ruling.
And because the standards for bypassing reunification no longer apply, if
there are any future matters for review, they will likely involve whether the
services provided to Mother were reasonable, and whether there is a
substantial probability that the children will be returned to her based on her
progress in addressing the substance abuse problems that led to the
dependency. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Those issues are beyond the scope
of the briefing and record in this appeal.
As this case does not pose an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur and there is no likelihood of the recurrence of the same controversy
between the same parties or others (N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58–
59), we grant the Department’s motion to dismiss this appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
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_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
_________________________
Petrou, J.
Sonoma County Department of Social Services v. K. L. (A170347)
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