People v. Edwards CA5

CourtListener 10310624Calctapp8 gen 2025

Testo completo

Filed 1/8/25 P. v. Edwards CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F085114
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR033982)
v.

MATTHEW EDWARDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Dale J. Blea,
Judge.
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Angelo S. Edralin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, appellant Matthew Edwards was convicted by jury of four counts of the
premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of their
duties (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, subds. (e), (f)/187, subd. (a)), counts 1-4), assault with a
firearm on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2), counts 5-8), felon in possession of a
firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 9), and vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a), count 10).2 In addition, the jury found true firearm use enhancements as to
counts 1 through 8. (See §§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).) Edwards
was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 60 years to life, plus a determinate term
of 83 years.
In 2022, Edwards filed a petition to vacate his convictions for premeditated
attempted murder, and to be resentenced pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6.3 Following the appointment of counsel to represent Edwards and the submission
of a motion to dismiss by the prosecutor, the trial court issued an order to show cause. At
the evidentiary hearing on Edwards’s petition, the parties submitted upon the record of
conviction. The trial court denied Edwards’s petition, finding him ineligible for
resentencing relief.
Edwards raises three claims on appeal. First, he contends that the superior court
prejudicially erred in the denial of his petition in multiple respects, including: by
applying an incorrect standard of proof in finding that he is ineligible for resentencing
relief, applying the law of felony murder to his convictions for premeditated attempted

1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2 Edwards’s conviction for vehicle theft was ultimately reversed on direct appeal.

3 On June 30, 2022, the statute was renumbered as section 1172.6 without further
substantive changes. (See People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 715, fn. 3.) We
refer to the statute by its current designation throughout the remainder of this opinion.

2.
murder, and relying upon facts from this court’s opinion on Edwards’s direct appeal.
Second, Edwards asserts there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
premeditated attempted murder under the kill zone theory. Third, Edwards contends that
his appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in the litigation of his
petition. Finding Edwards’s claims meritless, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
his petition for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 28, 2010, the Madera County District Attorney filed an information
charging Edwards with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murders of
peace officers engaged in the performance of their duties (§§ 664, subds. (e), (f)/187,
subd. (a)), counts 1-4), assault with a firearm on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2),
counts 5-8), felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 9), and
vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 10). As to counts 1 through 8, the
information further alleged that Edwards had personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm in the commission of a specified felony (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and that he had
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b)).
On February 20, 2013, Edwards was convicted by jury as charged.
On September 25, 2015, following Edwards’s direct appeal, this court reversed his
conviction for vehicle theft on count 10. (See People v. Edwards (Sept. 25, 2015,
F067823) [nonpub. opn.].)
On January 6, 2016, the trial court resentenced Edwards to an aggregate term of 60
years to life in state prison plus a determinate term of 83 years.
On February 25, 2022, Edwards filed a petition for resentencing (§ 1172.6).
Following the appointment of counsel to represent Edwards, and the submission of a
motion to dismiss by the prosecutor, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing on
Edwards’s petition.

3.
On September 30, 2022, at the hearing, the parties submitted on the record of
conviction, declining to introduce any new or additional evidence. The trial court denied
Edwards’s petition.
The Underlying Case
The following statement of facts is derived from the record of conviction in
Edwards’s original appeal. (People v. Edwards, supra, F067823.)4 Partial reporter’s
transcripts from Edwards’s criminal trial were submitted as exhibits to the prosecutor’s
opposition. These transcripts establish the following facts:
On December 28, 2008, around 3:45 a.m., Madera Police Officer John Palazzola
observed a red Plymouth Neon parked in a 7-Eleven store parking lot with two males
inside. After the Neon left the parking lot, Officer Palazzola observed the vehicle
commit several traffic violations. He activated his patrol car’s emergency lights to
initiate a traffic stop. The red Neon sped away.
Officer Palazzola pursued the vehicle, observing additional traffic violations
during the chase. As the Neon continued to flee, the front passenger leaned out of the
window, turned towards Officer Palazzola, and pointed his arm at the officer and his
patrol vehicle. Officer Palazzola was approximately 50 yards behind the Neon on
Avenue 13 when this occurred.
Officer Palazzola then heard gunshots and saw three muzzle flashes coming from
the passenger’s hand. He immediately took evasive action to avoid the gunfire.
After the first round of gunfire, the Neon accelerated further and turned off its
headlights to avoid detection. The vehicle’s lights remained off for most of the pursuit,
with only brief intervals of illumination. Several other Madera Police officers, including,
Officers Jason Green, Josh Chavez, and Juan Gaona, joined the pursuit.

4 We take judicial notice of the record from Edwards’s direct appeal on our own
motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [authorizing a court to take judicial notice of
records of “any court of this state”].)

4.
The red Neon continued to evade the officers. While navigating an “S-turn” on
State Route 145, the passenger leaned out of the window, aimed towards the officers, and
fired at least two more shots. During the second round of gunfire, Officer Palazzola was
50 yards behind the Neon, with Officer Green 30 to 50 feet behind him and Officers
Chavez and Gaona behind both.
The pursuit eventually reached Highway 99, where the red Neon entered the
southbound lanes. Once on the highway, the passenger leaned out of the Neon a third
time and fired at least two shots while the Neon was traveling at approximately 110 miles
per hour. Officer Palazzola, who was traveling approximately 150 yards behind the
Neon, made an evasive maneuver to avoid being hit by gunfire.
The Neon abruptly exited State Route 99 on the Princeton exit. Officers Chavez
and Gaona pursued the Neon to Parkway Drive. Officer Chavez was in the first position,
approximately 80 feet behind the Neon, and Officer Gaona was in the second position,
approximately 10 to 15 yards behind Officer Chavez. The passenger leaned out of the
Neon and facing Officer Chavez’s direction, shot his gun three times, causing Officer
Chavez to veer to the left.
The officers pursued the Neon into the City of Fresno, where it eventually crashed
into a light pole and came to a stop. Two individuals fled the vehicle. Fresno Police
Officer Jonathan Linzey, who had joined the pursuit in Fresno, watched the passenger
from the time that he fled the Neon until he was apprehended. Officer Linzey identified
Edwards as the passenger. Other officers, including Officer Michael Fortune, who had
joined in the pursuit, identified Edwards as the Neon’s passenger by his clothing. The
driver of the Neon was never apprehended.
The Prosecutor’s Statements in Closing Argument
In closing argument, the prosecutor explained that if the jury concluded that
Edwards was the driver of the Neon, rather than the passenger/shooter, it could still
convict Edwards of premeditated attempted murder as an aider and abettor. However, if

5.
the jury found Edwards guilty as an aider and abettor, the jury could not find true the
enhancement for the personal use of a firearm because the other individual in the Neon
would be the one who had used the gun.
The jury found Edwards guilty of all four counts of premeditated attempted
murder and found true the firearm enhancements alleged as to these counts.
The Trial Court’s Ruling on Edwards’s Petition for Resentencing

In denying Edwards’s petition, the trial court made the following
comments:

“THE COURT: The burden of proof in this matter[ is] on the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Edwards
is ineligible for resentencing. Mr. Edwards is ineligible for
resentencing if he may still be found guilty of attempted murder
pursuant to Penal Code Section 188 and 189. Section 189 provides
that, ‘A person may be convicted of murder if he was the actual
killer or if he was a major participant in the commission of the crime
and acted [with] reckless indifference to human life.’

“The – the parties have submitted on the record of conviction
in this matter, and the record of conviction reveals as follows: The
trial testimony from Officer Palaz[z]ola was that while he was
pursuing the vehicle in which Mr. Edwards was an occupant, he
observed the front seat passenger reach outside of the vehicle
window and fire three rounds from a firearm at the pursuing peace
officers. Officer Palaz[z]ola observed the front passenger fire two
additional rounds later – from the vehicle later in the pursuit. Mr.
Edwards is identified as that front seat passenger based on the
distinctive clothing that he was wearing and because he was
observed by a Fresno peace officer exit the front passenger seat and
flee on foot after the vehicle had crashed.

“The jury found true that Mr. Edwards personally discharged
a firearm at officers during the pursuit. There was no allegation in
the Information or evidence – evidence presented during the trial to
support a theory that anyone other than the actual shooter fired at
officers.

“And, finally, on appeal, at which Mr. Edwards’ convictions
for attempted murder were affirmed, the Fifth District Court of

6.
Appeal specifically found that Mr. Edwards was the occupant of the
suspect vehicle who fired at the pursuing peace officers.

“Based on this, the record of conviction establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt a conclusion that Mr. Edwards was the actual
shooter in this case. Further, the record establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Edwards was a major participant in the
crime and acted in reckless indifference to human life.

“For those reasons, I find that Mr. Edwards may still be
convicted under Penal Code Section 189 subdivision (c) for the
attempted murders, and accordingly, I’m ordering that his petition be
denied.”
DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court’s Conclusion That Edwards Is Ineligible for
Resentencing Relief Under Section 1172.6
Edwards challenges the superior court’s ruling denying his petition for
resentencing (§ 1172.6) on three grounds. First, he contends the court applied an
incorrect standard of proof by concluding that he “may still be convicted” of
premeditated attempted murder following changes made to sections 188 and 189.
Second, he asserts that the court misunderstood the amendments to the law on
premeditated attempted murder, as demonstrated by its conclusion that Edwards was not
only the sole and actual shooter, but that he was also a major participant who had acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Third, Edwards contends that the superior court
erred by relying upon this court’s prior appellate opinion in determining that Edwards is
ineligible for resentencing relief. Although we agree that the trial court erred in some
respects, neither the individual errors nor their cumulative effect demonstrate that
Edwards suffered prejudice as a result.
A. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides
that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person:

7.
(1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a
direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] The Legislature also amended the
natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188,
which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50-51; People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted
under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended,” initially
codified in former section 1170.95. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The
initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction
for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced
on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result
of the other legislative changes implemented by [Senate Bill 1437].” (People v. Flores
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 775) made substantive amendments to former section 1170.95 that were
consistent with People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), and also “ ‘[c]larifie[d]
that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of
felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the
same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.’ ” (People v.
Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
In the case at bench, Edwards’s petition proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. At
an evidentiary hearing on a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, “the burden of proof
shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is

8.
guilty of ... attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “A finding that
there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for ... attempted murder ... is
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (Ibid.) “The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by
the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may also
consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.
However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the
evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor
and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (Ibid.)
“Ordinarily, a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition [following an
evidentiary hearing] is reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this
standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 988.) Reversal is not warranted unless “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the trial court’s ruling].” ’ ” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
B. Analysis
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, an aider and abettor could be
convicted of premeditated attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (See People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 874 (Favor); see also, People v.

9.
Williams (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 388, review granted Sept. 11, 2024, S286314
[“Prior to the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was an available theory of both premeditated and unpremeditated
attempted murder”].)
Two years after Favor was decided, our Supreme Court held that “[A]n aider and
abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158-159.)
However, the high court declined to explicitly overrule or disapprove Favor, finding it
distinguishable in several respects. (See People v. Chiu, at p. 163.)
Edwards was convicted of premeditated attempted murder under the law as it
existed when Favor was decided. Thus, in proving his guilt for premeditated attempted
murder, the prosecution could have proceeded under a theory of imputed malice.
Specifically, the prosecutor would have had to have proven that Edwards aided and
abetted a target offense for which the attempted murders were a natural and probable
consequence, and the perpetrator of the attempted murders acted with premeditation. But
the record of conviction supports the conclusion that the prosecutor did not proceed under
such a theory.
In closing argument, the prosecutor explained that if the jury found that Edwards
was the driver rather than the passenger/shooter, it could still convict Edwards of
premeditated attempted murder based upon aiding and abetting the intended crime, i.e.,
the shootings. In the context of the record, the prosecutor argued that Edwards was guilty
as either the direct perpetrator or as a direct aider and abettor. The prosecutor explained
that if the jury found Edwards guilty as a (direct) aider and abettor, it could not find true
the enhancements alleged for the personal use of a firearm because the other individual in
the Neon would be the one who had used the gun. The jury found Edwards guilty of all
four counts of premeditated attempted murder and found true the firearm enhancements
attached to these counts. He was therefore convicted as the sole and actual shooter.

10.
The record suggests that the prosecutor never advanced a theory of imputed
malice.5 Further, the jury ostensibly convicted Edwards of the premeditated attempted
murders based upon a finding that he was the direct perpetrator. Nonetheless, the trial
court appropriately issued an order to show cause, finding that Edwards’s ineligibility for
resentencing relief could not be established as a matter of law at the prima facie stage.
At the evidentiary hearing, the superior court, acting as an independent factfinder,
drew the same conclusion as the jury had when Edwards was originally prosecuted,
finding that Edwards was the sole and actual shooter. By implication, the superior court
concluded that Edwards had acted with express malice in the commission of all four
counts of premeditated attempted murder.6
The evidence adduced at Edwards’s criminal trial established that the passenger in
the red Neon was the only shooter during the police pursuit. Shots were fired at officers
from the Neon’s passenger seat on four separate occasions. First, at Officer Palazzola
when he was 50 yards behind the Neon on Avenue 13. Second, at Officer Palazzola
when he was 50 yards behind the Neon on State Route 145, with Officer Green 30 to 50
feet behind him and Officers Chavez and Gaona behind both. Third, at Officer Palazzola
on southbound Highway 99 when he was 150 yards behind the Neon. And finally, at

5 The jury instructions given at Edwards’s criminal trial clearly demonstrate,
without resorting to improper factfinding (see People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
972), that the prosecutor did not rely on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
to establish Edwards’s guilt for premeditated attempted murder. Had the parties and the
court consulted these instructions, Edwards’s petition could have been denied at the
prima facie stage. Because it is unclear whether the jury instructions were available at
Edwards’s evidentiary hearing, we do not factor them into our analysis.
6 Edwards argues that the trial court’s conclusion that he was the sole and actual
shooter was insufficient to show that he had acted with express malice. Not so. The trial
court’s conclusion that Edwards is still guilty of attempted murder under amended
sections 188 and 189, means that it necessarily concluded that Edwards had acted with
express malice. (See CALCRIM Nos. 600 & 601.)

11.
Officer Chavez when he was 80 feet behind the Neon on Parkway Drive, with Officer
Gaona 10 to 15 yards behind him.
Officers Palazzola and Chavez testified that the front passenger aimed directly at
them while shooting, causing them to swerve their vehicles to avoid the gunfire. Officer
Palazzola specifically recalled seeing the passenger’s arm extend perpendicularly out of
the vehicle before turning to aim at him.
Further, eyewitness testimony placed Edwards in the passenger seat of the red
Neon. Officer Chavez observed someone wearing a black and white patterned jacket
leaning out of the Neon and shooting a gun at him. Officer Fortune saw the passenger’s
head and shoulders extending out of the Neon, explaining that the hood of the
passenger’s jacket appeared to be light in color, consistent with the inside of the jacket
Edwards was wearing. And, Officer Linzey saw the passenger, who was wearing a black
and white patterned jacket, exit the front passenger door after the vehicle stopped and he
apprehended that person—Edwards.
Based upon the fact that Edwards fired multiple shots at the pursuing officers at
four separate intervals during the pursuit, he not only acted with the intent to kill, but also
with premeditation and deliberation. Each interval between the shootings gave Edwards
the opportunity to reflect upon his actions. Each time, he decided to continue firing his
gun at the pursuing officers. (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812
[“ ‘ “Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. ‘The test is not time, but
reflection. “Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the superior court’s conclusion
that Edwards was the sole and direct perpetrator of the shootings and that he is ineligible
for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. We now turn to his contention that the court
nonetheless prejudicially erred in denying his petition for resentencing.

12.
1. The Standard of Proof Applied by the Superior Court
At an evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor must prove, “beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of … attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
Edwards suggests that the trial court may have failed to apply this standard of
proof in determining that he was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6.
He directs this court to the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss, which summarized the issue
before the court as follows: “ ‘the sole question to be answered at [the] hearing [is]
whether the Petitioner could still be convicted of murder [or attempted murder.]’ ”
(Italics added.) Subsequently, when ruling on Edwards’s petition, the superior court
stated that it was the prosecutor’s burden “to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Edwards is ineligible for resentencing.” However, at the conclusion of Edwards’s
hearing, the trial court stated that “Mr. Edwards ‘may still be convicted [of premeditated
attempted murder].’ ” Edwards takes issue with the superior court’s use of the phrase
“may still be convicted” rather than “is guilty of” premeditated attempted murder.
According to Edwards, the superior court may have applied a substantial evidence
test in concluding that he is ineligible for resentencing relief. (See e.g., People v. Vance
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (Vance) [prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No.775,
some courts had interpreted section 1172.6 as permitting the denial of a petition for
resentencing so long as there was substantial evidence to support the petitioner’s
conviction under sections 188 and 189 as amended, rather than requiring the trial court to
act as an independent factfinder to determine whether the petitioner is guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt under the current law].) As Senate Bill No. 775’s
amendments to section 1172.6 have made clear, “a court determination that substantial
evidence supports a homicide conviction is not a basis for denying resentencing after an

13.
evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 720, citing former
§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
The evidentiary hearing on Edwards’s petition was held on September 30, 2022,
nearly 10 months after Senate Bill No. 775’s amendments to former section 1170.95 went
into effect. Contrary to Edwards’s assertion, the proper inquiry is not whether the record
demonstrates that the court correctly applied the law, but rather, whether the record
affirmatively demonstrates that it did not. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361
[in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew and correctly applied the law].)
We conclude that there is no affirmative indication in the record that the superior
court failed to apply the correct standard in denying Edwards’s petition. The law was
settled at the time of Edwards’s hearing. Further, neither the prosecutor nor the trial
court ever used the words “substantial evidence” or “sufficient evidence.” Instead, both
described the prosecutor’s burden of proof as being proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
We are not persuaded that the trial court’s conclusion that Edwards “may still be found
guilty of attempted murder pursuant to Penal Code Section[s] 188 and 189,”
demonstrates that the court applied a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Edwards further contends that the superior court erred by deferring to factual
findings made by the jury, rather than acting as an independent factfinder. At the
evidentiary hearing, “ ‘it is the [trial] court’s responsibility to act as independent fact
finder and [to] determine whether the evidence establishes a petitioner would be guilty of
murder under amended sections 188 and 189 and is thus ineligible for resentencing under
section [1172.6].’ ” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 110.)
To support his claim, Edwards directs this court to the following comment made
by the superior court in its ruling denying his petition: “The jury found true that Mr.
Edwards personally discharged a firearm at officers during the pursuit. There was no
allegation in the Information or evidence…presented during the trial to support a theory

14.
that anyone other than the actual shooter fired at officers.” This was not an improper
finding of fact. The superior court merely observed that the jury had concluded that
Edwards was the sole and actual shooter, thereby ruling out any possibility that he was
convicted upon any theory of aiding and abetting, whether direct or indirect. (See People
v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [“Section [1172.6] applies by its terms only to
attempted murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine”].) To that
end, the superior court also made independent findings of fact that were consistent with
the jury’s conclusion that Edwards was the sole and actual shooter. We conclude that the
record demonstrates that the superior court applied the correct standard in concluding that
Edwards was ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing relief.

2. The Trial Court’s Analysis of the Felony Murder Rule and its
Application to Premeditated Attempted Murder
Next, Edwards contends that the trial court misunderstood the law on attempted
murder. In addition to finding that Edwards was the sole and actual shooter, the superior
court further held that “the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Edwards was a major participant in the crime and acted in reckless indifference to human
life.”
We agree with Edwards’s assertion that the trial court’s conclusion on this point
was erroneous. Attempted murder is not one of the enumerated felonies that may support
application of the felony murder rule. (See People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 653,
661-662, fn. 2 [explaining that “attempted murder is not one of the enumerated felonies
in section 189”].) Consequently, the trial court erred by finding that Edwards was a
major participant in the underlying felony who had acted with reckless indifference to
human life. However, the error was harmless upon the instant record.
As discussed, the superior court also found that the trial evidence demonstrated,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Edwards was the sole and actual shooter. Therefore,
malice could not have been imputed to him. Instead, the superior court’s finding that

15.
Edwards was ineligible for resentencing relief necessarily required the court to find that
Edwards had personally harbored express malice. Despite the superior court’s erroneous
reliance upon the felony murder rule, its determination that Edwards is (still) guilty of
premeditated attempted murder under sections 188 and 189 was correct.

3. The Superior Court’s Reliance Upon Our Opinion on Edwards’s
Direct Appeal
Finally, Edwards contends that the superior court prejudicially erred by relying
upon facts from our prior appellate opinion. Subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.6
provides that “The court may…consider the procedural history of the case recited in any
prior appellate opinion.” This court has previously held that while the procedural history
of a prior appellate opinion may be relied upon, by implication, “the factual summary in
an appellate opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an evidentiary hearing to
determine a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988.)
The prosecutor’s motion to dismiss Edwards’s petition observed that our prior
appellate opinion had found the following: “ ‘the passenger pointed a handgun out the
window and fired it repeatedly … at the police cars’ and that ‘Fresno Police Officer
Jonathan Linzey caught up with the passenger, Edwards, inside the complex and arrested
him.’ ” These statements, included within the procedural history of our prior opinion,
were technically within the ambit of evidence that may be considered at an evidentiary
hearing. (See People v. Edwards (Sept. 25, 2015, F067823) [nonpub. opn.]; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The prosecutor further represented that this court’s “opinion shows that [this]
court found [Edwards] was the actual shooter,” a conclusion which likely rested upon
additional facts outside of our procedural history. In its ruling, the superior court relied
upon our prior opinion, observing that this court had previously found that Edwards was
the occupant of the suspect vehicle that had fired at the officers.

16.
Edwards did not object to the admission of this evidence. His failure to lodge a
timely and specific objection to the superior court’s reliance upon our prior opinion
resulted in forfeiture of his claim on appeal. (See Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 162
[“when an appellate opinion is admitted at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
without objection,” a party forfeits any challenge to the superior court’s consideration of
the opinion]; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 696 [defendant forfeited his
challenge to admissibility of evidence admitted at evidentiary hearing under former
section 1170.95 by failing to object]; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [error in admitting
evidence may not be basis for reversal of judgment unless “an objection to or a motion to
exclude or to strike the evidence ... was timely made and so stated as to make clear the
specific ground of the objection or motion”].)
Forfeiture aside, we conclude that any error was harmless under People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). (See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [error
based solely on state law is subject to Watson harmless error analysis]; see also, Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958 [procedural error under section 1172.6 is “state law error
only, tested for prejudice under [Watson]”]; and, Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp.
716-717 [the harmless error standard in Watson applies where the superior court
improperly considered an appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing].) Under Watson,
Edwards “has the burden of showing that it is reasonably probable that, in the absence of
the error, he ... would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome.” (Vance, at p. 710.) No
such probability exists upon the instant record. Our opinion is merely duplicative of the
trial evidence, which amply demonstrates that Edwards was the sole and actual shooter,
that he acted with express malice, and that he is therefore, ineligible for section 1172.6
resentencing relief.
II. The Kill Zone Theory Does Not Implicate Imputed Malice
Edwards submits that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
premeditated attempted murder based upon the kill zone theory. He argues that following

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his conviction, our Supreme Court has limited the scope of the kill zone theory (see
People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales)), and that the evidence is no
longer sufficient to support his convictions under this theory. We conclude that his claim
may not be raised in the context of section 1172.6 petition proceedings.

A. Background: This Court’s Discussion of the Kill Zone Theory on Edwards’s
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, Edwards challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his convictions on counts 2 and 4, the premeditated attempted murders of Officers Green
and Gaona, respectively. Following an extensive analysis of the trial evidence, this court
found substantial evidence of Edwards’s intent to kill Green and Gaona under the kill
zone theory. Although the jury was not instructed pursuant to the kill zone theory (See
CALCRIM No. 600), as this court explained, “ ‘[t]his concurrent intent theory is not a
legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions,’ … [it] is ‘simply a reasonable inference
the jury may draw in a given case.’ ” Following a detailed discussion, this court
concluded that the evidence supported Edwards’s conviction for attempted murder on all
four counts under the kill zone theory.
B. Legal Principles: The Kill Zone Theory
Like first degree premeditated murder, attempted murder requires evidence of
express malice—implied malice is insufficient. (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
623.) However, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder.
(People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331.) Therefore, “[w]hen a single act is charged
as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be
examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim.” (Canizales, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 602.)
Although the intent to kill a specific target does not transfer to an unintended
surviving victim, it does not preclude a finding that the assailant concurrently intended to
kill others. In one scenario, an assailant may fire indiscriminately into a crowd of people,

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intending to kill anyone who gets caught in the hail of bullets. (See People v. Thompkins
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365, 396, disapproved on other grounds by In re Lopez (2023) 14
Cal.5th 562, 584.) Alternatively, the assailant may intend to eliminate a specific target by
killing all individuals in close proximity to the intended target. (See Canizales, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 603.) This is the so-called “kill zone” theory. (Id. at p. 596.)
“[A] shooter may be convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder on a ‘kill
zone’ theory where the evidence establishes that the shooter used lethal force designed
and intended to kill everyone in an area around the targeted victim (i.e., the ‘kill zone’) as
the means of accomplishing the killing of that victim.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 745-746, discussing People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329-330].)
For the kill zone theory to apply, the trier of fact must conclude: “(1) the
circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target, including the type and extent
of force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the
defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm – that is, an area in which the defendant
intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target’s death – around the
primary target and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary
target was located within that zone of harm. Taken together, such evidence will support a
finding that the defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the primary
target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
607; People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 197 [“ ‘[i]f the evidence supports a
reasonable inference of the [defendant’s] requisite intent, it necessarily follows that the
jury could find it was the only reasonable inference’ ”].)
C. Analysis
“Section 1172.6 offers resentencing for petitioners who have not been determined
beyond a reasonable doubt to have the degree of culpability now required for a murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction.” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 720.) Relief under section 1172.6 is available to defendants convicted under the

19.
natural and probable consequences doctrine or another theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. (Id., subd.
(a).) Thus, when the jury instructions or the jury’s verdict reflect that the defendant was
not convicted under such a theory, the petition may be denied as a matter of law. (See
People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677, review dism. Dec. 1, 2021, S266336
[instructions]; People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864, 866-867 [verdict].)
We acknowledge that “section 1172.6 relief is not necessarily confined to those
who might have been able to obtain relief through sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
raised on direct appeal or through functionally similar claims raised on habeas corpus.”
(People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 720, fn. 5.) But even if we agreed with
Edwards’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support the kill zone theory on
some, or even all, of his premeditated attempted murder convictions, we do not agree that
his claim may be raised in the context of section 1172.6 proceedings.
The kill zone theory sets forth circumstances by which the jury may infer the
defendant possessed the intent to kill; it does not implicate imputed malice. Attempted
murder requires a specific intent to kill. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) The
kill zone theory of attempted murder is not an exception to that requirement but rather a
“theory for establishing the specific intent to kill required for conviction of attempted
murder.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) “The kill zone theory looks to
circumstantial evidence to support a permissive inference regarding a defendant’s intent.”
(Id. at p. 606.)
We further observe that to be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, the superior
court must conclude that “the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective [by Senate Bill No. 1437].”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Because the kill zone theory does not implicate
changes made to sections 188 or 189 by the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437,
Edwards’s challenge to his convictions upon the kill zone theory may not be raised in the

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context of section 1172.6 proceedings. (See People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
942, 947 [“The mere filing of a section 1170.95 petition does not afford the petitioner a
new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s findings”].)
III. Edwards’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Finally, Edwards asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel. He contends that appointed counsel “filed no papers,
presented no evidence, made no arguments, and permitted readily-discernible errors to
[occur] without comment.” We conclude that Edwards has failed to establish his claim.
A. Legal Principles
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant is required
to make a two-part showing. First, they must establish that “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”
(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519-520.) Second, they must show that trial
counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. (Ibid.) Prejudice must be affirmatively
shown; the record must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.)
B. Analysis
At Edwards’s evidentiary hearing, the record of conviction supplied overwhelming
evidence that he was the sole and actual shooter and that he had acted with express
malice. Edwards fails to identify the existence of any new, persuasive evidence that
could have undermined these conclusions. The record demonstrates that appointed
counsel requested the court set the evidentiary hearing out so that he could investigate
whether any new evidence existed. We presume that no new evidence was discovered.

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Edwards argues that because he was only 22 years old at the time of the offense,
his attorney could have argued that he was unable to fully perceive risk and
consequences, which affected his ability to form express malice. We agree with Edwards
that the trial court probably did not consider this factor, even implicitly. The cases that
have held that a section 1172.6 petitioner’s age at the time of a murder is a relevant factor
have done so in analyzing whether the petitioner had acted with implied malice in the
commission of a second degree murder (see People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400) or with reckless indifference to human life pursuant to the felony murder rule (see
People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434,
439, People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093). In our view however those
questions are distinct from the question of whether a 22-year-old man, who was the sole
perpetrator of a series of shootings, could form the intent to kill.
Even assuming appointed counsel should have raised the issue of Edwards’s age at
the time of his crime, we conclude that any presumed error is harmless under Watson.
(See People v. Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 417-418 [applying Watson], People
v. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489 & fn. 8 [same]; see also People v. Epps, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 29 [Watson applies to the denial of a right that “is purely a creature of
state statutory law”].) Other than the fact of his age, Edwards marshals no evidence
demonstrating that his actions were motived by “relative impulsivity” or his
“vulnerability to peer pressure.” (People v. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.)
Where there is “no evidence” that a defendant’s “criminal behavior was motivated by
either of these two factors,” the trial court’s failure to consider relative youth is harmless.
(Ibid.)
Further, insofar as appointed counsel failed to object to the superior court’s
reliance upon findings from our direct appeal, some of which may have been outside of
our procedural history, the record does not support Edwards’s claim that the error was
prejudicial. As stated in Part I.B.3, ante, our appellate opinion’s finding that Edwards

22.
was the sole and actual shooter is consistent with the trial transcripts considered at the
evidentiary hearing below.
We conclude that based upon the overwhelming evidence supporting Edwards’s
guilt, the filing of motions or additional argument by appointed counsel would have been
futile. Trial counsel “is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts to
appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092,
citing People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219.) Nor is trial counsel “required
to make futile objections, advance meritless arguments or undertake useless procedural
challenges merely to create a record impregnable to assault for claimed inadequacy of
counsel.” (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820, 827.) We therefore reject
Edwards’s claim.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Edwards’s petition for resentencing (§ 1172.6) is
affirmed.

SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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