CourtListener 10308516•In re J.M. CA5
Testo completo
Filed 1/7/25 In re J.M. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re J.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES F087816
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. 23JP-00149-A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Donald J.
Proietti, Judge.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Ann Hanson, Deputy County Counsel;
Gordon-Creed, Kelley, Holl, and Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and Anne H. Nguyen for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
S.M. (mother) filed a timely notice of appeal following a contested dispositional
hearing. Mother’s sole claim is that because the Merced County Human Services Agency
(agency) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether J.M. is or may be an Indian
child,1 in compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, former
subdivision (b),2 the juvenile court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) did not apply. Mother seeks reversal of the
court’s ICWA finding and remand for further proceedings consistent with the law.3
Based on the combination of the parents’ representations that they do not have any
Native American ancestry and prior findings by the juvenile court that ICWA does not
apply, the agency disputes there was any error and contends the court’s ICWA finding is
supported by substantial evidence. If this court finds error, the agency contends we may
nevertheless affirm the court’s orders and findings given its commitment to reviewing its
1 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we [may at times] do the same for
consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or
‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735,
739, fn. 1, disapproved in part on another ground in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).)
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
3 As addressed in part I.B. of the Discussion, section 224.2 was amended, effective
September 27, 2024, by Assembly Bill No. 81. (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2024,
ch. 656, § 3 [California Indian Child Welfare Act or Cal-ICWA] (Assembly Bill 81).)
The agency’s inquiry and the juvenile court’s ICWA finding in this case predated
Assembly Bill 81, but, for the reasons discussed by this court in K.H., E.C., and Jerry R.,
the inquiry and finding were deficient under the law as it stood prior to the passage of
Assembly Bill 81. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 598–599 & 602–605 (K.H.);
In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 141–142 (E.C.); In re Jerry R. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 388, 428–429 (Jerry R.).)
2.
records and determining what further steps, if any, are required. Alternatively, the agency
contends we may dismiss the appeal as moot.
Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dezi C., this court ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether conditional reversal and remand is
required under that decision. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1151–1152.) The parties
maintain their respective positions in supplemental briefing.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dezi C. and this court’s decisions
in K.H., E.C., and Jerry R., we conclude that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA
does not apply given the absence of a documented, proper, adequate, and duly diligent
inquiry, as required under California law. (§ 224.2, subds. (b)–(c); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(5);4 Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125; K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 591; E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 405.)
Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional orders but conditionally reverse
the court’s ICWA finding and remand this matter with directions to ensure a proper,
adequate, and duly diligent inquiry in compliance with California law. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1152; In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567–568.)
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY5
Events Leading Up to Detention
On November 30, 2020, a section 300 juvenile dependency petition was filed on
behalf of J.M. J.M. and a confidential half sibling were detained from their mother due to
mother’s inappropriate parenting, excessive discipline, substance abuse, and living in the
maternal grandparents’ home which was found in “deplorable conditions.”
4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
5 The facts and procedural history are summarized to include background
information and information relevant to the legal issue presented.
3.
When notified the children had been detained and were ordered to be produced to
the agency, mother refused and allowed the maternal grandmother to abscond with the
minors out of state. The maternal grandmother hid in Mississippi to avoid the children
being removed, and it took three weeks and multiple attempts by several agencies across
the country to locate the children. The children were finally taken into custody on
December 14, 2020.
On February 4, 2021, mother and J.M.’s father were offered family reunification
services. Mother was offered substance abuse treatment, mental health services, anger
management, and parenting education, but did not complete some of her classes, was
unable to demonstrate or apply what she had learned from the classes she completed, and
continued to test positive for methamphetamine. On September 8, 2021, J.M.’s case was
dismissed and sole physical custody was given to father.6
On October 4, 2023, the agency received a report that mother had applied for full
custody of J.M., stating that J.M. was in her physical care due to J.M. running away from
her father’s house. The application was denied. On October 12, 2023, social worker
A.A. received records from the Vacaville Police Department, which indicated officers
responded to a motel after a report was made to Solano County Child Protective Services
that J.M. had run away for three months. Vacaville Police located J.M. at a motel with
J.M.’s boyfriend and his parents. Mother indicated she wanted J.M. returned to the
agency’s custody and alleged that father abused J.M., but the allegations were
unsubstantiated and J.M. was returned to father’s care.
On October 5, 2023, A.A. discovered mother attempted to add J.M. to her welfare
aid case on December 27, 2022, but was initially denied. Mother was successful in
6 On September 29, 2022, reunification services were terminated for the confidential
half sibling due to mother’s failure to meet her case plan objectives, and the half sibling
was placed in long-term foster care.
4.
July 2023. On May 26, 2023, mother indicated J.M.’s boyfriend was living in mother’s
home, and J.M. was pregnant.
On October 11, 2023, A.A. discovered multiple reports from law enforcement and
child protective services mentioning J.M. had run away multiple times, but no records
that either parent was the one who reported her as a runaway. On October 12, 2023, A.A.
spoke with father, who stated J.M. was unhappy in his care so he allowed the maternal
grandparents to pick her up from his home in December 2022. Father did this knowing
mother resided with the maternal grandparents and was not allowed to have her children
in her care. Father did not maintain contact with J.M., did not know she was pregnant,
and did not report her as a runaway.
On October 12, 2023, A.A. with the assistance of a Los Banos Police Department
officer, interviewed J.M. at her school. J.M. was visibly pregnant, refused to cooperate
and requested the presence of her mother. Mother arrived shortly after, appearing to be
under the influence. Mother confirmed the maternal grandparents picked up J.M. and
that J.M. was residing with them and mother since December 22, 2022. Mother stated
she did not report J.M. was in her care because she did not trust the agency. She also
refused to do a hair follicle drug test and claimed that while she had used
methamphetamine earlier that year, she had not used it for a few months.
On October 12, 2023, A.A. observed mother’s home. Mother, the maternal
grandparents, J.M. and J.M.’s boyfriend all lived in the home, and it was cleaner than it
had been during the prior dependency case.
Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing
On October 16, 2023, a section 300 petition was filed alleging J.M. came within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on mother’s failure or inability to supervise or
protect J.M. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A)), inability to provide regular care for J.M. due to
mother’s mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse (§ 300,
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subd. (b)(1)(D)), and that J.M.’s half sibling had been abused or neglected and there was
a substantial risk that J.M. would be abused or neglected (§ 300, subd. (j)).
At the October 17, 2023, detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.M. be
detained and ruled as follows.
“Reviewing allegations of the petition, particularly the
(b) allegations—(b)(1) allegations, that [J.M.] came to the attention of the
Agency as [J.M.] had run away from her father’s home and was in the
custody of her mother. Mother was seeking full custody, which was denied
by the Family Law Court. There have been a number of concerns
concerning [J.M.’s] welfare check or AWOLing multiple times, police
records being obtained.
“The totality of the allegations are such that I am concerned about
[J.M]’s safety, particularly with regard to the history of this case and the
family’s history in child dependency, [mother’s] history as well. I am
concerned about her very fragile condition given the fact that she’s in the
last trimester, from what I am told, in her pregnancy. She needs to be in
protective custody.
“I am going to order that [J.M.’s] continuance in her mother’s home
or father’s home is contrary to the child’s welfare. I am ordering temporary
placement and care be vested with the Agency and that reasonable efforts
have been made to prevent the need for removal.”
ICWA Status
The October 16, 2023, petition included a checked box which stated, “I have asked
as to whether the child is or may be a member of an Indian tribe or eligible for
membership and the biological child of a member and the Indian Child Inquiry
Attachment (form ICWA-010(A)) is attached.”
The attached form indicated mother and father were asked and “gave … no reason
to believe the child is or may be an Indian child.”
The October 17, 2023, detention report contained the following statement
regarding ICWA.
“The Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.
6.
“On December 10, 2020, at the trailed detention/interim hearing in
Merced County case number 20JP-00139-A, the Court found that ICWA
did not apply as to [father.]
“On February 24, 2022, at the Twelve Month Status Review Hearing
in Merced County case number 20JP-00139-B, it was determined that
ICWA does not apply to the mother .…”
During the October 17, 2023, detention hearing, the juvenile court stated, “I’ll take
judicial notice that on February 24, 2022, in this same case, 20JP139A, the Court made a
determination that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply to the parents. [¶] Can I
confirm with [father], have you learned any new information that you may have
American Indian heritage in your family? [¶] [Mother]?” Both mother and father
responded, “No.”
A Parental Notification of Indian Status form was filled out by mother and filed on
October 25, 2023. Mother checked the box on the form indicating J.M. had no applicable
Indian status and signed and dated the form.
A jurisdiction report prepared on December 8, 2023, in addition to the above,
stated, “Neither parent has provided any new information regarding Native American
ancestry.”
February 20, 2024, Contested Disposition Hearing
At the February 20, 2024, contested disposition hearing, father waived his right to
reunification services and indicated he did not want custody of J.M. Mother requested
reunification services and indicated an intention to enter in-patient rehabilitation.
The juvenile court ruled by clear and convincing evidence there was a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, and welfare of J.M. should she be returned to the
care and custody of her mother because of substance abuse issues, parenting issues, and
failure to reunify in a related case. The court did not offer reunification services to
mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) because she previously had
7.
reunification services terminated for J.M.’s half sibling. Since that time, mother also had
not made reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal.
The juvenile court did not make any findings regarding ICWA, but took judicial
notice of “all prior findings, orders, and judgments of this court in this matter.” The case
remained open to allow mother to make motions for change of order should mother be
successful in her treatment. Mother filed a timely appeal of the court’s dispositional
order on March 25, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
A. ICWA
“ICWA was enacted in 1978 by Congress ‘out of concern that “an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies.” 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(4). Congress found that many of these children were being “placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions,” and that the States had contributed to the
problem by “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” §§ 1901(4),
(5). This harmed not only Indian parents and children, but also Indian tribes. As
Congress put it, “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” § 1901(3).’ (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023)
599 U.S. [255, 265]; accord, [Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians] v. Holyfield (1989)
490 U.S. 30, 32–36 …; In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8 (Isaiah W.).)” (Jerry R.,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407–408.)
“ ‘[ICWA] thus aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families. “Indian
child” is defined broadly to include not only a child who is “a member of an Indian
tribe,” but also one who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” § 1903(4). If the Indian child lives on a
8.
reservation, ICWA grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody
proceedings, including adoptions and foster care proceedings. § 1911(a). For other
Indian children, state and tribal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the state
court is sometimes required to transfer the case to tribal court. § 1911(b). When a state
court adjudicates the proceeding, ICWA governs from start to finish. That is true
regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” (one to which the parents do not
consent) or “voluntary” (one to which they do).’ (Haaland [v. Brackeen], supra, 599 U.S.
at [pp. 265–266]; accord, [Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.] Holyfield, supra, 490
U.S. at p. 36.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.)
ICWA sets the minimum standards, providing, “In any case where State or Federal
law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher
standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child
than the rights provided under this title …, the State or Federal court shall apply the State
or Federal standard.” (25 U.S.C. § 1921; accord, § 224, subd. (d).) “The minimum
standards established by ICWA include the requirement of notice to Indian tribes in any
involuntary proceeding in state court to place a child in foster care or to terminate
parental rights ‘where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is
involved.’ ” (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 8, quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) “ICWA’s
notice requirements serve two purposes. First, they facilitate a determination of whether
the child is an Indian child under ICWA.” (Isaiah W., at p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
“Second, ICWA notice ensures that an Indian tribe is aware of its right to intervene in or,
where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding involving an
Indian child.” (Isaiah W., at p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(a), (c), 1912(a).)
“To facilitate notice in appropriate cases, federal law provides, ‘State courts must
ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child custody
proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child. The inquiry is made at the commencement of the proceeding and all
9.
responses should be on the record. State courts must instruct the parties to inform the
court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is
an Indian child.’ (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2023).) California law requires more and,
relevant to the issue raised here, imposes on counties a broad duty of inquiry into whether
a child placed in the temporary custody of the county is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.)
B. Cal-ICWA
“In 2006, ‘persistent noncompliance with ICWA led [our state] Legislature … to
“incorporate[] ICWA’s requirements into California statutory law.” ’ ” (Jerry R., supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 409, quoting In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91.) “ ‘ “In
2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance” ’ ” (Jerry R.,
at pp. 409–410, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595), but “[p]rior to that time,
‘neither ICWA itself nor the implementing federal regulations in effect … imposed a duty
on courts or child protective agencies to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency
proceeding was an Indian child.’ ” (Jerry R., at p. 410, quoting In re T.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 275, 289 (T.G.).) Now, “ ‘federal regulations governing ICWA … require an
ICWA inquiry be made at the inception of dependency proceedings, as well as at all
proceedings that “may culminate” in foster care placement or termination of parental
rights.’ ” (Jerry R., at p. 410, quoting In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 323,
fn. 11.)
“Subsequently, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3176,[7]
effective January 1, 2019, which ‘ “made conforming amendments to its statutes,
including portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA notice and
inquiry requirements.” ’ ” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, quoting K.H.,
7 “Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3176).”
(Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, fn. 11.)
10.
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.) “Assembly Bill 3176 repealed former sections 224.2,
pertaining to notice, and 224.3, pertaining to inquiry, and reenacted them in different
form. (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, §§ 4–7.) Section 224.3 now governs notice and
section 224.2 inquiry.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The legislation “revised and recast the duties
of inquiry and notice, in accordance with federal law, and, relevant to inquiry, ‘revise[d]
the specific steps a social worker, probation officer, or court is required to take in making
an inquiry of a child’s possible status as an Indian child.’ ” (Id. at p. 411, quoting Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 3176, Stats. 2018, ch. 833, p. 1.)
Very recently, faced with continuing difficulties and inconsistencies in this area of
the law, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 81, effective September 27, 2024.8
Assembly Bill 81 “create[d] a comprehensive act to protect and preserve Indian families
in California and to aid in improving implementation of applicable state and federal
laws.” (§ 224, subd. (c).) The legislation expressly recognized, “Despite the passage of
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Senate Bill 678 (Stats. 2006, [c]h. 838), and
Assembly Bill 3176 (Stats. 2018, [c]h. 833), California continues to experience
inconsistent implementation of [ICWA] and its related state law protections, thus
continuing the harm and breakup of Indian families. Variation in practice undermines
tribal sovereignty, furthers destructive impacts on tribes and tribal communities, puts the
lives of Indian children and families at disproportionate risk for multiple adverse
outcomes, and fails to address systemic racism.” (Id., subd. (b).) In addition to
advancing the goals of clarity and consistency under California law (§ 224, subd. (c)),
Cal-ICWA resolved the split of appellate authority over whether or not the duty of initial
8 The amendments to section 224.2 between Assembly Bills 3176 and 81 did not
affect subdivision (b). (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 410–411, fn. 12; Assem.
Bill No. 686 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2020; Assem. Bill No. 2944 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.), eff. Sept. 18, 2020; Assem. Bill No. 2960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1,
2023.)
11.
inquiry under section 224.2, former subdivision (b), arises when a child is taken into
protective custody by warrant under section 340, expressly providing that it does (id.,
subd. (b)(2)). (See Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403–404 [addressing In re
Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, review granted July 26, 2023, S279743, & In re
Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, & agreeing with Delila D. that the duty of initial
inquiry applies regardless of how the child is taken into custody].)
As amended, section 224.2 provides, in relevant part, “The court, county welfare
department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may be or has
been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire
begins for a county when first contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to,
asking a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that
the child may be an Indian child, and upon a county department’s first contact with the
child or the child’s family, including extended family members as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 224.1. At the first contact with the child and
each family member, including extended family members, the county welfare department
or county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).)
“If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county probation department
pursuant to Section 307, or received and maintained in temporary custody of a county
welfare department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or taken
into or maintained in the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken into
protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340, the county welfare
department or county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is an
Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
12.
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2).)
“For a court presiding over any juvenile proceeding that could result in placement
of an Indian child with someone other than a parent or Indian custodian, including
proceedings where the parents or Indian custodian have voluntarily consented to
placement of the child, the duty to inquire begins at the first hearing on a petition. At the
commencement of the hearing, the court shall ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, whether
they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child, and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian are domiciled, as defined in Section 224.1. Inquiry shall
also be made at the first appearance in court of each party or interested person who was
not present at the first hearing on the petition. The inquiry and responses shall occur on
the record. The court shall instruct the parties and persons present to inform the court if
they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is, or may
be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
II. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143; Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 542;
rule 5.482(c)(1), (2).)9 First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no reason to know whether
the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether any of the
six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., supra, at
9 Assembly Bill 81 effected only minor technical changes to subdivision (i) of
section 224.2.
13.
p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).)
Second, “[t]he juvenile court must … find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence .…’ ” (K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra,
at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).)
“The juvenile court’s finding on the second element ‘requires the … court to
“engage in a delicate balancing of” various factors in assessing whether the … inquiry
was proper and adequate within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether …
[there was] due diligence.’ (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid
standard and review the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of
discretion. (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; In re Ezequiel G.,
supra, at p. 1003.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.)
III. Analysis
A. Error
“ ‘ “Notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose .…” ([T.G.,
supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 288], citing Isaiah W., supra, [1 Cal.5th] at p. 8.) However, it
is typically “not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child” ([In re] Benjamin M.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741), and “the question of membership is determined by the
tribes, not the courts or child protective agencies” (T.G., supra, at p. 294). To ensure
notice in cases in which it is known or there is reason to know an Indian child is involved
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); … § 224.3, subd. (a)), the law imposes an affirmative and ongoing
duty to inquire whether a child subject to dependency proceedings is or may be an Indian
child (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) .…’ ” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 411, quoting K.H.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 588.) Under California law, “ ‘agencies now have a broader
duty of inquiry and a duty of documentation.’ ” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
14.
p. 411, citing K.H., supra, at p. 588, fn. omitted, citing § 224.2, subd. (b) &
rule 5.481(a)(5).)
“[C]omplying with the duty of inquiry and documentation under ICWA is unlikely
to ‘prove onerous’ in most cases [citation], [but] in no event may we interpret the law to
relieve the court or the agency of complying with the plain directives imposed by statute
and rule (K.H., supra, [84 Cal.App.5th] at p. 620; see § 224.2; rules 5.480–5.482). There
may be cases in which there is no one else to ask beyond [one or both] parents [and a few
relatives], but, if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and supported
by documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) Properly developed and documented, ‘the court
has relatively broad discretion to determine [that] the … inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.’ (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C.,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.)
In this case, mother and father denied any Native American ancestry, and mother
contends on appeal that no other maternal or paternal relatives were asked even though
the record contains mention of some maternal and paternal relatives.
The agency points to no inquiries of anyone other than the parents, but it argues
that “the unequivocal and repeated representations from mother and father that there was
no Native American ancestry, no membership or eligibility for membership in a federally
recognized tribe, and no new ICWA information to be disclosed, combined with the lack
of any objection or challenge to the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s prior ICWA
findings in the earlier dependency proceedings, permitted the juvenile court to reasonably
determine that ICWA does not apply and that J[.M.] is not an Indian child as defined by
ICWA.” In supplemental briefing, the agency contends the court’s finding that ICWA
does not apply is supported by substantial evidence because of “(1) unchallenged prior
judicial findings made in earlier dependency proceedings involving the same family that
ICWA did not apply, (2) the parents’ denial in open court that they had no new
information that would alter the prior judicial findings, (3) the parents’ reaffirmation that
15.
they held no tribal memberships or were in the process of obtaining tribal membership,
and (4) mother’s ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status confirming that she
had no Native American ancestry and was not a member of any Native American tribe.”
For the reasons that follow, we reject the agency’s arguments.
1. Absence of Objection to ICWA Findings
First, in pointing out there were no objections to earlier ICWA findings, the agency
necessarily implies that an ICWA claim may be forfeited or its failure to conduct an
adequate inquiry may be otherwise excused because there were no objections. This
argument is unavailing. As this court has stated, “ ‘The purpose of ICWA and related
California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine
whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the
proceedings’ [citations], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information
gathering upon which the court’s ICWA determination will rest. However, while the
appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering
information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the claim of
error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.)10 The
Supreme Court subsequently reiterated that “a parent may ‘challenge a finding of ICWA’s
inapplicability in an appeal from the subsequent order, even if [they] did not raise such a
challenge in an appeal from the initial order.’ (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 6.) We
justified this conclusion in part because ICWA permits its notice requirements to ‘be
10 There may be circumstances in which a parent’s argument that additional people
were not asked may be deemed unmeritorious. As we recognized in K.H., “it is difficult
to envision a successful claim premised on the agency’s failure to question a
second cousin or a family friend, if the agency inquired of a child’s closer maternal and
paternal relatives on both sides, those relatives provided no information suggesting
possible Indian ancestry, and the agency documented its efforts in the record for the
juvenile court’s review.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 604.) That circumstance is
not present in cases such as this, where there is no documentation of a proper, adequate,
and duly diligent inquiry. (Id. at p. 605.)
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enforced after the issuance of an order terminating parental rights.’ (Id. at p. 13; see also
25 U.S.C. § 1914.) Accordingly, ICWA findings ‘are preserved for review irrespective of
any action or inaction on the part of the parent .…’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1149–1150, quoting In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 708.)
2. Inquiry of Parents Only
Next, bare reliance on the parents’ representations regarding Native American
ancestry does not suffice. In K.H., this court explained that “the law demands more than
merely inquiring of [the parents].” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; accord,
Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.) Subsequently, and binding upon the parties
and the juvenile court, Dezi C. stated, “[N]othing in the statutory scheme permits the
required inquiry to be halted or short circuited when a parent denies Indian ancestry.”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1150.) This fundamental failure to comply with statutory
requirements cannot be cured by simply asking the parents more than once, as the agency
argues. As previously stated, “There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask
beyond the parents, but, if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and
supported by documentation.” (Jerry R., at p. 428, citing rule 5.481(a)(5).)
3. Prior ICWA Findings
Finally, the agency argues that it was not error for the juvenile court to rely on its
prior findings that ICWA does not apply. However, “the bare assertion that there was a
previous finding that ICWA did not apply is insufficient to permit deference to the
finding.” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.) In Jerry R., we noted that “the
earlier finding the agency refers to here predates the amendment to rule 5.481(a)(5)
requiring documentation, which was effective January 1, 2020 (K.H., supra, [84
Cal.App.5th] at p. 599), and the many appellate decisions that have more recently shaped
this area of the law (id. at pp. 611–618 [discussing development of various approaches in
cases decided in 2021 and 2022]).” (Ibid.) Here the prior ICWA findings do not predate
the rule change, but this distinction does not result in a different conclusion because the
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concerns expressed in Jerry R. remain at issue here. We explained, “ ‘[A]s the recent
surge of cases reflects, following changes to California law over the past few years, the
agency’s discharge of its duties to inquire and document under section 224.2,
subdivision (b), and rule 5.481(a)(5), is often so lacking that the juvenile court is left with
little or nothing to work with; there is no evidence in the record and, therefore, nothing
upon which to base a sound exercise of discretion.’ ” (Ibid., quoting K.H., at p. 605;
accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.)
Where an agency relies on a past ICWA finding, without pointing to any evidence
in the record showing a reasonable inquiry into Native American ancestry that would
support the court’s finding of a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry, courts must
exercise caution. The Legislative history underlying the 2019 and 2024 amendments to
the law, the sheer volume of litigation concerning ICWA inquiries, and cases decided by
this court and the Supreme Court well illustrate the rampant and continuing failure to
comply with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. Reliance on a past ICWA finding, where there is no
documentation in the record reflecting that an inquiry comporting with the law was
conducted, would render compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA illusory.
The agency relies on Charles W. for support and asserts that Dezi C. did not
overrule Charles W. In that case, the appellate court concluded, “[G]iven the prior ICWA
finding regarding this family and the parents’ unequivocal denials of Indian ancestry, we
do not find it reasonably probable that further inquiry based on the record before us
would yield a different result. Thus, [f]ather fails to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice
requiring remand.” (In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 492, citing In re
Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430–1431, disapproved by Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.) The agency’s reliance on Charles W. is misplaced, however,
as its reasoning on this point has been undermined in light of Dezi C., irrespective of the
fact that Charles W. is not expressly included in the group of cases disapproved. (Dezi
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C., at pp. 1151–1152.) Notably, Rebecca R., on which Charles W. relied, is expressly
included. (Dezi C., at p. 1152, fn. 18.)
4. Conclusion
In sum, “ ‘ “[o]n a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion
to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the
specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.” ’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141, quoting In re
Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101–1102.) “ ‘ “When, as in this case, the court’s
implied finding that the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent rests on
a cursory record and a patently insufficient inquiry …, the only viable conclusion is that
the finding is unsupported by substantial evidence and the court’s conclusion to the
contrary constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” ’ ” (Dezi C., at p. 1141, quoting Kenneth
D., at p. 1102.) Although the agency in this case does not concede the record is cursory
and the inquiry patently insufficient, the deficiencies here are not distinguishable from the
conceded deficiencies in Dezi C., K.H., E.C., and Jerry R. (Dezi C., at p. 1141 [inquiry of
parents only]; K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 605 [inquiry of parents only]; E.C.,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [inquiry limited to mother]; Jerry R., supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at pp. 428–429 [inquiry of parents only].)
“ ‘General information from the family about its ancestry frequently provides the
only available basis to believe an Indian child may be involved. [Citation.] Additional
investigation may not develop further information establishing the need for ICWA notice,
but it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and child protective agency’s
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” to construe broadly the duty to make further
inquiry.’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 147, quoting T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 295.)
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B. Remedy
“ICWA and Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect
Native American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of Native
American ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125, citing Isaiah W.,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 7–8; 25 U.S.C. § 1902; § 224, former subd. (a).) As previously
discussed, “ ‘Notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose, enabling a
tribe to determine whether the child involved in a dependency proceeding is an Indian
child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise jurisdiction over, the matter.’ ”
(Dezi C., at p. 1133, quoting T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 288.) “ ‘Although the duty
of inquiry is a continuing one [citation], as we have seen in countless cases, … if the
inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant
information will present itself later in the proceeding declines precipitously.’ ” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.)
Therefore, “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry requires
conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the
inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision of section 224.3.
When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain whether the
agency’s error is prejudicial. [Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial
inquiry and makes that information known, it is impossible to know what the inquiry
might reveal.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136, quoting K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)
We recognize that mother is not appealing from the termination of her parental
rights, this action remains ongoing, and the agency and the juvenile court remain under a
continuing duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) However, “ ‘absent a reasonable inquiry
at the outset, the opportunity to gather information relevant to the inquiry is often missed
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entirely.’ ” (Dezi, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1144, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 615.) As the court concluded in Dezi C., “We hold our child welfare agencies and
courts to these commitments. We do so by requiring a judgment to be conditionally
reversed when error results in an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry. It is only by
conditionally reversing that we can ascertain whether error in the inquiry is prejudicial.”
(Dezi C., at p. 1152.) Because the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA does not apply,
the remedy for the error is reversal of the ICWA finding and remand with instructions to
comply with the law. (Ibid.; In re Dominick D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 567–568.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional orders but reverse the court’s finding
that ICWA does not apply and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance
with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2 and rule 5.481.
If, after determining that a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry was made, the
court concludes that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA finding. If,
instead, the court concludes that ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in conformity
with ICWA and Cal-ICWA.
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