People v. Vasquez CA4/1

CourtListener 10307183Calctapp3 gen 2025

Testo completo

Filed 1/3/25 P. v. Vasquez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081820

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN416061)

JESUS ALFONSO BAUTISTA
VASQUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sim von Kalinowski, Judge. Affirmed.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Andrew S. Mestman and Arlene A. Sevidal, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Jesus Alfonso Bautista Vasquez of three counts of
sexual penetration with a child under 10, nine counts of lewd acts upon a
child under 14, and three counts of exhibiting pornography to a minor. He
appeals from his convictions on three grounds: (1) the People presented
insufficient evidence of force, duress, or fear regarding three of his lewd acts;
(2) the People failed to prove whether the pornography counts occurred before
or after a 2014 amendment to the statute for which the jury convicted him,
resulting in improper jury instructions and violating the prohibition against
ex post facto laws; and (3) his 135-year-to-life sentence for nine lewd acts is
cruel and unusual, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on
that ground. Concluding that none of these claims warrant reversal, we
affirm the judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

J.M., D.M., and M.H., are Vasquez’s nieces. In 2013 and 2014 they
lived together in the same duplex. During this time, J.M. was between eight
and 10 years old, and D.M. and M.H. were between four and six years old.
J.M., D.M., and their parents shared one side of the duplex with Vasquez, his
wife, and their two children. Each adult couple slept in one of the home’s two
bedrooms, while the children slept in the garage. The girls’ parents left early
in the morning for work, and Vasquez was responsible for taking them to
school. M.H. lived in the other side of the duplex with her parents and
brother.

A. Vasquez’s Abuse of J.M.

After their parents left for work, J.M. and D.M. would usually go into
their parents’ bedroom to continue sleeping. Shortly after going back to

2
sleep, approximately three to four times a week, Vasquez would go into that
bedroom and close the door behind him. In each such instance, Vasquez
showed J.M. pornography. Because Vasquez would tell her to watch it, J.M.
felt she had no choice in the matter. Vasquez also touched his penis every
time, pulling his shorts down to expose it. About two times a week, Vasquez
grabbed J.M.’s hand around the wrist and made her grasp his penis and
move it up and down. On two occasions, while Vasquez was carrying J.M.
with her legs around his torso, he moved her body up and down and rubbed
his penis against her genital area.
Between 5 and 10 times, Vasquez inserted his finger or a larger object
into J.M.’s vagina, though more frequently he touched the outside of her
vagina. To accomplish this, Vasquez would either remove J.M.’s clothes
himself, or he would instruct her to do so. J.M. complied with those
instructions, initially not knowing it was wrong. However, J.M. discovered
Vasquez’s actions were wrong after seeing D.M. and M.H.’s reaction when
Vasquez exposed himself to all three of them; the abuse continued after that
point.
D.M. remained in the bedroom sleeping while these assaults on J.M.
occurred. D.M. awoke only once, causing Vasquez to scurry out of the room.
Because of that reaction, J.M. unsuccessfully tried to wake up D.M. on
another occasion to stop the discomfort she felt when Vasquez was pulling
down her pants.
When Vasquez abused J.M., she obeyed him because he told her to, he
was much bigger than she, and she felt like she could not say no. Vasquez
also told her not to tell anyone, especially her parents. This made J.M. feel
she could not disclose the abuse.

3
B. Vasquez’s Abuse of M.H. and D.M.

Vasquez acted similarly with his two younger nieces. He showed M.H.
pornography multiple times when no other adults were around. He told M.H.
the videos depicted acts in which her mom and dad engaged. Vasquez also
forced M.H. to touch his penis behind a closed door in her parents’ bedroom.
He told her that milk comes out of it and that J.M. touches his penis too.
On numerous occasions, Vasquez carried D.M. to his bed, sat next to
her, and showed her pornography. Vasquez did this when all the other adults
were at work. D.M. stated that during one of those times, he touched her
over her clothes in the general area of her vagina. D.M. also stated that
Vasquez exposed himself to her many times and forced her to touch his penis
on one occasion.
In 2022, the Office of the San Diego County District Attorney charged

Vasquez with three counts of sexual penetration with J.M. (Pen. Code,1
§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1–3), three counts of forceable lewd acts for touching
the outside of J.M.’s vagina (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 4–6), three counts of
forceable lewd acts for making J.M. touch his penis (§ 288, subd. (b)(1);
counts 7–9), three counts of forceable lewd acts for rubbing J.M.’s body
against his penis (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 10–12), one forceable lewd act for
touching D.M.’s vagina (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 14), one forceable lewd act
for making M.H. touch his penis (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 16), and three
counts of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor, one for each of the girls
(§ 288.2, subd. (a); counts 13, 15, 17).

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
4
Vasquez testified at his trial in 2022. He admitted showing J.M.
pornography two or three times and touching her vagina with the palm of his
hand three times. He denied all other allegations.
The jury found Vasquez guilty of all counts except 12 and 14. Jurors
found Vasquez not guilty of count 12 and were unable to reach a verdict on
count 14, resulting in a mistrial as to that count. The jury also found that all
sexual penetration and lewd act counts involved substantial sexual contact
(§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), and all lewd act counts were committed against
multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(4), (e)(4)).
In a bench trial, the court found these aggravating factors true: the
offenses involved a high degree of callousness, Vasquez took advantage of a
position of trust and confidence, each victim was particularly vulnerable, the
offenses were carried out with planning, and Vasquez used harmful matter to
induce a minor to engage in lewd acts (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 421(a)(1), (3),
(8) & (11); § 1170.71).
The trial court sentenced Vasquez to prison for three years plus 180
years to life. The sentence consisted of a three-year term for count 15, two
concurrent three-year terms for counts 13 and 17, and 12 consecutive
15-year-to-life terms for counts 1 through 11 and 16. Vasquez’s timely appeal
followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficient Evidence Supported Conviction for Lewd Acts with Force,
Fear or Duress (Counts 4–6)

Counts 4 through 6 involved Vasquez touching the outside of J.M.’s
vagina. Vasquez claims no evidence supports that he used any force greater
than that necessary to accomplish these offenses. As for duress and fear,
Vasquez relies on J.M.’s testimony that she would remove her clothing in

5
response to Vasquez’s demands because she “didn’t know it was wrong.” He
argues J.M.’s unawareness of wrongdoing differs from coercion by threat and
does not amount to fear. The People contend there was sufficient evidence of
duress. We agree.

1. Standard of Review

“ ‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears
“that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 45.)
Accordingly, the “defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there is
insufficient evidence to sustain his molestation convictions,” and “[i]f the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due
deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves.” (Id. at p. 46.)

2. Duress

A defendant who commits a lewd act on a child under 14 suffers
additional punishment when the crime is committed “by use of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
victim.” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘The very nature of duress is psychological
coercion.’ ” (People v. Barton (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 496, 518.) It is defined as
“ ‘ “a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or
retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities
to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or,

6
(2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted.” ’ ”
(People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246, italics omitted.)
To determine if the defendant used duress, we look at “[t]he totality of
the circumstances includ[ing] the victim’s age, her relationship to the
perpetrator, threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim
when the victim attempts to resist, warnings to the victim that revealing the
molestation would result in jeopardizing the family, and the relative physical
vulnerability of the child.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1063, 1072.)
For example, “ ‘[d]uress can arise from . . . the relationship between the
defendant and the victim and their relative ages and sizes. [Citations.]
“Where the defendant is a family member and the victim is young, . . . the
position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous
exploitation of the victim” [are] relevant to the existence of duress.’ ” (People
v. Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) Duress can also be shown by “a
defendant’s attempt to isolate the victim and increase or maintain her
vulnerability to his assaults.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
8, 15.) Further, “[t]he fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use
force or threats does not preclude a finding of duress.” (People v. Thomas,
supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.)

3. Analysis

Vasquez continuously molested J.M. when she was between seven and
nine years old. He was her adult uncle and an authority figure. The abuse
occurred in their shared home after J.M.’s parents left for work, behind a
closed door where the only other occupant was J.M.’s sleeping younger sister.
J.M. felt weird, confused, uncomfortable, and eventually realized it was
wrong. Vasquez told J.M. not to tell anyone, especially her parents, causing

7
J.M. to feel unable to disclose the abuse. Vasquez also employed force in the
unchallenged counts, making J.M. rub his penis and moving her body up and
down against himself.
Though the jury received no evidence of explicit threats to J.M., and
J.M. may not have initially known it was wrong to remove her clothes in
response to Vasquez’s demands, J.M. surrendered to Vasquez because he told
her to, he was much bigger than she, and she believed she could not say no.
J.M. also attempted to wake up D.M. to interrupt the abuse, indicating she
feared Vasquez and felt incapable of stopping him by herself.
Under these circumstances, J.M.’s initial ignorance of wrongdoing does
not defeat a finding of duress. Vasquez was a cohabitating adult family
member, he continuously abused J.M. by isolating her and demanding her
silence, he asserted physical control over J.M. in the unchallenged counts,
and J.M. believed she could not deny Vasquez’s advances because he was
much bigger. The jury could therefore reasonably infer that Vasquez
impliedly threatened hardship or retribution to accomplish the acts in counts
four through six. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that Vasquez
used duress in the challenged counts.

B. Any Error Regarding Exhibiting Harmful Matter to a Minor (Counts 13,
15, & 17) was Harmless

Vasquez argues the prosecution alleged and proved that he violated
section 288.2 between 2013 and 2015, but the People failed to establish
whether specific counts fell prior to, or after, 2014. He asserts that a 2014
amendment to section 288.2 expanded the crime’s intent element because
before 2014, the statute was limited to intending to engage in sexual
intercourse or genital contact, while the newer version includes more
intended acts. Vasquez also contends the current statute is broader than the

8
former because it omits a seduction requirement. Vasquez therefore claims
the trial court erred by only instructing the jury on the current version of
section 288.2 because his crimes could have predated the 2014 amendment.
For the same reasons, he claims his convictions under section 288.2 violate

the prohibition on ex post facto laws.2
We agree the evidence does not establish whether Vasquez’s offense
occurred before or after the 2014 amendment to section 288.2. Nonetheless,
any error in failing to instruct the jury on the prior law was harmless.

1. Standards of Review

We independently review instructional error and ex post facto claims.
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326; In re Sampson (2011)

197 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241.) Both claims are also subject to the Chapman3
harmless error test. (People v. Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 241
(Jensen); People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1306.) Under that
standard, the error is reversible unless “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 615.)

2 We address these claims despite the lack of an objection in the trial
court. Vasquez contends the jury instructions incorrectly stated the law and
affected his substantial rights, which are forfeiture exceptions. (People v.
Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 495, 499.) Additionally, an ex post facto
claim may be raised on appeal without a prior objection when the evidence
does not establish that the offense occurred after the effective date of the
relevant statute. (People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 256.)
3 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
9
2. 2014 Amendment of Section 288.2 and Corresponding Jury
Instructions

Section 288.2 criminalizes showing pornography to a minor. (§ 288.2,
subd. (a).) The required mental state for the offense has two elements; we

focus on the second because that is the basis of Vasquez’s claims.4 In 2013,
that second element required that the defendant act “with the intent or for
the purpose of seducing a minor.” (Former § 288.2, subd. (a)(1), amended by
Stats. 2013, ch. 777, § 2.) Consistent with case law interpreting section
288.2’s use of “seducing,” the former version of CALCRIM No. 1140 described
the second element, stating: “[t]o seduce a minor means to entice the minor
to engage in a sexual act involving physical contact between the seducer and
the minor.” (Former CALCRIM No. 1140 (2013); see also Jensen, supra,
114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 239–240.)
Effective January 1, 2014, the Legislature modified section 288.2.
(Stats. 2013, ch. 777, § 2.) Now one violates the law if he or she acted “with
the intent or for the purposes of engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or
oral copulation with the other person, or with the intent that either person
touch an intimate body part of the other.” (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(1).) The
amended statue also clarified that “an intimate body part includes the sexual
organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, or the breasts of a female.”
(§ 288.2, subd. (d).)
These statutory changes are reflected in the current version of
CACLRIM No. 1140, which the court gave to Vasquez’s jury. Specifically, the

4 The first element is “the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying
the lust or passions or sexual desires of [the defendant] or of the minor.”
(§ 288.2, subd. (a)(1).) It received only a small nonsubstantive change in the
2014 amendment of section 288.2, and Vasquez does not challenge this
element’s application to his crimes.
10
judge instructed the jury that the People must prove “[w]hen the defendant
acted, he intended to engage in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or oral copulation
with the other person or to have either person touch an intimate body part of
the other person.” The trial court also told the jury an intimate body party
“includes the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, or the
breasts of a female.”

3. Analysis

We disagree that the 2014 amendment to section 288.2 added more
intended acts to the offense. First, Vasquez is incorrect that the former
version of section 288.2 was limited to sexual intercourse or genital contact.
No such limitation is found in the earlier version of the statute, former
CALCRIM No. 1140, or the governing case law. Instead, all that was
required was an intent “to engage in a sexual act involving physical contact
between the perpetrator and the minor.” (Jensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at
p. 240, italics added.)
Additionally, when comparing the former and current versions of
CALCRIM No. 1140, we see the current version is more descriptive. The
former instruction broadly applied to intent “to engage in a sexual act
involving physical contact between the seducer and the minor” without
specifying which acts would qualify. (Former CALCRIM No. 1140 (2013).)
The newer version is narrower, identifying the qualifying acts; however, we
observe, “sexual intercourse, sodomy, or oral copulation with the other person
or [having] either person touch an intimate body part of the other person,”
(CALCRIM No. 1140) all fall within the previous instruction’s description of
“a sexual act involving physical contact between the seducer and the minor”
(Former CALCRIM No. 1140 (2013)).

11
Vasquez is correct, though, that CALCRIM No. 1140 no longer includes
the words “seduce” or “entice.” It merely requires that the defendant
“intended to engage in” certain specified acts. (CALCRIM No. 1140.)
Ultimately, we need not decide whether the variations between the
current and former statute are substantial enough to warrant an instruction
under the former. Any error in that regard was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
J.M., said Vasquez forced her to touch his penis, Vasquez touched and
penetrated her vagina, and Vasquez rubbed his penis on her “private parts”
while carrying her. This abuse occurred frequently, with Vasquez showing
J.M. pornography every time he sexually assaulted her. Vasquez also
admitted that he showed J.M. pornography before he would touch her, that
he did it because J.M. did not know what sexual touching was, and that he
would touch her while the videos were on.
As for M.H., Vasquez showed her pornography multiple times when no
other adults were present, telling her that her parents did what was depicted
in the videos. Vasquez also forced M.H. to touch his penis.
Vasquez also repeatedly showed D.M. pornography. Vasquez played
the videos while he and D.M. sat on his bed and no other adults were home.
D.M. also testified that Vasquez exposed himself to her many times and
forced her to touch his penis on one occasion, although the People did not
charge Vasquez for those acts.
Considering all the evidence and the jury’s findings, when Vasquez
showed each victim pornography, he intended to entice them to engage in

sexual acts involving physical contact.5 In fact, there was no evidence of a

5 The jury’s acquittal on count 12 and inability to reach a verdict on
count 14 do not change our analysis here.
12
contrary intent. Accordingly, we conclude the record supports that a rational
jury would reach the same verdict absent any error regarding instructing on
the 2014 amendment to section 288.2. We therefore affirm the convictions for
counts 13, 15, and 17.

C. Vasquez’s Punishment was Not Excessive (Counts 4–11 and 16)

The trial court imposed consecutive 15-year-to-life sentences for each of
Vasquez’s lewd acts (counts 4–11 & 16), totaling 135 years to life. Vasquez
argues this is effectively a life without parole sentence, amounting to a cruel
and unusual punishment. He further claims he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object on this ground in
the trial court.
Vasquez forfeited his excessive punishment claim by failing to raise it
in the trial court. (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) We
therefore review this issue through his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Vasquez fails to meet the requisite showing for reversal because he
has not established that his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have
been more favorable to the defendant. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th
892, 958.)

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The federal Constitution prohibits “ ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment,”
while the California Constitution prohibits “ ‘[c]ruel or unusual’ punishment.”

13
(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 723 (Baker).) “ ‘As a result, we
construe the state constitutional provision “separately from its counterpart in
the federal Constitution.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

a. California Constitution

“A punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of the California
Constitution if ‘it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.’ [Citation.] Three techniques are employed to make this
determination: first, we examine the nature of the offense and/or the
offender with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to
society; second, compare the challenged penalty with the punishments for
more serious offenses in California; and third, compare the challenged
penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other
states.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1145.)
Additionally, our inquiry involves “great deference to the Legislature.”
(People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494.) “A defendant has a
‘considerable burden’ to show a punishment is cruel and unusual [citation],
and ‘[o]nly in the rarest of cases could a court declare that the length of a
sentence mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive.’ ”
(People v. Meneses (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1092–1093.)
Examining the record under the three techniques demonstrates this is
not a rare case. As for the nature of the offender, Vasquez argues he was
sexually assaulted by his older brother, he worked full time prior to his
incarceration, he has no criminal record, he sought treatment for addiction to
pornography, and he was assessed as presenting a below average risk of
reoffending. For the nature of the offenses, Vasquez claims counts 4 through

14
6 did not involve force or duress, and counts 7 through 11 and 16 involved
minimal force or duress.
We find these claims unpersuasive based on our discussion above and
the trial court’s findings that Vasquez’s offenses involved a high degree of
callousness, he took advantage of a position of trust and confidence, each
victim was particularly vulnerable, the offenses were carried out with
planning, and Vasquez used harmful matter to induce his lewd acts.
Further, Vasquez ignores the abhorrent and continuous nature of his
offenses. As detailed above, Vasquez engaged in substantial sexual conduct
with two children under 10 years old, his abuse of J.M. occurred multiple
times a week for years, and to groom his victims he repeatedly showed
pornography to all three of them. Indeed, “ ‘sexual abuse of a child is a most
serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent
people.’ ” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 725.)
Turning to the comparison to more serious offenses in California,
Vasquez relies on the punishments for a single count of various forms of
homicide. But Vasquez’s sentence is based on nine counts, and “ ‘[t]he
penalties for single offenses . . . cannot properly be compared to those for
multiple offenses.’ ” (People v. Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 781, 808.)
Vasquez also cites the punishments for nine counts of pimping or
pandering a child under 16 (maximum of 24 years; §§ 266h, subd. (b)(2), 266i,
subds. (a) & (b)(2), 1170.1, subd. (a)), human trafficking of a minor by
persuasion (maximum of 33 years and 4 months; §§ 236.1, subd (c)(1), 1170.1,
subd. (a)), and human trafficking of a minor by force (maximum of 135 years
to life; §§ 236.1, subd (c)(2), 669, subd. (a)). However, Vasquez fails to
address the “One Strike” law, enacted in section 667.61, which was the basis
for his challenged sentence.

15
The One Strike law is an alternative, harsher sentencing scheme for
certain enumerated sex offenses committed under specific circumstances.
(In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 712.) As the offenses or circumstances
increase in seriousness or number, the One Strike law mandates increasing
punishments from 15 years to life to life without the possibility of parole.
(§ 667.61.) It also mandates consecutive sentences for qualifying offenses.
(§ 667.61, subd. (i).) In fact, the One Strike law mandated consecutive
25-year-to-life sentences for each of Vasquez’s lewd acts, which would have
resulted in a total sentence of 225 years to life. (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(4), (e)(4),

(i), (j)(2).)6 Had Vasquez’s conduct been more serious, such as binding a
victim or committing forcible rape, he would have faced life without the
possibility of parole. (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(4), (e)(4) & (5), (j)(1), (l), (n)(1).) As
courts have observed, “the punishment under the One Strike law ‘is precisely
tailored to fit crimes bearing certain clearly defined characteristics.’ ” (People
v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 89.) We agree with that assessment, and
the punishments cited by Vasquez do not convince us that his sentence is
disproportionate.
Finally, regarding punishment for analogous crimes in other states,
Vasquez acknowledges that three states (Idaho, Florida, and Utah) authorize
a life sentence for a single comparable offense. He then claims that to his
knowledge, no other state imposes a mandatory sentence exceeding 100 years
for nine counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14. Vasquez fails to
show disproportionality on this ground because the cited sister state

6 Although that sentence was mandated under the terms of the statute,
Vasquez’s 15-year-to-life sentences under section 667.61, subdivision (b) were
authorized because the People chose not to plead allegations bringing
Vasquez within the higher sentencing option. (In re Vaquera, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 724, 726.)
16
sentences contradict his claim, and he provides no authority to support his
assertion about other states’ sentencing schemes. (Holden v. City of San
Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418.)
In sum, we do not find Vasquez’s sentence for his lewd acts so
disproportionate to his crime that it shocks the conscience or offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.

b. Federal Constitution

“There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches”
because “ ‘both standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime or the individual culpability of the
defendant.’ ” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 733.) The federal analysis
starts with “ ‘comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence,’ ” and “[o]nly in the rare case in which this threshold comparison
leads to an ‘ “inference of gross disproportionality” ’ do we proceed” further.
(Ibid.)
For the reasons discussed above, we do not see an inference of gross
disproportionality under this threshold inquiry. Vasquez has therefore failed
to show that his sentence is cruel and unusual under the federal
Constitution.
Returning to our ineffective assistance of counsel standard, our
analysis above precludes Vasquez from establishing his trial counsel was
prejudicially deficient in failing to raise his excessive punishment claim. We
therefore affirm Vasquez’s sentence on counts 4 through 11 and 16.

17
IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

18

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.