People v. Perkins CA2/5

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Filed 1/2/25 P. v. Perkins CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B331425

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. GA099146)

BRANDON PERKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael D. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Brandon Perkins (defendant) was
convicted of second degree murder on an aiding and abetting
theory. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, but he later
filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)
petition arguing he should be resentenced because the jury
instructions at his criminal trial allowed the jury to convict him
without finding he personally harbored malice aforethought.1
The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage
without issuing an order to show cause. We are asked to decide
whether this was error because defendant could have been
convicted on a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).)

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Murder and Ensuing Criminal Proceedings
In June 2016, defendant and Laquan Parker (Parker) drove
to an apartment complex to pick up Parker’s girlfriend, Dezerae
Lyons (Lyons). When Lyons walked to the front of the complex to
meet them, she was accompanied by Phillip Niles (Niles) and
another woman. Defendant and Parker began arguing with
Niles, and Parker ultimately drew a firearm and shot Niles
multiple times. Niles was still able to flee some distance, but
defendant and Parker gave chase in an automobile. During the
chase, defendant fired his own gun at Niles too. Niles was later
found dead, and defendant and Parker were apprehended.

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

2
The criminal information filed against defendant and
Parker alleged they each personally and intentionally used and
discharged a handgun causing great bodily injury and death.
They were also charged with possession of a firearm by a felon
and carrying a stolen loaded firearm. Defendant alone was
charged with being an accessory to a felony after the fact. At
trial, Parker admitted shooting Niles but claimed he shot him in
self-defense.

1. Jury instructions at trial
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 400, which
provided in pertinent part that “[a] person is guilty of a crime
whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted
the perpetrator.” The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM
No. 401, on direct aiding and abetting, which explained the
charges the prosecution filed asserted defendant was liable for
the murder as an aider and abettor.
In pertinent part, the CALCRIM No. 401 instruction
provided: “To prove that defendant Brandon Perkins is guilty of
a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2.
The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the
crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the
defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing
the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in
fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends
to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”

3
The trial court also gave defendant’s jury a CALCRIM 520
instruction. Among other things, it informed the jury that, to
prove a defendant guilty of murder with malice aforethought, the
People must prove: “1. The defendant committed an act that
caused the death of another person; [¶] 2. When the defendant
acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. He killed without lawful justification.” The instruction
additionally stated: “There are two kinds of malice aforethought,
express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to
establish the state of mind required for murder. [¶] The
defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully intended to
kill. [¶] The defendant acted with implied malice if: [¶] 1. He
intentionally committed an act; [¶] 2. The natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At
the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life;
[¶] AND [¶] 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard to
human life. [¶] Malice aforethought does not require hatred or
ill will toward the victim. It is a mental state that must be
formed before the act that causes death is committed. It does not
require deliberation or the passage of any particular period of
time. [¶] If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it
is murder of the second degree, unless the People have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree as
defined in CALCRIM No. 521.”
The cross-referenced CALCRIM No. 521 instruction that
the jury was also given provided: “A defendant is guilty of first
degree murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted
willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if
he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice

4
and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant
acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing
the act that caused death.”
The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2. Jury verdict and direct appeal
The jury found Parker guilty of first degree murder and
found true allegations that he personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun causing great bodily injury or death. The
jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder (and not
guilty of first degree murder). The jury found true allegations
that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
but it found not true the allegation that the discharge caused
great bodily injury or death.2 The trial court sentenced defendant
to 15 years to life for second degree murder and added a 10-year
enhancement for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) firearm
discharge allegation.3 On direct appeal, this court reversed
defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm
but otherwise affirmed. (People v. Perkins, (Jul. 30, 2021,
B302370) [nonpub. opn.].)

2
The jury also found Parker and defendant guilty of the
other charges against them.
3
The court sentenced defendant to a concurrent 16-month
term for the felon in possession of a firearm offense and stayed
sentence on his other convictions pursuant to section 654.

5
B. Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Resentencing Petition
In November 2021, defendant personally filed what the
trial court construed as a petition seeking relief pursuant to
section 1172.6 as amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.). Defendant asserted he was convicted of second
degree murder based on a theory that he was not the actual
killer, and in which malice was imputed to him. The court
appointed counsel to represent defendant.
The People opposed defendant’s petition and arged he had
not established a prima facie case for relief because the jury was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, because this court affirmed defendant’s murder
conviction on an aiding abetting theory on direct appeal, and
because the petition was based on the same argument made in
defendant’s previously denied motion for new trial—a denial this
court also affirmed on direct appeal. After holding a hearing and
entertaining argument from counsel, the trial court found
defendant had not made a prima facie case for relief and denied
the petition.4

II. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in finding defendant did not
make a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief. To convict
defendant of murder as instructed, defendant’s trial jury was
required to find defendant knew Parker intended to commit the

4
At the hearing, defendant argued the trial court should
consider the prosecutor’s closing argument at trial. The court
declined. Defendant asked this court to take judicial notice of the
pertinent excerpts from the Reporter’s Transcript of his trial, and
that request was granted.

6
crime—here, premeditated first degree murder—and intended to
aid and abet Parker in committing that crime. Based on the
evidence at trial, this meant the jury had to find defendant acted
with malice and could not impute Parker’s malice to defendant.
That the jury returned a second degree murder verdict for
defendant rather than a first degree finding does nothing to
undermine the conclusion that there could be no imputation of
malice; the second degree finding is at least explainable as the
product of compromise or lenity. (See, e.g., People v. Avila (2006)
38 Cal.4th 491, 600.)

A. Section 1172.6 and Appellate Review
After amendments by Senate Bill No. 775, section 1172.6
provides in relevant part that “person[s] convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” may
file a petition to have that conviction vacated under certain
circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) At the prima facie stage of
section 1172.6 review, a trial court must determine whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if the petition’s allegation
were proven. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) In
making its determination at the prima facie stage, the court
should not make credibility determinations or engage in
“‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (Id. at 974.) Our review is de novo. (People v. Flores
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170.)

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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding Defendant
Did Not Make a Prima Facie Case for Relief
Defendant’s jury was not instructed on felony murder or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, nor does
defendant contend he was convicted under those theories. It is
also undisputed that defendant’s murder conviction was obtained
on a direct aiding and abetting theory of liability.
Defendant nevertheless argues he could have been convicted
under a theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime based on the jury
instructions delivered during his trial. Specifically, he argues the
aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM 401) and the murder
instruction (CALCRIM 520) did not adequately inform the jury it
must find he personally harbored malice aforethought to find him
guilty of murder. In so arguing, defendant relies on People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, and People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972.
In Powell, the defendant and a codefendant were convicted
of second degree murder and first degree residential burglary for
going with a group to the victim’s home, at which the victim was
beaten and fatally stabbed. On appeal, the Powell court
concluded the standard aiding and abetting instruction,
CALCRIM No. 401, is “not tailored for” aiding and abetting an
implied malice murder because its language focuses on whether
the aider and abettor knew the perpetrator intended to commit
the crime, but in the context of implied malice murder the
relevant question is whether the aider and abettor intended the
commission of the life endangering act. (Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at 714.) The court in Powell therefore concluded the

8
instructions were erroneous, though it found the error harmless.
(Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court agreed with Powell’s explanation of the
elements of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder in
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 991. There, our high court reversed a
trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an
evidentiary hearing because the trial court “said it was ‘guided by
the principles’ of implied malice murder in CALCRIM No. 520”
and “[t]hat instruction alone . . . does not encompass the elements
of aiding and abetting implied malice murder as set out in
Powell.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the trial court found that “‘the
defendant, along with several other gang members, one of which
[was] armed, traveled to rival gang territory’ and then considered
whether that act was done with the mental state required for
implied malice.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held this was error
because “implied malice murder requires attention to the aider
and abettor’s mental state concerning the life endangering act
committed by the direct perpetrator, such as shooting at the
victim.” (Id. at 992.) The court further stated that, “[b]y relying
exclusively on the legal principles [for implied malice] outlined in
CALCRIM No. 520, the trial court did not appear to recognize
that implied malice murder requires, among other elements,
proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and intent with regard
to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act.” (Id. at 991.)
In Langi, the First District applied Powell’s reasoning to a
section 1172.6 resentencing petition. There, Langi was part of a
group that beat and robbed the victim, who ultimately fell, hit his
head, and died. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 975.) Langi
argued at trial that he did not throw the fatal punch and his jury
was instructed on aiding and abetting and second degree murder.

9
The jury convicted him of robbery, battery, and second degree
murder (Id. at 977), and his subsequent section 1172.6 petition
was summarily denied.
The reviewing court assumed the jury had convicted Langi
as an aider and abettor. It then found the standard jury
instructions were ambiguous and permitted the jury to find Langi
guilty on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based
solely on his participation in the crime. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at 980.) The court observed that while the aiding
and abetting instruction stated a person aids and abets a crime if
the person acts with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and with the intent to commit or encourage the crime,
“the second-degree-murder instruction specified that the direct
perpetrator of that crime need not act with the unlawful intent of
causing death.” (Id. at 982.) The perpetrator’s unlawful purpose
could instead have been “only to strike or to injure, or conceivably
only to embarrass, the victim.” (Ibid.) “Since the perpetrator’s
purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and
abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been
knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill.” (Ibid.) Because
the aiding and abetting instruction did not require the jury to
find the defendant personally acted with malice, the court
concluded the jury could have convicted Langi as an aider and
abettor merely because he intended to aid or assist in the beating
of the victim. (Id. at 983.)
While Powell and Reyes identify issues that can arise with
CALCRIM Nos. 401 and 520 and Langi holds there are
circumstances in which the relevant jury instructions can create
an ambiguity, those circumstances and issues do not arise here.
Defendant’s jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 401 and

10
520, but the context in which the instructions were delivered is
important.
That context reveals the jury certainly convicted defendant
of aiding and abetting Parker’s willful and deliberate killing of
Niles, not an implied malice murder. CALCRIM No. 401, on
aiding and abetting, required the jury to find defendant knew
that Parker intended to commit “the crime” and defendant
intended to aid and abet the commission of “the crime.” The only
charges at issue here were murder, improper possession of
firearms (used in the murder), and accessory after the fact (of the
same murder). The only theories of murder on which the jury
was instructed were first and second degree murder, either as a
direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. The only theory of
first degree murder upon which the jury was instructed was
murder committed willfully, intentionally, and with
premeditation. The same jury that convicted defendant of second
degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting convicted
Parker of first degree murder, thereby necessarily finding Parker
acted with the intent to kill, not just with implied malice. Read
in context, the instruction therefore required the jury to find
defendant knew Parker intended to commit an intentional
killing.5 By contrast, none of the defendants in Langi, Powell, or

5
That was also strongly borne out by the evidence presented
at trial. After Parker shot Niles multiple times in defendant’s
presence but Niles was still able to flee some distance, defendant
and Parker immediately pursued Niles and defendant fired at
Niles with his own gun. This is compelling evidence of malice
aforethought; indeed, we see no possibility a rational jury could
have failed to find defendant personally harbored malice under
the circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1123 [“Absent some circumstance negating malice,” where

11
Reyes were convicted alongside a co-defendant found guilty of an
express malice murder by the same jury. (See, e.g., Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at 982 [reasoning the jury could have returned a
murder finding without concluding Langi knew the principal in
the crime aimed to kill].
The fact that the jury here was not asked to adjudicate
lesser assaultive crimes against the victim further distinguishes
this case from Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972. In that case,
the defendant was charged with, and convicted of, robbery and
battery in addition to murder, which led the court of appeal to
conclude he could have been convicted based on a finding he
intended to aid and abet only the perpetrator’s intentional act of
punching the victim, rather than the victim’s killing. (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 977, 983.) Here, the jury did not have to
adjudicate defendant’s guilt of an assaultive offense against Niles
short of murder and there is accordingly no possibility the jury
imputed malice to defendant by finding he aided and abetted
some “crime” or act other than an intentional murder. Defendant
was thus ineligible for relief as a matter of law and the trial court
did not err in denying his petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing.6

the only unlawful purpose charged is an unlawful killing, “one
cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit an
unlawful killing without acting with malice”].)
6
Defendant also argues the trial court’s denial of the petition
at the prima facie stage violated his due process rights. “Given
our conclusion that [defendant] is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law, the argument necessarily fails.” (People v. Fisher (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030, fn. 7.)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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