In re A.R. CA2/5

CourtListener 10306336Calctapp31 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/31/24 In re A.R. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A.R. et al., Persons Coming B337583
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 19CCJP02567B-C)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.M. (father) appeals from the May 1, 2024 orders
terminating parental rights to A.R. (born March 2019) and C.R.
(born December 2020) under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 Father contends the court erred in denying
application of the parental relationship exception to termination
of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14
[“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
Father contends the juvenile court erred when it
determined that the parental relationship exception to adoption
did not apply. However, taking the applicable law and the
standard of review into account, father has failed to demonstrate
reversible error.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
Once the juvenile court finds it is likely the child will be
adopted, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), requires termination
of parental rights unless a statutory exception applies. “The
statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
53.) In order to establish the parental relationship exception
under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a parent must prove
three elements: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) that
“the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) that
terminating the parent-child attachment “would be detrimental
to the child even when balanced against the countervailing
benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).) The moving parent bears the
burden of establishing the exception by a preponderance of the
evidence. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316.)
The substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements of the parental relationship exception (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640), while the third element—
“whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Id.
at p. 640.)
Father argues that his visits were consistent to the extent
possible, and that minors were bonded to him such that they
would benefit from continuing their relationship with him.

3
Father’s arguments about the consistency of his visits and the
nature and quality of minors’ attachment to him misapplies the
substantial evidence standard of review. The appealing party
“bear[s] the burden to show there was no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support those findings and
orders. [Citation.] We draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court
and review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations; we do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.]
Thus, we do not consider whether there is evidence from which
the juvenile court could have drawn a different conclusion but
whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that the court did draw.” (In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101,
108.)
Father’s argument focuses on the evidence favorable to him
while ignoring the evidence that supports the trial court’s
determination. On the consistency of father’s visits, he has not
established that the evidence mandates a reversal of the trial
court’s determination that his visits in the six to eight months
leading up to the section 366.26 hearing in May 2024 were not
consistent. After the Department liberalized visitation to allow
overnight visits starting September 29, 2023, father only had
three overnight visits before informing the social worker on
November 30, 2023 that he would no longer be able to participate
in overnight visits, and was only available to visit on
Wednesdays. After that, from mid-December 2023 to mid-April
2024, father’s visits were short and sporadic. Father only had
two visits in January 2024, with the first lasting only 30 minutes;

4
while the second visit was two hours long, the caregiver reported
that C.R. refused to go with father and he made minimal effort to
soothe her. He then canceled his visits the following two weeks.
This pattern of cancelling visits, summarized in the Department’s
section 366.26 report, provided substantial evidence to support
the court’s determination that father had not met the first
element of the Caden C. analysis.
Turning to the second element, father again focuses on the
positive nature of his visits, and his commendable efforts at
connecting with A.R., who had an Autism Spectrum Disorder
diagnosis, and C.R., who was three years old and participated in
various forms of therapy and displayed self-injurious behavior.
Here too, father has not demonstrated that there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s determination that minors’
attachment to father not substantial enough to clear the bar set
in Caden C. and earlier cases. While the Department’s reports
described positive visits earlier in the case, there was little to no
evidence that minors remained attached to father at the time the
court was making its determination in 2024. For example, while
C.R. cried during several visits in April 2023, favoring the
caregivers over father, her receptiveness to father improved the
following month. However, father ended his last overnight visit
in November 2023 a day early, disclosing that C.R. cried the
entire time. The parental relationship exception to termination
of parental rights “demands something more than the incidental
benefit a child gains from any amount of positive contact with her
natural parent.” (In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 318.) The juvenile court did not err in finding father did not
demonstrate a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment . . .

5
implying that [minors] would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Father’s brief does not explain why the court erred in
finding that he had not met the third element of Caden C., that
terminating parental rights would be detrimental to minors. He
does, however, argue without citation to the record that the
juvenile court did not apply the analysis of Caden C., instead
finding clear and convincing evidence that minors were adoptable
and that no exception to adoption applied.
Not only is father incorrect, as the court mentioned all
three elements discussed in Caden C. (consistency of visits,
existence of a bond, and detriment of severing the bond) at the
hearing, we are also “aware of no requirement—and father cites
no authority supporting the proposition—that the juvenile court,
in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite
specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of
the three elements of the exception. To the contrary, we infer
from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the
juvenile court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the
record’ when it makes a finding that termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not
required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights
termination would not be detrimental.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156; see also In re Andrea R. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109 [appellate record supported implied
finding by juvenile court that parents had failed to establish the
parental benefit exception].) In addition, the Department’s May
2024 report included an evaluation of the minors’ bond with
father and the Department’s assessment that minors would not
suffer emotional instability if parental rights were terminated.

6
The evidence supports the court’s determination that the
parental relationship exception did not apply.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s May 1, 2024 orders terminating
parental rights to minors A.R. and C.R. under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P.J.

KIM (D.), J.

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