CourtListener 10305575•In re C.K. CA1/5
Testo completo
Filed 12/30/24 In re C.K. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re C.K., A Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN A170926
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Sonoma County Super Ct.
No. DEP6745)
SARAH C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to
her then one-year-old daughter.1 She contends the court erred in
finding the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
After a parent’s reunification services are terminated, the
focus of dependency proceedings “changes from family
reunification to the child’s interest in permanence and stability.”
(In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1163.) Children have
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
1
“compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable,
permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full
emotional commitment to the child.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5
Cal.4th 295, 306.) At a section 366.26 hearing, the court is
statutorily authorized to order one of three alternatives:
adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re S.B.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296; accord, § 366.26, subd. (b).)
Adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631 (Caden C.); In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 573; accord, § 366.26, subds. (b), (c)(1).)
Thus, “the court must first determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether the child is likely to be adopted.
(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If so, and if the court finds that there
has been a previous determination that reunification services be
terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to
allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one
specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.
(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).) As we have
previously explained, ‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely permit
the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an
option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ ” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631, italics added.)
The beneficial relationship provision is one such exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
629.) “What it requires a parent to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, is that the parent has regularly visited with the
child, that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to the child. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i); Evid. Code, § 115.) The . . . exception applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
2
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., at pp. 629-630.)
B.
The Sonoma County Human Services Department
(Department) initiated these proceedings in early December
2022, after Peter K. (Father) was stopped while driving under the
influence of methamphetamine with Mother, then pregnant with
C.K.; 10-year-old S.C.; possibly seven-year-old K.C.; and older
half-sister J.P. in the car. Father was arrested for driving under
the influence, possession of methamphetamine and
paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, and child
endangerment.2
The Department filed a petition alleging Mother failed to
protect S.C. and K.C. from Father, and that his daily
methamphetamine use and possession of drugs and
paraphernalia placed the children at significant risk of harm.
Mother also had a long history of substance abuse, had used
methamphetamine, alcohol, and other substances during
previous pregnancies, and had shown no capacity over the past
10 years to protect her children. Between 2017 and 2021, her
parental rights to her four other children with Father had been
terminated due to substance abuse and related issues, while
older daughter J.P. had been placed in a legal guardianship after
numerous Department interventions for severe neglect and
parental substance abuse.
Mother gave birth to C.K. at a birthing center less than two
weeks after Father’s arrest. The same day that Mother and C.K.
were discharged, C.K. was transported to the NICU for
2 Father has not challenged the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights, so we limit references to him to
those relevant to Mother’s appeal.
3
dehydration and placed in emergency foster care following
treatment. The Department filed dependency petitions
concerning C.K., S.C., and K.C. alleging failure to protect (§ 300,
subd. (b)), risk of harm or illness in the parents’ care (ibid.), and
sibling abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)).
The Department recommended that C.K. be detained,
citing Mother’s long history of substance abuse and significant
welfare history; her loss of custody of four other children; and the
fact she had been bypassed for reunification services for three of
them and, despite receiving services, failed to reunify with the
fourth. S.C. had also reported Mother’s trailer was unsafe to live
in and that the family lacked access to water, food, and a toilet.
Mother said she had been sober for three and one-half
years, but the family’s child welfare history did not support her
claim. She also claimed she was unaware Father was using
methamphetamine. While she said she would end their
relationship, if necessary, she had not done so during their
previous dependency cases. The juvenile court ordered all three
children detained and scheduled a jurisdiction hearing.
C.
According to the Department’s jurisdiction report, Mother
continued to deny knowing Father had been using
methamphetamine but said he had moved out of the family home
and that she would not allow him back if he continued abusing
substances. The case worker was skeptical, noting that, in
January and July of 2022, police had found methamphetamine
and paraphernalia in the couple’s car and hotel room.
The jurisdiction report described a 20-year child welfare
history involving severe neglect, drug and alcohol abuse, Mother’s
drug use while pregnant, exceedingly filthy and unsanitary home
conditions, and sexual abuse by the paternal grandfather of an
adult child (R.B.) from Mother’s previous relationship. It also
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recounted the parents’ substance abuse-related criminal charges
and convictions from 2000 to 2020. Father’s parents told the case
worker that Mother had used and exposed the children to drugs
including marijuana, methamphetamine, and alcohol for many
years. According to the paternal grandmother, Mother and
Father were “ ‘never going to change.’ ”
The juvenile court found the allegations were true and
sustained the petitions. The Department’s report for the
disposition hearing stated that Mother and Father had recently
separated. Mother verbally acknowledged she had to prioritize
the children’s safety and would do whatever it took to
demonstrate her sobriety.
The case worker reported the children were not safe in
their parents’ care. Citing the parents’ lengthy relationship and
Father’s long history of substance abuse, the worker opined
Mother knew or should have known she was endangering the
children by allowing him to drive them while under the influence
and exposing them to methamphetamine and paraphernalia.
Nonetheless, she agreed with Mother’s longtime parent mentor
that Mother had progressed and was “ ‘not the same mother she
has worked with in years past.’ ” In view of her sobriety from
methamphetamine throughout her most recent pregnancy, and
her motivation, desire, and willingness to change, the
Department recommended that Mother be offered reunification
services “even though she has her history working against her.”
Following that recommendation, the court maintained all
three of the children out of the parents’ custody with visitation
and family reunification services for Mother. Services included
individual therapy, parenting classes, a 12-step program, random
drug testing, and a substance abuse assessment.
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D.
In advance of the six-month review hearing, the
Department recommended continuing Mother’s reunification
services. Mother had been fired from her part-time job at a
substance abuse treatment center but had found full-time work
helping developmentally delayed adults.
Mother’s safety goal was to ensure the children were not
exposed to, left with, or driven by anyone who was under the
influence of substances. She insisted she had been sober since
July 2019 despite a positive test for substances while she was
pregnant in 2021, in keeping with a long history of minimizing
her historic and current substance abuse. However, she had
tested clean for almost 18 months except for two tests after the
most recent removal, in June 2023, that showed high levels of
alcohol.
Mother had completed several parenting education classes
and completed a substance abuse assessment, which did not
recommend outpatient services because Mother reported she had
been sober for “some time.” Mother’s visits with the children
were consistent and generally went well, but the two older
children spent most of the time on their phones. Moreover, the
case worker expressed concern that Mother had inappropriately
told S.C. the case worker was forcing her to break up with
Father, and that this made her sad. Nonetheless, the worker was
hopeful that with therapy, parenting education, and drug
treatment support, Mother could make the changes necessary to
provide a safe home.
At the six-month review hearing, the court authorized a
trial home visit despite concerns about Mother’s alcohol use. It
also continued reunification services and set a three-month
update hearing and a 12-month status review.
6
E.
The Department’s report for the three-month update again
recommended continuing reunification services. K.C. and S.C.
reported that Mother promised them they would soon come home
and said the Department was only involved because the paternal
grandmother had called the police. To prevent similar
conversations, the social worker reinstated fully supervised
visits.
Mother tested positive for alcohol again on August 7,
2023—her fourth positive test during the proceedings. The case
worker met with her and an employee from the Drug Free Babies
program. It was recommended that Mother participate in Drug
Free Babies considering her continuing struggles with alcohol
and extensive history of abusing substances and minimizing her
use. Mother began the program and tested regularly at first,
with negative results. However, by late September Mother had
been avoidant, failed to engage in meetings for several weeks,
and had not joined self-help groups as requested. Despite the
positive test she continued to deny she was drinking, other than
having had one glass of wine with a girlfriend, but “this
admittance does not account for the levels of alcohol that
[Mother] tested for, and [Mother] denie[d] having any alcohol
since the last court hearing.”
Various sources had reported multiple people were living in
Mother’s home, including Father, an ex-boyfriend’s adult son, and
R.B. with her partner and two children. There were also reports
of Father hiding in a backyard shed.
During an unannounced visit, the case worker observed a
pickup truck matching the description of Father’s parked in the
driveway and his motorcycle behind the house near the shed.
Mother delayed for a minute and texted someone before allowing
the worker into the home. There were men’s clothes and shoes in
Mother’s closet and on her floor. Mother seemed nervous when
7
confronted with the reports of Father staying at the house and
volunteered that he was there, but only to pack up some
belongings. Father was nowhere in sight; Mother said he must
have left, but the case worker observed an extension cord running
into the backyard shed. The shed doors would not open even
though the exterior locks were unlocked. The social worker also
observed multiple open cans of an alcoholic drink in the living
room/kitchen area. In the case worker’s assessment, Mother
“appear[ed] to be dishonest about what is happening in her home
even when confronted with other information.”
By the time of the 12-month review, the Department
recommended terminating Mother’s reunification services and
setting a section 366.26 hearing. Its 12-month status report
described an incident in Mother’s home in July during which
R.B.’s boyfriend verbally and physically abused her. According to
R.B., this was not the first such incident. The boyfriend was
arrested. Despite the case worker’s warnings, Mother continued
to insist it was fine for there to be alcohol in her home.
Various individuals, including S.C., reported information
suggesting Mother and Father were still in a relationship and
possibly living together despite Mother’s case plan objective of
not having contact with him. In S.C.’s view, Mother would never
leave him. Mother also did not engage with the children’s
caregivers during transitions at visits or ask the caseworker for
information about the children, appearing uninterested in their
needs and more interested in being their friend than parenting
them.
Mother was testing regularly but had not provided
documentation of her attendance at self-help meetings. She was
perceived to be “just ‘going through the motions,’ ” rather than
fully engaging in the Drug Free Babies program or taking
accountability for her actions. However, Mother had maintained
her sobriety and employment throughout the reporting period,
8
consistently attended and engaged in her individual therapy, and
took multiple parenting classes.
Mother’s visits with her children were reported as “very
marginal.” At the start of the reporting period, she had weekly
individual visits with each child because she was struggling to
attend to all their needs and the caseworker and service
providers felt one-on-one time would help strengthen their
connection. In addition, she had one weekly group visit with all
three children. The visitation supervisor modeled appropriate
behavior for Mother by demonstrating how to simultaneously
engage with the older children while caring for C.K. Nonetheless,
Mother tended to sit by while the older children played rather
than engage with them, failed to reciprocate or initiate
affectionate behavior, and sometimes asked to end visits early for
arbitrary reasons.
The Department concluded Mother was unable to provide a
safe and supportive home for the children “[d]ue to the ongoing
presence of alcohol in the home, the continued minimization of
responsibility of maintaining a clean and sober household,
continued contact with [Father], and continued lack of connection
with her children.” After 12 months of services, Mother was
“largely in the same spot in which she was when the current
dependency matter came to be. She is still minimizing her
history, appears to be hiding her relationship with [Father], and
is trying to befriend her children instead of parenting and acting
proactively.”
In a supplemental report submitted shortly before the 12-
month review hearing, the Department disclosed that Mother
had tested positive for a “high level” of alcohol on December 26.
While Mother told the caseworker she had just two drinks on
Christmas Eve and Christmas, the level of alcohol in her system
made this highly unlikely. In addition, R.B. had not followed
through on getting a restraining order after the domestic violence
9
incident and apparently still lived with her partner in Mother’s
home.
After a contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile
court followed the Department’s recommendation and terminated
Mother’s reunification services, found the children could not be
safely returned home, and set a section 366.26 hearing. In In re
S.C. (April 25, 2024, A169636) [nonpub. opn.], this court denied
(on the merits) Mother’s petition for writ relief from the order
terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26
hearing.
F.
The Department’s section 366.26 report recommended
termination of parental rights and adoption as C.K.’s permanent
plan. C.K. continued to do well in her foster home, where she
had been placed, with her brother K.K., since the day she was
born. C.K.’s foster parents wanted to adopt her, as they had
previously done for K.K. C.K. presented as a happy baby, who is
closely bonded to her foster parents and K.K. Although C.K. was
sometimes apprehensive with new people, she became more
comfortable when supported by her foster parents, with whom
she was “playful and responsive.” She looked excited when her
foster parents entered a room and sought them out for comfort
and care. The Department reported that C.K.’s foster parents
had an “extensive and reportedly positive relationship with
[Mother] and [Father], due to caring for [K.K.] since July 31,
2021.”
Mother was engaged in supervised visits with C.K.
throughout the case. Visits were originally twice a week—one
visit along with her half siblings (S.C. and K.C.) and then a
second weekly one-on-one with just C.K. After reunification
services were terminated, visits decreased to twice per month.
The social worker indicated Mother brought snacks for the three
children, changed C.K.’s diapers, and interacted appropriately
10
with C.K. C.K.’s foster parents reported that she was able to
transition to her visits with Mother, but was clingier and
dysregulated after such visits.
The social worker believed that C.K. obtained little benefit
from continuing the relationship with Mother—as C.K. did not
appear to have a significant emotional attachment to Mother and
had been raised outside of Mother’s care since birth. The
Department also opined that termination of parental rights
would not be detrimental to C.K.; although C.K.’s interaction
with Mother could have some incidental benefit, the potential
detriment from severing that relationship did not outweigh the
benefit to be gained through the permanence of adoption. The
social worker explained that C.K. was “a young vulnerable child
in need of security and stability for her optimal development.”
Mother was not able to demonstrate she could maintain her
sobriety and provide a sober, safe, and stable home and the
resource parents had provided daily care, routine, and stability
since C.K. was born.
At the contested hearing,3 the court admitted the
Department’s report and portions of the Department’s “delivered
service logs” that included visitation notes.
The social worker testified that she had not personally
observed Mother’s visits with C.K. because they happened on
Saturdays, when the social worker does not work. As is
customary, she relied on observations from the visitation
supervisors, as well as information that C.K.’s caregivers
provided. The social worker confirmed that visits between C.K.
and Mother were generally positive and that there were two
visits (in January 2024) when C.K. had a hard time transitioning
3 The section 366.26 hearing for S.C. and K.C. was
continued and Mother’s parental rights with respect to them are
not at issue on this appeal.
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away from Mother to the foster parent, but then was fine after a
couple of minutes. However, the caregivers described C.K. “as
sometimes being dysregulated, very clingy, having a hard time
after visits with Mom.”
In assessing the nature of C.K.’s relationship with Mother,
the social worker considered various factors, including “[C.K.’s]
age; her overall interactions with . . . Mother; amount of time
that she spent [in M]other’s care; the amount of time she spent in
her current caregiver’s home; the interactions she’s been having
with her current caregiver; and her other full sibling that
currently resides in that same household. . . . History of the case
as well was taken into consideration.” Considering these factors,
the social worker believed it would not be detrimental to C.K. to
terminate parental rights. She said, “[S]ubstantially the care for
[C.K.] has been in her current caregivers throughout her life
where she . . . built a strong bond with them.” C.K. also shares a
“very strong bond” with her brother, K.K.” In the social worker’s
view, the benefits to C.K. of having a permanent home would
outweigh the harm of termination of parental rights.
Mother testified generally about her regular, supervised
visits with C.K. At the beginning of the case (when C.K. was
younger), Mother would read to C.K., feed her, snuggle her, and
walk her around. As C.K. grew, they played with toys, continued
reading, and went to the playground. C.K. calls her “Momma,”
looks for help from Mother, gives her hugs and kisses, and
“reach[es] for [Mother] if she’s in the car seat.” Mother clarified
that C.K. was in her custody on the day she was born; this was
the only time C.K. was exclusively in her care.
C.K.’s counsel joined in the Department’s recommendation
to terminate parental rights. Mother’s and Father’s counsel did
not contest C.K.’s adoptability but argued the beneficial
relationship exception applied. The juvenile court found it likely
that C.K. would be adopted, found that Mother had not met her
12
burden to show the beneficial relationship exception applies, and
terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mother argues the order terminating parental rights must
be reversed because the juvenile court erred in concluding the
beneficial relationship exception does not apply. We disagree.
1.
To establish that the beneficial relationship exception
applies, the parent bears the burden of proving the following
elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child
such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631,
636.) On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review to the first two elements, which are “essentially . . .
factual determination[s].” (Id. at pp. 639-640.) However, we
review “the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s
relationship with his parent”—for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p.
640.)
Because Mother argues that the court erred in concluding
she had not met her burden of proof, the more precise question is
“whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the [parent]
as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,
1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010 & fn. 7; see In re Aurora P. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.) We ask, “whether the [parent’s]
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In
re I.W., at p. 1528.)
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2.
The juvenile court found that Mother had established the
first element—that she had regular and consistent visits with
C.K. This finding is unchallenged by the parties.
Mother insists that the juvenile court was compelled to find
C.K. had a substantial emotional attachment to her. We
disagree. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding on
the second prong—that C.K.’s relationship with Mother was not a
parent-child relationship but was “more akin to a friendly
visitor.” In other words, Mother failed to meet her burden to
show C.K. had a substantial emotional attachment to her.
As to the second element, the juvenile court is required to
examine the record to ascertain whether the parent has proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that “the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
636, italics added.) “[T]he focus is the child. And the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age
of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . .
[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with,
look to, or talk about their parents.” (Id. at p. 632.)
Mother focuses on only one of the above factors—the
“positive” effect of interaction between her and C.K. She says
that visitation logs provided to the court, along with her own
testimony and the social worker’s report, show that her visitation
with C.K. was positive. The logs show that, during supervised
visits, Mother responded to C.K.’s cues, met her needs (changing
diapers, feeding her) during visits, and read and played with C.K.
Mother further observes that the delivered service logs and
visitation reports back up her testimony that, as C.K. got older,
14
she was sometimes affectionate with Mother, sometimes called
her “Momma,” and on two occasions had difficulty separating
from her at the end of visits. She contends that, “it was error to
terminate parental rights on this record.” Although we agree
that the record suggests the two had positive visits, this evidence
does not compel an affirmative finding on the second element as a
matter of law.
It is not necessary that the child be primarily bonded with
the parent for the exception to apply. (In re J.D. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 833, 859.) However, “[f]riendly or affectionate visits
are not enough.” (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25; see id.
at p. 27; accord, In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318
[“the beneficial relationship exception demands something more
than the incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of
positive contact with her natural parent”].) To avoid termination
of parental rights, Mother was required to “do more than
demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an
emotional bond with the child, or that [they] find their visits
pleasant.” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.)
“A positive attachment between parent and child is
necessarily one that is not detrimental to the child but is
nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and
stability,” and “an emotional attachment is one where the child
views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and
[whose] interactions with the parent were not ambivalent,
detached, or indifferent.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218,
1230, italics added.)
Here, even if we assume it is undisputed that Mother was
appropriate with C.K. and attended to her needs during visits,
the evidence does not compel a finding that C.K. has a
“substantial” emotional attachment to her. Of course, C.K. is too
young to tell the social worker (or anyone else) how she feels
about Mother. Mother hopes to fill that void with evidence that
15
there were a couple of occasions, during a single month of
visitation, that C.K. cried and clung to her at the end of visits.
But this evidence is not dispositive evidence that C.K. has a
substantial emotional attachment to Mother. After all, it is also
undisputed that in these instances C.K. settled easily with her
caregivers within a few minutes. In reviewing factual
determinations for substantial evidence, it is not our job to
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
640.) Mother also testified that C.K. calls her “Momma” and was
sometimes affectionate with her. But we know of no authority
that suggests such evidence compels a finding that C.K. had a
substantial, positive emotional attachment to Mother.
In fact, the remainder of the factors do not weigh in favor of
a finding in Mother’s favor on the second element. C.K. was less
than two years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and,
at that point, had been in foster care her entire life (excepting the
day she was born). It is clear that Mother loves C.K. and that her
visits with C.K. have been consistent and pleasant. However,
that is simply not enough to meet the parent’s burden of proving
the kind of qualitative attachment that the parental benefit
exception requires.
Mother relies on In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131
(A.L.), which does not support her substantial evidence challenge.
Here, unlike in A.L., the trial court’s finding on the second
(benefit) element was adverse to Mother. (Cf. id. at p. 1155
[stating that juvenile court determined “father in fact had
satisfied the second component of the parental-benefit exception”
and concluding “substantial evidence support[s] this express
finding”].) A.L. does nothing to advance Mother’s argument that
a benefit finding in her favor was compelled by the evidence.
Finally, Mother hints that the juvenile court considered an
improper factor—the fact that Mother was unable or unwilling to
16
maintain sobriety and a safe home for C.K. Mother is right that
Caden C. mandates a parent’s continuing struggle with the issues
leading to dependency may not, standing alone, serve as a bar to
applying the exception to terminating parental rights. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 634, 637.) Nonetheless, a parent’s
struggles will “often prove relevant to the application of the
exception” because “[a] parent’s struggles may mean that
interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a
‘ “negative” effect’ on the child.” (Id. at p. 637.)
Here, the juvenile court did not directly tie its findings on
the second element to any observations about Mother’s progress
on the underlying issues in the dependency. And there is nothing
in the record before us to suggest that the Department urged the
juvenile court to rule against Mother solely because of her
struggles with her case plan. True, the court did point out how
little time the two had spent together. But this was permissible.
(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 637, 639.)
On this record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s determination, we conclude the juvenile court
could reasonably find Mother failed to show C.K. had a
“substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to her or that C.K.
“would benefit from continuing [their] relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The court’s finding on the benefit
prong is supported by substantial evidence. We need go no
further. (In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn.
10 [a parent’s failure of proof on any one of three elements of
beneficial relationship exception is fatal].)
3.
Even assuming Mother proved that she and C.K. share a
substantial, positive emotional attachment, we would
nonetheless conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that terminating the relationship would not
be detrimental to C.K.
17
“[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental,
the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the
child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the
child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.) “Because terminating parental rights
eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the
relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental
rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts
need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life. . . . [T]he effects might include emotional instability
and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school,
insomnia, anxiety, or depression. Yet . . . a new, stable home may
alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
such problems, providing a new source of stability that could
make the loss of a parent not . . . detrimental.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Here, the Department removed C.K. from Mother’s custody
on the day she was born, and she has spent the entirety of her
young life (about 19 months) in foster care. Mother presented no
evidence that C.K. would be detrimentally affected by losing their
relationship—other than the evidence that she experienced brief
difficulty in transitioning after two visits with Mother. On the
other hand, it is undisputed that C.K. is strongly bonded to her
caregivers and to her brother, with whom she also lives. We
understand that the section 366.26 hearing “is decidedly not a
contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) But in assessing the potential
detriment to C.K. from adoption, it was entirely appropriate for
the juvenile court to consider the strength and quality of her
respective relationships. (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157;
see Caden C., at p. 634 [“[i]n many cases, ‘the strength and
quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will substantially
determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship,
18
which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive
home”].)
Mother maintains the court erred by assuming that C.K.’s
relationship with her would continue after termination of
parental rights. Although the social worker noted that C.K. could
possibly have a relationship with Mother even if her rights were
terminated, there is nothing in the record that affirmatively
suggests the juvenile court relied on this suggestion. Mother
concedes as much.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the benefits to C.K. that will be provided by the strength and
stability of an adoptive home are not outweighed by any harm
she will suffer from severing her bond with Mother.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.
In re C.K. / Sonoma County Human Services Department v. Sarah C. (A170926)
19
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