People v. Barrera CA2/8

CourtListener 10305573Calctapp30 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Barrera CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B331986

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA049453
v.

EDWARD BARRERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Almost twenty-three years ago, Edward Barrera received a
sentence of 38 years to life for a residential burglary. Barrera’s
sentence included three one-year prison prior terms, which are no
longer valid, and which entitled Barrera to a full resentencing.
(See Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subds. (a), (c), (d)(2).) The
resentencing court held a hearing but did not apply new
sentencing laws to Barrera’s benefit, as required. We therefore
remand the matter for resentencing. Statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
I
In 2001, a jury convicted Barrera of one count of first
degree residential burglary. As our opinion from Barrera’s direct
appeal described it, the crime involved no actual violence: the
evidence showed Barrera entered the victims’ house one night
through an open kitchen window and left with a purse. Police
found him walking down a nearby street shortly thereafter with
the purse. While one of the victims heard a noise that night,
neither victim encountered Barrera. (See People v. Barrera (Dec.
13, 2002, B157102) [nonpub. opn.] (Barrera).)
The trial court held a bench trial on Barrera’s prior
convictions. It found two of them amounted to serious felonies
and strikes under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12), and also found Barrera had served three prior prison
terms. (Barrera, supra, B157102.) The court sentenced Barrera
as a third strike offender to 25 years to life on the burglary count,
plus the three one-year prison priors under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and two five-year serious felony priors under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
In 2023, a new court recognized Barrera might be entitled
to resentencing under section 1172.75. Barrera filed a petition to

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recall his sentence under this provision. He sought to have his
strikes and enhancements dismissed and supplied many
documents bolstering his claim he merited a reduced prison term
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero) and section 1385. Barrera explained he had served 22
years for residential burglary and had secured a spot in two long-
term, live-in rehabilitation programs should he be released. He
underscored his rehabilitation efforts in prison, his positive
behavior there, and his extensive family support that would
facilitate his reentry into society.
The prosecution opposed Barrera’s request to dismiss his
strikes but wrote it was open to revisiting the issue after a longer
period of sobriety and good behavior in custody. The
prosecution’s filing did not address Barrera’s five-year
enhancements. It highlighted his lengthy criminal history, his
drug problem, and his rule violations in prison but acknowledged
his risk assessment score was “the lowest score possible for a
lifer,” he had maintained this score for five years, and he had no
rule violations in the last three years.
The resentencing court permitted counsel to argue at the
hearing—to an extent, as we discuss further below. The court
largely kept Barrera’s sentence intact, resentencing Barrera to 35
years to life. The court issued its ruling at the hearing as follows,
with our italics:
“The court has read this and has considered it, and is fully
aware of all the discretion this court has under 1385 as well as
the sentencing scheme that’s been incorporated originally back
when the defendant was sentenced and in the years since.
“Nunc pro tunc the court does strike the three one-year
priors per Penal Code 667.5(a).

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“The court in evaluating the rest of the sentence is going to
look at California Rules of Court 4.421 [Rule 4.421]. The crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness.
“The defendant entered a home where people slept at night,
so that is also factor three. The victim was -- in this case victims
were particularly vulnerable.
“Factors related to the defendant include the defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society both in his strike, Penal Code 211 prior to this, and his
other criminal conduct. And he served a prior prison term of
prison or county jail under 1170(h).
“The court does consider his conduct in prison since this
including all the incidents. The fact that he’s apparently been
five years clean is to his credit.
“But a number of other things were done. Alcohol was
found in his cell. Another fight. In 2000 he was heard referring
to another inmate as a faggot. He tested positive on multiple
occasions.
“The court cannot guarantee that this man would be safe if
released into society. The court believes the sentence imposed by
Judge Romero, subtracting out the three one-year priors, is
necessary to protect the safety of the public. The court concludes
and exercises its discretion that the defendant is a danger to
society.
“. . . He was given multiple opportunities and multiple
chances to reform. He refused to. He continued to commit
violent acts. And the only time in his life when he has not

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committed violent acts is the time that he’s been in prison since
the sentence in this case.
“For this reason the court exercises its discretion and
leaves unchanged Judge Romero’s sentence with the exception of
striking the three one-year priors. The court reduces his
sentence to 35 years to life.”
II
In reaching this result, the resentencing court misapplied
new sentencing laws, mischaracterized Barrera’s 2001 burglary
offense, and thereby abused its discretion. (See People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225 & 231 (Gonzalez)
[abuse of discretion standard governs motions to dismiss
enhancements]; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371
[same standard governs motions to strike prior convictions].)
Resentencing is required because the record does not provide a
“clear indication” of the result absent these missteps. (See
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.)
As part of Barrera’s resentencing, the court had to apply
the Judicial Council sentencing rules and “any other changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
One of the new laws in place was amended section 1385.
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended this statute to
require courts deciding whether to strike enhancements to
consider a list of mitigating circumstances. These circumstances
heavily favor dismissal, “unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2); see also People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1030–
1031.) Endangering public safety means “there is a likelihood

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that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
The court grounded its ruling maintaining Barrera’s
enhancements (and strikes) on Barrera’s continued
dangerousness. The court concluded, with our emphasis, “the
defendant is a danger to society” and it could not “guarantee that
this man would be safe if released into society.” There are
several problems with these conclusions.
Under the statute, a defendant must be dangerous to
others, not to himself, and guaranteed safety is not the standard.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
Moreover, timing matters, and the court’s focus on
Barrera’s current dangerousness was too narrow. The court had
to assess the effect of dismissing one or both five-year
enhancements, Barrera’s remaining indeterminate life term, and
future parole review. (See Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 220, 228–231 [in assessing whether dismissing an
enhancement would endanger public safety under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), a court prejudicially abuses its discretion by
considering only whether the defendant currently poses a danger
and not the date the defendant could be released with the
enhancement gone and the fact that release would be subject to a
review by the Board of Parole Hearings, “who will have the
opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that
time” and whose “future review will act as a safety valve against
a release that would endanger the public”].) Gonzalez shows the
court applied an incorrect legal standard when assessing the
threat Barrera posed to public safety.
The prosecution incorrectly maintains Barrera forfeited his
challenge to this ruling. Barrera’s motion outlined changes in the

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law that rendered his sentence unlawful, unjust, and excessive; it
discussed amended section 1385 and how it encourages courts to
dismiss enhancements; it listed five mitigating circumstances
applicable to Barrera; and it raised striking one or both of his
five-year serious felony priors.
As for the hearing, the court opened by remarking that the
prosecution was asking for a longer period of time and that
essentially just a Romero motion was before it at this point; both
points were incorrect. Defense counsel clarified the point of the
hearing, and the court said it would permit argument but warned
it did not have a lot of time that morning. Counsel raised section
1385 and tried to expand on the motion, but the court interjected:
“The court read your motion. I need you to finish up the
argument.” Counsel returned to section 1385 and discussed two
of the mitigating circumstances that warranted dismissing
Barrera’s two enhancements (the enhancements were over five
years old and the crime was connected to childhood trauma).
(See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E) & (H).) The court then ruled without
explicitly addressing this argument, thanked the parties, and
immediately concluded the hearing.
Barrera sufficiently preserved this issue for review.
The errors in this sentencing proceeding extend beyond the
application of section 1385, subdivision (c). For example, the
resentencing court misunderstood Barrera’s 2001 offense, which
tainted the court’s notion of Barrera’s dangerousness. (See
People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“A trial court
abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its
decision find no support in the evidence”].)
After striking the prison priors, the court turned to the rest
of Barrera’s sentence. The court’s first comment was Barrera’s

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burglary “involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” On appeal, the prosecution
seems to recognize this was not the case by arguing there was a
potential threat of harm and the potential for serious violence.
But Rule 4.421(a) does not refer to potential threats or potential
harm. Barrera did not have a weapon and never encountered his
victims during the crime. (See People v. Avila (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142 [“Ruling on a Romero motion requires
consideration of the nature and circumstance of the crime
actually committed, not a crime that might have occurred”].)
Remand is necessary for the court to reassess Barrera’s
eligibility to have one or both five-year enhancements dismissed
under section 1385 and to have one or more strike convictions
dismissed under Romero. On resentencing, the court must go
beyond the aggravating factors listed in Rule 4.421 to consider
relevant mitigating factors, including the materials attached to
Barrera’s motion showing nearly two straight decades of
nonviolence in custody. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3); § 1385, subd.
(c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423.)
Regarding Barrera’s strikes, the court must consider the
longstanding factors guiding Romero motions. (See People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [“in ruling whether to strike
or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction
allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, . . . the court in
question must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part”].)

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Finally, Barrera devotes a considerable part of his opening
brief to an argument he did not develop in detail below—that
Senate Bill No. 81 applies to strike sentencing. (See People v.
Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1338 & fn. 4; People v.
Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 404, 410–411, review granted
May 29, 2024, S284924; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60,
62, 67–69; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2;
People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244.) We do not
reach this argument because we are remanding the matter for
resentencing and the resentencing court should address the issue
in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
We vacate Barrera’s sentence and remand for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion as to how or
in what respect the court should resentence Barrera.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

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