People v. Daniel CA2/7

CourtListener 10305572Calctapp30 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Daniel CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B333911

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA105756)
v.

DAMONE DESHOWN
DANIEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Affirmed.
Katharine Eilleen Greenbaum, under appointment by the
Court of appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Lauren N.
Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence,
Damone Deshown Daniel pleaded no contest to transporting a
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and
being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1)). On appeal Daniel contends the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress a glass narcotics pipe found in his
pocket during a patdown search and the items subsequently
found in his vehicle during a search incident to arrest. Daniel
argues the Los Angeles County deputy sheriff who detained him
did not have a reasonable belief Daniel was armed and
dangerous. Daniel also requests we review the sealed record of
the court’s in camera hearing to determine whether the court
disclosed all relevant complaints in response to his Pitchess1
motion seeking discovery of the deputy sheriff’s personnel
records. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At a suppression hearing held on March 10, 2023, Los
Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Hrant Bairamian testified that at
approximately 12:57 a.m. on December 8, 2021 he was in West
Hollywood on patrol by himself in his marked patrol car. Deputy
Bairamian was familiar with the area, which he described as a
high-crime area, especially with respect to narcotics sales. While
he was driving on Santa Monica Boulevard, Deputy Bairamian
passed Daniel driving in the opposite direction in a car that had
neither front nor rear license plates. Because the absence of
license plates is a violation of Vehicle Code section 5200,

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-538
(Pitchess).

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subdivision (a), Deputy Bairamian initiated a traffic stop of the
vehicle.
Once the vehicle stopped, Deputy Bairamian approached
the driver’s side of the vehicle. He saw Daniel in the driver’s
seat, and there were two large dogs inside the vehicle. Deputy
Bairamian asked Daniel to lower his window, but Daniel
responded that it did not roll down. Deputy Bairamian then
asked Daniel to open the car door, and Daniel complied. Deputy
Bairamian explained to Daniel that he had pulled him over
because of the missing license plates, and Daniel responded that
his girlfriend had just purchased the car at an auction. Deputy
Bairamian asked Daniel for his driver’s license, but Daniel said
he did not have identification with him. Deputy Bairamian
testified, “[Daniel] was acting suspiciously, and he was evasive
when I asked him for his identification after he said he did not
have it. He looked away from me, looked into the car as if he was
looking around for something.” When asked what he meant by
“‘suspiciously,’” Deputy Bairamian elaborated, “[M]ost people
carry a driver’s license in their pocket, in their wallet. But
considering the fact he told me he did not have his identification
on him but continued to look through the car, that was to me,
based on my training and experience, very suspicious.”
Deputy Bairamian observed Daniel was wearing an
oversized leather jacket with open pockets, “leading [Deputy
Bairamian] to believe there were things inside [Daniel’s]
pockets.” Further, when asked whether he observed any bulges
in Daniel’s pockets, Deputy Bairamian responded that what
looked “like there were things inside [Daniel’s] pocket
. . . translates to bulges in his pocket.” At that point, Deputy
Bairamian requested that additional officers respond to his

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location for backup. He testified the situation was “[d]angerous,
to say the least. I was by myself at the time and on a dimly-lit
street. And considering the bulges that I had observed and
[Daniel’s] demeanor and his evasiveness, including the two pit
bulls inside the car, it was a high-risk stop for me.” After the
additional deputies arrived, Deputy Bairamian asked Daniel to
exit the vehicle. Daniel refused, stating that he was “just
traveling.” Deputy Bairamian asked Daniel to get out of the
vehicle several more times and eventually told him the deputies
“were going to get him out of the vehicle one way or the other.”
Daniel finally exited the car, and Deputy Bairamian immediately
placed him in handcuffs and conducted a patdown search.
Deputy Bairamian testified he conducted the patdown
because he believed Daniel was armed. His conclusion was based
on Daniel’s baggy jacket, his evasive and suspicious demeanor,
and the fact that the vehicle had no license plates, which Deputy
Bairamian explained typically meant the vehicle had been stolen.
During the patdown search Deputy Bairamian found a knife in
Daniel’s front waistband, a small bottle of alcohol in Daniel’s left
jacket pocket, and a glass narcotics pipe with a bulbous end in
Daniel’s right jacket pocket. Deputy Bairamian arrested Daniel
for being in possession of narcotics paraphernalia.
Deputy Bairamian conducted a Department of Motor
Vehicles record check on Daniel’s name and birthdate and
discovered Daniel’s driver’s license was suspended. The officers
conducted an inventory search of Daniel’s vehicle and found glass
narcotics pipes, substances resembling methamphetamine and
crack cocaine, digital scales, metal knuckles, and an explosive
device.

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During the suppression hearing, the trial court admitted
into evidence Deputy Bairamian’s body-worn camera footage
from the encounter with Daniels, as well as three still images
taken from the footage. The court noted the encounter was in
December. Further, it looked at the still photographs, focusing
on exhibit 1-C, and stated, “They are not inconsistent with the
deputy’s testimony that the jacket had bulges. . . . But it’s also
not being consistent with the pocket simply being open based on
the way the jacket is being flexed at that time.” The court
initially stated it intended to grant the suppression motion.
However, after hearing further argument, the court took the
matter under submission. At the continued hearing, the court
stated the prosecution had provided additional authority on the
legality of patdown searches, and the court allowed further
argument. The court acknowledged that its tentative ruling was
based on its understanding of the standard for a lawful patdown
search, which was different from the case law. The court denied
the motion, finding the bulges in Daniel’s baggy jacket provided
reasonable suspicion to justify a patdown search for officer safety.
Daniel subsequently entered a no contest plea to
transporting a controlled substance (count 1) and being a felon in
possession of a firearm (count 3). On count 1 the trial court
sentenced Daniel to the lower term of two years in state prison,
suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Daniel on formal
probation for two years. On count 3 the court imposed and
suspended execution of a concurrent two-year sentence. The
court dismissed the remaining counts.

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DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion To Suppress
1. Governing law and standard of review
When a police officer reasonably suspects a crime has been
committed and the individual the officer has detained may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may “conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”
(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 (Terry).) “The purpose of this
limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow
the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence . . . .” (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 146;
accord, In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 143 (H.M.) [“[t]he
sole justification for the search is the protection of the officer and
others nearby”].)
To justify a patdown search for weapons, the officer need
not have probable cause to arrest the individual or “be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.) The officer’s
reasonable suspicion must be directed at the individual to be
searched (Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 95) and must be
based on specific, articulable facts. (Terry, at p. 21; see H.M.,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [“a limited frisk for weapons is
justified where the officer ‘can point to specific and articulable
facts which, considered in conjunction with rational inferences to
be drawn therefrom, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and dangerous’”].) The determination whether

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an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown search
for weapons is based on “a totality of the circumstances test,
which is of necessity fact driven.” (People v. Osborne (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059; accord, People v. Avila (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1074.) Reasonable suspicion must be based
on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 125.)
“Whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon
the circumstances known to the officer when the search was
conducted.” (H.M., at p. 144.)
Whether evidence should be suppressed because it was
unlawfully seized is governed by federal constitutional standards.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2); Robey v. Superior Court
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223.) In reviewing a ruling on a motion
to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express
or implied, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Ayala
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255; People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99,
107.) The power to judge credibility, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. (James, at p. 107.)
However, in determining whether, on the facts found, the search
or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we
exercise our independent judgment. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 342.)

2. Deputy Bairamian had a reasonable suspicion to
conduct a patdown search
Daniel challenges only the legality of the patdown search,
arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion he was armed and
dangerous. Daniel does not contend the traffic stop was
improper. Nor does he challenge the inventory search of the

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vehicle, except to the extent it resulted from an unlawful
patdown search.
Deputy Bairamian articulated the following facts in
support of his decision to conduct a patdown search for his safety:
Daniel was driving in a high crime area late at night; the
immediate area of the traffic stop was dimly lit; the vehicle had
no license plates, which indicated to Deputy Bairamian based on
his training and experience that the car may be stolen; Daniel
had no identification; Daniel acted evasively and suspiciously,
looking away from the deputy and around the car; Daniel wore a
bulky leather jacket with open pockets in which Deputy
Bairamian observed bulges; and Daniel was uncooperative in not
wanting to get out of the car.
Daniel argues these circumstances were insufficient to
support a reasonable suspicion he was dangerous. He contends
that, even if Deputy Bairamian reasonably suspected the vehicle
was stolen, vehicle theft is not a violent crime, and therefore that
fact could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion Daniel was
armed and dangerous. However, an individual suspected of
vehicle theft may “reasonably be anticipated to be armed with a
weapon (such as a knife or a firearm)” and “also may reasonably
be expected to possess ‘tools of the trade’ such as screwdrivers
and pry tools, which may easily be used as weapons.” (People v.
Osborne, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.)
Daniel also argues his baggy leather jacket did not provide
a basis for suspicion because it was appropriate for the weather
in December and leather “is a stiff fabric that often has stiff or
bulging pockets.” However, the United States Supreme Court
has held an officer’s observation of a bulge in a jacket pocket
“permitted the officer to conclude that [the individual] was armed

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and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the
officer.” (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 112;
accord, People v. Miles (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 612, 618 [officer’s
observation of “exaggerated bulge” in defendant’s jacket pocket
supported inference defendant had a weapon]; People v. Brown
(1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 159, 165 [patdown search was supported
by reasonable suspicion where officer’s “decision to pat appellant
down was based on his observation of a bulge under appellant’s
jacket”].)
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including
Deputy Bairamian’s suspicion the vehicle was stolen, the bulge in
Daniel’s jacket pocket, Daniel’s suspicious behavior in looking
around the vehicle, and the dimly lit location in a high-crime
area, it was reasonable for Deputy Bairamian to believe his
safety was at risk, justifying the decision to perform a patdown
search of Daniel. (See H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 144
[“[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
a reasonable suspicion” suspect was armed, citing Illinois v.
Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124]; People v. Collier (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1377-1378 & fn. 1 [wearing baggy clothing,
coupled with other suspicious circumstances, can support a
patdown search for weapons]; People v. Williams (1992)
3 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1105 [patdown search may be justified by a
number of factors, including “furtive movements, unidentifiable
clothing bulges, or the nature of the offense the officer is
investigating”]; see also Wardlow, at p. 124 [presence in a high
crime area is not determinative but is “among the relevant
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis”]; cf. People v.
Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 240-241 [area’s reputation for
criminal activity and the time of night are appropriate

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considerations in assessing whether investigative detention is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment].)

B. The Trial Court Complied with Its Obligations Under
Pitchess
On August 3, 2022 Daniel filed a Pitchess motion pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1043, seeking discovery of Deputy
Bairamian’s personnel records concerning “[a]ll complaints . . .
relating to acts of aggressive behavior, violence, excessive force,
or attempted violence or excessive force, racial bias, coercive
conduct, violation of constitutional rights, fabrication of
reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, illegal
search/seizure; false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false
police reports . . . and any other evidence of misconduct
amounting to moral turpitude . . . .” On September 9, 2022 the
trial court granted the motion in part, ordering disclosure of any
information concerning Deputy Bairamian’s dishonesty. The
court conducted an in camera hearing and found no disclosure
was required.
“‘When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of
information in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court must
examine the records in camera to determine if any information
should be disclosed.’” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 338;
accord, People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391 (Anderson).)
“‘The court may not disclose complaints over five years old,
conclusions drawn during an investigation, or facts so remote or
irrelevant that their disclosure would be of little benefit.’”
(Rivera, at p. 338; accord, People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402,
424; see Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b).) “‘Pitchess rulings are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’” (Rivera, at p. 338; accord,
Anderson, at p. 391.)

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Daniel requests we review the sealed portion of the record,
which includes the transcript of the in camera hearing. The
People do not object to our review. Daniel’s request for us to
review the sealed records is proper. (Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 391 [“Defendant properly asks us to review the sealed record
of the in camera hearing to determine whether the court
erroneously failed to provide discovery that he should have
received.”]; see Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 338-339 [court
reviewed sealed transcript of in camera hearings and sealed
exhibits].)
We have reviewed the sealed record. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding there was no discoverable
information to disclose to Daniel. (See Anderson, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 391; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 424.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

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