In re Iris A. CA2/7

CourtListener 10304146Calctapp24 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/24/24 In re Iris A. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re IRIS A., a Person Coming B329034
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
23CCJP00598)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARIUS A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Dismissed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________

Darius A. (Father) appeals from the jurisdiction findings
and disposition order declaring three-year-old Iris A. a dependent
of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b)(1),1 after the court sustained an
allegation that Iris was at substantial risk of serious harm
because Father had placed her in a dangerous situation during
an encounter with police officers in January 2023.
On February 2, 2024, during the pendency of the appeal,
the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and entered a juvenile
custody order granting Father and Kylamae V. (Mother) joint
legal and physical custody of Iris. Because we cannot provide
Father any effective relief, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 16, 2023 the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The Department
alleged under both subdivisions that Father and Mother had a
history of engaging in violent altercations in front of Iris, and on
January 31, 2023 Father threatened harm to Mother if she

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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obtained a restraining order against him or took custody of Iris
away from him. The petition further alleged under
subdivision (b)(1) that Father placed Iris “in a detrimental and
endangering situation” during a confrontation with police officers
on January 26, 2023. During the incident, Father “held the child
in front of the father’s chest and held the child as a shield,” and
Father “was repeatedly tazed while [he] held the child.”
During the course of its investigation the Department
learned that on January 26, 2023 Father’s neighbor called the
police to report a domestic violence incident involving Father’s
girlfriend that occurred outside Father’s apartment. The
neighbor stated a woman was “thrown out of the unit and a male
comes and grabs the female and drags her back into the unit.”
According to the primary responding police officer and another
police officer who had reviewed the responding officers’ body
camera footage, the officers listened outside Father’s apartment
door for approximately 10 minutes and heard a child crying.
They knocked on the door repeatedly, but there was no response.
Eventually, Father opened the apartment door while holding Iris
in front of his chest like a shield. Officers explained they were
responding to a report of domestic violence and asked if they
could enter the apartment. Father would not allow the officers
into the apartment, but they were able to push their way inside.
They asked Father to put Iris down, but Father refused. Father
backed away from the officers toward the window and balcony.
The officers were concerned that Father was moving toward the
window, and they did not know whether a domestic violence
victim was still in the apartment. They pushed Father to the
ground and used their taser on him twice while he was still
holding Iris. Father let go of Iris, and the officers tased Father

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two more times. Father was arrested for child endangerment,
but no charges were filed.
Father’s version of the events leading to his arrest differed
in some respects from the police officers’ accounts. Father
admitted he had a verbal altercation with his girlfriend outside of
his apartment on the day of the incident, but Father and his
girlfriend both denied there was any physical violence. After the
argument, Father’s girlfriend left, and Father returned to the
apartment where his uncle and cousin were with Iris. The men
decided to take Iris for a walk. When Father opened the
apartment door to leave, approximately 15 police officers were
standing there. Father denied that the police had knocked on the
door or explained why they were there. Father also insisted he
was holding Iris on the side of his body and not in front of him
like a shield. When Father did not let the officers into the
apartment, they pushed their way in and demanded he put Iris
down. He refused to put Iris down because he did not know what
was going on and did not believe she was in danger. The officers
forced Father to the ground, tased him four times, and took Iris
from him. Father’s account of the events was corroborated by his
girlfriend, uncle, and cousin.
Mother told the Department social worker that she and
Father had an informal custody arrangement pursuant to which
they alternated physical custody of Iris each week. Mother
initially denied any domestic violence with Father but later
admitted there had been two incidents where Father physically
assaulted her in Iris’s presence. After one incident in 2020,
Mother had called the police, but Father was not arrested.
Mother also reported that Father had been threatening her since
the Department opened its investigation, saying he would take

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Iris away. Mother was concerned that Father would retaliate
against her if his visits were discontinued.
Father was combative with the social worker during his
interviews. He yelled at the social worker and accused her of
coercing Mother to get a restraining order against him. Father
claimed he had no prior significant interactions with police
officers or the Department. However, the social worker learned
there had been a referral to the Department in 2022 after Father
physically assaulted his ex-girlfriend while their daughter (Iris’s
half-sister) was in the home. The ex-girlfriend reported the
assault to the police, but Father was not arrested, and the
Department did not file a petition based on the allegations. The
Department also learned Father had been convicted of felony
possession of a concealed weapon in Michigan in 2017. He served
a one-year jail sentence and completed his probation in 2019.
Father denied any responsibility for placing Iris in a
dangerous situation. Father insisted the police officers had
created the danger by failing to inform him of the reason for their
presence and by backing him into a wall where he had no place to
go. Father stated to the social worker that he was pursuing civil
litigation against the police department based on the incident.
At the April 26, 2023 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
Father’s counsel admitted that “Father was combative with the
police.” However, counsel argued the police “overreacted,” which
was likely why no charges had been filed against Father.
Counsel requested the court strike the allegation regarding the
confrontation with police officers because it was a one-time
incident and the Department failed to show a similar situation
was likely to recur.

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The juvenile court dismissed the allegations regarding
domestic violence, finding the Department had failed to meet its
burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The court struck the
language in the allegation regarding the confrontation with police
officers that Father “held the child as a shield.” The court
sustained the allegation as amended by interlineation and
declared Iris a dependent of the court. The court allowed Iris to
remain in her parents’ care under the Department’s supervision.
The court ordered Father to attend a 26-week anger management
program and to participate in a parenting program and
individual counseling. Father timely appealed.
At the January 24, 2024 review hearing (§ 364), the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Iris, and on
February 2, 2024 the court entered a final juvenile custody order
granting Father and Mother joint legal and physical custody of
Iris.2 Father did not appeal from the order terminating
jurisdiction or the final juvenile custody order.

DISCUSSION

A. Mootness and Dependency Appeals
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “A case becomes moot when events

2 On July 3, 2024 we granted Father’s request to take
judicial notice of the January 24, 2024 minute order and the final
custody order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

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‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) In other
words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must
first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in
legal status.” (Id. at p. 277.)
“[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case
is not moot, and merits review is required.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) Accordingly, “a case is not moot where a
jurisdictional finding affects parental custody rights [citation],
curtails a parent’s contact with his or her child [citation], or ‘has
resulted in [dispositional] orders which continue to adversely
affect’ a parent.” (Id. at pp. 277-278.) “Although a jurisdictional
finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is
generally stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is
insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired
with some effect on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of
being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (Ibid.)
Even where an appeal is moot, however, “courts may
exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) As the Supreme
Court explained in D.P., reviewing courts will generally exercise
their discretion when the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, there may be a recurrence of the

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controversy between the parties, or a material question remains
for the court to determine. (Ibid.) The court also identified
additional factors reviewing courts may evaluate when
considering whether to exercise their discretion to decide a moot
case, including whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could
impact current or future dependency proceedings, and the nature
of the allegations against the parent (with more egregious
findings showing a parent’s greater interest in challenging the
findings). (Id. at pp. 285-286.) In addition, reviewing courts may
consider why the appeal became moot; for example, principles of
fairness may favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot
“by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the
parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Id. at
p. 286.) “It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if
mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from
jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or
for whom the court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)

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B. Termination of the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction Moots
Father’s Appeal3
In his briefing on appeal Father challenges only the
jurisdiction findings made by the juvenile court. He does not
challenge the disposition order, nor has he appealed the court’s
order terminating jurisdiction or the final custody order. Because
jurisdiction has been terminated and Iris has been returned to
her parents’ joint custody, the jurisdiction findings have no
ongoing effect on Father’s custody rights, nor do the findings
continue to adversely affect Father. In other words, even if we
were to reverse the jurisdiction findings, it would not change
Father’s legal status with respect to his parental rights.

3 The Department acknowledges that Father’s appeal is moot
but requests we consider the matter on the merits because “the
question of mootness is now pending before the California
Supreme Court” in In re S.R., review granted September 11,
2024, S285759 (review granted from Court of Appeal order
dismissing appeal as moot). On our own motion, we take judicial
notice of the July 2, 2024 petition for review filed in In re S.R.,
S285759. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) In her
petition for review, the mother in In re S.R. argued her appeal
was not moot because the jurisdiction findings could result in her
inclusion in the Child Abuse Centralized Index (CACI).
Specifically, the petition requested the Supreme Court consider
“what evidence of CACI inclusion is required to defeat a mootness
challenge” and/or remand the matter for the appellate court to
reach the merits of the appeal because the mother had shown an
ongoing adverse consequence of the jurisdiction finding as a
result of being included in CACI. Father has not alleged
inclusion in CACI as an adverse consequence of the jurisdiction
findings. Thus, it is unlikely the Supreme Court’s decision in
In re S.R. will affect whether this appeal is moot.

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Therefore, we can provide no effective relief—that is, relief that
“‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277; see In re
Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163 [“An order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an
earlier order moot”].)
Father argues the jurisdiction finding could have a
practical adverse effect on him because the finding “potentially
could impact a civil proceeding against the City of Los Angeles
arising out of father’s arrest for child endangerment.” However,
even if the jurisdiction finding were admissible in a civil
proceeding, which is far from clear, any potential effect would not
be on Father’s custody rights or legal status. Further, Father
does not dispute the general facts underlying the jurisdiction
finding—that he was combative with police officers while holding
Iris; he refused to put Iris down when asked repeatedly by
officers; and he did not release her until the officers used a taser
on him. These facts would be admissible in a civil lawsuit
regardless of whether the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are
reversed on appeal. And it is these facts, not the juvenile court’s
finding that Father’s conduct placed Iris in a detrimental and
endangering situation, that could potentially affect Father’s
lawsuit against the police department. Whether the police
officers’ conduct was justified was not at issue in this proceeding.
Accordingly, Father’s claim of future harm based on a potential
civil lawsuit is speculative and insufficient to avoid mootness.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 277-278.)
Father also argues we should exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of his appeal because “the allegations that
father was responsible for the endangering situation that arose

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on January 26 are significant, given father was tased by law
enforcement multiple times in his daughter’s presence.”
However, as Father acknowledges, stigma alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal absent an effect on Father’s legal status. (See
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) Further, as discussed, Father
does not dispute the general underlying facts from which any
stigma would arise. Finally, Father argues his prompt
compliance with his case plan (within a year) justifies
consideration of his appeal on the merits. While we commend
Father for his compliance, this factor alone does not justify
reaching the merits of this appeal. (See id., at p. 286 [“no single
factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal”].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

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