CourtListener 10304142•People v. Chester CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 12/24/24 P. v. Chester CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330550
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA380962)
v.
SAMUEL CHESTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Samuel Chester appeals from the
trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.61 (former § 1170.95),2 following an
evidentiary hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)). Defendant contends
that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
he aided and abetted an attempted murder. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts3
On October 15, 2010, defendant drove up to an apartment
complex where Michael John Adame (Adame) lived. Defendant’s
only passenger was a teenage girl.
At the time, Adame was drinking beer in the front yard,
along with his nephew, Edward Martinez (Martinez), and a few
others. Martinez was a member of the East Side Clover gang, a
rival of the Lincoln Heights gang.4
Defendant got out of his car, a white truck, and began
fighting with Martinez. Shortly thereafter, defendant said,
“Lincoln Heights,” and punched Martinez in the face three or four
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section
by its new numbering.
3 These facts are taken from the preliminary hearing
transcript, which was admitted into evidence at defendant’s
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
4 On appeal, defendant confirms that he was a member of the
Lincoln Heights gang.
2
times. Defendant yelled, “‘I’m Gunner from the Heights. You’ll
see. You’ll get it[,]’” before getting back into the truck and
driving away.
Adame returned to his apartment, and Martinez and the
others congregated at the rear of the building. A few minutes
later, defendant drove the white truck into the parking lot behind
the apartment complex. A fellow member of the Lincoln Heights
gang, Martin Pacheco (Pacheco), got out of the passenger seat,
ran towards the group, drew a gun from under his shirt, and
began shooting. Meanwhile, defendant drove down an adjacent
alley.
Martinez tried to flee, but Pacheco pursued him. Pacheco
shot at Martinez four or five times, wounding him in the head,
hand, and leg.
Adame heard the shooting from his apartment window, ran
outside, and chased Pacheco down an alley. Pacheco told Adame
to stop and reached into his pocket. Then he suddenly turned
and sprinted off towards the white truck.
II. Plea and Sentencing
In 2013, defendant pled no contest to one count of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. (§§ 664/187,
subd. (a).) As relevant here, he also admitted to the special
allegation that the attempted murder was “committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist
in criminal conduct by gang members” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
Defendant stipulated that the arrest reports and preliminary
hearing transcript formed the factual basis for his plea.
Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 33 years in state prison.
3
III. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
A. First and Second Section 1172.6 Petitions
In February 2019, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court
summarily denied the petition on March 8, 2019.
Two years later, defendant filed a second petition, which
was also summarily denied.5
B. Third Section 1172.6 Petition and Prima Facie
Hearing
In March 2022, defendant, acting in propria persona, filed a
pleading which he characterized as a writ of habeas corpus
requesting resentencing. The trial court construed the filing as a
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and appointed
counsel.
Although it initially opposed the petition, the prosecution
ultimately conceded that defendant had made a prima facie
showing. The trial court issued an order to show cause and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
C. Evidentiary Hearing and Ruling
On May 16, 2023, the matter proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing. The prosecution introduced the preliminary hearing
transcript into evidence. Defendant submitted several minute
orders from the 2013 plea proceedings, along with articles about
the Los Angeles Police Department’s policies on street gang data
collection.
After entertaining argument from both parties, the trial
court denied defendant’s petition. Relying on the preliminary
5 Defendant’s first two petitions were denied primarily
because, at the time, section 1172.6 resentencing relief was
unavailable to those convicted of attempted murder.
4
hearing transcript, the court found that defendant had
threatened Martinez, a gang member, on behalf of a rival gang.
He then “came back within minutes with a fellow gang member
who was armed with a firearm . . . and started shooting[.]”
Therefore, the trial court ruled that “[t]aken as a whole
. . . there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that . . . [defendant] had the same intent that
. . . Pacheco had[.]”
IV. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from the order denying his
third section 1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Background Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The bill also added what is now section 1172.6 to provide “a
procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be convicted
of murder under the amended laws to seek retroactive relief.
[Citations.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451,
457.) Later amendments to section 1172.6 clarified that the
statute also applies to persons convicted of attempted murder
under the now-invalid natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (People v. Porter (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 651.)
In order to obtain resentencing relief, a defendant who pled
no contest to attempted murder must allege that (1) an
information was filed against him allowing “the prosecution to
5
proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)); (2) he “accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which [he] could have been convicted of . . . attempted murder”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he could not now be convicted of
attempted murder “because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing, the parties may rely upon
evidence in the record of conviction and/or new evidence to
demonstrate whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The prosecution bears the burden of
proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“If the superior court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
the petitioner is guilty of [attempted] murder notwithstanding
the amendments to sections 188 and 189, the petitioner is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).)
II. Standard of Review
“In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a
section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing, ‘“‘we
review the factual findings for substantial evidence and the
application of those facts to the statute de novo.’”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.)
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we
examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009,
6
1028), “examin[ing] the record independently for ‘“substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value”’ that would support a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 804 (Banks)).
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief because he aided
and abetted Pacheco’s attempt to murder Martinez.
A. Applicable Law
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591,
602 (Canizales).) A person aids and abets attempted murder if he
encourages or assists the perpetrator, shares his intent to kill,
and deliberately facilitates the attempted killing. (People v. Lee
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 624.) When determining the state of mind
of the aider and abettor, the “existence of the requisite knowledge
may be established by circumstantial evidence.” (People v. White
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 305, 319; see also People v. Bloom (1989)
48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [“Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is
almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is
as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction”].)
Because a direct aider and abettor of attempted murder
shares the criminal intent of the perpetrator, he can still be found
“guilty . . . notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and
189,” and is thus “ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.”
(Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; see also People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 (Offley) [Sen. Bill No. 1437
7
“did not . . . alter the law regarding the criminal liability of direct
aiders and abettors”].)
B. Analysis
The record amply supports the trial court’s implied finding
that defendant aided and abetted Martinez’s attempted murder.6
Defendant initiated the fight that led to the attempted
murder. Upon seeing Martinez, a known affiliate of the East
Side Clover gang, defendant confronted him.7 Defendant
escalated the fight by announcing his allegiance to the rival
Lincoln Heights gang, punching Martinez multiple times in the
face, and threatening him, saying, “‘I’m Gunner from the Heights.
You’ll see. You’ll get it.’” Defendant’s language indicates that he
intended to kill Martinez. (See People v. Morales (1992)
5 Cal.App.4th 917, 921, 926 [a defendant demonstrated his intent
to kill by saying that he was “‘going to go get’” the victim shortly
before making an attempt on his life]; People v. Evans (1970)
8 Cal.App.3d 152, 157 [same, as to a defendant who told the
victim “‘I’m going to get you’” before killing him]; see also People
v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 110 [a defendant who repeatedly
6 While the trial court did not expressly find that defendant
was an aider and abettor, it concluded that defendant facilitated
the shooting and shared Pacheco’s murderous intent. As the
parties do, we construe this determination as an implied finding
that defendant aided and abetted attempted murder.
7 Defendant argues that after he punched Martinez, the
latter claimed that he was not an active gang member. Even
assuming that Martinez was telling the truth, the record
demonstrates that he was historically active in and associated
with the East Side Clover gang.
8
said someone was “‘going to get it’” was essentially saying that
person would be killed].)
And this was not an empty threat. Minutes later,
defendant returned with Pacheco, a fellow Lincoln Heights gang
member armed with a gun. Although Pacheco was not present
for defendant’s fight with Martinez, he pursued Martinez as the
latter attempted to flee. Tellingly, while Pacheco shot Martinez
multiple times, he did not shoot Adame or any of the other people
gathered behind the apartment complex. Pacheco’s targeted
attack suggests that defendant told him to go after Martinez to
fulfill defendant’s earlier threat on Martinez’s life. (See People v.
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630 [a “defendant’s substantial
participation in the events leading up to [the victim’s] death[,]”
creates an inference that the defendant “knew of the plan to kill
[the victim], intended to facilitate that plan, and aided [the
assailant] in committing the [attempted] killing”].)
Moreover, once Pacheco began shooting, defendant made no
attempt to stop him. (People v. Abelino (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
563, 578 [presence at the scene of the crime and failure to take
steps to prevent a crime may be “considered together with other
evidence in determining that a person is an aider and abettor”].)
Instead, defendant fled the scene immediately after the shooting
started. (See People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 274
[“a defendant’s conduct after a crime, including flight, is a
relevant factor in determining his liability for aiding and
abetting”].)
Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports
the implied finding that defendant directly aided and abetted the
attempted murder. The trial court correctly determined that
defendant is ineligible for resentencing relief under section
9
1172.6. (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; Offley, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596.)
C. Defendant’s Counterarguments
Defendant raises what boils down to three arguments
against our conclusion.
First, defendant contends that the trial court’s “finding that
[defendant] intended to kill” improperly “rests on conjecture and
assumptions about gang members and gangs generally[] [rather
than] the facts of this case.” Defendant argues that “[t]here are
simply no statements or acts by [defendant] that show [he] had a
homicidal purpose when he dropped Pacheco off[,]” and because of
that, any conclusion to the contrary “could only rest . . . on
[defendant’s] gang affiliation and an assumption that gang
members always want to kill each other.”
Not so. Defendant’s intent to kill can be inferred from his
own conduct before and after the attempted murder—namely,
threatening Martinez, retrieving and directing Pacheco, and
fleeing rather than attempting to restrain Pacheco or aid
Martinez once the shooting started. The participants’ gang
affiliations merely strengthen those inferences and show
defendant’s motive for targeting Martinez. (People v. Nguyen
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055 [when evaluating evidentiary
support for an aiding and abetting charge, evidence of gang
rivalries can be used to strengthen other inferences supporting
the defendant’s conviction]; People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th
733, 740–741 [evidence of motive is often probative of intent to
kill].)
Defendant cites Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, in support of
his proposition that “being a gang member and committing a
‘gang-related’ crime does not support an inference th[at]
10
defendant was willing to kill or assist a killing, in the absence of
evidence that the particular defendant[] ‘had [himself] previously
committed murder, attempted murder, or any violent crime.’”
Without such evidence, defendant contends that the prosecution
could not show that he knew Pacheco was armed or intended to
kill Martinez.
Banks is inapposite. The Banks court considered whether,
under California’s now-invalid felony murder law, a getaway
driver was subject to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole as a major participant in an attempted robbery that
resulted in murder. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 794, 803.)
The court concluded that the driver’s role in the crime was
minimal because “[t]here was no evidence” that he “could have
seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in
instigating it or could have prevented it[,]” and thus he had no
“reason to know [that] it was going to happen, and could not do
anything to stop the shooting or render assistance.” (Banks,
supra, at pp. 805, 807.) Under those circumstances, the court
reasoned that one of the only ways the defendant could have been
“‘“subjectively aware that his . . . participation in the felony
involved a grave risk of death”’” would be if he, “his
confederates[,]” or “any member of their [gang]” “had ever
participated in shootings, murder, or attempted murder[.]” (Id.
at pp. 807, 811 [italics in original].)
Conversely, defendant did instigate the shooting in this
case by threatening Martinez’s life. He was also present when
Pacheco drew the gun and began firing at Martinez, and could
have tried to restrain Pacheco or render aid. Thus, regardless of
defendant or Pacheco’s criminal history, there was plenty of
evidence that defendant was aware Pacheco would use lethal
11
force on Martinez.8 (See People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th
518, 531–532 [“[I]t is not necessary that the primary actor
expressly communicate his criminal purpose to the defendant[,]
since that purpose may be apparent from the circumstances”].)
Second, defendant points to evidence that contradicts the
trial court’s factual findings. But under our substantial evidence
standard of review, we must “accept all evidence supporting the
judgment, disregard contrary evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences in favor of the verdict.” (People v. Aguilar (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1026; see also People v. Johnson & Johnson
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 329 [“The test ‘is simply whether
there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent. If this
“substantial” evidence is present, no matter how slight it may
appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the
judgment must be upheld.’ [Citation.]”].)
Lastly, defendant attempts to fault the prosecution for
failing to produce new evidence supporting the conviction. To be
sure, at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, either party “may
. . . offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) But defendant cites no
authority requiring the prosecution to do so where, as here, the
existing record contains ample evidence of defendant’s guilt. (See
8 We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that he
intended for Pacheco to hurt Martinez, but not kill him. Had
defendant merely wanted someone to injure Martinez with their
bare hands, he would have had no need to fetch Pacheco;
defendant himself had already punched Martinez in the face
multiple times. This supports an inference that defendant knew
Pacheco was armed with some sort of weapon and would follow
through on defendant’s earlier threat to have Martinez killed.
12
People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1029 [if no authority “is
furnished on a particular point, the [appellate] court may treat it
as waived[] and pass it without consideration”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
13
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