CourtListener 10304084•In re K.M. CA5
Testo completo
Filed 12/24/24 In re K.M. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re K.M., Jr., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN F088403
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JJV074456A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
K.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Sylvia J.
Hanna, Judge.
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant K.M.
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant E.S.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Marit C. Erickson, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
E.S. (Mother) and K.M. (Father) filed timely notices of appeal following the
termination of their parental rights to now two-year-old K.M., Jr. under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother, joined by Father, claims that because the
Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry into whether K.M., Jr. is or may be an Indian child, in compliance with
section 224.2, former subdivisions (b) and (e),2 the juvenile court erred when it found
that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA))3 did not
apply, necessitating remand. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
The Agency concedes error with respect to its ICWA inquiry, and the parties
stipulate to a conditional reversal and remand for an adequate inquiry. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
We have reviewed the record and agree with the parties that the juvenile court
erred in finding ICWA does not apply given the absence of a documented, proper,
adequate and duly diligent inquiry, as mandated by California law. (§ 224.2, subds. (b)–
(c), (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5);4 Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
specified.
2 As addressed in part I.B. of the Discussion, section 224.2 was amended, effective
September 27, 2024, by Assembly Bill No. 81. (Assem. Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
ch. 656 (Assembly Bill 81) [California Indian Child Welfare Act or Cal-ICWA].) The Agency’s
inquiry and the juvenile court’s ICWA finding in this case predated Assembly Bill 81, but, for the
reasons discussed by this court in K.H., E.C., and Jerry R., the inquiry and finding were deficient
under the law as it stood prior to the passage of Assembly Bill 81. (In re K.H. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 566, 598–599 & 602–605 (K.H.); In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 141–142
(E.C.); In re Jerry R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388, 428–429 (Jerry R.).)
3 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we [may at times] do the same for consistency,
even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1 (Benjamin M.),
disapproved in part on another ground in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18.)
4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2.
Therefore, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, we conditionally reverse the
juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and remand this
matter with directions to ensure a proper, adequate and duly diligent inquiry in
compliance with Cal-ICWA. (Dezi C., supra, p. 1125.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY5
Mother and Father are married and in an intact relationship. K.M., Jr. was born in
September 2022, and an Agency social worker made contact with Mother at the hospital
due to her mental health risk assessment score. Mother’s support system reportedly
consisted only of Father, but he worked long hours out of the area. After Mother left the
hospital against medical advice, an Agency social worker made a home visit and
recommended K.M., Jr. be placed into protective custody given the limited baby supplies;
lack of a support system; and Mother’s concerning physical appearance, failure to take
her prescribed medication, agitation, refusal of all services, and prior dependency case
history involving her infliction of physical injury on K.M. Jr.’s half-sibling, which had
resulted in placement in a legal guardianship. K.M., Jr. was subsequently taken into
protective custody via warrant, and the Agency filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect based on untreated mental illness) and (j) (abuse of
sibling).6
During initial contact at the hospital, Mother and Father denied Native American
ancestry. Mother subsequently refused to sign a Judicial Council form ICWA-020. An
Agency social worker completed a Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A) stating that
Mother and Father gave no reason to believe that K.M., Jr. is or may be an Indian child.
5 We include only a limited factual summary given that the sole issue on appeal is Mother’s
and Father’s ICWA claim.
6 Effective January 1, 2023, failure to protect based on mental illness was renumbered to
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D). (Sen. Bill No. 1085 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) ch. 832.)
3.
Based on Mother’s and Father’s responses, the Agency’s detention report stated ICWA
did not apply.
At the detention hearing held in September 2022, Mother stated she was not aware
of any Native American ancestry for her or for Father, who was not present. The juvenile
court found insufficient reason to believe ICWA may apply, found a prima facie showing
had been made that K.M., Jr. was a person described by section 300, and ordered him
detained from Mother and Father and placed in the temporary custody of the Agency.
In October 2022, at the continued detention hearing, Mother reiterated she had no
Native American ancestry, but Father stated his late father was Cherokee. Father stated
paternal grandfather was not a registered member of the tribe, he was not aware of any
relatives who were, and he was not in contact with paternal grandfather’s family.
However, he thought he might be eligible for tribal membership. The juvenile court
found Father to be the presumed father of K.M., Jr., found insufficient reason to believe
K.M., Jr. is or may be an Indian child, found a prima facie showing had been made that
K.M., Jr. was a person described by section 300, and ordered him detained from Mother
and Father and placed in the temporary custody of the Agency.
In November 2022, the Agency documented that it sent ICWA-030 notices to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation,
and the United Keetowah Band/Cherokee Indians of Oklahoma. The only family
information included was paternal grandfather’s name and date of birth.
Several days later, the juvenile court held the jurisdiction hearing and sustained
the section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) petition allegations against Mother. At the
disposition hearing in December 2022, the court adjudged K.M., Jr. a dependent; found
by clear and convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of K.M., Jr. if
returned home; and found there were no reasonable means by which his physical health
could be protected without removing him from Mother’s and Father’s physical custody.
4.
The court ordered family reunification services and again found insufficient reason to
believe K.M., Jr. is or may be an Indian child.
In February 2023, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the Cherokee Nation
sent responses that K.M., Jr. was not a member or eligible for membership. In March
2023, the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma sent responses
that K.M., Jr. was not a member or eligible for membership.
At the six-month review hearing held in July 2023, Mother claimed Cherokee
ancestry on her father’s side. The juvenile court ordered family reunification services for
six months.
Mother subsequently informed the Agency social worker that she had Native
American ancestry in the Oklahoma Seminole tribe through her father and her paternal
grandmother. She also claimed Seminole Cherokee ancestry through her paternal great-
great-great-grandmother.
In August and September 2023, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the
Cherokee Nation, the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma
sent responses that K.M., Jr. was not a member or eligible for membership.
At the 12-month review hearing in October 2023, the juvenile court continued
reunification services for six months.
In April 2024, at the 18-month review hearing, the court terminated family
reunification services, set a section 366.26 hearing, and made a finding that ICWA does
not apply.
In July 2024, the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 request to change a
court order, found K.M., Jr. was adoptable and the parental-benefit exception did not
apply, terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and set adoption as K.M. Jr.’s
permanent plan. (§ 366.26.)
Mother and Father appealed.
5.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
A. ICWA
“ICWA was enacted in 1978 by Congress ‘out of concern that “an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies.” 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C.
§1901(4). Congress found that many of these children were being “placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions,” and that the States had contributed to the
problem by “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” §§1901(4),
(5). This harmed not only Indian parents and children, but also Indian tribes. As
Congress put it, “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” §1901(3).’ (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023)
599 U.S. ___ [143 S.Ct. 1609, 1623] (Haaland); accord, Mississippi Choctaw Indian
Band v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32–36 (Holyfield); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1, 7–8 (Isaiah W.).)
“‘[ICWA] thus aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families. “Indian
child” is defined broadly to include not only a child who is “a member of an Indian
tribe,” but also one who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” §1903(4). If the Indian child lives on a
reservation, ICWA grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody
proceedings, including adoptions and foster care proceedings. §1911(a). For other
Indian children, state and tribal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the state
court is sometimes required to transfer the case to tribal court. §1911(b). When a state
court adjudicates the proceeding, ICWA governs from start to finish. That is true
regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” (one to which the parents do not
6.
consent) or “voluntary” (one to which they do).’ (Haaland, supra, 599 U.S. at p. ___
[143 S.Ct. at p. 1623]; accord, Holyfield, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 36.)
“ICWA sets the minimum standards, providing, ‘In any case where State or
Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides
a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian
child than the rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply
the State or Federal standard.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1921; accord, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224,
subd. (d).) ‘The minimum standards established by ICWA include the requirement of
notice to Indian tribes in any involuntary proceeding in state court to place a child in
foster care or to terminate parental rights “where the court knows or has reason to know
that an Indian child is involved.”’ (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 8, quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).) ‘ICWA’s notice requirements serve two purposes. First, they facilitate a
determination of whether the child is an Indian child under ICWA.’ (Isaiah W., supra, at
p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) ‘Second, ICWA notice ensures that an Indian tribe is
aware of its right to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child.’ (Isaiah W., supra, at p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1911(a), (c), 1912(a).)
“To facilitate notice in appropriate cases, federal law provides, ‘State courts must
ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child custody
proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child. The inquiry is made at the commencement of the proceeding and all
responses should be on the record. State courts must instruct the parties to inform the
court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is
an Indian child.’ (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2023).) California law requires more and,
relevant to the issue raised here, imposes on counties a broad duty of inquiry into whether
a child placed in the temporary custody of the county is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407–409, fn. omitted.)
7.
B. Cal-ICWA
“In 2006, ‘persistent noncompliance with ICWA led [our state] Legislature … to
“incorporate[] ICWA’s requirements into California statutory law.”’” (Jerry R., supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 409, quoting In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91.) “‘“In 2016,
new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance”’” (Jerry R., supra,
at p. 409, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595), but “[p]rior to that time,
‘neither ICWA itself nor the implementing federal regulations in effect … imposed a duty
on courts or child protective agencies to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency
proceeding was an Indian child’” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, quoting In re T.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 275, 289 (T.G.). Now, “‘[f]ederal regulations governing ICWA … now
require an ICWA inquiry be made at the inception of dependency proceedings, as well as
at all proceedings that “may culminate” in foster care placement or termination of
parental rights.’” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, quoting In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
309, 323, fn. 11.)
“Subsequently, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3176,[7]
effective January 1, 2019, which ‘“made conforming amendments to its statutes,
including portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA notice and
inquiry requirements.”’” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, quoting K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.) “Assembly Bill 3176 repealed former sections 224.2,
pertaining to notice, and 224.3, pertaining to inquiry, and reenacted them in different
form. (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, §§ 4–7.) Section 224.3 now governs notice and
section 224.2 inquiry.” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, fn. omitted.) The legislation “revised
and recast the duties of inquiry and notice, in accordance with federal law, and, relevant
to inquiry, ‘revise[d] the specific steps a social worker, probation officer, or court is
7 “Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3176).” (Jerry R.,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, fn. 11.)
8.
required to take in making an inquiry of a child’s possible status as an Indian child.’” (Id.
at p. 411, quoting Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 3176, Stats. 2018, ch. 833, p. 1.)
Very recently, faced with continuing difficulties and inconsistencies in this area of
the law, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 81, effective September 27, 2024.8
Assembly Bill 81 “create[d] a comprehensive act to protect and preserve Indian families
in California and to aid in improving implementation of applicable state and federal
laws.” (§ 224, subd. (c).) The legislation expressly recognized, “Despite the passage of
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Senate Bill 678 (Stats. 2006, Ch. 838), and
Assembly Bill 3176 (Stats. 2018, Ch. 833), California continues to experience
inconsistent implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act and its related state law
protections, thus continuing the harm and breakup of Indian families. Variation in
practice undermines tribal sovereignty, furthers destructive impacts on tribes and tribal
communities, puts the lives of Indian children and families at disproportionate risk for
multiple adverse outcomes, and fails to address systemic racism.” (Id., subd. (b).) In
addition to advancing the goals of clarity and consistency under California law (id.,
subd. (c)), Cal-ICWA resolved the split of appellate authority over whether or not the
duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2, former subdivision (b), arises when a child is
taken into protective custody by warrant under section 340, expressly providing that it
does (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2)). (See Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403–404
[addressing In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, review granted July 26, 2023,
S279743 & In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, review granted Sept. 27, 2023,
S281447, & agreeing with Delila D. that the duty of initial inquiry applies regardless of
how the child is taken into custody].)
8 The amendments to section 224.2 between Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) and Assembly Bill 81 did not affect subdivision (b). (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 410–411, fn. 12 [Assem. Bill No. 686 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2020; Assem. Bill
No. 2944 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), eff. Sept. 18, 2020; & Assem. Bill No. 2960 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2023].)
9.
As amended, section 224.2 provides, in relevant part, “The court, county welfare
department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may be or has
been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire begins for
a county when first contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking a
party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child
may be an Indian child, and upon a county department’s first contact with the child or the
child's family, including extended family members as defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (c) of Section 224.1. At the first contact with the child and each family
member, including extended family members, the county welfare department or county
probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is or may be an Indian
child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
“If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county probation department
pursuant to Section 307, or received and maintained in temporary custody of a county
welfare department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or taken
into or maintained in the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken into
protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340, the county welfare
department or county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is an
Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2).)
“For a court presiding over any juvenile proceeding that could result in placement
of an Indian child with someone other than a parent or Indian custodian, including
proceedings where the parents or Indian custodian have voluntarily consented to
10.
placement of the child, the duty to inquire begins at the first hearing on a petition. At the
commencement of the hearing, the court shall ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, whether
they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child, and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian are domiciled, as defined in Section 224.1. Inquiry shall
also be made at the first appearance in court of each party or interested person who was
not present at the first hearing on the petition. The inquiry and responses shall occur on
the record. The court shall instruct the parties and persons present to inform the court if
they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is, or may
be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
Relevant in this case, “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” triggers
the duty of further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)9 “[R]eason to believe” exists whenever
the court or the agency has “information suggesting that either the parent of the child or
the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(1).) The required further inquiry includes interviewing the parents and
extended family members to gather the information necessary for an ICWA notice,
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of Social Services to gather
the names and contact information of the pertinent tribes, contacting the tribes, and
contacting any other person who may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child's membership status or eligibility. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)
“‘The duty to provide notice arises only if [the agency] or the court “knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see [Welf. & Inst.
Code,] § 224.3, subd. (a); [In re] Austin J. [(2020)] 47 Cal.App.5th [870,] 883–884[,
disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18].) Federal
9 Assembly Bill 81 effected only minor technical changes to subdivision (e) of
section 224.2.
11.
regulations define the grounds for reason to know that an Indian child is involved. (25
C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1)–(6) (2022).) State law conforms to that definition. (§ 224.2,
subd. (d)(1)–(6).)’ ([In re] Ricky R. [(2022)] 82 Cal.App.5th [671,] 678–679[,
disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, at p. 1152, fn. 18].)” (E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 141.)
II. Standard of Review
“‘The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, “subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.”’
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 142; Adoption of M.R. (2002) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 542;
rule 5.482(c).)[10] First, ‘[t]he court must find there is “no reason to know whether the
child is an Indian child,” which is dependent upon whether any of the six circumstances
set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.’ (K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting
§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).) Second, ‘[t]he
juvenile court must … find a “proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence .…”’
(K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143;
rule 5.482(c)(1).)
“The juvenile court’s finding on the second element ‘requires the … court to
“engage in a delicate balancing of” various factors in assessing whether the … inquiry
was proper and adequate within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether …
[there was] due diligence.’ (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid
standard and review the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of
10 Assembly Bill 81 effected only minor technical changes to subdivision (i) of
section 224.2.
12.
discretion. (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; In re Ezequiel G.,
supra, at p. 1003.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.)
III. Analysis
A. Error
“‘“Notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose .…” (In re
T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 288 (T.G.), citing Isaiah W., supra, [1 Cal.5th] at p. 8.)
However, it is typically “not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child”
(Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741), and “the question of membership is
determined by the tribes, not the courts or child protective agencies” (T.G., supra, at
p. 294). To ensure notice in cases in which it is known or there is reason to know an
Indian child is involved (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, subd. (a)), the
law imposes an affirmative and ongoing duty to inquire whether a child subject to
dependency proceedings is or may be an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (a))’ [citation] .…”
(Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 411, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 588.) Under California law, agencies have a broad duty of inquiry and documentation.
(Jerry R., supra, p. 411, citing K.H., supra, at p. 588, § 224.2, subd. (b) &
rule 5.481(a)(5).)
“[C]omplying with the duty of inquiry and documentation under ICWA is unlikely
to ‘prove onerous’ in most cases [citation], [but] in no event may we interpret the law to
relieve the court or the agency of complying with the plain directives imposed by statute
and rule (K.H., supra, [84 Cal.App.5th] at p. 620; see § 224.2; rules 5.480–5.482). There
may be cases in which there is no one else to ask beyond [one or both] parents [and a few
relatives], but, if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and supported
by documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) Properly developed and documented, ‘the court
has relatively broad discretion to determine [that] the … inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.’ (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C.,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.)
13.
As previously summarized, Father claimed Cherokee ancestry through his late
father and Mother subsequently claimed Oklahoma Seminole ancestry through her father
and her paternal grandmother, and Seminole Cherokee ancestry through her paternal
great-great-great-grandmother. In responses to two sets of ICWA-030 notices, the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation, the Seminole Tribe of Florida,
and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma sent responses stating that K.M., Jr. was not a
member or eligible for membership.
Mother argues that the record contains no documentation of an inquiry of anyone
other than Mother and Father, even though maternal grandmother attended the continued
detention hearing. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) She also argues that her claim and Father’s claim
of Native American ancestry provided a reason to believe that K.M., Jr. may be an Indian
child, triggering the duty of further inquiry. (Ibid.) Instead of conducting an adequate
inquiry, the Agency unnecessarily sent ICWA-030 notices that failed to set forth sufficient
information to afford the tribes a chance to conduct a meaningful review.11 Mother
asserts that without an inquiry sufficient to gather, or attempt to gather, relevant
information, the first set of ICWA-030 notices were insufficient and there is no record of
the second set of ICWA-030 notices.
Given the information about possible Native American ancestry relayed by both
Mother and Father, the Agency had a duty of further inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision (e). (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) However, there is no
documentation that anyone other than Mother and Father was asked about possible
Native American ancestry even though maternal grandmother attended the continued
detention hearing and they were living with her, and there is no documentation
concerning whether there are any other family members or interested parties available to
ask. (§ 224, subds. (b), (e).) This fell well short of the inquiry required under both
11 The notices sent in July 2023 are not part of the record.
14.
subdivision (b) and subdivision (e) of section 224.2. Although the Agency sent ICWA-
030 notices based on Mother’s and Father’s claims of Native American ancestry, the first
set included only paternal grandfather’s name and date of birth, giving the tribes
contacted almost no information on which to proceed, and the second set is not part of the
record. (See § 224.2, subd. (d).) On this undeveloped record, the Agency’s very limited
inquiry is insufficient under the law, as it concedes. (§ 224.2, subds. (b), (e);
rule 5.481(a).)
“‘General information from the family about its ancestry frequently provides the
only available basis to believe an Indian child may be involved. [Citation.] Additional
investigation may not develop further information establishing the need for ICWA notice,
but it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and child protective agency’s
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” to construe broadly the duty to make further
inquiry.’” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 147, quoting T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 295.)
B. Remedy
“ICWA and Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect
Native American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of Native
American ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125, citing In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8; 25 U.S.C. § 1902; & Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224, former
subd. (a).) As previously stated, “‘Notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating
ICWA’s purpose, enabling a tribe to determine whether the child involved in a
dependency proceeding is an Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise
jurisdiction over, the matter.’” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1133, quoting T.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 288.) “‘Although the duty of inquiry is a continuing one [citation], as
we have seen in countless cases, … if the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the
likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant information will present itself later in
15.
the proceeding declines precipitously.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140, quoting
K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.)
Therefore, “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry requires
conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the
inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision of section 224.3.
When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain whether the
agency’s error is prejudicial. [Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial
inquiry and makes that information known, it is impossible to know what the inquiry
might reveal.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136, quoting K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)12
On remand, “‘the juvenile court [must] direct the [Agency] to conduct a proper,
adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision[s] (b) [and (e)], and
document its inquiry in the record in compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5).’” (E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 621; accord, Jerry R.,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 431.) “‘So long as the court ensures the inquiry is reasonable
and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose underlying ICWA and [Cal-
ICWA], the court will have an adequate factual foundation upon which to make its ICWA
finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’” (E.C., supra, at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, at p. 621;
accord, Jerry R., supra, at p. 431.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is
conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the court for the limited purpose of
12 This case, like Dezi C. and our decisions in K.H., E.C., and Jerry R., involves a patently
insufficient inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620; E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Jerry, R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 427–
429.)
16.
ensuring compliance with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in
section 224.2 and rule 5.481. If, after determining that a proper, adequate and duly
diligent inquiry was made, the court concludes that ICWA does not apply, the court shall
reinstate its order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. If, instead, the court
concludes that ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-
ICWA.
17.
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